The Pak-US Relationship

[RabzonKhan]

A B O U T T H E P A K I S T A N
P O L I C Y W O R K I N G G R O U P

The Pakistan Policy Working Group is an independent, bipartisan
group of American experts on U.S.–Pakistan relations. The group
was formed in January 2008 to assess the state of U.S.–Pakistan
relations and to offer ideas to the next U.S. President and his
Administration on managing this critical partnership. The group’s
efforts were guided by the understanding that Pakistan is and
will remain one of the United States’ foremost foreign policy and
national security challenges, deserving of heightened attention in
the new Administration.

The group met regularly for eight months to discuss topics
involving Pakistan’s domestic political situation, counterterrorism
and internal security challenges, relationships within the
region, and economic development and assistance. To inform
the group’s work, members traveled to Pakistan, where they
interviewed government officials, academics, business leaders,
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers. Various U.S.
officials and Pakistani experts also joined the group’s regular
meetings to brief members on their areas of expertise. This report
presents the findings of those meetings and research trips.

This report was reviewed and endorsed by Richard L. Armitage,
former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, and Lee H. Hamilton,
former U.S. Representative and Co-Chair of the 9-11 Commission.
The findings in this report reflect a strong consensus view of the
group but not necessarily every individual’s specific views or those
of their respective institutions.

Complete Report:
PakistanPolicyWorkingGroupReport_0908.pdf (413K PDF)

 

[Neo]

Pakistan a major issue for US media, think-tanks​

WASHINGTON, Oct 5: Pakistan has become a major issue in the US election and is projected here as the biggest threat to American interests across the world.

On Sunday, some US newspapers reported that an ailing US economy had given Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama an unassailable edge over John McCain and the Republican can only come back in the race if there is a a national security crisis.

Pakistan topped the list of possible scenarios for such a crisis.

“Pakistan’s new government is toppled. Al Qaeda and the Taliban, with support from elements in Pakistani intelligence and the military, get a stronger foothold in the nuclear-armed nation. India, which already accuses Pakistan of complicity with terrorist attacks on the country, initiates a cross-border attack on its longtime enemy. The regime of President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan becomes even shakier. Chaos reigns in one of the most dangerous places on the planet.”

And it is not just the media which is ringing the alarm bells. A joint report by a dozen US think-tanks, collectively the Pakistan Policy Working Group, is equally alarming.

“Pakistan may be the single greatest challenge facing the next American president,” the report warned.

“Pakistan is suffering its greatest internal crises since partition. … We find US interests in Pakistan are more threatened now than at any time since the Taliban were driven from Afghanistan in 2001.”

One of the authors, Stephen Cohen, encouraged the US administration to attack suspected terrorist hideouts inside Fata.

Another set of US experts on Pakistan predicted an increase in US military strikes at targets inside Fata. At a recent meeting of the Pakistani-American Congress in Washington, the experts said that neither the United States nor India was interested in breaking up Pakistan.

Jonathan Landay, a veteran US journalist who has stayed engaged with Pakistan for more than 20 years, said that New Delhi would not like to live next door to a destabilised Pakistan “where non-state actors armed with nuclear weapons run amok”.

Walter Andersen of the Johns Hopkins University warned that any US president would come under enormous pressure if US troops continued to be killed by Pakistan-based insurgents and regardless of what party he belonged to, he would order strikes at Pakistan.

Rodney Jones, who runs a local consultancy, warned that Pakistan and the US were on a collision course and immediate steps were needed avoid a crash.

“As the September 19 bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad demonstrates, there is little time to waste. Our options in Pakistan are diminishing rapidly,” warned the joint report.

The report noted that political developments in both Pakistan and the United States “make this an opportune moment” to recalibrate US policy.

“The upcoming US presidential election will… bring a new set of policymakers to power and a potential willingness to consider fresh approaches to managing the difficult but exceedingly important US-Pakistan relationship.”

The report by the Pakistan Policy Working Group also included recommendations for strengthening US policy towards Pakistan, urging Washington to exhibit patience with Pakistan’s new democratically elected leaders, while working to stabilise the government through economic aid and diplomacy. But at the same time, emphasise to the Pakistan government that US patience is not unlimited, and that the US is prepared to be patient only so long as the Pakistan government is achieving visible results in its efforts against the extremists in the tribal areas. Invest in US institutions and personnel in Pakistan. And increase support for civilian institutions that would provide oversight of the military and the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence.

