The state that wouldn't fail

[RabzonKhan]

Time to give up hidebound thinking

The News
Saleem Safi
January 27, 2011

Pakistan is faced with numerous problems, but its complex and troubled relations with India and Afghanistan are the source of most of its problems. Our internal and external troubles mainly flow from this source.

Our strained relations with India compelled us to maintain our defence capabilities at a level not maintainable with this country’s resources and capacity. Feeling the crunch, we looked to other support, and that inevitably turned Pakistan into a security state. A security state is unsuitable for the nurturing of civil society, and that is why democracy has not taken firm roots in this country.

The pursuit of the strategic depth doctrine on Afghanistan and the fierce competition with India to counter its influence in Kabul gave rise to the culture of extremism in Pakistan. This culture tarnished our image in the world community. The state’s ostensible helplessness in the containment of this threat earned us the tag of “failing state.”

So, any well-meaning leader in Islamabad who wants the country to develop a democratic culture, have an efficient state and achieve progress and prosperity will have to find ways to secure peace on both the western and eastern borders of Pakistan.

Tragically, these issues have never got the due attention of the political leadership, the intellectuals, the media and civil society. We have left the two fronts, Afghanistan and India, to the establishment, or at best to the Foreign Office.

The country’s political and media personalities are not eager to keep abreast with new developments in both India and Afghanistan. A few think tanks watching both countries are not worth the name because they either serve as mouthpieces of the establishment or look to Washington and London for financial survival.

In this situation we cannot expect fresh thoughts and new ideas on these critical issues.

Pakistanis have been made to develop certain stereotypes about India and Afghanistan. News and analyses in the print and electronic media merely strengthen those trite and old perceptions. The people are frightened with threats that no more exist. The emerging and real threats spawned by the changing environments in India and Afghanistan find no mention in such debates, discussions and analyses.

For many years, India’s priorities in the region, and the situation in Afghanistan, have undergone many radical changes. A few days back, an Indian diplomat came to my office. We hotly debated a range of issues, including Kashmir and Afghanistan. I told him that we cannot wrest Kashmir from the Indian clutches by force, but at the same time India will never be able to match us in Afghanistan.

He was unable to justify his country’s role in Afghanistan. I told him that India’s intention to exploit the situation of near-anarchy in Pakistan is suicidal, because Pakistan would not lose much in a possible war with India. If a war broke out between the two countries, India would be the bigger loser, because its dreams of becoming a superpower would be permanently shattered.

The diplomat stressed that India cannot afford a war with Pakistan. If it could afford such a conflict, then Kargil and the Mumbai attacks offered the best opportunities for a war with Pakistan. But I told him that, though unwillingly, India would be dragged into a war with Pakistan.

He was not convinced by this logic and asked how that would happen. I told him that India had provided to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates the means of triggering a war between India and Pakistan. India is playing into the hands of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates because it has signalled to the extremists and militants that a lone incident can derail the peace process between the two rival countries. So if Al-Qaeda and its affiliates felt threatened in the region, they would seek to cause a war between India and Pakistan as the last viable option. These groups have the capability of launching terrorist attacks and any Mumbai-like attacks in the future can trigger a war between the two nuclear powers.

During this discussion, I felt that the Indian establishment has not even thought of this possibility. Rather, they have the idea that, like in the past, Pakistan still controls the militants. I am certain that this new element in India-Pakistan relations has not been appreciated by our policymakers as well. And that is why we lack vision, direction and purpose to seek new avenues for healthy competition and better relation with India.

The ground realities have undergone a sea change in Afghanistan as well. For example, despite its being non-existent at the moment, we are still obsessed with the term “Northern Alliance” in that country. Most of the leaders of northern Afghanistan have turned against their friends of yesterday. Hamid Karzai, who used to play second fiddle to his Western friends, has now become a stumbling block in the way of the fulfilment of certain designs of those very friends, the United States and NATO.

Similarly, the Taliban are also a changed species. They were enemies of Iran in bygone days, but they have now established training camps on Iranian territory. During their rule in Afghanistan, they were against photography, but today they use video cameras, CDs and the internet as special tools in their war against the foreign forces in their homeland.

Similarly, we are told that the United States forces will flee Afghanistan, sooner rather than latter. However, against this perception, a few days back the US awarded supply contracts for ten years to keep its bases operative in Kandahar, Sheendand and Mazar Sahrif.

We need to get rid of traditional thinking on India and Afghanistan and determine new priorities in view of the new realities. We should do this with an open mind. This necessitates engaging collective wisdom. Unfortunately, we are victims of a huge gap between the views and beliefs of the military and the civil establishment on these issues. That gap should be bridged through discussion and constructive debate in order for Pakistan to forge a united approach on this critical juncture of our history.

We never needed this line of thinking so desperately. This is a difficult task, but not an impossible one. If we fail to do this, the fire will engulf the entire country, to the satisfaction of our enemies.


The writer works for Geo TV.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: Mardan attack

Daily Times
February 12, 2011

After a brief lull in attacks on high profile targets, Thursday’s suicide bombing in a Punjab Regiment training camp in Mardan came as a rude shock. Despite claims to the contrary, the militants have once again exhibited their capability to strike difficult targets. It is sad that apparently lax security cost us the precious lives of 31 young army recruits. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has claimed responsibility, stating that this was done in retaliation for drone strikes. It has become clear from several incidents, including this one, that the Taliban are adapting themselves to the challenges of asymmetrical warfare. They are training and using women and children to achieve their objectives. . A boy in school uniform entered the military facility and blew himself up near the parading cadets. The same day a burqa-clad would-be teenage suicide bomber was captured from Tank. Had he not been running, given the cultural sensitivities of gender segregation, it would have been difficult to spot and search him. This reveals the enormity and urgency of the task before the security forces.

