The state that wouldn't fail

[RabzonKhan]

Taking steps in the right direction

Saturday, May 30, 2009
Ayesha Ijaz Khan

It is easy enough to point out what is wrong with Pakistan. We face a militant insurgency in the north, terrorist activities in the rest of Pakistan, an enormous humanitarian crisis in the form of the IDPs and weak democratic structures. But there is also another side.

Let's look at what has gone right in the last year and a half. When General Kayani took over from General Musharraf, he had a daunting task before him. Not only was the army facing a challenge by rogue militant forces that had previously enjoyed the military's support, but the image of the Pakistan Army was also greatly tarnished in the eyes of the public. There were doubts about its sincerity and competence in weeding out anti-state elements, resentment against its exaggerated economic interests, and disdain for its interference in the country's political space.

Yet General Kayani has taken steps to improve that image, and although the press and public at large must continue to monitor the army's performance, encouraging it to minimize collateral damage and battle the insurgents with dedication, there are a number of heartening indicators.

The biggest difference between General Kayani and General Musharraf is that the latter can concentrate on his job as army chief and not be distracted by competing concerns of maintaining popularity as a politician. During Musharraf's time, the strategy of supporting the Islamic threat at some level so that the west could be convinced of Musharraf's indispensability led the military to enter into dubious alliances with political forces that would provide space to extremist ideology. The 2002 election, in which the MMA was assured a certain number of seats so that they would in turn support Musharraf in passing the controversial Seventeenth Amendment, was a glaring example of this.

But in the 2008 election, the military wisely refrained from interfering and hence there was consensus on the election result and a routing of the Islamic parties. General Kayani also departed from Musharraf's stance against the lawyers' movement and helped resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner and one in which the citizenry felt rightly empowered.

In addition, the many serving and retired military men who had been appointed to important civilian positions were called back by General Kayani, and in the same spirit, he halted plans for an expensive GHQ facility, declaring 2008 the Year of the Soldier instead. This was followed through by increasing the pay of the demoralized foot soldier and by increasing compensation amounts for members of the Frontier Constabulary in the event that they lost their lives in battle.

In the most recent effort to repair the army's image, General Kayani also announced that all military personnel would contribute a day's salary to the IDPs. These efforts must be noted and lauded. Moreover, according to trusted sources, the military is continuing to purge itself of the jihadi elements that had infused its ranks during the Zia era. Although to be fair to Musharraf, this policy began during his time, but it has not been abandoned by Kayani.

Collective ownership of the war by the ruling civilian coalition and the military is essential and must be supported by the public at large. And while it is imperative that our government do a lot more for the IDPs and ensure their freedom of movement, other steps taken in the right direction need to be appreciated. The recent peace conference organized in Peshawar jointly by the HRCP and the newly formed Aman Tehreek was attended by two district nazims along with several intellectuals and human rights activists. And although the ruling ANP should be more active in organizing such seminars, the trend is markedly different from the MMA approach.

The All Parties Conference moreover was another effort at consolidating the secular opinion within the country. And although it can be critiqued for ceding the Parliament's rightful authority, the efforts to build consensus on the part of the ruling PPP must be lauded. Since the APC was called at the insistence of Mian Nawaz Sharif, the PML-N owes it to the government and the people to back this stance consistently. The likes of Khwaja Saad Rafique, who oppose the party stand on this, should not be the ones appearing on talk shows as PML-N representatives. Mr Rafique's personal opinion is irrelevant. It is the PML-N's public stance that is at issue here, and it must not waver in the wake of the tragic attack in Lahore. By attacking Lahore, the militants are sending the PML-N a message but true leadership cannot appease.

The media must also play a responsible role in this regard. Independent analysts who do not belong to any political party should be welcome to express personal opinions. But representatives of political parties, at this critical juncture, need to express the stance of their respective parties. Otherwise, we will be confusing the people. In addition, those politicians who represent a minority of public opinion, namely Imran Khan (PTI, at its zenith, won one parliamentary seat) should not be given disproportionate airtime.

Some media personalities are acting responsibly and their efforts must be praised. Munib Farooq of Dunya News, for example, made the effort to talk to several IDPs camped in schools. Unlike many other anchors who ask abrupt and non-sequential questions, Mr Farooq bothered to have conversations such that the IDPs felt comfortable in describing how their lives were affected by the Taliban and by the military operation. And although they were understandably disturbed by the military operation, in the words of one IDP, "Hamain pata nahin tha key fauji acha hai ya Taliban lekin ab hamain pata hai ke fauji acha hai."

Talat Hussain of Aaj TV also conducted a very good show with students in Peshawar. Through appropriate and intelligent cross-questioning, Mr. Hussain was able to unveil real opinions as opposed to knee-jerk reactions that often come through from the lack of coherent or probing interviews. Other hosts however are disturbingly meek when interviewing Taliban operatives.

This begs the question: should they be interviewing them at all? Kashif Abassi, for instance, is very well respected for his hard talk with all manner of politicians, but when he interviews Taliban commanders, there is no hint of cross-questioning. I distinctly remember one interview where the Taliban operative not only disgraced Mr. Abassi by not taking his questions seriously, but also continued to twiddle his toes in the face of the ARY camera.

An even more disturbing occurrence happened on a TV channel when a reporter managed to interview the four valiant SSG commandos (now shaheed) when they were in Taliban custody. Although the reporter was extremely harsh with the commandos, asking pointless questions like why they were sporting long hair as army personnel, he was dutifully obedient to the Taliban commander. While the four commandos have laid down their lives for Pakistan, I wonder why no military or civilian high command bothered to contact the said reporter to ask him where they were kept.

In these trying times, it is important to isolate the militants. And although the state must initiate reforms as there is no surer antidote to extremism than citizen empowerment, there must however be no confusion on the intentions and competence of the anti-state elements. And while President Zardari must be praised for conferring Hilal-e-Shujaat on the courageous Afzal Khan Lala, circumstances dictate that he go further. Afzal Khan Lala must be named the next governor of NWFP, as suggested by astute Pakhtun analysts like Jamal Khan. The people of the province respect him and he understands the plight of the displaced. We are fortunate to have him amongst us. Let us take one more step in the right direction.