 

[Neo]

US-Pakistanis ask Obama to ease bombing rhetoric​

* Express concern through letter at comments supporting violation of Pakistan’s border​

LAHORE: A group of Pakistani-Americans and anti-war activists delivered a letter on Thursday to the Chicago office of Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama, calling on him to ‘cool political rhetoric about bombing targets in Pakistan’, the Chicago Tribune reported on Friday.

“We are particularly concerned with your public pronouncements earlier this week in support of violating the borders of our ally, the country of Pakistan.... You must understand the sweeping dismay that your avowed support for US military incursions into Pakistan...has elicited among untold numbers of Pakistani-Americans and peace activists across the country,” the Tribune quoted the letter as stating.

It noted that during his debate on Tuesday with Republican candidate John McCain, Obama had said he was not calling for the invasion of Pakistan, but also said “If Pakistan is unable or unwilling to hunt down [Osama] bin Laden and take him out, then we should.”

Ifti Nasim, host of a Pakistani radio show in Chicago called ‘Sargam’, was quoted as saying the US was ‘making a mistake’ by “attacking Pakistan and making Pakistan your enemy”.

According to the report, Nasim and other protesters criticised US military incursions into the Tribal Areas to attack Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. They also decried the Bush administration’s use of unmanned military drone aircraft, which have resulted in civilian deaths.

Nasim said McCain wanted to continue the policy. The Tribune said the group planned to send a similar letter to McCain.

The report also quoted another Pakistani-American Said Umar Khan as saying his hometown of Mardan outside Peshawar “has seen a wave of displaced people escaping fighting in the Tribal Areas”.

The Tribune noted that on Thursday, officials of Obama’s campaign had restated his comments from the debate this week. “They said Obama understands Pakistan is an ‘important ally’ and is calling for a partnership with the South Asian nation through increased US aid for health, education and security,” the report said.

It also noted that Pakistani-Americans and other immigrant and anti-war groups such as the Chicago Coalition Against War and Racism were planning an anti-war march at 2pm on Saturday at Devon Avenue and Leavitt Street.

 

[Neo]

Biased report against Pakistan released by US Congress ​

Friday, October 17, 2008

ISLAMABAD: The concerned quarters in Islamabad have taken strong exception to a recent congressional report on ëSecurity situation in Afghanistaní, which accuses Pakistan of carrying out the July 7 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

The report has been prepared by the Congressional Research Services, which is meant for internal use of the US law-makers it reads: “The growing Indian financial and political influence might have been a cause of the July 7, 2008 attack on Indiaís embassy, presumably by pro-Pakistan elements that want to limit Indiaís influence.” India is majorly involved in reconstruction and development work in Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era.

Pakistan considers this as an increasing strategic depth of India in Afghanistan as India is using its nine consulates there to spread its influence, the report adds.

However, the report fails to bring into light any evidence regarding Pakistan’s involvement in the Kabul attacks. The car bomb attack on July 7 had resulted in the death of more than 40 people, including a senior Indian Diplomat and injuring more than 100.

The Congressional Report said India and Pakistan are working against each other in Afghanistan. India, which has been a victim of cross-border terrorism, sees Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as a threat because of al-Qaeda’s association with radical organisations in Pakistan.

 

[pkpatriotic]

Press Roundtable on Pakistan

Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Washington, DC
October 9, 2008
Released on October 17, 2008

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: It’s good to talk to you guys. We thought it was maybe a good time to get together again because there’s so much happening with the U.S. and Pakistan.

QUESTION: Something is always happening.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: Something is always happening. I was going to say, even though we had quite an eventful week two weeks ago in New York when President Zardari was there -- we had lots of meetings -- it seems to me that events keep moving along, both good ones and bad ones. So let me say a few words at the beginning and then just take questions for a while.

The summary that I would give you of our meetings with Pakistani leaders who came to New York was: we expressed our very strong support for civilian democratic government in Pakistan and our strong desire to work with this government as they take on some of these enormous challenges. We were struck by their determination to address all the difficult issues that the country faces: extremism, but also some economic and development issues of great importance throughout the country.

We are continuing, obviously, our broad support for Pakistan, to help modernize Pakistan, whether modernizing education or the economy or institutions for the military. We’re also, as events arise, looking to make sure that we provide the kind of assistance that’s necessary with particular events. So you saw in the summertime, Prime Minister Gillani came here. We addressed with him the food question, food and agriculture assistance, going forward.

Right now there’s a serious problem of [displaced] people because of the fighting in Bajuar. In the last week or two we’ve gotten together a total of $8 million…to help the government help those people who have been displaced by the fighting. Recognize that fighting’s necessary, but obviously the people who are displaced and who are harmed by it need to be taken care of so we’re making our contribution of a little more than $8 million to try to help those people. And we know some of these people have been pushed over into the Afghan side, so we’ll also look at how to take care of them on the Afghan side of the border as well.