The situation is made more complicated given Pakistan’s dual policy towards al Qaeda, the Pakistani brand of Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban. When certain groups are allowed to run riot in certain localities within Pakistan and then the military’s own facilities come under attack, what message does it send to the soldier fighting the war? This ambiguity is at the bottom of all our failures. It is easier to blame other countries for orchestrating these attacks on Pakistani soil than doing serious introspection to correct the wrong we are committing against our own nation. Already we are dealing with a huge crisis of internally displaced persons (IDPs), a situation that may worsen over time. Attacks such as these send out a very wrong impression about the military’s capability to deal with the situation. Not only should the distinction between good Taliban and bad Taliban end, there should be an all-out effort to eliminate this menace through proactive intelligence gathering and busting their networks from within. Security forces must take on all the groups that challenge the writ of the state.

 

[RabzonKhan]

COMMENT: Kurram: sacrificed at the global jihad altar

Daily Times
Dr Mohammad Taqi
February 24, 2011

As the world at large focused on events in the Arab world and Pakistanis remained preoccupied with CIA contractor Raymond Davis, a jirga composed ostensibly of tribal elders from Kurram Agency announced on February 3, 2011 a ‘peace’ accord between Shias and Sunnis in Parachinar, the headquarters of the Kurram Agency.

However, a closer look at the players involved in brokering the deal shows that what appears, prima facie, as a welcome solution to years of deadly impasse, is nothing but the Pakistani establishment’s attempt to roll out its own version of the end game in Afghanistan. Never mind the jihadist history of reneging on deals, but without actually addressing the grievances of the Sunnis displaced from Parachinar or the Shias dislodged from Sadda, Jalamai and Chardewal — let alone restitution for the thousands killed and maimed on both sides — the deal is bound to end in failure. A senior Pashtun leader, Abdul Lateef Afridi, speaking to this writer, stated: “While the opening of roads is a welcome sign, unless the establishment changes its policy towards Afghanistan, the Kurram deal spells more trouble for the region...an agreement under the auspices of the Pakistani Pashtun elders may be the only route forward but, unfortunately, none of them were consulted.”

The Kurram Agency’s geo-strategic importance, with its proximity to the Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces of Afghanistan on one hand and North Waziristan (NW) and Orakzai Agencies on the other, is well established. A neutral Kurram is imperative for the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) to stymie the influx of jihadists from this region into Afghanistan. Conversely, any sustained Taliban intervention into Afghanistan from the Pakistani side requires open access through upper Kurram. The contiguity of lower and central Kurram to NW and Orakzai can allow jihadists easy transit into Afghanistan. The northeast reaches of upper Kurram, adjoining the Tirah valley and the Tora Bora complex in the Spin Ghar mountain make for a retreat and retraction route for the jihadists — a conduit used to the fullest benefit by al Qaeda in 2001.

Pakistan has resisted US pressure to take action against the jihadists, especially of the Haqqani network, holed up in NW. However, with the July 2011 date for the start of the US drawdown from Afghanistan looming, the US demand has become urgent. The establishment remains convinced, however, that the US will leave Afghanistan sooner rather than later and therefore hedges its bets for the Kabul throne through its jihadist assets like the Haqqani network. The de facto leader of the network, Sirajuddin, has even been tipped as Pakistan’s choice for Mullah Omar’s eventual replacement. These assets, therefore, had to be moved to safe havens that could also double as bridgeheads, and Kurram fits that bill.

However, the Turi and Bangash tribes of Kurram refused to play ball with the agencies and their jihadist proxies, with whom they have significant religious doctrinal differences. An armed resistance by the Kurram tribes effectively denied the al Qaeda-Taliban a thoroughfare into Afghanistan, something that directly drew the wrath of Rawalpindi. The deep state then worked overtime to manufacture a sectarian crisis in Kurram in April 2007.

When attempts to gain a foothold in Parachinar failed, the establishment allowed a siege of upper Kurram by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and their al Qaeda overlords, blockading the Tal-Parachinar road. A humanitarian crisis in upper Kurram was averted only through the efforts of several Pashtun elders, who helped secure the long and arduous Parachinar-Khost-Gardez-Kabul-Peshawar route as an alternative. Cessna flights to Parachinar operated by the Peshawar Flying Club, though very expensive, were an added relief line. The reprieve thus gained by the Turis and Bangash of upper Kurram reinforced their resolve to fight on and continue denying sanctuary and conduit to the jihadists.

Watching the keystone of its plan for post-US Afghanistan unravelled by the ragtag Kurramis, the establishment decided, in the words of one Colonel Sajjad, to “teach the Turis a lesson”. In September 2010, Colonel Tausif Akhtar of the Pakistani security forces announced closure of five border entry points to “clamp down on sectarian violence”. The Kurramis were thus squished between the hammer and anvil of a state-sponsored double embargo. The state also interrupted the small aircraft sorties from Peshawar. The isolation of upper Kurram was now complete. Having pushed them against the wall, the establishment felt that the Kurramis might be amenable to a settlement.

While the Pakistani media went hoarse over Raymond Davis, it conveniently ignored several other foreign thugs of the tallest order, operating with impunity inside Pakistan. The media has portrayed a TTP commander, Fazl-e-Saeed of Uchat village (lower Kurram), as the guarantor of the Kurram deal. The fact, however, is that the Pakistani establishment imposed Khalil Haqqani (an uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani) as an arbiter, as early as October 2010 (as noted then in this column). Khalil Haqqani was the most influential jihadist involved in getting the February 3 deal off the ground.