The writer is a London-based lawyer-turned-political commentator .

 

[RabzonKhan]

Little time and few choices

By Irfan Husain
Saturday, 30 May, 2009

AS Lahore reels from the shock and horror of yet another vicious attack, Pakistan has to brace for more such violence from the likes of Baitullah Mehsud.

He and his fellow killers have repeatedly shown that they have no compunction in taking innocent (and usually Muslim) lives.

If any good can possibly come from such terrorist acts, it is to further unmask these murderers. For far too long, there has been unnecessary confusion about their means and goals. To a large extent, this ambiguity was caused by the army’s legitimisation of jihadi outfits. Used to further the establishment’s agenda in Kashmir, India and Afghanistan, they were allowed to recruit and raise funds openly. In many simple people’s minds, they were heroes.

But ever since Fazlullah and his father-in-law Sufi Mohammad were allowed to take over Swat, the country has been able to watch these thugs in action. Once allowed free rein in a peaceful, settled area, they have beheaded, flogged and slaughtered unarmed men and women. Many of these atrocities have been widely reported by the media. And as the flood of displaced people flees, many have recounted their tales of horror under the Taliban.

Earlier, many Pakistanis ascribed the actions of these killers to America’s ‘war on terror’, defending the Taliban by saying that they were reacting to western forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s support for this operation. Some of us have been roundly abused for arguing that the war against these extremists was, first and foremost, our own battle for survival.

Even today, there are voices that suggest that if western forces were to pull out of the region, things would somehow return to normal. They ignore the fact that even before 9/11 (an attack, let us not forget, that was planned and launched from Afghan soil), the situation was far from normal. A full-fledged civil war raged in Afghanistan in which Pakistan covertly supported the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Jihadi outfits like the Jaish-i-Mohammad sent terrorists into Indian-held Kashmir. Within Pakistan, Sunni groups routinely targeted Shias.

Supporting this terror network were allegedly the ISI and the army. Even when Musharraf made his famous u-turn in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the establishment made a clear distinction between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Members of the former were scooped up and handed over to the Americans, while the latter were treated as distant relatives in distress. Rather than being seen as our enemies, they were viewed as potential allies who, while presently out of favour, could be useful again.

However, this policy of duplicity and ambiguity could not be sustained for long. As the Taliban sought to establish their control over large swathes of the tribal areas, our American allies began putting pressure on Musharraf to act against them. Reluctantly, the army launched a few half-hearted operations and suffered heavy losses. Emboldened by their success, militant groups ventured deeper into Pakistan, attempting to terrorise people into supporting them.

Soon after the 2008 elections, Swat was pushed to the brink. A panicky ANP government in the NWFP felt it had no military support and practically ceded Swat. And here the Taliban made a cardinal error. Instead of offering the people of Swat a decent government that could have served as a model and attracted others, they went on a rampage and confirmed our worst suspicions about their intentions and their capability.

But their incompetence and their cruelty should have come as no surprise. After all, Taliban rule in Afghanistan hardly created a heaven on earth. Even the slightly less repressive Islamic government that ruled the Frontier province for five years brought little peace or prosperity. In their longing for the perfect ‘Islamic’ government, people often forget that the fundamentalists who make up these parties and groups are barely literate, and have no understanding of the modern world. To expect them to master the intricacies of administration and economics is to expect the impossible.

And yet it would be a huge mistake to assume that this yearning for the perfect Islamic model has no rational basis. Crushed by poverty, millions of Muslims around the world heed the siren call of the mythical golden era of early Islam. Secular and Islamic governments in many Muslim countries are notoriously corrupt and repressive. By neglecting the most basic elements of decent governance, despotic kings, generals and politicians have alienated their own people and pushed them into the arms of extremist groups.

As the recent suicide attack in Lahore shows, our cities cannot be defended against such acts of terrorism. If the police headquarters and the ISI office cannot be guarded, how can our citizens expect protection? Clearly, Baitullah Mehsud does not expect to pay a price for his repeated strikes against ordinary Pakistanis. But why is he not being targeted by our commandos? Why can’t our highly trained Special Services Group go after him? Until the leaders of these terror groups feel the heat, they will go on launching their audacious attacks with impunity.

Even when extremists are arrested, they languish in jail for a while before being released. In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan arrested several Jamaatud Dawa activists after an initial period of denial. Having acted under huge international pressure, Pakistan has done little to take the process to its logical conclusion. Apart from arousing Indian suspicions about our intentions, we also reassure these extremists that no action will be taken against them.

It all comes down to political will. And this is linked closely to the kind of state we wish to become. Do we see our future as a country perpetually teetering on the brink, wracked by endless extremist terror and economic crises? Or do we wish to join the rest of the world as a modern, prosperous nation? The choice is still ours to make, but unless we act swiftly, the likes of Baitullah Mehsud will snatch it from us.

 

[third eye]

He and his fellow killers have repeatedly shown that they have no compunction in taking innocent (and usually Muslim) lives. [/B]

Readers must stop thinking that a Muslim will ( should ) not kill Muslims.

The earlier we all accept that fact that there are no Hindu or Muslim terrorists the sooner we will be able to tackle them.

Why only a Muslim should not kill Muslims ? Terrorists are not bound by such religious niceties. They have their own agenda which thrives on ambiguity, narrow views, money & establishing themselves.

A human must not kill an unarmed human against whom he has no enmity or grouse... and whom he does not even know.

Terrorists compel ppl to see shadows where there are none, play on the mind & further their agenda.

 

[RabzonKhan]

End of the beginning?

Thursday, June 04, 2009
Kamila Hyat

The writer is a freelance columnist and former newspaper editor

The battle for Swat seems to be reaching its final stages, at least in terms of the immediate fighting. Mingora is out of militant hands; people in the town hope this will mean a resumption in supplies of food and medicines reaching the city, where there have been acute shortages for weeks.

There is a sense that the battle for Swat may be reaching some kind of conclusion. But is this really the end of the battle? Is it even the beginning of the end – or will the Taliban monster we have created rise up once more in the times ahead to confront us, like a kind of indestructible Frankenstein.

