The state that wouldn't fail

[RabzonKhan]

Editorial: Baitullah Mehsud and America

June 24, 2009

As Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) comes under pressure from the military operations launched in its stronghold, deserters from its rank and file are making revelations that belie some of the sacred beliefs the media has allowed to become common “analytical” currency. One big diversion from the truth is the “discovery” that Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the TTP, is an agent of the United States and India wreaking havoc in Pakistan to fulfil the US design to establish the hegemony of India in South Asia and to facilitate the elimination by the US of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Who has proof of all this? Who inside the government has spread this “information” without giving sufficient proof? If you ask the state functionaries they insist they have not planned any such massive disinformation. Yet one has to recall that some spokesmen have vaguely named “agencies” on the “other side of the border”, but again without tangible proof. This, however, convincingly looks like a part of the “strategic” decision that the presence of NATO in Afghanistan is not in Pakistan’s interest and that India’s presence in Afghanistan is hostile to the interests of Pakistan. Some Pakistani analysts have now started questioning the “logic” behind the stringing together of these tales of TPP-Indian and TTP-American collusion.

Logic is the first casualty. There are a number of statements of Baitullah Mehsud on record vowing revenge on the Americans for their invasion of Afghanistan, recalling his own time spent in that country fighting alongside the Taliban. His men have preyed on the trucks that take provisions to the NATO troops through Pakistan and for which the Americans bypassed the Pakistan government and made independent arrangements with various private hauling companies and warehouse owners. The TTP now has a good supply of high quality combat vehicles and other military supplies. How does one reconcile this with the “fact” that Mehsud is actually working for the Americans?

The willingness to believe Mehsud rather than the government was in evidence in the media after the assassination of Ms Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Mehsud’s telephonic conversation with the mastermind of the suicide attack was intercepted and made known by Pakistan’s intelligence establishment. However when he declared that he had not carried out the attack, Mehsud was immediately believed. Now that deserters from the TTP have revived the truth — that Baitullah Mehsud actually planned the killing and personally sent off the attackers to Rawalpindi — there is a silence of embarrassment in Pakistan. Had the fact been accepted in 2008 when the gang of assassins was apprehended, we would not have horribly falsified the evidence that linked the killing to Al Qaeda’s understanding of Ms Bhutto as an American “asset” in Pakistan.

Then in 2008 came the Mumbai attacks. The Indians reacted by rattling the sabre. Suddenly, India was the enemy and Mehsud a patriot. A “disenchanted” Pakistani analyst sought answers to such newspaper reports as the one quoting an army official saying that Baitullah Mehsud and Fazlullah were “patriots”. Another was reported as saying that in case of an Indian invasion the TTP will fight “shoulder to shoulder” with the Pakistani troops to save Pakistan.

From that to what is being said now is a big leap of the imagination. Such leaps are usually called fantasy. Now Mehsud is the paid agent of the Indians. Analysts appearing on TV have gone so far as to say that the Taliban inflicting savage cruelty on the people of Swat were actually Hindus! Everyone has forgotten about the 5,000 plus foreigners — Uzbeks, Arabs, Chechens and Uighurs — sheltered by Mehsud on behalf of Al Qaeda. One “deserter” has thrown in the red herring about how India trains its Hindu agents in the intricacies of Islamic learning till they become ulema before being sent into Pakistan looking like the Taliban!

So buried are we in our narcissistic obsessions that the world now rebukes us for living on the basis of contradictions. Foreign commentators now ask: If you hate the US so much and know that it is helping the Taliban to create chaos in Pakistan as a prelude to grabbing your nuclear weapons, why do you go asking Washington for money? They also say: If India is destroying Pakistan through the Taliban why are you seeking a “composite” dialogue with it instead of going to war with it?

 

[RabzonKhan]

The nature of insurgencies

By Dr Tariq Rahman
Thursday, 25 Jun, 2009

AN example of victory against an insurgency which everyone is quoting these days is of Sri Lanka where in May soldiers walked into the last enclave held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tigers, was killed. Does violence work? Is force the answer to insurgencies? It is this question which is answered below.

First, it is the nature of the insurgency which should be considered. If a group of people is asking for autonomy or even a separate territory, there should be no suppression of the demand by force. This view may not go down well with the nationalists. But my view is that the boundaries of the nation-state are not sacrosanct and, therefore, autonomy or independence is better than military action once everything else has been tried. Honouring this principle I support the partition of India, the emergence of Bangladesh and the aspirations of the Kashmiri people to join Pakistan or India or remain independent.

It is in deference to this principle that I have always believed that the Tamils in Sri Lanka had a point. Their grievances were genuine and if it was autonomy — or even partition — they really desired then so be it. But the government used repression and intransigence so that the moderates were pushed out and a monster of iniquity, Prabhakaran, took over. This man’s cruelty knew no bounds. He killed the moderate Tamils. He made suicide bombing a trademark of the Tigers. In the end, he left the government with no choice but to kill him and countless civilians. If only successive governments in Sri Lanka had ensured justice for the Tamils, things would not have come to this pass.

Let us now consider ideological insurgencies. The most well-known have been inspired by communism and political Islam. In the former category, cases in Latin America and Asia come to mind. In South Asia, the Communist Party of Nepal is an example of success. Another success story is that of Vietnam where the US could not win.

There are parallels between insurgent movements even when their ideologies and causes are different. The Tamil Tigers became very violent. They alienated even the Tamils. In Peru the Shining Path fought the government from the 1980s until 1992. They condemned ‘bourgeois democracy’ and denounced human rights just as Al Qaeda and the Taliban do. Like the Tamil Tigers and the Shining Path, the Islamic militants are also brutal. The Shining Path slit throats, strangulated people, and stoned and burnt them alive. The Taliban have done most of these things in Pakistan too.

Wherever such a movement starts there are terrible human rights abuses by all parties. In Sri Lanka critics of the government and the Tigers were silenced; in Peru the 2003 report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reports 69,280 dead of whom about 54 per cent were killed by the Shining Path, one-third by the military and the rest by small guerilla groups or rogue killers. In Pakistan people are caught up in the crossfire between the Taliban and the army or killed by US drones. The Taliban brooked no opposition wherever they were in power, although the government has allowed the democratic right to dissent.

Yet another parallel is that the common people are initially sympathetic to the insurgents because they express old grievances against an unjust regime and social order. However, if the insurgents prove ruthless the people start detesting, even killing, them. In Peru the peasants killed Shining Path guerillas in the 1990s. In Pakistan we see tribal lashkars seeking to destroy the militants in many places.