The irony is that while Pakistani intelligence services and that drama queen of a foreign minister were wailing about a CIA man running amok in Lahore, Khalil Haqqani was conducting a jirga a stone’s throw away from Islamabad in Bhara Kahu, where he reportedly maintains a business concern. These meetings were attended by some six Shia Kurramis, including Haji Aun Ali, Laiq Hussain, Captain Yousaf, Councillor Iqbal Hussain and MNA Sajid Turi. MNA Munir Orakzai and Senator Rashid Ahmed were among the eight Sunnis representing lower and central Kurram. Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik, reportedly, also attended the meetings with Khalil Haqqani — a man declared a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ by the US earlier this month.

The Haqqani network has freely used the Pir Qayyum, Sateen and Shasho camp (an old hub of Rasul Sayyaf in the 1980s) areas of lower Kurram but really needed open access to its bases in Tari Mangal, Mata Sangar, Makhrani, Wacha Darra and Spina Shaga in upper Kurram to launch attacks into Afghanistan in the upcoming summer fighting. By coercing the Kurramis into accepting the writ of the Haqqani network, the Pakistani establishment has cast its lot with the jihadists.

It remains to be seen if this strategy to use upper Kurram against the US will work. But for now the deep state has sacrificed Kurram at the altar of global jihad.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Smokers’ Corner: The ‘honour’ generation

Dawn
Nadeem F. Paracha
Feb 27 2011

Sixty-three years old and suffering from grave identity crisis. Sixty-three years old and still requiring hoards of people to continue knee-jerking their way across a number of hyperbolic patriotic clichés and chants. This is Pakistan.

Ours is a country with an economic, political and military elite and an awkward but growing urban middle class that is still playing out a redundant fantasy: a flight of fancy that sees Pakistan as some monolithic and one-dimensional construction where everyone can be conveniently pigeonholed within a single concept of faith, language and patriotism. Many dictators, terrorists and ethnic and sectarian fragmentations later, the retarded evolution of this country has given birth to a generation of young, urban Pakistanis who have lost all capability to look through hypocrisy and deceit.

This is a generation that was born and raised in the post-Cold War world. A world where communism had been defeated and in which a mixture of consumerism and the resurgence of faith collaborated to turn everything, from entertainment to information to faith itself into an industry. An industry squarely catering to a highly depoliticised market of young people in a scenario where the state was eroding, where politicians had delegated much of their roles to multinational corporations, to the NGOs and to a new set of preachers who had turned religion into a media-savvy enterprise.

Faith and capitalism came together to celebrate the fall of communism/socialism –creatures they had accused of keeping the middle class distracted by ideological issues, and in a state of stasis from which this class could not progress economically or spiritually. But communism’s defeat and the end of the Cold War did not solve problems like poverty, economic disparity, despotism, etc. It did however give the post-Cold War generation a chance to enjoy (on credit) services and products that were almost unattainable among the many from the generation before.

To enjoy these without having much of a guilty conscience, the same triumphant system of post-Cold War capitalism also constructed attractive valves through which young hip consumers, neo-yuppies and aspiring new bourgeoisies could escape into the spiritual realm. Here fast-talking corporate gurus would tell them how to balance hefty profit-making with ‘corporate responsibility’, and where slick men and women of faith would (basically) explain to their ever-growing audiences how to enjoy the fruits of brand-waving consumerism with a set of spiritual lingo and rituals that would help keep them connected to God.

All this took place mostly after 1995. A sham democracy manipulated by the military from behind the scene that had turned politicians into punching bags for whatever that was putting a spanner in Pakistan’s economic progress saw the new urban generation consider democracy as a corrupt hindrance in their growth as an economic force. Though millions of young people suddenly became aware of the corrupt ways of politicians, ironically the same millions could not figure out the scams they were being burdened with in the name of plastic money by the banks.

Neither was this generation willing to ask that simple question: if politicians were siphoning off millions of rupees, weren’t these still only a fraction of what the military got by way of military aid, jobs, industries and, of course, the largest chunk of the country’s budget? Then came our own nuclear device, the clandestine and expensive making of which our leaders had boasted about earlier and we were ready to eat grass. But it was certainly neither the elite nor the middle class that were chewing this figurative grass. It was the majority, the so-called masses.

Alas, though the coming together of neo-capitalism and faith only managed to instill psychic confusion in the youth, this confusion, instead of lashing out against the artificiality and dichotomies found in the new ways of economics and spirituality, buckled under the weight of a narrative constructed by the drivers of the new arrangement. Those who had benefited most from the setup — the military, the slick religious preachers and capitalists – with the help of the corporate gurus, seth-owned private media, began to invoke God and ‘honour-cum-pride’ against those whom they considered to be enemies of the middle class, the country and religion.

These ‘enemies’ were politicians advocating democracy – they became labelled as ‘corrupt’ and insensitive—not that many of them were not corrupt. Enemies also included the last bastions of liberal or the shrinking left-leaning journalism (who suddenly became ‘liberal fascists’) and certain Islamic scholars who, unlike the political-religious groups patronised by the military and the traders, spoke more about the benevolent, tolerant and democratic aspects of Islam instead of hatred in the name of faith and national honour.