There is every reason to believe this will happen. The factors that gave rise to militancy remain in place. The sense of social deprivation, of injustice of resentment against the state could rise once more. There is also continued suspicion in areas of conflict of a nexus between powerful forces and the militants. Even now there is a lack of trust on this count.

People believe that the military, at least as long as India continues to be seen as the enemy, may not be willing to loosen its handshake with militants or may at least aim to keep up some level of association with them.

It is the government that needs now to move in behind the determined military effort, and ensure this does not happen. To do so it must move sensibly and work to a plan.

There are several areas that need immediate attention. One is that of creating jobs in Swat. The collapse of the tourist industry in that region has affected many. People everywhere complain of being barely able to survive. The events of the past month, during which homes, land, livestock – and many lives have been lost further affect their capacity to do so.

An immediate development and employment plan is needed. People, shattered by conflict, must be assisted in the task of picking up the pieces of their lives. It is no coincidence that in the Valley, people still look back with nostalgia to the time when Swat as a princely state was ruled by its 'Walis'. In the 30 years since its status as such was abolished in 1969, the state of Pakistan has not made a similar impression on lives.

Indeed the 'Islamic' aspect of law under the Walis has been one factor in the support for 'Shariah' – associated by people with easier, swifter access to justice. Many have of course since realized that under the Taliban it took a quite different and much uglier manifestation.

The conflict has brought immense hardship to Swat; power has remained suspended for weeks; families have stared starvation in the face. Some have watched bombs kill relatives. There must now be a swift effort to rescue people and enable them to resurrect lives that they have, for too long, had very little control over.

The government must also look beyond Swat though. Tens of thousands of madressahs currently operate across the country. In Lahore alone one can be found along virtually every street in some localities. Giant set-ups flourish at mosques in many places. Even where they are not involved in militancy, the madressahs create closed minds and churn out 'graduates' with a distinct way of thinking.

Instances of the abuse of children within them remain commonplace. They act too to rob children of an ordinary life and the right to a mainstream education. But then, on the other hand, they provide something that is much more important to those who have nothing at all: food, clothing, shelter – and a better life than that they enjoyed at home. Many of the women at Jamia Hafsa at Lal Masjid testified to this; former maid servants spoke of a life of relative comfort and the guarantee of regular food.

The government should consider what can be done. At a time when dollars are being directed this way, a nationalization of madressahs may be possible. This would be a means to ensure that the 'welfare' services the institutions offer are kept intact while regulating education within them.

In times of crisis, radical moves are required. The past policy of supporting madressahs – backed by the US – has been a disaster. We need to bring the pupils of these seminaries into the mainstream, so the vast chasm between their way of thinking and that of those who attend regular schools can be narrowed and then closed. The few studies conducted suggest this is a very wide gap indeed.

Scholars from Egypt, studying the phenomena of extremism in Pakistan and elsewhere, have repeatedly commented on the role of the Al-Azhar University in promoting relaxed, progressive notions of Islam in their society. This too is something that requires thought. We have failed even to take up proposals, some of them based on extremely positive open thinking, put forward by the Islamic Ideology Council.

We need far more pro-active effort to push back obscurantism. There is no reason why papers produced at Al-Azhar and indeed at other institutions in the Middle East cannot be disseminated more widely. The official media can be used to hold discussions on them. And perhaps, in response to the harsh, orthodox institutions that cropped up over the 1980s, promoted by a specific line of official thinking, there can be some thought to setting up others based along more open lines of thinking.

Our own Sufi heritage can in some way be used. We, as a society, are in many ways obsessed with religion. This is the outcome of very deliberate polices pursued with terrifying effectiveness in the past. We need now to find ways of challenging them so we can move into a better future.

But, at the same time, we must remember that using religion as a political gambit can be dangerous. Eventually it places us in the hands of clerics. The longer-term strategy must be to create a state free of dogma and able to rise above it. Respect for everyone's freedom of belief is central to this. So too is the need to give people the means for a decent life. It is the denial of this, the acute socio-economic deprivation of millions, the indifference of governments to their plight and the lack of access to justice that created militancy.

We must now make certain these weaknesses are corrected – or we may find one day that the struggle that is now being waged, the deaths, the destruction and the suffering, were after all futile. This is not something to look forward to.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Poverty of imagination

By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 05 Jun, 2009

THE Pakistani state has taken so many wrong turns in the past that it’s almost a surprise there are any more turns left to take.

But at a crossroads it is again: almost a decade after it should have become clear that the age of nurturing ‘non-state actors’ had passed, the state has a second chance to bury that madcap policy.

Eight years ago, Al Qaeda brought down the World Trade Centre and America pursued it into Afghanistan. We were faced with a choice then: understand the long-term significance of that seminal event and adjust our strategic outlook accordingly or bury our heads in the sand and hope the storm would blow over quickly enough.

We, or rather the Pakistan Army led by Musharraf, chose the latter. Our decision: bag as many Al Qaeda types as possible while sweeping our home-grown jihadis under the carpet and shielding the Afghan Taliban from America’s prying eyes. The policy ‘worked’ because the Bush administration only seemed to care about Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and even on that front got distracted soon enough by its interest in Iraq.

Musharraf and his cohorts were smug: they got tens of billions of dollars in return for simply putting their strategic-depth policy and jihadis in cold storage. When the time was right, they would simply reactivate those guys and use them once again to pursue strategic depth in Afghanistan and as a potent threat against India.

Two problems — serious problems — were always apparent: one, the security establishment didn’t comprehend the pernicious effect of Al Qaeda on our jihadis; and, two, the security establishment didn’t comprehend the long-term strategic fallout of 9/11.

The first problem meant that we continued to believe we could by and large control the home-grown jihadis and Afghan Taliban operating from our soil. Eight years later, with the northwest and Fata acutely destabilising Pakistan proper, we now conclusively know how naïve that policy was. Al Qaeda and its ideology are a virus, and once it infects its victim, it takes over — gone are the illusions of ‘control’ by the security establishment over its erstwhile puppets.

The second problem meant that we didn’t realise how dangerously Pakistan was isolating itself regionally and internationally. The first thought any leader would have had after 9/11 was: not in my backyard. The destructive power of non-state actors had been seared onto the world’s collective consciousness and henceforth the tolerance for anyone playing with that same fire was exceedingly low.