Both communist and Islamic insurgencies take shape because people are attracted to certain ideologies especially in countries where the ruling elite is unjust and corrupt. In both Latin America and the Muslim world the rich ruling elite is seen as a stooge of the US. These elites are perceived to be without legitimacy which can only come through democracy and good governance. Pakistan has more democracy than other Muslim countries but a flawed system of governance. The ruling elite is elected, but is seen as corrupt, selfish and alienated from the masses.

And yet, the government is lucky that the people are now supporting the army to eliminate the Taliban. They would have done so earlier had they not been confused by those who misled them into supporting the ‘good Taliban’ (those fighting the Americans) but not the bad ones (the ones attacking the army). The fact is that militant ideology espoused by various Islamic militant groups all over the world believes in making people live their lives in accordance with their version of the Sharia.

Like communist groups they seek to change lifestyles and views and will use force to do so. Negotiations hardly work with the more hardcore of militant leaders of religious groups. They believe their ideas are sacrosanct. They do not fear death; they fear life. They do not want compromise; they want victory or death. This makes short and swift military action necessary against them. But even military action tends to get prolonged as in Latin America and Sri Lanka. That is the problem.

However, once military victory is achieved good governance follows. In the Philippines, for instance, Air Force Major General Edward Lansdale prevented the Huk Bulahap communist insurgency from overthrowing the government. But, Lansdale did not use only force. He created economic development and provided land to former guerillas. He also arranged training for them so that they became economically better off. Since communist movements are fed by poverty, the movement lost its popular appeal and was

defeated.

In our case the state has to open the minds of Pakistanis to humanist, pluralist values. This requires changes in textbooks which create militancy in the name of Islam. More wholesome entertainment — games, sports, literary evenings, poetry, music, theatre, humour, storytelling, fairs — is also required. We have reduced the space for these at our peril. If we do not give fun and laughter a place in our lives we will be haunted by hatred, violence and depression. In short, we have to change the orientation of society from militant chauvinism and political Islam to an affirmation of life with all its pleasures. Unless we do this we will not be able to defeat the Taliban.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Editorial: Imran Khan on Talibanisation

June 27, 2009

During an interview with an American channel, Imran Khan stated that the Pakistan army’s operation against the Taliban is suicidal. In his view the operation would fail because it would create more anarchy and do little to end Pakistan’s problem with areas where it has lost control. He used the word “suicidal” because he claimed that Pakistanis were employing the term Talibanisation wrongly.

He said: “This term being used, that Pakistan is going to be Talibanised, is absolute nonsense, because the Taliban is not some ideology. It is a direct reaction to the US invasion of Afghanistan and the Pashtun nationalism kicking in. And on our side of the border, when the Pakistan army, under US pressure, went into the tribal areas, that’s when the Taliban — Pakistani Taliban — emerged four-and-a-half years back. And so, with each operation, they have expanded.”

To set the record straight, the Taliban were not moved by a remote-controlled emotion on seeing the Americans arrive in Afghanistan. The Taliban were the “non-state actors” used by Pakistan to help the Kabul regime of Mullah Umar survive in the face of internal opposition. Almost all the warlords now bedevilling Pakistan with their criminal activities are veterans of this war which later turned against the Americans when they attacked in 2001. That year also saw General Musharraf deciding that the Taliban would be covertly retained as a “strategic option” for Afghanistan.

We are suffering from the failure of our past strategy on Afghanistan. Talibanisation is an outcome of our embrace of an ideology that doesn’t stop becoming more and more stringent as a part of a worldwide Muslim trend. Pakistan’s ideology leans on the Constitution which proclaims the sharia. Talibanisation is an ideological extension which rejects the Constitution of Pakistan and seeks to implement a tougher version, something which the people of Pakistan have rejected.

Imran Khan doesn’t know what he is talking about. He cannot run with the Taliban and disco in London at the same time.

 

[third eye]

Editorial: Imran Khan on Talibanisation

June 27, 2009

During an interview with an American channel, Imran Khan stated that the Pakistan army’s operation against the Taliban is suicidal. In his view the operation would fail because it would create more anarchy and do little to end Pakistan’s problem with areas where it has lost control. He used the word “suicidal” because he claimed that Pakistanis were employing the term Talibanisation wrongly.


To set the record straight, the Taliban were not moved by a remote-controlled emotion on seeing the Americans arrive in Afghanistan. The Taliban were the “non-state actors” used by Pakistan to help the Kabul regime of Mullah Umar survive in the face of internal opposition. Almost all the warlords now bedevilling Pakistan with their criminal activities are veterans of this war which later turned against the Americans when they attacked in 2001. That year also saw General Musharraf deciding that the Taliban would be covertly retained as a “strategic option” for Afghanistan.

We are suffering from the failure of our past strategy on Afghanistan. Talibanisation is an outcomerom the of our embrace of an ideology that doesn’t stop becoming more and more stringent as a part of a worldwide Muslim trend. Pakistan’s ideology leans on the Constitution which proclaims the sharia. Talibanisation is an ideological extension which rejects the Constitution of Pakistan and seeks to implement a tougher version, something which the people of Pakistan have rejected.

Imran Khan doesn’t know what he is talking about. He cannot run with the Taliban and disco in London at the same time.

He is not far far from the truth.

On one hand everyone here swears that the talibs will not let the coalition forces rest till whatever..on the other hand the PA back stabs the Talibs by 1st striking a deal & then going to war with them. If it were on US insistence - it doesn't help or absolve the PA & there the existing regime of GOP form it blame as far as the talibs are concerned.- It is suicidal. The ' victories' the PA is gaining are results of strategic with drawls by the Talibs . To re assert themselves they will retaliate at time & place of their choosing.

There is no room for complacency when you deal with snakes.

 

[RabzonKhan]

He is not far far from the truth.

My friend, I think you got it all wrong. Imran Khan is lunatic, the words you have underlined are not his views, but Najum Sethi’s views, the editor of the Daily Times.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Smokers’ Corner: The tide’s turning?

Nadeem F. PARACHA
Sunday, 28 Jun, 2009

There is now a clear consensus developing in society at large not only against extremism, but also against whoever attempts to still explain it as a noble cause in the service of Islam and Pakistan.

The eruption of anti-government riots and protest rallies in Iran recently has taken even the most astute political observers by surprise.

Accusing the electoral authorities of committing mass fraud in the country’s presidential elections held on June 12, supporters of Mir Hossain Mousavi — who was the main challenger to President Ahmadinejad in this year’s election — started to pour out onto the streets, holding massive protest rallies and clashing violently with police and members of Iran’s Islamist militia, the Basij.