The glaring dark irony surrounding even the most modern members of the new generation is that they have ended up equating the availability of all the goodies of the corporate and consumerist setup that they have become addicted to with a projected belief. A belief that suggests that a ‘moderate’ authoritarian political setup (preferably by the army or at least backed by it), coupled with an identity defining version of bourgeois Islam, is what will make Pakistan more sovereign and more proud.

It’s like a hoard of sheep all going baa when told by the media, the military and the political maulanas, that they are the defenders of the Pakistan’s honour. The sad part is, each sheep, though baaing exactly like the other, is deluding himself into believing that he truly is a proud citizen.

 

[muse]

Sheep ? Really? - No sir, certainly not, that's rather unfair

t’s like a hoard of sheep all going baa when told by the media, the military and the political maulanas, that they are the defenders of the Pakistan’s honour

At least, these at the very least, mouth, ideas that ordinary persons want to be invested in - After all, what's so bogus about being proud citizens?

And now for the heart of the matter:

All this took place mostly after 1995. A sham democracy manipulated by the military from behind the scene that had turned politicians into punching bags for whatever that was putting a spanner in Pakistan’s economic progress saw the new urban generation consider democracy as a corrupt hindrance in their growth as an economic force. Though millions of young people suddenly became aware of the corrupt ways of politicians, ironically the same millions could not figure out the scams they were being burdened with in the name of plastic money by the banks.

Neither was this generation willing to ask that simple question: if politicians were siphoning off millions of rupees, weren’t these still only a fraction of what the military got by way of military aid, jobs, industries and, of course, the largest chunk of the country’s budget?

Now, I realize it's "Smokers Corner", one must ask what it is that Mr. Paracha is smoking --- Democracy is not some utopia that can be called into existence by simply uttering the word "democracy" - in Pakistan, politicians, who belong to political parties which do not allow democratic processes with their own organization and which do not extend those same political and organizing processes to the "local" level, seek now to position themselves as if champions of other than their considerably bloated bank accounts -- though Mr. Paracha, has a point, after all, these same so called politicians can by force of law, effect the size and quality of the armed forces, why don't they? sheepish citizens wonder, even as they "baa" in unison.

 

[RabzonKhan]

The unfolding war

By Dr Akmal Hussain
Published in The Express Tribune, March 8th, 2011.


The cold-blooded assassination of Minister Shahbaz Bhatti, following that of Governor Salmaan Taseer, has made apparent the modus operandi of the Taliban and al Qaeda, in this, the latest phase of their war strategy: Target a prominent politician who explicitly opposes their extremist ideology on humanitarian grounds, pass a fatwa and then execute with telling efficiency. The objective is to demonstrate that it is the ideology of the Taliban and al Qaeda, rather than the Constitution of Pakistan, which defines what is acceptable. Equally, it is they who determine the guilt of an errant individual and the punishment to be given, rather than Pakistan’s judiciary.

Conversely, through these assassinations the extremists are attempting to delegitimise the government by showing that it has failed to protect the lives of its leaders, let alone ordinary citizens. What makes this failure endemic to the existing institutional structure is that organs of the state itself, which are supposed to provide security to citizens, are undermining it. This is illustrated by the statement of the advocate general of Balochistan, Salahuddin Mengal, before the Supreme Court recently: “We are recovering dead bodies, day in and day out, as the Frontier Constabulary and police are lifting people in broad daylight at will, but we are helpless.” It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court in a recent court order observed, “…the law and order situation is required to be tackled in accordance with the Constitution and it is the duty of the state, including the federal as well as provincial governments, to protect the lives and properties of the citizens in terms of Article 9 (Security of Person) without any discrimination”.

The relationship between the state and citizens in the context of security is fraught because of another factor: The widespread perception that Pakistan’s premier Intelligence Service (ISI) treats with kid gloves some of the deadliest extremist groups who were earlier nurtured as ‘strategic assets’.

What then is the war strategy of the Taliban and al Qaeda? It is clear from their declarations as much as their systematic actions that they seek to capture the Pakistani state, or as large a part of it as they can. Their strategy is informed by the classic principle of guerilla warfare: Undermine the will to fight of the military, the government and their civilian support base. They have attempted to achieve these goals in three phases: The first was to capture significant swathes of Pakistan’s territory, initially in Fata and then the settled areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. In this phase, the extremists were driven back by the Pakistani military in what is regarded as one of the quickest and most efficient combat operations in the history of modern counter-insurgency. The second phase of the Taliban and al Qaeda strategy was to spread out to the major urban centres and establish sleeper cells there. At the same time, gun and suicide bomber attacks were mounted against key military, intelligence and police installations to undermine morale. The third phase consisted of assassinating some of Pakistan’s key political leaders. First, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, then Salmaan Taseer and now Shahbaz Bhatti. This was combined with organising a propaganda apparatus with a national outreach to capture ideological space. This was done by winning allies amongst elements in the media, madrassas, selected sectarian groups and some of the mainstream religious parties.

The danger to the state and society of Pakistan lies in three eventualities: (a) Continued violence reaches a point where governance is seen to collapse. This would create the possibility of a military managed formation of a ‘national government’ dominated by right-wing parties, with a representation for the Taliban. (b) Widespread mayhem through simultaneous terrorist attacks in key cities, as a prelude to an extremist counter-revolution. (c) A Mumbai-style attack against an Indian city which could trigger a devastating war between Pakistan and India.

The writing is on the wall. It is time for the democratic government and the security apparatus to get their act together to defend Pakistan and its people.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Faisalabad blast

Editorial
Published in The Express Tribune, March 9th, 2011.