The last thing I’d note that I think is very important is the Friends of Pakistan meeting we had in New York, which was an international group formed with a dozen countries, but we found there are many more who want to participate. There are, I think, a lot of people with good solid programs already, and people that are looking to start programs.

I think the basic structure of this is going to be to focus on those big categories the chairmen pushed out, but to really hear from the Pakistani government what is their program, what is their commitment, what is their plan for each of these areas, then look at how we make sure that our support and our aid programs, our commitment matches their commitment in terms of going to the right areas and doing the right thing. So if they have plans to build schools and find teachers, maybe we can help make sure their teachers are properly trained, to make sure that their commitments and our support match up. That’s where I think one of the most useful parts of Friends of Pakistan comes in. Obviously there are people who will participate in this that are looking at how to assist Pakistan, and that’s most welcome.

We’ve started to work behind the scenes with the other governments involved on follow-up meetings. We were planning on doing a follow-up meeting late this month or early next month in Abu Dhabi, so we’ve been talking to the Pakistani government obviously in the lead, and the Government in Abu Dhabi about how and when that meeting should take place. It’s not scheduled yet, but everybody wants to do it in that timeframe that we announced.

QUESTION: By the end of this month?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: We said end of the month. It may be early November, but that’s around the time. Towards the end of the month or early next month.

We’re following up on that. We’re going to make this work. We’re going to make it work concretely and positively for the people of Pakistan. As was said at the meeting itself by several people, it’s a friend of a democratic Pakistan and a friend of the Pakistani people. The goal is to help the government institute programs that help build institutions of democracy in Pakistan and also help the government serve the needs of the people who are faced with all kinds of difficulties right now.

That’s enough from me. I’m happy to take questions on these things or whatever.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) dollars. Would that be part of the discussions in Abu Dhabi? Is (inaudible) also, like (inaudible) program or (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: It’s not a defined program yet. You’re going to have each country bring to the table what it can bring to the table. We’ve got a big assistance program -- it’s in the area of $800 million. There are proposals in the United States to take this up much higher, particularly on the civilian side. Each country’s going to bring to the table what it’s got, but the sum total will be fairly significant and the goal is to make all these pieces work properly together.

So it’s not the place to try to raise new funds or get a new cash transfer or something like that. Those remarks have more to do with the fiscal aspect of things, and the Pakistani budget and foreign exchange accounts – Pakistan’s taking a lot of debt to sort of stabilize them, and I think it’s in that context that we talked about getting some deposits or available funds.

QUESTION: You’re assisting them in doing so?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: We’re talking to them along with the IMF mostly about what kind of steps they can take to reestablish their…to establish fiscal health.

QUESTION: What have you proposed?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: That’s not something really we’re leading. That’s something the Treasury Department and the IMF and the Asian Development Bank are working.

QUESTION: What are the $800 million, that’s your commitment?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: That’s our ongoing assistance program. That’s our assistance program this year, and there are proposals to raise it in the future.

QUESTION: So we can say that the next meeting they will come up with a framework (inaudible) to materialize what kind of assistance --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: It’s not a number. It’s a plan to match the Pakistani plan with foreign support. That’s fundamentally what we can do in this group. There will be money available because there are a lot of donors there, but the goal is not to come up with a number. The goal is to come up with a program that matches Pakistani commitments, Pakistani plans with foreign support.

QUESTION: Medium-term? Long-term?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I think short, medium, long, whatever we can figure out. We’re still early days with this.

QUESTION: Yesterday was a briefing by the chief of the, the new ISI chief and (inaudible).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: Wasn’t it a closed briefing?

QUESTION: I know. When you brief about 400 people…(inaudible) separate areas, not private but separate areas. (Inaudible) beyond Pakistan’s control. Pakistan exercises no control there, and there have been independent reports (inaudible) saying that (inaudible) or any Pakistani (inaudible) between (inaudible) and (inaudible) which has (inaudible). How (inaudible) on the basis of information which you possess that (inaudible) control?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: You’re doing an interpretation of remarks reportedly made that neither you nor I heard, so let’s wipe that out completely and say there is no way I can comment on something that somebody supposedly said in some meeting that none of us were at.

What is the situation in the Northwest Frontier, and particularly the settled areas, and how concerned are we about it? We’re quite concerned about the situation in the settled areas in the Northwest Frontier. If you look back a year or two at this there was a lot of trouble in certain tribal areas and there were forays, you might say, into some of the other parts of the settled areas. Then you compare that to the situation now where the militants are doing more and more things in the settled areas. We’ve seen fighting in the Swat Valley where the government has taken them on. They’ve been up there actually for quite a while.