The protest is largely being led by students who are representing two shades of the anti-clerical protest sentiments brewing in Iran for over a decade now. The first strain is of young activists who are toeing a reformist agenda first aired during the election of Iran’s first reformist President, Mohammad Khatami in 1992.

In spite of the way Khatami and his supporters were constantly frustrated by Iran’s conservative state apparatus, the reformist movement seems to have been kept alive. This trend includes students and activists attempting to wrest control of the Islamic Republic from the clutches of the clergy and its ultra-conservative organs.

The second strain in the current movement is of people who blame the clergy for hijacking the 1979 revolution which they say was originally based on the more humanitarian and philosophical works of Dr Ali Shariati — then a popular young Islamic scholar who was described as an ‘Islamic Marxist’ by the Shah and presumably murdered by his secret police in 1975.

The anti-clergy riots have shaken the smug Islamic state which hadn’t been challenged to this extent, at least not since it got entangled in a violent urban guerrilla war with the leftist Mojahidin-i-Khalq between 1980 and 1983. It is interesting to note that this anti-Islamist trend may very well turn out to be a much wider phenomenon encompassing the rest of the Muslim world. For example, in the last three months or so, Pakistan witnessed its first ever rallies against religious extremism.

This is a significant event, particularly in a country where — especially after its defeat in the 1971 war with India — the state and its Islamist allies had restructured the country’s education and national policies as a way to propagate a militaristic and myopic view of Islam; even to the extent of distorting history in a rather Orwellian manner to convolutedly prove ‘Pakistan’s historical Islamist origins.’

This bogus claim, however, generated a warped narrative in a society that explained religious extremism as an expression of struggle against ‘western imperialism’ and myriad ‘Hindu/Indian/Jewish intrigues’ against Pakistan. In the last few years, this narrative has ironically been dented most not by secular historians and intellectuals as such, but by a violent and barbaric expression of the faith propagated through bombs and the barrel of the gun — an expression first encouraged by the state itself.

These forces are a climatic culmination of what started to take hold in Pakistan as political Islam from late 1970s onwards. With the rising incidents of suicide bombings against civilian population and in mosques by the extremists, it has finally become hard for the political and intellectual apologists of the above-mentioned narrative to defend it, let alone openly advocate it.

There is now a clear consensus developing in society at large not only against extremism, but also against whoever attempts to still explain it as a noble cause in the service of Islam and Pakistan — a cause that has generated nothing but unprecedented bloodshed, chaos and fear.

Another Muslim country, Algeria, too represents a valid example in this context. It fought a gruesome war against extremists throughout the 1990s, but victory (for the Algerian army) came only when in the latter part of the decade society, sickened and burnt by terrorist attacks, started to openly express its dislike for deadly Islamist organisations such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the once popular Islamic Salvation Army (FIS).

Extremist thought in modern political Islam first reared its head with the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood organisation in Egypt in 1928 (as an expression against ‘western cultural and political imperialism’). It has gone through various phases. Its first two phases (from 1930s till the 1960s), saw political Islam mainly opposing the secular-nationalist philosophy popular at the time in the Muslim world. Its third phase (1970s-1990s), was perhaps most successful. First working closely with the United States during the Cold War, extreme strains of political Islam aggressively tackled various pro-Soviet secular/ socialist forces in the Muslim world on university campuses, the streets and eventually in the mountains and deserts. However, at the end of the so-called anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in 1989, political Islam broke away from the US orbit, and its warriors, politicians and ‘intellectuals’ took it upon themselves to create strict Islamic states across the Muslim realm.

It is this phase and the cause that gave birth to various fanatical and violent Islamist outfits. Their growlingly violent behaviour is now reflective of the frustration they have felt in failing to ignite the kind of Islamic revolutions they thought they were capable of. The majority of the population in the Muslim world — no matter how anti-West in orientation — has largely refused to rise up to the call of what was being advocated as ‘true, unadulterated Islam’.

This has left the extremists venting out their frustration by turning their guns and bombs on Muslim populations whom they now call ‘cowards’, and ‘false Muslims’. This may also suggest that perhaps political Islam’s eventful adventure might as well be coming to an (albeit bloody) end.

So maybe this is the right time to at last begin writing this ideology’s obituary. Or is it?

 

[muse]

Rabzon


As God is our Judge, we tried to bring this to the attention of those we thought responsible - we advised that we have to be "ahead of the curve" - but they would hear nothing of it, and the disappointment was made even more bitter when one we thought was the "best of the best" came to front the radicals.


But Jinnah's Pakistan is not only viable, it goes from strength to strength, insHaAllah! Lead and world will follow! This is the role of leaders.

These forces are a climatic culmination of what started to take hold in Pakistan as political Islam from late 1970s onwards

. With the rising incidents of suicide bombings against civilian population and in mosques by the extremists, it has finally become hard for the political and intellectual apologists of the above-mentioned narrative to defend it, let alone openly advocate it.

There is now a clear consensus developing in society at large not only against extremism, but also against whoever attempts to still explain it as a noble cause in the service of Islam and Pakistan — a cause that has generated nothing but unprecedented bloodshed, chaos and fear

.

This has left the extremists venting out their frustration by turning their guns and bombs on Muslim populations whom they now call ‘cowards’, and ‘false Muslims’. This may also suggest that perhaps political Islam’s eventful adventure might as well be coming to an (albeit bloody) end

.

 

[niaz]

Our national misfortune is that we have had constant drought of leadership. Our leaders irrespective of the fact whether they were civilians or from the military were authoritative and self promoting. ZA Bhutto was one of the best. Here is a glimpse of what our best was really like!.

Spirit of the 1973 constitution
By Ardeshir Cowasjee
Sunday, 28 Jun, 2009 | 01:52 AM PST


A PROMINENT headline in this newspaper on June 25, 2009 informed us that our powerless prime minister, appointed by our power-charged president, “vows to revive the spirit of ’73 constitution”. His vehicle is the potentially everlasting committee formed to frame further amendments to restore the original Zulfikar Ali Bhutto constitution.

Now, where was young Yousuf Raza Gilani in 1973? He was not sitting in parliament when the ‘spirit’ of the constitution in question was well aired at its unveiling on Aug 14 of that year.

Does he recollect that the constitution was promulgated by a man who has the distinction of having been the first civilian martial law administrator; does he know that it was accepted by consensus, not unanimously as is often claimed? The majority of the members of that particular National Assembly were anxious to come up with a constitution, and any old constitution would do as it would be better than no constitution.