There are few cities in Pakistan that have been spared the wrath of the extremists. Until yesterday, Faisalabad was one of those that had been relatively peaceful. A car bomb that exploded at a CNG station, killing at least 25 people and destroying a PIA building and gas station, has shattered that calm. Although it is not yet known who was responsible for the blast, given the sensitive location of the attack — near several military and government buildings as well as the ISI office — it is fair to assume that the Taliban or one of its affiliates is behind the bombing.

The attack comes just a few days after Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif complained about the use of the term ‘Punjabi Taliban’. Sharif claimed that the term was being employed to sow interprovincial discord and blamed Interior Minister Rehman Malik of concocting it as a way of undermining the PML-N. The fact that his words were followed so swiftly by yet another attack, should give Shahbaz Sharif food for thought and, perhaps, force him to eat his words. The fact is that there is a group of connected extremist groups operating out of Punjab, all of which have now allied with the Taliban. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammed, Harkutul-Mujhahideen and Harkutul-Ansar have all been increasingly active in the province, particularly in southern Punjab. Most of these militant outfits are offshoots of the Sipah-e-Sahaba, which itself has seen a resurrection in recent years. That this nexus is behind the Faisalabad bombings is likely. That they have been responsible for militant attacks and the spread of extremism in Punjab is beyond any doubt.

Meanwhile, the PML-N-led provincial government has adopted a head-in-the-stance posture. The government is seemingly uninterested in tackling the Taliban menace, preferring instead to wage war against its political opponents. The PML-N is staying true to its ideological roots by trying to appease or even co-opt religious elements in the country. It is not that the PML-N supports the terrorists. It just doesn’t have the same level of vitriol for them that it reserves for the PPP. If that attitude doesn’t change, the battle against extremism in Punjab will be lost.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: Faisalabad and Adezai bombings

Daily Times
March 10, 2011

Although the bombings in Faisalabad and Adezai were conducted in two different areas, using different methods and for different reasons, they have been perpetrated by the same forces that want to destabilise Pakistan. The Faisalabad attack took place near the office of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on Mall Road. Being unable to breach the security cordon of the ISI office, the militants exploded the car bomb at a nearby CNG station, taking 25 lives of innocent bystanders, and injuring more than a hundred people, some of whom are in critical condition. Reportedly, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for this heinous act, stating they did it in retaliation for the security forces’ detaining and later killing one of their senior members in Faisalabad. In Adezai area near Peshawar, a suicide bomber attacked the funeral of a peace committee member’s wife, which was attended by a large majority of Adezai lashkar (militia) members. The Adezai lashkar was formed to protect the local community from Taliban militants. By several accounts, this private militia constituted by the local people stood as a bulwark against the advance of the Taliban to Peshawar. However, lack of support by the military and the government compelled them to threaten that they would lay down their arms and make peace with the Taliban for survival’s sake. The existential question for them is why should they expose themselves to attacks by the Taliban if the government is not interested in supporting them.

All this reminds us that that the military establishment and the ISI have been playing with fire for a long time and now that fire has spread and arrived at their own doorstep. ‘Strategic assets’ created to secure dubious goals in Afghanistan are wreaking havoc in that country and also spilling the blood of Pakistanis. One might ask whose interests are these ‘assets’ securing if not the people of Pakistan, who foot the bill of all these adventures and then pay the additional cost of this treacherous game with their lives. Pakistan’s security agencies will have to scotch the monster they have created, and the sooner they do this the better. Also, it would not be in the interest of the military itself to alienate peace lashkars created to fight against the same elements the military is fighting. If the Adezai lashkar members had been uncertain about which way to go, this suicide bombing must have cleared their minds. Arranging for the security of the community in defiance of the Taliban has cost them heavily. For them, there is no hope of military or other assistance and making peace with the Taliban is probably the only option. If they do not do it now, they would risk being attacked again.

Last but not the least, the buck stops with the interior ministry, which is responsible for the country’s internal security. Rehman Malik has miserably failed to devise and implement a credible and coordinated plan that would ensure that each head of the hydra of militancy is cut off. Despite his blatant failure, the federal government insists on retaining him at this post. It would be in the best interests of the country for someone more capable to be given the challenge and task of providing security to the citizens of Pakistan. *

 

[muse]

More Pakistanis should read the editorial above -- note some of the ideas, some friends will recognize these ideas from our private discussions -- and this should allow them to exert influence, to the degree possible, that it's not too late and that course corrections are existential imperatives :

1. I Don't TRUST YOU anymore, I cannot rely on you -- and if I cannot rely on you, WHY are you relevant ?-

Pakistan’s security agencies will have to scotch the monster they have created, and the sooner they do this the better. Also, it would not be in the interest of the military itself to alienate peace lashkars created to fight against the same elements the military is fighting. If the Adezai lashkar members had been uncertain about which way to go, this suicide bombing must have cleared their minds. Arranging for the security of the community in defiance of the Taliban has cost them heavily. For them, there is no hope of military or other assistance and making peace with the Taliban is probably the only option.....the ISI have been playing with fire for a long time and now that fire has spread and arrived at their own doorstep

No one has to buy the argument put forward, but at least do consider, do learn to discern friends from foes

And speaking of foes:

2. Decapitate this evil, NOW!! The interests and continued existence/relevance of those security apparatus itself is at stake

Pakistan’s security agencies will have to scotch the monster they have created, and the sooner they do this the better....

.Rehman Malik has miserably failed to devise and implement a credible and coordinated plan that would ensure that each head of the hydra of militancy is cut off. Despite his blatant failure, the federal government insists on retaining him at this post. It would be in the best interests of the country for someone more capable to be given the challenge and task of providing security to the citizens of Pakistan

.