So I think you’d have to say there’s been an expansion of militant influence into the settled areas in a way that’s disturbing. Now there have been a number of military operations already this year. There is, I think, a government effort, and we’ve had a lot of talks with government up there through our folks in Peshawar who talk to people like (inaudible) about the situation.

I think one of our goals is to help them build development in those areas. So we’ve got the Tribal Areas Development Fund and other development money that goes up there to try to help the government develop those areas with roads and schools and bridges and electricity and hospitals for people all over those areas, try to help them build institutions of that region. I’m not sure how much money we eventually got, but we looked at the police, for example, what can one do to help the police in that area take more control?

I think there’s a strong desire on the part of the government and the government in the Northwest Frontier and the governors in the Northwest Frontier to establish more stability and control. But we recognize that that’s more difficult over the past year or two, and it’s going to take a concerted effort, an organized effort, to get rid of that militant…those militant incursions.

QUESTION: You said that part of U.S. efforts is to help Pakistan (inaudible) development to those areas. (Inaudible) situation there (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: It’s ongoing already. Since the beginning of the year we’ve been signing contracts, undertaking projects. That’s $150 million a year for the tribal areas; we also have regular aid programs in the settled areas up in the Northwest Frontier. So it’s an ongoing process of really trying to help the tribal areas develop, but also some of the other areas up in the Northwest Frontier.

QUESTION: Do you (inaudible) assistance (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: You need a measure financially (inaudible) the second year, or you can measure it in terms of contracts on the ground, which is calendar year 2008, which is when a lot of it got up and running in a big way.

QUESTION: You talk about (inaudible) and building there. What about (inaudible) problem that is (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: It’s very important. There’s a lot of different remarks that people make and they’re often taken out of context. I think we all think there needs to be an integrated military/political/economic plan to address the problems that they’re having. You need to involve the people in the process. You need to give them the benefits of development, and you need to fight the hard-core militants who are not allowing the people to develop.

We have always made a point that we’re willing to help the Frontier Corps develop and modernize itself. We’re willing to help the army learn to do better in terms of addressing these issues. We’ve helped with equipment. We’re in talks with our Congress about how to improve the capability of the F-16s that are being used up there. So there is a military aspect to it, but I never want to talk about the purely military aspect of this because it’s always linked to a need to provide people with a role in their governance and to provide people (inaudible).

QUESTION: Which means government is moving in all these dimensions? Political, economic…

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I think so. Generally, yes. Some places, when there’s heavy fighting going on you can’t build bridges. So there’s always kind of a tradeoff, but they’re always trying to move forward on all fronts.

QUESTION: How would you define (inaudible) in Afghanistan?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I wouldn’t compare it to that. I would say over the last year or two in Pakistan its gotten worse.

QUESTION: Is it alarming?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: It’s a very challenging situation. I’m not given to exaggeration. I’d just say it’s a difficult and challenging situation.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) on how (inaudible)? Do the Pakistani people understand the degree that (inaudible) U.S. (inaudible)? And when you (inaudible). How would you talk to the Pakistani people? What would you tell them to correct this perception if Pakistan and America (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: First, let me say I can’t really talk about any particular military action or a course of military action. But there are fundamental things to remember. It’s Pakistan’s war, not just a U.S. war. I think the elected leadership of Pakistan has made it very clear that the militants, the extremists, particularly in the tribal areas but in other parts of Pakistan, too -- this is a challenge to the vision that they have for Pakistan’s future. It’s a challenge, a threat, to the vision that Pakistanis have for their own future. They were elected because people shared a vision of a modern, a moderate, and Islamic Pakistan. Pakistan is a country of people who believe in Islam. But their vision of Islam, their vision of modern society, their vision of democracy is being attacked by these militants. The people who bombed the Marriott were trying to kill the vision that all these new leaders have of a modern Pakistan.

I think first and foremost we understand they want to proceed because they think it’s essential to their goals, the goals that the people had who elected them, to achieve a more stable, more modern Pakistan.

The United States shares that goal. We’re happy to support it. That’s primarily where we are. We’re in support of a goal that the Pakistani government and Pakistani people share.

We also know there are some very dangerous people holed up in the tribal areas. It’s got a long history to it. I think we all understand that. But particularly when you have al-Qaida people up there who are threatening the whole world, when you have people who are up there who are training and sending forces across into Afghanistan, it’s important that we all look at the bigger picture and that we end the use of this area for terrorism, we end the use of this area for terrorism against Pakistan, for terrorism against Afghanistan, and against the whole world.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: The tribal areas in particular.