So, it was grandly promulgated at noon on Independence Day, with much joy and jollity. How many of our present constitutionalists and contortionists remember that the life of the original document was of four hours duration? At 1600 hours that same day, Prime Minister Bhutto ordered the president he had appointed the meek and gentlemanly Fazal Elahi Chaudhry to sign an order which was notified in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extra, on Aug 15, 1973, No.F.24(1)/73-Pub.

By this order the proclamation of emergency issued on Nov 23, 1971 was declared to be still in force, the reason being that while in force the president was empowered to order that the right to move any court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred in the constitution was suspended and would remain suspended for the period the proclamation was in force. No court could be moved for the enforcement of the rights of the people — they were rendered non-justiciable.

Thus were the people deprived, within the space of four hours, of 10 of the major fundamental rights guaranteed to them at noon on Aug 14, 1973. It was all a matter of premeditated fraud.

The reason for this chicanery and short-lived constitution was Bhutto’s desire to ‘deal with’ (or to use one of his favorite terms, ‘fix’) his political opponents, men such as Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Ataullah Mengal and Wali Khan, by having them arrested and imprisoned.

Such was the birth of the constitution and the spirit in which it was raised. Then came Bhutto’s own amendments to his constitution, seven of them. The first, in 1974, redefined territories, covering the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. The second, also in 1974, stripped an entire community (the Ahmadis), once part of the majority, of its rights and declared it a minority.

The Third Amendment of 1975 allowed the government to detain a person without trial for three months instead of one month as originally provided. The fourth, also 1975, enlarged the scope of preventative laws.

In 1976 came the Fifth Amendment which extended the period of separation of the judiciary from the executive from three to five years, fixed the tenure of the chief justices of the supreme and high courts, and prohibited high courts in cases of preventative detention from granting bails before arrest or ordering the release of a person on bail. This was followed in 1977 by the Sixth Amendment by which chief justices of the supreme and high courts were to hold office for tenures of respectively five and four years irrespective of the specified retirement ages.

These two amendments were made solely to favour judges of ZAB’s liking and to extend the term of the chief justice of Pakistan even though he had reached the age of retirement.

The Seventh Amendment of May 1977 provided inter alia that high courts have no jurisdiction over persons and property in areas where the armed forces were brought in to aid the civil authorities.

ZAB set the tone for further amendments to come. The rules of procedure were suspended for the passages of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments, there was no debate, deliberation or consultation. They were all bulldozed through the same day they were introduced. The First Amendment took a week of bickering over the territorial limits and the Third Amendment was passed the day after its introduction.

That was all ZAB had time for. June 1977 was a fraught month for him and the country and he was deposed by his own chosen anointed army chief, the wily Ziaul Haq, early in July.

We know all about the notorious Eighth Amendment with which we live to this day and which had a catastrophic effect upon the constitution, involving 58 articles in toto and inserting three. One of the inserts was totally unwarranted — it was a simple duplication. Article 2A provided that the all-pervasive Objectives Resolution, the basis for so many ills that this country suffers from, which was and remains a preamble to the constitution would also be reproduced in the annex and made a substantive part of the document, to the nation’s detriment as has been well evidenced and sadly suffered.

The Ninth Amendment of the Junejo government was never passed; the 10th, also of the Junejo era, concerning the summoning and prorogation of the National Assembly and Senate was passed after due deliberations.

The 11th Amendment of Benazir Bhutto’s first government was not passed. Then came Nawaz Sharif’s first round and the 12th Amendment regarding special courts and speedy trials. Rules were suspended so that it could be rushed through the house.

The 13th Amendment amending the Eighth Amendment to suit Sharif’s purposes for his second round was introduced in the Assembly and Senate on the same day and passed the same day. Sharif’s Fourteenth Amendment, also of 1977, ensured that there could be no dissent in any political party, and no defection from a party. It was passed the same day as it was introduced.

We had a lucky escape from the Fifteenth Amendment by which Sharif hoped to declare himself amir-ul-momineen. It could not come up for debate in the Senate in which Sharif had no majority. The Sixteenth Amendment of 1999 affected the quota system — nothing startling.

And then came Gen Pervez Musharraf and his government of 2002 which brought in the 17th Amendment of 2003, the main bone of contention bothering Prime Minister Gilani. His problem: his boss is not bothered.

Now, which devilish spirit does Gilani 'vow' to revive?

arfc@cyber.net.pk
DAWN.COM | Columnists | Spirit of the 1973 constitution

 

[RabzonKhan]

The year 1979 and its impact

By Imtiaz Gul
Tuesday, 30 Jun, 2009

THE turmoil following allegations of fraud in the Iranian presidential election seems to be gradually subsiding. But the violent riots and street demonstrations revived memories of the political upheaval before and with the arrival of Imam Khomeini to Iran in early 1979. The country seems to have come full circle in three decades.

The year 1979 also reminds us of another tumultuous event in another neighbouring country, Afghanistan, which was occupied by the Soviets in December that year, and the ensuing US-led response to it. Both events influenced Pakistan — directly and indirectly — to the extent that three decades down the road, this country is being seen on the brink.

In fact, much of the recent and current turmoil in Pakistan has its roots in the seismic events of 1979 and the policies taken in response to them. This turmoil is as tragic as it is worrisome. Since January 2008, Pakistan, 75 per cent of whose 170 million inhabitants live off less than two dollars a day, has been rocked by more than 100 suicide bombings conducted by groups opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. During this period, hundreds of explosions and ambushes have taken close to 2,000 lives.

In fact, in April 2009 things had turned ugly to the extent that the international community began talking and thinking aloud of “Pakistan’s disintegration in the face of mounting Islamist insurgency ¯ the mortal threat”. Since early May 2009, military operations in Pakistan’s border regions against Islamists, including elements of the Afghan jihad, have resulted in the displacement of nearly 2.5 million people.

Besides the army, the US has been the other common element that has influenced Pakistan’s political development in the last three decades. In Iran, the American influence waned while in Afghanistan, the US mounted a methodical proxy war. In both American foreign policy experiments, Pakistan served as the laboratory.

Let’s take the Afghanistan case. While the Americans left Pakistan to its own devices after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, the Bush administration renewed its interest in Pakistan soon after 9/11 ¯ but this time with a few words of regret and an expression of determination never again to leave the country in a lurch.

In May this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also apologised for what the Americans had done to Pakistan in the late 1990s. Pakistanis had been bearing the brunt of “incoherent US polices for the past 30 years,” she admitted.