Again, no one needs to buys into this stuff, Maybe they can ride the tiger, do what has not yet been done - Have we not had enough of reckless gamblers??

 

[muse]

Readers may also enjoy Radicalization in Pakistan and Afghanistan
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

[RabzonKhan]

The paradox

By Khurram Husain
Published in The Express Tribune, March 11th, 2011.

There is a medieval legend about a sword so powerful that whoever wielded it could defeat entire armies single-handedly. The legend opens with a dead monarch in his chambers. Outside the window, the smouldering wreckage of the capital city is clearly visible; pillaged and burned beyond all recognition. The monarch’s slayer pries loose the all-powerful sword from his dead fingers and walks out of the room with it.

Here is the paradox the legend poses: How could a sword that bestows so much power upon its wielder, be found in the hands of a monarch slain like a commoner? The answer is slowly revealed as the story unfolds.

The new possessor of the sword initially reaps the whirlwind. The conqueror’s realm grows rapidly and not one amongst his neighbours dares cast a covetous eye towards it. The fear of the sword keeps all of the conqueror’s rivals and enemies at bay.

But slowly things begin to change. The conqueror begins to doubt the loyalties of his trusted lieutenants. He becomes uncomfortable with disagreement. He spends most of his time polishing the sword himself, nursing it like a precious prize, muttering to it. He becomes angry when people try to draw his attention away from the sword towards the affairs of state.

Soon the conqueror begins to fear that people are out to separate him from the sword. Squabbles break out in the court, between those who would pander to his growing dementia and those who would plead for sanity. As the court sinks into the quicksands of palace intrigue, the realm falls into disrepair.

Rebellion sweeps the auxiliary forces of the army, petty rajas cease to remit revenue, merchants flee to neighbouring cities, taking their wealth with them; banditry and disease, hunger and inflation stalk the countryside, while speculators and hoarders drain the hope out of people’s lives.

Meanwhile, confusion reigns at the court. Visceral squabbling engulfs the ruling elites over questions like, who is the enemy and who the friend, who is responsible for this and who is to blame for that?

Concerns about the state of the realm are parried away by the sycophants who gladly indulge the conqueror’s obsession with the sword. “So long as the sword is with him,” the sycophants say, “none of these trivial matters will ever disturb my Sovereign’s peace.” The conqueror nods in agreement.

As the dementia consumes the conqueror, the sycophants reign supreme. “The rebellion is the handiwork of those who want to take our sword away from us,” say the sycophants. “The penury of the populace is the fault of those who do not respect the sword and the security it has brought us.” Everything they see, they tie back to the sword. And the conqueror nods every time.

The tipping point arrives in the story. The conqueror’s daughter is persuaded to carry a message to him, and in his paranoid dementia, he slays her with the sword. Panic breaks out across the land. Everyone flees the realm, save for those who connived to pander to his dementia. With nobody left but sycophants and panderers, charlatans and crooks, tricksters and liars and third-rate rhetoricians, the dementia takes total control of the court.

Then the rebellious auxiliaries appear on the city gates. Soon they are inside the city. Soon they are marching up the steps of his castle. Nothing but confusion and disarray stand in their way.

The contender enters the room, walks up to the decrepit old man holding the sword in his lap, and with one sweep of his own — conventional — sword, slays him.

He picks up the sword and turns to leave with his prize. He pauses to peer out the window where the smouldering wreckage of the capital city is clearly visible; pillaged and burned beyond all recognition. The answer to the paradox is revealed. The monarch’s death and the destruction of his realm does not come in spite of possessing such a fearsome weapon, but because of it.

I’m reminded of this tale every time I hear somebody argue that the terrorism engulfing our country is the handiwork of those who wish to separate us from our nuclear weapons.

 

[RabzonKhan]

A grim trajectory

Dawn
Cyril Almeida
March 11 2011

PEOPLE killed in suicide bombings, people killed in a hail of bullets, people killed by remote-controlled IEDs — dead, dead, dead. At every step, at every turn, people are dying violent deaths in Pakistan. And there is no end in sight.

Are the militants and the terrorists winning?

The short, glib answer, yes, they are. The longer, more nuanced answer: if this keeps up, they will. Ã la

`Winning` here doesn`t mean toppling the state and running the place the Afghan Taliban in the `90s.

Winning just means pulling the country into a low-level equilibrium: endemic violence and insecurity; low growth and few economic prospects; poor social indicators; a populace that is further under-educated and distanced from the modern world; the reign of intolerance, misogyny and misanthropy.

The parasitic state would still exist in this nightmare scenario, but it would be too worried about its own security and well-being to do anything for a frightened and defenceless population.

Sounds Orwellian?

Not really. If you think about it, that pretty much describes the trajectory Pakistan has been on the past few years. Now, the convulsions have been more and more frequent; the orgy of violence is near constant.

The `solutions` are well-known. Operational and tactical: infiltrate the new sub-groups; improve intelligence-gathering; better coordination between the various law-enforcement and security agencies.

Policy level: stop trying to parse the various strands of militancy — the good from the bad — it is an amorphous whole, a threat in totality to the country and the people. Suck the extremist `oxygen` out of the air, present a counter-narrative to the extremist vision. Refine the instruments at the disposal of the state — legal, law-enforcement, intelligence — to progressively excise the extremists embedded in society.

If the solutions are so well-known, why aren`t they being implemented?

To partly answer that, think about the state and how if functions. In what area has it succeeded?