Because Musharraf dealt primarily with the clumsy, Iraq-obsessed Bush administration, he and his generals missed that seismic strategic shift. Once again, eight years later it is readily apparent: terrorism and Pakistan’s connection to it as at the top of the agenda of our relations with virtually any state important to us. Name the country — China, UK, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE — and it is more likely than not to be fretting over security concerns.

But now we have a second shot at changing course and doing the right thing. The military operation in Swat, Buner and Dir could be the springboard for a wider policy of crushing militancy of all stripes inside Pakistan. No more good Taliban/bad Taliban, our guys versus Al Qaeda and Arab outsiders, but a clear, unequivocal sign that a militant is bad because he is a militant and not because of the kind of militant agenda he subscribes to.

Is that happening? Two very bad signs have been sent out this week that it is not.

First, Hafiz Saeed was released. This wasn’t a case of judicial activism by the superior judiciary, but a case of the inevitable given the lack of the government’s interest in prosecuting the leader of the group believed to be behind the Mumbai attacks last November.

Saeed’s release capped what has been a rather half-hearted, arguably farcical, attempt to clamp down on Jamaatud Dawa and its earlier incarnation, Lashkar-i-Taiba. Six months since the Mumbai attacks, it seems the security establishment has decided that the attacks were an aberration and that after a slap on the wrist, the group involved can go back into temporary obscurity.

Any crackpot theory about ‘pressurising’ India to renew the composite dialogue or to back off in Afghanistan by going easy on the Lashkar for now is just that: madness that doesn’t take into account how the international impression that Pakistan is an incorrigible sponsor of terrorism has been grimly reinforced.

Second, the kidnapping of the students of the Razmak Cadet College in the North Waziristan Agency. There is a sordid tale of the continuing good Taliban/bad Taliban distinction behind the incident. The bad Taliban in question is Baitullah Mehsud, the scourge of the country in recent years because of his habit of sending suicide bombers to attack security forces and cities and towns. The good guy was supposed to be Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a Taliban commander in North Waziristan and the man tasked with ensuring the safe passage of the students out of his territory.

Gul Bahadur is considered ‘good’ because he helped the state eject Uzbek militants linked to Al Qaeda from his area and because he doesn’t always get along with Baitullah. But good made common cause with the bad in this instance: Gul Bahadur double-crossed local officials who negotiated with him and tried to hand over the students to Baitullah.

Why? Because the very idea of good and bad Taliban is stupid. The ‘good’ stay good as long as their interests are not under threat: fearing that the state may be serious about crushing Baitullah — and for that we have to thank President Zardari for blurting it out and making international headlines — Gul Bahadur may have shrewdly, and logically, calculated that he could be next. So, better to help out a frenemy now than risk losing his own kingdom later.

And why kidnap the students at all? Because if a military operation is imminent, wrong-footing the state may cause it to charge in unprepared. Militarily, it amounts to poking your opponent in the eye while he’s still donning his armour and picking up his weapons.

Why do we keep doing this to ourselves? Why, after eight years of a failed policy whose security fallout we are struggling to contain, are we still clinging to it so desperately? What can we not see that our security policy, born of an insecure mindset, has made us progressively less secure as a state?

There are many reasons, ones that security analysts, political scientists and historians readily proffer. But at the core of those explanations is the poverty of imagination of the security establishment.

Needy, greedy and seedy, it is like Tolkien’s Gollum. Just as the Ring extended his life but ended up enslaving him, so our security policy has dragged on the state, but at the cost of dragging us into a deep, dark place.

 

[zombie]

The Taliban (Wahabis) do NOT follow the correct shariah! They follow their nafs!

So why not implement the right shariah in pakistan?

 

[RabzonKhan]

Better alive than dead?

Thursday, June 11, 2009
Kamila Hyat

The writer is a freelance columnist and former newspaper editor

The ISPR has stated the victory over the Taliban would not be complete until the top leadership was defeated.

This of course makes sense. The dramatic story of Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, who were eventually forced to surrender after a 25-year struggle as they were cornered in a piece of jungle barely larger than a football field, is one that ends too with the death of

Velupillai Prabhakaran – the elusive leader who pioneered the suicide belt and from his jungle hide-out ordered a series of high-profile kidnappings, including that in 1991 of Indian Prime Minsiter Rajiv Gandhi. But in the context of Pakistan, where death is associated by extremists with martyrdom, the army suggestion that final victory can come with the killing of men like Maulana Fazlullah, who the ISPR says has already been targeted thrice, raises some questions.

This is also borne out by the chilling interview given to 'The Sunday Times' by the man known as 'Colonel Imam'. Between 1979 and 1989, Amir Sultan Tarar, himself trained at Fort Bragg and courted by US presidents, helped raise the mujahideen army that defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan and then played a key role in raising the Taliban force that eventually over-ran the country. Men like Mullah Omar rank among his pupils. Like a handful of ISI officers, he is believed to have retained links with the militants even after his former US mentors changed their stance. Today, Tarar warns the Taliban can never be defeated and that each death will lead to more supporters rising to replace the man who fell. This may be an exaggeration, but it would be unwise to completely dismiss the warning. The building up of militants as martyrs has played a part in their phenomenal growth. This is true not only in the tribal areas, where the notion of an 'eye for eye' justice remains strongly rooted, but even in towns like Gujranwala where squares have been re-named for jihadi 'heroes' and which has seen a series of crimes motivated by extremism, including the 2007 murder of Punjab minister Zill-e-Huma, shot dead by a fanatic who opposed a role for women in public life. Similar sentiments can be detected in other places. Even in Lahore, there are those who seek still to defend the Taliban, and to blame the bombings in our cities on some plot hatched in Washington.