The US practice of expediency combined with the self-serving policies of Pakistan’s military dictators increased the state’s reliance on extremist non-state actors who are now eating into the very vitals of the state of Pakistan. Unless neutralised ¯ a task that will be neither quick nor easy to accomplish ¯ these groups will continue to threaten the peace and stability not only of Pakistan but of the entire region.

This context obviously gives birth to the conspiracy theory that revolves around America’s perceived “ill intentions” regarding Pakistan. Little do the proponents of this thinking realise that the problem lies with a leadership that lives off the taxpayers’ hard-earned money, a leadership that gives sermons to its citizens on the virtues of human rights but that itself lives regally and is largely insensitive to the fundamental issues of governance and security.

Simultaneously, an alliance with and reliance on non-state actors has proved disastrous. Reliance on such elements amounts to an expression of inability when it comes to achieving core objectives. This is what happened in the case of the Afghan Mujahideen, when the US-led international community cobbled together groups of them to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

That is why the entire socio-political system is leaking and creaking. If somebody takes advantage of this, it is only to be expected. The real fault lies within. If we can correct ourselves, outside forces would have little leverage to destablise us to the extent of raising global speculation regarding the country’s survival. It is the nexus of misgovernance, the failure of governance and the duplicity of an insensitive and insincere ruling elite that threatens the country. This situation is rooted in the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 but the remedy will have to come from within as soon as possible.

The impact of that tumultuous year on Pakistan has been destructive; because, one, of the expedience of the United States, two, the self-serving policies of military dictators, and three, the mindless pursuit of a policy that increased the state’s reliance on those non-state actors who were part of the Godzilla created by the US and others. Smaller Godzillas are now eating into the very vitals of the state of Pakistan. As said earlier, unless neutralised, they will keep threatening the peace and stability not only of Pakistan but of the entire region.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Avoiding the abyss

Thursday, July 02, 2009
Ikram Sehgal

We should not have gone into FATA when we did. Once in we should have finished the job. Why was Baitullah Mahsud allowed free rein? Was this deliberate vacillation meant to ensure Musharraf's indispensability to the US? The prime favour the Army once enjoyed with the Pakistani masses was restored substantially by the magnificent manner it is conducting battle in Swat. The Shaheed ratio between officers and other ranks is 1:5, extremely high by any standard. Tragically, many retired officers have lost their sons in battle in Swat, a second-generation sacrifice of leading from the front that cannot be eulogised in words alone. The blemish of Musharraf rule-misrule on the army's reputation has almost been washed off by the blood of these young martyrs.

Musharraf's policies were motivated to hang onto power, making many undeserving uniformed individuals without professional merit (or, for that matter, integrity) millionaires many times over. Coincidently, like their generous benefactor, many had never seen combat. Loyalty to one individual rather than their duty to the army and the nation got them prized jobs and lucrative real estate. Challenging for the Army chief to name the handful who really deserved such largesse!

The real scandals came, rightly and wrongly, from managing the defence housing authorities (DHAs) in Karachi and Lahore, the corps commanders Karachi and Lahore being coveted postings. To quote my August 2, 2003, article entitled "Creek city, bleak city": "Uniformed personnel must lean backwards to ensure that nothing happens that will give added ammunition to those who make it their business to criticise the uniform, at the very least they should exercise discretion in such ventures. For the sake of their operational mission statement, I put it to the president in his capacity as COAS, kindly disassociate HQ 5 Corps from DHA Karachi and HQ 4 Corps from DHA Lahore with immediate effect. If not, give them a deputy corps commander each to pursue the corps' operational mission statement." The armed forces and millions of serving and retired servicemen got an undeserved reputation, fanned assiduously by motivated interest into hatred for those in uniform. This was patently unfair to the armed forces.

Self-cleansing in a fair and equitable manner must protect the legitimate rights of those serving or retired. Those retiring after rendering good service to the nation must have a house over the heads on retirement. The army housing scheme (which must be emulated by the civil service, federal and provincial) is a tremendous initiative, a fair process being employed in its implementation. Monthly instalments deducted from the officer's pay would hardly be enough on retirement, balance money will still need to be paid off when he retires and takes possession of the house. To finance the remaining debt he is presently allotted an additional plot. The doling out of "plots" has led to scandals, this practice should be stopped forthwith. Instead of allotting an additional plot it would be far simpler for the state to take 50 percent of his commutation of pension and assume the balance debt, calculating an equitable formula for years of service. The families of Shaheeds must be allotted a house. Similarly the families of all those who die during service must be given a house. This same mechanism must also apply for the civil service, all those in government service given same facilities as their uniformed counterparts.

Why name anyone. If anybody thinks it is not public knowledge already, he should think again. One unworthy individual is trying to sell one of his houses in Karachi for Rs90 million while young officers are spilling their blood in Swat and FATA. Should we call it blood money? While the Army must redeem itself, the price to be paid is actually a bonus, to rid itself of these parasites who have no business wearing the uniform that is drenched with the blood of the officers and soldiers who are actually fighting and dying for their country. An internal confidential accountability process should ensure a maximum of one house on the army housing acheme and (in keeping with the present practice) one residential plot. If any officer has more, this must be surrendered, the money being refunded (at commercial value when it was sold) to the state. The present military hierarchy can set an example by doing this on voluntary basis to show solidarity with the young Shaheeds.

The National Accountability Bureau prosecuted many bureaucrats for "living beyond their means," yet those in uniform clearly breaking the same covenant escaped justice. The NAB officers investigating this were almost all from the armed forces, how about requisitioning their services and targeting those in uniform still serving, and later, against those who may have retired but have clearly illegally used their position to enrich themselves? A caveat: anything inherited because of family ownership must be outside this ambit. Income tax statements are a matter of record, check the person's worth when he was promoted to brigadier (or an equivalent rank) against his present valuation? This fairly easy process does not need a chartered accountant. Any misstatement or attempt to hide facts should be treated as perjury, and prosecuted as such.

The army is crucial to Pakistan's existence, whatever the democratic nature of its Constitution. The very nature of this country makes them the guardians of the integrity and the sovereignty of the state in all senses of the word. Deserving full credit for taking his command away from "Civvy Street" and making it into a battle-hardened machine, Kayani's final step towards full redemption will be a tremendous blow against institutionalised corruption. It will encourage accountability throughout the country, perhaps even goading the Supreme Court to declare the NRO the black law it is. Only with the army's reputation redeemed will the country be prevented from sliding into an abyss. Swat gives us an opportunity, the blood being shed by our young ones should not be spilt in vain.