Poverty is rampant. Growth is uneven. Educational system is dysfunctional. Health sector is poor. Crime, of the non-militant kind, is commonplace. Financial system is weak. Manufacturing base is wobbly. Agricultural market is broken.

This is a Third World country and it`s a Third World country for a bunch of reasons. Across the board, institutions of state are frail and ineffectual. If they fail at ordinary stuff — the stuff of making people`s lives better — why would they succeed at the extraordinary stuff, fighting a violent insurgency?

Does that mean we give up?

No. We haven`t given up on the state system after more than six decades of anaemic results, so why should we give up on the state system after half a dozen years of poor results in fighting an insurgency?

New challenges mean developing new responses. Take intelligence-sharing. Director of X agency may be worried that if he shares his intelligence with other agencies, X agency`s clout will diminish. No one likes seeing their clout diminish.

Or Director of Y agency simply prefers to keep his head down because if you do nothing — good or bad — you don`t get blamed, and not getting blamed is the first rule of survival in a bureaucracy.

Inter-agency rivalries and bureaucratic anxieties exist the world over — see, 9/11 and the spectacular failures — but just because they are real and formidable doesn`t mean they can`t be overcome.

Paradoxically, the relentless wave of violence may jolt the state system into a better response. Security officials across the country are — after dismissing their own culpability — worried men. Self-preservation is causing them to rethink their approach.

So much for the somewhat good news. The bad news: time isn`t on our side.

The militants may not be any closer to toppling the state, but they are threatening to permanently alter the trajectory of the country.

In a race between reversing bureaucratic and political inertia and encouraging a robust institutional response on the one side and militants with bombs and guns and dreams of suicide on the other side, it isn`t looking good.

Suppose it takes the state another five to six years to figure out how to get the desired results (a generous calculation). By then Pakistan would have already been in a vortex of violence for over a decade. Add another decade for the praxis to take hold. Not much may be left to save by the time we are in a position to try and save.

Now, to the other part of why the state has not been able to implement well-known solutions. Two words: Pakistan Army. But here, too, the answer has become more nuanced in recent times.

The army now `gets` the threat from militancy. At least it understands the internal threat. Senior army officers are worried men.

Even from the narrowest of self-interests, the current state of Pakistan is not good for the army. If you like playing golf, taking the kids out to buy the latest iPad, fancy yourself to be a real-estate investor, dabble in the stock market a bit, sit around with friends and shoot the breeze, none of what is going on is helpful.

But there remain two problems. One, the army is largely clueless, a conventional army trying to fight an unconventional conflict. Note the wholesale borrowing of terms from the American COIN manual — clear, hold, build, etc. Real life isn`t like the movies: helping create a monster doesn`t mean you know the secret to take it down.

Two, they remain blind. India-centric led to a fear of a two-front war which led to certain choices that have led to a three-front war — soldiers are stationed on the eastern and western borders and are fighting inside Pakistan. But the army, at least publicly, remains unwilling or unable to connect the dots so.

Clueless, blind, a broken system and no political will — that about sums up the Pakistani state at the moment.The militants haven`t won. But neither will they be worried. Time is on their side.

 

[RabzonKhan]

VIEW: Conspiracy factories

Daily Times
Laila Khan
March 12 2011

When the US, under President George W Bush decided to invade Iraq, a well-documented propaganda campaign was undertaken in which the American people were convinced that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11 attacks — a piece of misinformation that was necessary to justify the invasion. The propaganda tactic used was a simple one: continue repeating a piece of misinformation, even after it has been disproved, and enough people will either believe the lie or get so confused about the issue that space will be available to promote a political agenda. This same propaganda tactic of repeating a claim even after it has been disproved appears quite regularly in Pakistan’s media and, like its neo-con cousin in the US, the misinformation presented is born in a network of shadowy ‘think-tanks’.

An example of this tactic at work can be observed in the number of news stories that continue to assert that the number of visas issued to American officials has skyrocketed in recent years and that the country has witnessed an influx of Americans granted entry without undergoing standard background checks.

This conspiracy theory was disproved a few weeks ago when Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani held a press conference during which he opened the books and revealed to journalists that there was no conspiracy and that all visas were issued following proper protocols.

Despite the evidence, media commentators continue to repeat these claims. In a piece that was published in two newspapers on the same day, one ‘analyst’ notes that Pakistan’s embassy in Washington issued 400 visas to the US nationals in two days, but he does not explain that the majority of these visas were issued for a state visit by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her staff and security before a July 2010 visit. According to the embassy, these American officials were in Pakistan only for two or three days. Without this context, the readers are left to believe that the floodgates have been opened for an invasion of ‘Raymond Davises’.

The author goes on to quote the embassy that “approximately 3,555 US diplomats, military officials and employees of allied agencies were issued visas in 2010”. But, as the ambassador explained last month, most of the US officials and contractors were only in the country for three months each, so the total number of US nationals in Pakistan would be 1/4th to 1/3rd of the total number of visas issued during the year. This means that, at any given moment, there are probably 1,000 or fewer US officials in Pakistan.

This number, too, should be viewed in context. Since the 1980s, the number of US diplomatic visas has been roughly the same. During the Cold War, the largest CIA station in the world was located in Pakistan. As many as 780 US diplomats were listed in the Islamabad Diplomatic List during the government of General Zia. The author claims that “there have been no worthwhile voices on these expansionist designs of the US in Pakistan from various circles”, but the truth is that the numbers do not support any claims of American expansion in Pakistan.