These factors mean that the state may need to rise above ideas of vengeance and revenge. Rather than deliberately attempting to kill Fazalullah and others who form the top tier of Taliban leadership, perhaps we need to focus on the need to bring them to courts – and to lay out the truth before people. Too many facets of this truth remain hidden. People in Swat need a chance to talk openly of Fazalullah's own role in extortion; of rape and sodomy committed by his men. The refusal by state agencies to come clean is one reason why men like Hafiz Muhammad Saeed are able to walk out unpunished after periods in detention, waving confidently to supporters and making speeches about 'moderation'. The stories told by 'Colonel Imam' testify to the close links that have existed between the state and the extremists. The existence of this nexus alone explains why men like Hafiz Saeed or Maulana Masood Azhar seem able to time and again escape the reach of the law without even facing charges. We need now to squarely confront this past; to talk about it openly and to admit to mistakes made. Otherwise the blackmail hold of militant leaders who threaten to divulge details of these ties in order to coerce the authorities into silence will remain intact and prevent the process of prosecution and justice that is at this point essential.

Through history, there are many examples of the manner in which death bestows immortality. We need to guard against this. The sight of men like Fazalullah and Muslim Khan in the dock would help dispel the myths that still persist. In Swat there is some evidence that these are being deliberately propagated, by the remnants of the Taliban, who speak of their 'escape' as evidence that God has sided with them. There is a need to challenge such assertions and the myths that will in time evolve.

More too needs to be done. Looked at it retrospect, there is no doubt the Afghan war that began with the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979 altered the contours of our society. General Ziaul Haq's opportunistic 'Islamization' and the US policies pursued at the time contributed to this. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has accepted this without further attempts to deny the past. But in the period that followed the dark Zia years, fundamental errors were made. After every war, an attempt to re-assimilate combatants is necessary. People engaged in fighting need to be re-introduced to the different pattern and priorities of life in times of peace, assisted in the role of re-adaption to changed circumstances. This requirement has been completely overlooked. The thousands of young fighters who were encouraged at various points to take up arms in the name of 'jihad' were never deprogrammed or offered other roles in society. In Swat, those who went with Sufi Mohammad Khan to Afghanistan in 2001 to fight US-led forces were in many cases simply released back into society when they returned as angry, defeated warriors some of whom had faced mistreatment in Afghan jails. These men, some no more than teenagers when they were recruited by Sufi, today form in many cases the ranks of the Taliban in the Valley.

We need a rehabilitation plan for them and for others who have since been herded into madressahs and other training institutions. For many of these boys, power stems only from the gun they see in the hands of others and yearn to hold themselves. A similar phenomenon was seen in Kashmir as militancy emerged in that once-peaceful region. A well-planned policy is needed to turn it back and to demonstrate to people that there are indeed other ways of getting ahead in life. Somehow, the cycle of vendetta and violence needs to be broken. Simplistic arguments being put forward say the people of NWFP, the families who lost loved ones in the current conflict will seek revenge. It is said suicide bombers include those who lost relatives as a result of armed action in Waziristan or elsewhere.

There may be some element of truth in these assertions. But what needs to be emphasized is the importance of moving beyond it, of lifting people up from their past and encouraging them to look towards the future. The government now needs to work towards carving out this future. For many people none currently seems to exist. Involving them in the process of creating one, by offering education, jobs, opportunity – and at the same time dispensing justice in an open and fair manner – may be the key to turning back the tide of militancy and ensuring it does not in the future return to flood our society.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Heading towards victory

Thursday, June 11, 2009
Zafar Hilaly

Some weeks ago a divided establishment, a confused nation and a parliament cringing with fear and irresolution wallowed in self-pity. Everyone else was to blame for our pathetic plight beginning with malevolent India, Mossad agents and the ubiquitous CIA. Telegenic ex-ISI DGs (who unlike other soldiers neither die nor fade away) were on most channels warning that our nuclear assets were about to be pilfered by the Americans. Imran Khan and the Jamaat-e-Islami cried, "Free yourselves from the American yoke and the machinations of the Indians and Israelis. Stop fighting the Taliban, they are your brothers, hearken to us!" Mr Zardari's heir apparent, Nawaz Sharif, could not get himself to utter a bad word about the Taliban or a good word about the army. Old and aged Foreign Office colleagues reared on a rich diet of mindless hate, which took them far in their careers but the nation nowhere, were pouring out anti-US venom in articles and cameo appearances on TV.

For a horrible moment it seemed that they might have struck a cord with the public. Desperate, and at a loss for direction, some started paying heed to what Imran and the Jamaat were saying and wondering whether they might be right. Imran Khan's reverse swing, from the Americans to the Taliban, looked like the answer. Ziaul Haq's ilk, hitherto marginalised and bedraggled, felt resuscitated and warned of Armageddon. Prominent anchors prattled on in ********. They ran amuck posing questions and, without waiting for the reply, themselves supplied the answers with a superior sneer. Dr Shahid Masood, always too clever by half, had a field day. Hamid Mir as usual only heard what he wanted to hear. Talat Hussein was drowning in righteous piety and Kamran Khan straddling all fences forgetting that he had only two legs.

And then, mercifully, out of the blue there emerged, not Mr Zardari, who was abroad as usual, but the Taliban themselves. They helped the public make up their minds, they helped the army do what it should have done much earlier, which was to fight, they encouraged parliament to acquire some spunk and the establishment to do likewise and they set Mr Zardari free to plan his next trip abroad. The rest is history.

Pakistan's victory in the present war against the Taliban is foreordained for no other reason than that the nation is finally united against the enemy. Of course, the Taliban frontline has yet to be eliminated, yes, there will be reverses and sadly the cost will be high in terms of lives lost and suffering; and there is always the possibility that the fickle public may recoil but the outcome is not in doubt. Pakistan's Pashtuns are too free spirited and savvy to mortgage their future to savage rural hillbillies. The pristine medievalism that the Taliban promise has few takers among the urban Pashtuns; and where the towns lead the rural community follows, in due course. Besides Pashtuns have a multitude of scores to settle for the murder, rape and pillage that the Taliban have inflicted on them in Swat and elsewhere.

The country that will emerge at the end of this process will be very different from the one that entered it. To prepare for such an eventuality a pitiless process of self-examination needs to begin. Every facet of our society must be scrutinised. Political, moral, economic and intellectual failings must be recognised and discussed frankly and then remedied. The onrushing crisis of demography has to be tackled. Pakistan is woefully short of water, food, electricity, schools, roads and infrastructure. We are deficit in everything but people and nuclear warheads which, alas, we can neither trade (not any longer) nor eat. No less crucially absent are a political structure that works and a system that can cope. While all these defects will have to be addressed, even as the war is being fought, some matters must take priority over others.