The writer is a defence and political analyst.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Kayani's commitment

The News Editorial
Sunday, July 05, 2009

At the present time, Pakistan looks to its military to rescue it from the crisis it confronts. It has become quite evident over the months that have recently gone by that armed action is the only way to cope with the military threat. Indeed, in the past, a great deal of time and energy has been lost in striking peace deals or conducting negotiations. Eventually they have led nowhere at all, and may in fact have permitted the Taliban valuable time to re-group.

In this context General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani remains the central figure in the present struggle. His clear-cut declaration while addressing a naval commissioning parade that the internal threat faced by Pakistan was one that needed 'immediate attention' is as such important. General Kayani indeed went so far as to say that the external threats that existed were not quite as dangerous as the one from within. He also maintained that terrorism would indeed be overcome and that the army would not shirk from its duty in this regard.

There is a significance to these words that goes beyond their immediate context. In the past, indeed on more than one occasion, the commitment and resolve of the military in the fight against terrorism has been questioned. There has been talk of strategic alliances and an unwillingness to abandon militant groups that at one time at least had the backing of the establishment. General Kayani has made it clear such thinking belongs to a different, more distant era. He has stated without mincing words that the terrorists need to be dealt with. Perhaps the time has come for us to change our attitudes, dispel the doubts that still exist in minds and put more trust in the army.

The fight against terrorism needs the effort of the entire nation. People need to rally behind the soldiers that are taking the brunt of the battle. Indeed, even beyond the battle field, many have died in attacks on vehicles and convoys. Civilians and soldiers must at this moment in time stand shoulder by shoulder. General Kayani has said in no uncertain terms that he sees the present battle as one necessary to save the country. Everyone then must join in this, so that the morale and confidence of a force that is waging battle in its own territory can grow, raising its chances of success against the militants.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Strategic confusion

Sunday, July 05, 2009
Dr Farrukh Saleem

Pumping Sufi to tame Fazlullah and stirring Zainuddin to take on Baituallah -- the more we stir the worse we sink. Putting out a fire in Swat and then rushing to Waziristan -- a strategy or strategic confusion? Is the enemy inside or outside, within or without? Who is our enemy number one? Is our enemy east of the Line of Control (LoC) or within Pakistan's 778,720 square-kilometres of landmass?

The Indian military has 1.4 million soldiers in active service, a reserve force of 1.1 million and one million paramilitary (sorted by the total number of active troops the Indian military is the third largest after China and the US). The Indian army fields 34 divisions including four RAPID Action divisions, 18 Infantry divisions, 10 Mountain divisions, three Armoured divisions and two Artillery divisions. The Indian army has 4,500 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), 12,000 artillery pieces and 90,000 surface-to-air missiles. The Indian army is composed of 93 tank regiments, seven airborne battalions, 200 artillery regiments, 360 infantry battalions, 40 mechanised infantry battalions, 20 combat helicopter units and 52 air defence regiments.

The Taliban have neither tanks nor helicopters. All they have is AK-47s, pickup trucks, suicide bombers and their own distinct worldview (that rejects the current world order and proposes to replace it with an 'anti-modern' ideology through an armed, violent struggle). To be certain, all of India's tanks and infantry battalions are east of the LoC. The Taliban, however, control Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Hangu, Lakki Marwat, Bannu and Tank. Additionally, some 6,000 sq-km of Dera Ismail Khan are being contested. Also under 'contested control' are Karak (3,372 sq-km), Kohat (2,545 sq-km), Charsadda (996 sq-km) and Mardan (1,632 sq-km). Kohistan is under 'Taliban influence'. Mansehra (4,579 sq-km), Battagram (1,301 sq-km), Swabi (1,543 sq-km) and Nowshera (1,748 sq-km) are all under 'Taliban influence'. All put together that's a tenth of our landmass either under complete Taliban control, contested control or under Taliban influence.

Who should we be fighting? Around 90 percent of our military assets are along the India-Pakistan border. Tanks are known to have invaded countries. Suicide bombers, on the other hand, mostly kill non-combatants and have never ever in human history captured a country. America has a National Defence Strategy (NDS). The Department of Defence regularly updates it and puts it on the net. America's latest NDS is a concise 29-page document and can be read by clicking: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008 national defense strategy.pdf; for Americans to read, debate and analyse.

What really is our national defence strategy? Do we even have one? If we do then why is it under lock and key? Why can't we read, debate and analyse it? Were the forces we are now fighting once allied with us in our NDS? Have we restructured our NDS to reflect the new ground realities? Yes, the Pakistan army has a definite 'offensive-defence" military doctrine against India (the main purpose of which is to "seize enemy territory of strategic importance which can then be used as a bargaining chip" in any future ceasefire negotiations).

Do we now have a counterinsurgency strategy or are we all about tactics? Look at the record: January 2002: the TNSM was banned by the government. July 2007: the TNSM takes over much of Swat (and declares music and dancing as 'major sources of sin'). January 2009: the TNSM establishes parallel judiciary in the name of 'Sharia courts'. February 2009: the government negotiates with the TNSM and allows Sharia law in Malakand. April 13: the government signs Nizam-e-Adl Regulation. April 14: the TNSM announces that Sharia will be implemented in other parts of the country. April 19: Sufi Mohammed terms "judges, lawyers and pro-democracy clerics as rebels." May 7: Prime Minister Gilani says that the Pakistan army will eliminate the Taliban in Swat. May 23: President Zardari says that he military has no plans to launch an operation in Waziristan. June 1: Ramzak Cadet College cadets kidnapped. June 2: Hafiz Saeed released. June 9: military operation launched in Bannu; PC hotel bombed. June 15: Governor Owais

Ghani says that the military will launch a comprehensive and decisive operation in South Waziristan.

What we are up against is rugged terrain and asymmetric warfare spread over more than 90,000 sq-km. The Taliban are all united and have a coherent strategy. Do we have a proactive strategy or are we all about tactical reactions? Strategies win wars. Tactical reactions translate into further loss of blood.

PS: The inspiration for this article came from a TV programme that is hosted by Air Marshal (r) Masood Akhter.



The writer is the executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS).

 

[RabzonKhan]

Analysis: A decisive shift

Rasul Bakhsh Rais
July 07, 2009

We are not sure if the Pakistani Taliban and their brand of justice and political violence ever had grassroots public support. There is only one objective measurement of public support, and that is the percentage of the popular votes a party or group wins at the elections. The Taliban and their public defenders, their numbers on a constant decline, don’t have trust in the common man or seek power through popular legitimacy. Their route to power is through tribal-type conquest and absolute subjugation of the people.