In addition to these misrepresentations, it is also curious that multiple authors are repeating the same personal attack against unnamed government officials by suggesting that ‘personal relations and personal gains’ are being prioritised over the national interests of Pakistan. Is it a mere coincidence that multiple authors wrote the same smear, or is this a case of talking points being provided to guide the writers?

A week before one article appeared in the newspaper, a paragraph from it was posted as a comment on the website of another newspaper. The commenter left a different name than that of the analyst. This raised eyebrows among media watchdogs.

Research revealed that this same article first appeared on the website of a ‘virtual think-tank’ chaired by a retired military officer. Further research revealed that this retired military officer also serves as Islamabad Editor for an American virtual think-tank, and that the chairman had bragged about the retired officer’s association with the ISI in an interview of September 2010. Additional research uncovered the fact that a former ISI chief recently joined the editorial board of directors of this think-tank.

In fact, the board of advisors for the retired officer’s virtual think-tank is composed entirely of the faculty of National Defence University, media analysts, and retired military officers. One media analyst associated with the think-tank brags in his bio that he has performed “public policy outreach projects as a consultant, serving mostly government clients in the larger Middle East region”.

All of this information only raises further questions. Who are these prolific ‘analysts’ that are filling our newspapers with content and our heads with ideas? Many of them claim to be academics, but they appear to be primarily associated with defence universities and are writing for websites with links to military and intelligence officers.

Do the national media groups that publish commentary by these analysts verify the backgrounds and affiliations of these so-called analysts? Do we even know that some of these analysts exist? If so, why do the media groups not inform their readers of these authors’ associations with the military intelligence establishment?

We should also ask why journalism has become the favourite retirement hobby for our military and intelligence officers. It seems that there is virtually no end to the number of think-tanks that are paying retired officers to write ‘analyses’ that end up being widely spread in newspapers and websites. And it must be asked who is funding all of these websites and newspapers that are proliferating throughout the country? Surely, all of these respected generals are not donating their time for free.

Unfortunately, the answers to these questions must wait until another day. But one thing is clear: Pakistani media is infested not only with conspiracy theories, but with propaganda rings that seek not to inform but to manipulate. As long as this is the case, media freedom is only an illusion.

The writer is part of the team that runs Pakistan Media Watch

 

[RabzonKhan]

Pakistan and national defence

Editorial
Published in The Express Tribune, March 15th, 2011.


Director General Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Athar Abbas has made a spirited defence of Pakistan’s military budget and sought to correct what he calls some misunderstandings in relation to what the Pakistan Army is spending on maintenance and induction of new weapons. More importantly, he said that if the government wanted to make reductions in defence it should talk to India, which poses a threat to Pakistan.

Major General Abbas correctly pointed to the waste occurring in the spending of the civilian budget which was responsible for creating the extra pressure on an already troubled economy and pointed to the gap in the military expenditures of Pakistan and India: $4 billion and $36 billion respectively.

The discussion of Pakistan’s national defence has always been an important topic in the country, especially during periods of low economic growth and financial emergencies. This is quite normal and it happens wherever a country comes under pressure from the malfunctioning of the national economy. In Pakistan, disclosure of the complete military budget in parliament has always been a controversial matter, and its absence from the budget document has often been attributed to the dominance of an army that runs state policy to maintain its importance among the state institutions.

It is also clear — as pointed out by Major General Abbas — that alternatives to defence policy are always possible through negotiation with the enemy, from whom threat is traditionally perceived. All countries under economic duress resort to negotiations and there are examples, where defence perceptions have changed among nations after they overhauled their relations with the ‘enemy state’. However, there are certain additional dimensions to Pakistan’s national defence that make the option of ‘normalisation of relations’ an important factor. The era of ‘intra-state’ conflict is upon us in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan are subject to this internal upheaval and need to revisit their hostile bilateral equation that swells their military budgets.

There are two ways the problem can be approached. One is the ‘Sri Lankan model’, which has overcome its intra-state conflict after ‘normalisation’ with its neighbour, India. The other way is to link the internal conflict to the ‘enemy without’ and worsen an already bad security situation. The increased heat of accusations of ‘cross-border’ interference through ‘local elements’ and ‘non-state actors’ actually brings the enemy states close to war, while internal conflicts deteriorate. The concept of ‘security’ is not only purely military; the economist also presents his alternative to interstate conflict hitched to disputes that can’t be resolved. The economist’s prescription of normalisation through trade and cross-border investment presumes resolution of perennial disputes after development of what he calls ‘co-dependency’.

Pakistan has also to deal with the question of the paramountcy of army. This military dominance over civilian governments is long-standing and is linked to Pakistan’s textbook nationalism, designating India as a permanent enemy. Because of a steadily declining economy and uneven development across the country, the ‘binding’ effect of our textbook nationalism is no longer uniform. The ‘threat of India’ does not inspire national integration in parts where alienation is actually increasing because of neglect. Is the Pakistan Army prepared for a paradigm shift?

What Major General Abbas says points to this shift, but events covered extensively in the media prove that it has not happened. In fact, what often appears credible is yet another instance of pressuring the civilian government into pliancy by exploiting the internecine national politics which may have actually been revived to maintain the army’s dominant position. The latest proof of it is Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s absurd ‘strategic wisdom’ that not only India, but also two other states, including the sole superpower, were busy bribing the Taliban to attack Pakistan!

 

[muse]

One hopes friends among TT will find the article above interesting - perhaps they may have visited the ideas the article raises elsewhere --- and may it give them cause to consider --- Isn't it curious how some ideas at defence.pk find echoes in much larger chambers, it would seem.