Foremost, without doubt, is the structure of the state. Pakistan cannot be run from Islamabad. There must be five power centres with the federal capital as the weakest. One centre may eventually lead to four countries. We are a voluntary association of peoples that are compelled to live together. The army exists to protect us not herd us together. East Pakistan and now Balochistan are lessons that we must heed. How such changes are enacted is for those entrusted with the task to suggest. The present constitution, suitably amended, provides ample leeway to bring this about.

Second, we cannot let our preferences trump our needs. We must engage with India wholeheartedly. War is not an option any longer hence neither is the acquisition of Kashmir by force. We must not bleed India, nor let the Indians bleed us by inveigling us into an arms' race. Minimum credible defence is a good policy not an excuse for increasing defence expenditure. And that will only be possible if the gap in our respective defence outlays is made up by constructive engagement with India so that each passing year reduces the prospect of conflict and lessens the need for expensive new weapon systems.

If India continues on its mad splurge of defence spending impervious to the suffering caused to the hundreds of millions of poverty-stricken Indians it does not mean that we should follow suit. Our people deserve better. Having wonderful battlements for a bankrupt nation is pointless.

If relations improve the burgeoning Indian economy will be eyeing the cost of production advantages that may exist in Pakistan, we should hope so. And, because it is pointless and absurd to cut your nose to spite your face, we should be sourcing raw materials and finished products from India rather than Australia. We can no longer let pride or prejudice determine economic policy or commercial decisions. And it is now, rather than in retrospect, that such policies should be judged and discarded. If no man is an island unto himself, in today's world this adage also applies to nations.

Third, a madressah policy must evolve and be implemented urgently. What changes are required in the curricula have been identified. The monitoring, supervision and ascertaining the source of funding of madressahs are relatively routine tasks. What is challenging is whether the government has the gumption to take on the fundos who will oppose such a move. Perhaps now is the best time to do so with the army in the field.

Finally, the Quaid had always maintained that Pakistan would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting with the people. And as Mr Jinnah said in a radio interview in 1947: "Nationality rather than religion is the basis for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India." (Tahir Wasti in 'War against Taliban' (Dawn: May 21, 2009). Furthermore, in the same article, Wasti writes that "the statement often quoted as proof of the ideology that created Pakistan, 'Pakistan ka matlab kya, La Ilahlah Illallah' was in fact one that had never been raised from the platform of the Muslim League. An election slogan coined by a Sialkot poet during the 1945 elections to decide the partition of India, it was vehemently opposed by Jinnah himself at a meeting of the Muslim League held under his chairmanship in 1947. The incident is quoted in the memoirs of a member of the council of the Muslim League."

The sooner our leaders recognise that invoking God's help, while doing nothing themselves to earn it, will find no favour with Him or their public, the sooner Pakistan, now reduced to penury on a par with the most wretched nations of the earth, will be able to cope with the onrush of fanatical militant groups like the Taliban. The army is rightly tackling the enemy on a war footing; the government should tackle the country's myriad problems in the same mode.


The writer is a former ambassador

 

[third eye]

Finally, the Quaid had always maintained that Pakistan would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting with the people. And as Mr Jinnah said in a radio interview in 1947: "Nationality rather than religion is the basis for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India." (Tahir Wasti in 'War against Taliban' (Dawn: May 21, 2009). Furthermore, in the same article, Wasti writes that "the statement often quoted as proof of the ideology that created Pakistan, 'Pakistan ka matlab kya, La Ilahlah Illallah' was in fact one that had never been raised from the platform of the Muslim League. An election slogan coined by a Sialkot poet during the 1945 elections to decide the partition of India, it was vehemently opposed by Jinnah himself at a meeting of the Muslim League held under his chairmanship in 1947. The incident is quoted in the memoirs of a member of the council of the Muslim League."
A well written piece.

I notice the underlined slogan as a par of signatures of a few members here..having read this one cannot help feel Pk has been hijacked by fundamentalists..

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Finally, the Quaid had always maintained that Pakistan would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting with the people. And as Mr Jinnah said in a radio interview in 1947: "Nationality rather than religion is the basis for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India." (Tahir Wasti in 'War against Taliban' (Dawn: May 21, 2009). Furthermore, in the same article, Wasti writes that "the statement often quoted as proof of the ideology that created Pakistan, 'Pakistan ka matlab kya, La Ilahlah Illallah' was in fact one that had never been raised from the platform of the Muslim League. An election slogan coined by a Sialkot poet during the 1945 elections to decide the partition of India, it was vehemently opposed by Jinnah himself at a meeting of the Muslim League held under his chairmanship in 1947. The incident is quoted in the memoirs of a member of the council of the Muslim League."
A well written piece.

I notice the underlined slogan as a par of signatures of a few members here..having read this one cannot help feel Pk has been hijacked by fundamentalists..

Not necessarily - you have to distinguish between conservatism and extremism.

No doubt a significant number of Pakistanis do see their nation in more religious terms than the Quaid did, but that does not mean the nation has been hijacked by fundamentalists. It just means that these Pakistanis see Pakistan's identity differently than the Quaid.

In the US you have a significant minority that sees the US as a 'Christian nation', and disagrees with the whole concept of 'Secularism' as being the basis of the US constitution.

 

[third eye]

Not necessarily - you have to distinguish between conservatism and extremism.

No doubt a significant number of Pakistanis do see their nation in more religious terms than the Quaid did, but that does not mean the nation has been hijacked by fundamentalists.

Ok, but whats the reason ? why has religion become so important. It has a place but cannot be the end all of all thoughts & actions.

 

[wtf]

I notice the underlined slogan as a par of signatures of a few members here..having read this one cannot help feel Pk has been hijacked by fundamentalists..

You are ignoring selection bias. This is a defence forum. There a few military people and a few interested in international affairs. But large section of people hanging out here will be people who are out to have a fight (with India/Pakistan/China whatever) or generally feel good about their own countries. So obviously the posters here would be more likely to be fundamentalistic in one way or the other and more likely to see their country as "morally right".