But then the Taliban are a very kind of people: they don’t accept democracy, the constitution, fundamental human rights, equality among citizens or the sovereignty of parliament. Nor do they represent Islam, as it is understood and interpreted by great classical or modern day Muslim scholars and jurists.

The Taliban, those who have taken up arms against the people, society and state of Pakistan, have neither learnt the ethical, philosophical and cultural content of Islam nor have they any respect for religious pluralism within the broader understanding of Islam as is practiced by different streams of religious thought in different countries.

How did they emerge as a religious and militant force?

The political and ideological roots of the Pakistani Taliban are in the Taliban movement of Afghanistan and its successful overthrow of the fragmented Mujahideen government. Two other factors need to be mentioned regarding their rise. First is the Pashtun ethnicity and the philosophy of tribal jihadism to redress wrong, seek justice, punish wrong doers, and realistically establish their control and political domination.

The second is our alliance with the Taliban as a formidable demographic and military force against other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, which were supported by our rival regional powers — Iran, India and Russia. Many political leaders in Pakistan and in other countries thought that the Taliban were a good force as long as they could end violence and warlordism, establish peace and security and de-weaponise Afghan society.

Since the Mujahideen war against the Soviet Union, private Pakistani religious groups along with our government and Western powers became deeply involved in Afghanistan. It was a strange mix of powers with different post-Soviet outlooks for the region, rooted in different ideological traditions but with an immediate common goal: defeat of the Soviet Union and the Afghan communists.

Our Taliban tradition — armed struggle by mainly religious groups to establish an Islamic regime — is based on history, factional beliefs and political ethos linked to the Afghan Taliban.

The closet Taliban in the media, the religious and political parties, and some political commentators created a benign myth about the Taliban as an Islamic force willing to sacrifice anything to defeat western imperialism and its surrogate elites in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A wide array of other Muslim groups from the Middle East have similar agendas and have trans-national linkages through Al Qaeda and other organisations to fund and promote this mindset.

The Taliban mindset further flourished during the Musharraf regime with what was virtually the political front of the militant Taliban running governments in two critical provinces — Balochistan and the NWFP, both bordering Afghanistan, where a Taliban insurgency was underway. It was really during the tenure of General Musharraf that the Pakistani Taliban in Swat, Malakand and FATA became organised and started taking control of territory through the use of violence.

The anti-American sentiment in the context of Afghanistan was carefully cultivated by Taliban sympathisers in Pakistan, which further nurtured the image of the Taliban as an ‘anti-imperialist force’ and some kind of liberators. Some leaders, mostly from the religious parties, justified crossing of the Pak-Afghan border by the Pakistani Taliban much like the Mujahideen that fought against the former Soviet Union.

The supporters of the Taliban, now silenced by the majority view, still don’t see them as a threat to society and the state. It doesn’t really matter to these Taliban supporters if people are humiliated, whipped or slaughtered publicly and on camera.

But finally, the people of Pakistan, the silent majority, have woken up to the threat that the Taliban and their supporters in different political formations pose to society and, in a broader context, to the image of Muslims and Islamic civilisation. The Taliban actually further the same caricatured view of Islam and Muslims societies as intolerant, primitive and hostile to modernity and human liberty as the one held by some orientalists.

Pakistan’s standing as an Islamic society suffered a great deal during the Musharraf regime as it was caught between the Taliban and him with no respect for the constitution, the people’s mandate or democratic principles.

As the fake democracy and political manipulations of the Musharraf regime and his political associates and their corruption have become exposed, so has the brutality and violent face of the Taliban. As the Taliban ordered suicide bombing of civilians, killed security personnel, targeted locally influentials and engaged in criminal activities to sustain their war against the Pakistani state and society, the people of Pakistan realised who the real enemy was.

The people in Swat and FATA have been held hostage and have suffered the cruelty and totalitarianism of the Taliban for too long. Neither successive Pakistani governments nor the rest of society came to their rescue, while the Taliban’s supporters continued to praise them as patriotic, just and selfless warriors.

A big shift in the image of the Taliban and their supporters has occurred, not accidentally but after a careful analysis of what Pakistan and its society would become if the Taliban and other religious zealots were allowed to capture power. Life in Pakistan under the Taliban or forces like them would fare no better than the Hobbesian state of nature — brutish, nasty and short.

We believe the support for the Taliban was exaggerated and their image hyped up unrealistically. Actually, those praising the Taliban should have migrated to live under their brutal rule with the daily drill of public executions, mass murders and dehumanisation of women.

The strong sentiment against the Taliban that has emerged is comparable to the patriotic sentiment during our wars with India. Many people in Pakistan and outside the country believe that the Taliban are a worse enemy that any other internal or external adversary that we have ever faced.

This realisation, though late in the day, is going to help the security forces and the nation marginalise and effectively counter the Taliban threat. Pakistan has already secured a big victory against the Taliban by creating a national consensus against them. The Taliban and their supporters that scared us for so long have suffered a big blow and may not able to socially and politically recover. But this also offers us a respite and opportunity to address the domestic and foreign policy issues that created the Taliban monster in the first place.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Comment: Chipping away doggedly

Munir Attaullah
July 08, 2009

For the past few weeks I have, using specific examples, focused on the irrational streak that pervades much of our media. Warming to my theme, I see no reason not to continue with that effort this week also.

Some might consider such an exercise as being unnecessarily judgemental. After all, might not what I consider as ‘biased’ or ‘irrational’ be considered as very proper and perfectly rational by others? Also, when the ‘facts’ of a particular situation are not wholly clear or fully known, is it not normal that different people will often, with complete honesty, draw radically different conclusions?

That is true, of course. But it is also true that propagandists, and those seeking to promote a specific agenda come what may (not to mention outright charlatans), are the first to take ruthless and unreasonable advantage of a basic principle of an open and civilised society: the principle that calls upon reasonable people to extend others the benefit of doubt.

But what if the ‘facts’ are clear enough, and the distortions blatantly obvious? What if the conclusions are so outlandish they defy commonsense and reason? Should we still apply the benefit of doubt principle?

No. Discriminate we do, and discriminate we must. And I think we should call rubbish, rubbish, though always being ultra careful when it comes to imputing dishonest motives.

So I box on, undaunted. Sure, such a miniscule individual effort as mine is not about to usher in a revolution in the thinking of our people. But there are a goodly number of journalists out there who are honourable exceptions to that general observation about the media I made above. In the battle against obscurantism these few professionals are doing their little bit to promote sanity in our midst. Remembering some Shakespearean advice — “Therefore ‘tis meet that noble minds keep ever with their likes; for who is so firm that cannot be seduced?” — such worthy souls deserve every little fraternal support possible to build much needed momentum for a worthwhile cause.