So one cannot say that people having that message as a signature is a sign of the whole of Pakistan believing it. Look at many of the Indian forums - as long as it is unmoderated, you'll see people quoting Arthashastra or praising Godse ruling the boards. Before the elections, if you read the internet you'd have thought BJP was up for a complete victory.

 

[RabzonKhan]

We must prepare for a long conflict

Reality check

Friday, June 12, 2009
Shafqat Mahmood

Why attack a hotel? It happened in Islamabad earlier and now in Peshawar. A hotel was also the focus during the Mumbai assault. Is it to target foreigners? Just any foreigner or of a particular kind? Those staying in Peshawar were doing humanitarian work with the displaced people. Was that their crime?

When the Islamabad Marriott was attacked, our media Taliban came up with a story of mysterious Americans seen carrying large boxes into the hotel. This not only explained the bombing from their perspective but somehow justified it.

What are they going to say now? That the UN workers trying to help a suffering people were CIA agents!

The citizens of Peshawar are going through a torrid time. This bombing is the latest in a series of terror attacks. It must rankle more at least to some because this hotel was a prominent landmark of the city; a place to gather, attend social occasions or enjoy the cuisine in its restaurants. Even for visitors who could afford to stay there, it is a place to remember. Not because its architecture was spectacular or its service out of the ordinary but because it was linked to so many enjoyable visits to the city.

This attack and others of a similar kind are an assault on memory.

This is war and our war, and if anyone doubts it they are either seriously deluded or collaborators. Some of us do not recognise its nature because we, in fact the entire subcontinent, has no experience of war.

Our conflicts have been short – 17 days, 20 days - and while precious lives have been lost, large-scale destruction of towns and cities, vast degradation of infrastructure and huge displacement of people have not happened. The only exception being Partition in 1947 with a massive impact on the people.

Europe experienced two wars during the first half of twentieth century with millions of lives lost; huge populations displaced and many urban centres virtually flattened. It knows what war is, and is an important reason why deadly enemies are now together in the European Union.

It is time we recognise that what we are experiencing today is also a war. We can hope and pray that its impact would not be as destructive as it was during the world wars or as in recent times in Afghanistan. But, let us not have any doubt; it is going to be a long haul. Our cities and towns and people will pay a price. But, we shall overcome.

This will require some doing. Both the state and society will have to prepare for it and be ready. The state and its agencies will certainly have to become more professional. The army seems to be getting better at fighting this kind of a war but among the civilian law-enforcement agencies, the police performance is not up to the mark.

It is not that police leadership or planning is bad. We have some very fine officers leading the police, and none more so than Malik Naveed Khan, the head of Frontier police. The problem is poor training and as a result non professional attitude of the force.

Consider any deployment of police personnel you may have recently seen. The officers would place them at sensitive points and instead of standing vigilantly they would be bunched up together, chatting or smoking. There caps would be off, their belts loose and shoes unlaced.

This is no way to fight terror. And bunching up is particularly bad because the terrorist are targeting clusters of policemen. Yet, that training and professionalism is not there to recognise either gravity of the situation or the necessity for vigilance.

There is no shortage of other examples. A particularly bad one is the attack on Rescue 15 station in Islamabad after a similar assault in Lahore. It is obvious that despite clear warning, the police was not prepared for it. No one is questioning the bravery of those who resisted or lost their lives. The only issue is that at least some of these tragedies could have been averted if the training and attitudes were better.

The same is true of other elements of law enforcement. The intelligence agencies have to do a better job. For too long they have had soft targets and easy agendas such as tapping phones of politicians or of other prominent people. Salacious gossip and juicy stories is what they were capable of.

Now they confront an elusive enemy who is well trained and highly motivated. They would have to haul their backsides and go looking for it. It is dangerous work but the rewards are great. In this kind of a war, good intelligence is half the battle. It can be the difference between winning quickly and a prolonged grind.

While the state has a lot of work to do, the people also have to play an important part. It is not possible that foreign elements and hundreds of tons of explosives are smuggled into an urban centre and no one sees anything or that outsiders are not noticed. It is, but either because of laziness or fear nothing is done. This will have to change. Everything out of the ordinary must be reported.

Many a time nothing will come out of it and there may be discomfort of a false alarm but it is better to be embarrassed than dead. Many countries experiencing similar kind of a terrorist challenge or a crime wave have constituted neighbourhood watch committees. We need to do something similar.

Why can't our civic leaders such as local councillors take a lead in this? The provincial governments can help by coordinating such an exercise. Let the people get involved in defending themselves. It could become a critical factor in winning this war.

There cannot be a better example of people having an impact than in upper Dir. The terrorist caused mayhem and despondency by killing 50 of their kin in a mosque but they did not buckle under. They banded together and took them on. Reports are that the Taliban are being routed. The state is helping but the people are leading. This is a model to follow.

Spirit and morale has also to be kept high in times of adversity. The collaborators would continue to undermine it by calling this America's war. They would also praise the piety and the simplicity of these throat-cutters. And they would attack the political leadership viciously because they dare not attack the army.

These people have to be isolated from the national discourse. They confuse and obfuscate and in practice, if not deliberately, aid the enemy. They have their democratic rights and no one is advocating taking them away but their voices should be marginalised even more than they already are.

Reports from the battlefield are encouraging but its ambit is becoming larger. The Frontier Region of Bannu has become the new front. It may be a precursor to an attack in South Waziristan.

There is a tug on the heart when one talks about conflicts in areas that were so familiar. But, there is no option. Reality must be faced. It is the only way to win this war.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL...and the obligation of the state

June 14, 2009

President Asif Ali Zardari, speaking to the nation late Friday night, said that the army and the people were united in the war against the Taliban. He said that the national consensus against the Taliban was represented by the parliament which had condemned the acts of violence of the Taliban and given the army the mandate to fight them. But the state of Pakistan too must follow by modifying its conduct. The first obligation of the state is to move against the spread of extremist thinking adopted by the people at large in consequence of almost 30 years of jihad that the state had sponsored.

The state must protect the unarmed clergy against the armed clergy but without “empowering” the Barelvis as a counterforce against the Taliban. After the Barelvi consensus developed under Mufti Naeemi there was some opinion in favour of “enabling” the Barelvis to fight the Deobandis — “fight mullahs with mullahs”. If this is done it will simply compound the dereliction of the state that has encouraged the world to regard Pakistan as a kind of rogue state which also kills it own people. What has to be done is to empower the state itself against killers espousing extremist programmes. And this will have to be done by increasing the strength of the police and by training it better than we do today.

That the people of Pakistan are neither extremists nor sectarian by birth is proved by the fact that Pakistan has chosen Mr Zardari, a Shia, as their president. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani is a direct descendant of the greatest mystical saint of Islam, Sheikh Abdul Qadir Gilani. (Mr Gilani’s son is actually named Abdul Qadir Gilani!) Ahle Sunnat-Barelvis usually have names ending with Qadri to show their devotion to the great saint. In the eyes of the Taliban and their Wahhabi patrons this leadership may be anathema, but for Pakistan it is proof that the people of Pakistan are not sectarian-minded and even today revere the founder of the nation, Quaid-e Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was a Shia. The state however went astray and must now mend its ways.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Innocent until proven guilty?

By Irfan Husain
Saturday, 13 Jun, 2009



WE shoot ourselves in the foot with predictable regularity. Take the release of Hafiz Mohammad Saeed from house arrest, for example.

Picked up in the crackdown on the Jamaatud Dawa, the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s successor, in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks last November, Saeed spent around six months in ‘custody’ before being sprung recently by the Lahore High Court on grounds of insufficient evidence.

This is not the first time clerics accused of sundry crimes of violence have walked out of comfortable sojourns at home. Another leader of a jihadi outfit was arrested some seven years ago following attacks on the Srinagar assembly that killed 30. Days later, the assembly building in New Delhi was attacked, and again the Jaish-i-Mohammad was implicated.

After the usual dance of denial, Maulana Masood Azhar was arrested and, later, the Jaish was banned. Nevertheless, relations between India and Pakistan plunged, and the two countries came close to war. For months, their respective armies were eyeball to eyeball, and the world feared a nuclear exchange.

Even then, the maulana was no stranger to legal restrictions: he had been arrested by Indian authorities in Kashmir in 1994, and released in a deal to free hostages taken in an Indian Airlines plane hijacking in December 1999. Although Pakistan initially denied he had entered the country from Afghanistan after his release, Masood Azhar soon addressed a rally in Karachi where he said: “I have come here because it is my duty to tell you that Muslims should not rest in peace until we have destroyed America and India.”

So given this background of violence and open threats, why are people like Saeed and Azhar still walking free? Many Indian readers have asked me in angry emails why the former was released after the carnage his organisation allegedly committed in Mumbai last November, according to intercepted phone calls and the confession of the sole survivor of the attack.

Why indeed? In England, where I am currently, many friends have asked me the same question. It is hard to convince anybody that had the state been serious, keeping Saeed in custody would have been impossible. While I am sure the prosecution case was flimsy, we all know that when the government wishes to, all kinds of legal gimmicks are deployed to retain individuals as guests of the state. Indeed, thousands of prisoners have been ******* in jails across Pakistan for years, still awaiting trial.

While browsing through Google for this article, I came across a piece (‘Paying for the past’; Feb 2, 2002) I had written seven years ago. I normally never quote from my own articles, but apart from the neat symmetry of the date, I thought I had something relevant to say all those years ago:

“Rich and powerful states and individuals often get away with their crimes, while the weak and the poor usually get caught and punished….

“When we allowed … [Maulana Masood Azhar] to move in after he was freed from an Indian jail in the aftermath of the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Afghanistan in the last days of 1999, surely somebody in authority knew we were violating international norms. But to compound this act, Maulana Azhar was allowed to raise the Jaish-i-Mohammad, a group that operated freely in Pakistan and in … Kashmir….

“Another embarrassment has been caused by the famous list handed over to our government by the Indians. Apart from those Pakistanis released from Indian prisons, there are 15 names of the Indians accused of extremely serious crimes in their own country. Despite official denial of any knowledge of their whereabouts, last year Newsline, a Karachi-based monthly, ran a cover story giving details of the comfortable exile several of these people were enjoying in Karachi under official protection. No denial was issued by the government at that time.

“The problem with handing them over, of course, is that there is no telling what they might spill to the Indian authorities to save their own skins. The last thing General Musharraf would want at the height of a military stand-off is a series of shocking revelations or operational details about covert, illegal acts.”

This, of course, is the dilemma of using criminals and terrorists to further the state’s agenda: they become an embarrassment or, worse, turn against their handlers. It has always struck me as ironic that people like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar use random violence against the innocent as a tool, while claiming the protection of the constitution when they are arrested. Thus, while people like them organise terror operations targeting ordinary citizens, when caught they demand their habeas corpus rights guaranteed under the constitution.

Many countries have tried to strike a balance between human rights and the protection of their citizens from terrorism. In Britain, an anti-terror law was enacted in 2005 under which suspects can be put under virtual house arrest, barred from going abroad, and using telephones and the Internet. These restrictions are imposed because there is insufficient hard evidence to try them, and yet there is a strong suspicion that they pose a threat.

Clearly, for the innocent such a state of legal limbo would be a nightmare. In Britain, several people have mounted a legal challenge against being held under this law. And certainly, it can be misused by overzealous officials who do not want to take the risk of letting potential terrorists run around free. Nevertheless, it is not always easy to gather hard evidence in cases of terrorism, especially against leaders of jihadi organisations who do not pull the trigger themselves. Their DNA is absent from the debris collected after suicide bombings, and it becomes difficult to convict them under existing laws.

The sad reality in Pakistan is that when the state wishes to hold an individual, nobody is beyond its reach. So when people like Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Masood Azhar and Abdul Aziz of Lal Masjid fame are released by our superior courts on grounds of insufficient evidence, we have the right to ask what’s going on. Some of these people have publicly urged their misguided followers to commit violent acts, so to pretend they should get the benefit of the doubt is dangerous legal sophistry.

Finally, the army has taken off its gloves in the fight against extremism. And if new laws are required to combat this menace on the judicial level, parliament must do whatever it takes.