And who is to say such collective efforts are in vain? Looking back over the few years I have been writing, I think we have, as a nation, made much progress in the right direction albeit the pace, and the results, have not exactly been what one might have hoped for.

There was a time, not so long ago, when our ex-president could publicly say, “Who is Al Qaeda? We don’t know of any such thing as Al Qaeda”. Are matters not a little different today? There was a time when every sectarian killing and every suicide bombing was the result of a ‘hidden hand’, or a ‘Zionist/Hindu conspiracy’. Most of the public no longer buys that blatant lie. Not so long ago India was the real enemy rather than the threat from within. That perception too is slowly undergoing a change.

There was a time when stubborn and intransigent adventurism (Kargil, Afghan policy, international jihad and nuclear proliferation) had made us a pariah in the world. Today we are on the path of slowly re-integrating with the international community.

Welcome to a Pakistan that is slowly coming to its senses. And, obviously, our media has a critical role in giving this process much needed impetus.

But there is one area where we could be ‘doing more’: not on the ‘war on terror’ front but on ‘the war on error’ front. We can confront those who propound fanciful and irrational theories to befuddle our public a little more forcefully and directly. Particularly on the electronic media, too many have, for too long, got away unchallenged spreading what, on the face of it, is little more than blatant disinformation.

I am not suggesting that they be shouted down in classic Pakistani fashion. But an excessively deferential manner of interviewing is no help either, and gives such people more credibility than they deserve. The message needs to be got across to the viewing public that such views utterly fail to satisfy two basic requirements: they violate the principle of Occam’s Razor; and they seek to turn upside down the fundamental principle of where the onus of proof should lie in assessing competing viewpoints.

Take, for example, a recent interview I saw wherein General Hamid Gul was touting again that theory (believed by many others too) that 9/11 was an inside job intended to provide a justification for launching a war against the Muslim world. Would a president really take the wild and utterly unnecessary political risk of ordering the wanton killing of 3,000 Americans in New York and hope his plan would go undiscovered? Covert operations, especially on such a scale, spring a leak, sooner or later.

The General’s theory depends on erecting a flimsy superstructure on a series of alleged suspicious ‘facts’ and ‘circumstantial evidence’, all pointing to a conspiracy. Well, if he knows those ‘facts’ (because they are public knowledge) then presumably the rest of the world does too. Why have reputable international media organisations not relied on these ‘facts’ to dig deeper? Are we then to believe the whole world (including Europe, South America, China, Japan and Russia) is part of the conspiracy? Why is an international media, ready to expose the Americans on Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, meekly accepting the official version instead of coming up with the scoop of the century?

But the specific target of my ire in today’s context is that ‘expert’ on everything, the gentleman who has a programme called “Brasstacks”. Told by many people that his mesmerising expository monologues have won him a large cult following, I watched some of his programmes and did some research on Google on his background.

The less said about the results of my research (readers can — and should — do their own) the better. All I will say here is, given the content of his programmes, I was utterly unsurprised.

And what wondrous content!

Here, for example, is a small sample of his magnificent political insight. It is Pakistan and not the Arabs (or even Iran) Israel fears most because of our bomb and our missiles that are capable of striking it. (Do we really have such long range missiles?) War with the Jews is inevitable and we must prepare for it. There can be no peace with India, because Hindus have an inferiority complex of us, and therefore have made common cause with Israel and America (whose foreign policy is decided by Israel) to conspire against us. Of course there was no such thing as a ‘holocaust’. Only 15,000 at most were killed and that too probably by other Jews.

His economic theories are even more bizarre. We need, apparently, ‘a moral and spiritual economic order’. This means repudiating the ‘Zionist’ economic system based on paper currency and adopting an ‘Islamic’ system, based essentially on a mixture of barter and ‘real wealth’ (gold and silver coinage). Buy his dozen or more DVDs if you are — as I certainly am not — consumed by morbid curiosity as to wherein truly lies our salvation.

One obvious question arises. Who is funding the “Brasstacks” series? Is it the TV channel? If so, how much responsibility do the owners and management of the channel take for the content of the programmes? Or does the Brasstacks organisation pay the channel for the airtime? If the latter, where does a small time security company (check the website) find such sums of money?

The writer is a businessman. A selection of his columns is now available in book form.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Jihad and the state

Dawn Editorial
Thursday, 09 Jul, 2009

TWICE this week President Zardari has spoken about the root of Pakistan’s problems with religious extremism and militancy. In an interview with The Daily Telegraph, the president said that the military’s erstwhile “strategic assets” were the ones against whom military operations were now required. And in a meeting with retired senior bureaucrats in Islamabad on Tuesday, Mr Zardari was reported in this paper to have said that “militants and extremists had been deliberately created and nurtured as a policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives”. The president is right, and we would add the policy was wrong then and it is wrong now. It cannot be any other way. How is it possible to rationally explain to the people of Pakistan that the heroes of yesteryear are the arch-enemies of today? The militants’ religious justifications remain the same; what’s changed is that the militants were fighting the state’s ‘enemies’ yesterday but have turned their guns on the state and its allies today.

Perhaps more than anything else impeding the defeat of the militants today is the inability of the security establishment to revisit the strategic choices it made in the past and hold up its hand and admit candidly that grave mistakes were made. Should we have ever used jihadi proxies to fight the Russians in Afghanistan? Should we have ever supported the idea of armed jihad in Kashmir? Should we have ever sought to retain our influence in Afghanistan through the Taliban? If any of those choices ever made sense, then we should have no complaints about the rise of Talibanisation in Pakistan because we created the climate and opportunity for them to run amok. Blaming the US’s invasion of Afghanistan is no good — the first and foremost responsibility of the state is to ensure the security of Pakistan, and allowing an internal threat to create a space for itself is anathema to that idea. Whatever the catalyst, the fact remains that it was because a jihadi network was allowed to flourish inside the country that we were left exposed to its eventual wrath against us.

The fault is of course not ours alone. The US, obsessed with the Soviet enemy, happily colluded in the creation of Muslim warriors. Our Middle Eastern and Gulf allies were happy to create a Sunni army to counter the ‘threat’ from post-revolution Shia Iran. But, at the end of the day, it was Pakistani soil on which they were primarily nurtured. Because they were raised in our midst we should have always been wary of the extreme blowback we are now confronted with.