QUESTION: And (inaudible) areas as well?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I don’t know if I can quite go that far. I don’t know I can identify all the locations of the al-Qaida people. They’re probably more in the tribal areas than elsewhere. I don’t know if any of them have moved out into other areas.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) meetings of Afghan leaders and Taliban in Saudi Arabia?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: First, I wouldn’t hang too much on this. It appears that it’s been in iftaar. That was pretty much what happened.

But President Karzai has always made clear that he wants to have a process of reconciliation. There needs to be a way for Afghans who want to join in the new constitution, who want to support Afghanistan -- there needs to be a way for them to come in and join. We’ve always supported that. We’ve always made very clear that with certain provisos: you’re not going to take in al-Qaida, you’re not going to take in people who have war crimes on their heads, you’re not going to take in people who defy the constitution. You can’t imagine giving the Taliban a piece of Afghanistan and saying you can keep girls out of school and you can beat people in markets for not having long enough beards.

So the fundamental has to be accepting the constitution, but there has to be a way for people to come in. So, I think this is something that the Afghans have in their hands, the Afghan president is exploring. If he has the Saudis supporting it, that’s probably a good idea. But we’ve always known there has to be some kind of process like this and it’s an Afghan process first and foremost, and we support it.

QUESTION: Would you like to (inaudible) if any Afghans (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: There’s been a lot of negotiation up in the tribal areas and we’ve always supported the view that we’ve heard from Pakistan, from Pakistanis of different parties and Pakistanis in the tribal areas: that’s the view that you negotiate with the tribes, not with the Taliban; you negotiate with the tribes, not the militants, not the extremists. I think we all recognize under whatever reconciliation proposals you’ve got, there may be some people who are willing to accept the benefits of joining with the government and there are going to be other people who are going to fight against it. So you have to welcome in those who accept the benefits of joining the government and you have to fight the people who are going to continue to try to kill you.

QUESTION: Essentially the tribesmen joining the (inaudible) in flushing out (inaudible) terrorists? How do you see that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I think that’s the way it should be. There have been some signs of that. I think those are good. Fundamentals to any counter-insurgency are fundamental to the situation in the tribal areas. There are a lot of people up there who just want to live decent, normal lives. I haven’t been out as much as maybe some of you have, but the people I’ve met from the tribal areas, whether they were NGOs or in official positions or tribal leaders, they all say: we want jobs, we want health care, we want education, we want roads, we want development. And they have a right to that as much as anyone in any other part of Pakistan or anywhere else in the world. And so, many of them are actually willing to stand up at great danger to get those things for their own people. We’ve seen too many leaders of the tribal areas when they have stood up and want a different course, they’ve been assassinated – hundreds of maliks. And yet there are still people who are brave enough and strong enough and who believe enough that they’re willing to stand up. So I admire them and I welcome them and I think the government of Pakistan is pursuing the right course in terms of (inaudible).

QUESTION: The Saudi move, (inaudible) before (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I don’t know we knew about the specifics of that, and we haven’t really talked with the Saudis that much about it at this point. We’ve talked to a few. But we’ve always had a clear understanding with the Afghan government and with President Karzai about reconciliation and we’ve always had clear support for reconciliation that brings people into the fold of the new constitution and the new government.

QUESTION: About the (inaudible), can you say that you have a better understanding with this government on those issues?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I didn’t say anything about (inaudible). No. It’s not a question I can answer on military actions.

QUESTION: You have (inaudible) as well. That (inaudible) appear to be more willing to cooperate with you on…

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I don’t want to characterize it. Let me put it this way: they’ve made very clear what their views are on some of these things that have happened. I’ll leave it at that.

QUESTION: Judging from the current (inaudible), do you think, how long will it take to bring things under control?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I don't know. And I don’t know if they know. We’ll see if they try to estimate that when they talk to Parliament. Talking to Parliament is a good thing. There does need to be strong national consensus because these are serious events and serious actions. I think you remember, before the elections we always said we think a democratic base for action against the militants is a better way, a stronger way to fight extremism. And so we’ve welcomed that, we’ve welcomed them talking to Parliament and including Parliament in this process. But as far as, kind of, the military estimates, you need political and economic ones of how long this might take. A lot of that does depend on the actions of people themselves in the area. If the leaders in the area and the tribes in the area decide that they want the benefits of governance, then it could happen more quickly. If they have to fight their way through and eliminate the militants first, that becomes a longer and more difficult proposition.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) seen in the U.S. media also the (inaudible) Pakistan is the most dangerous place on earth. And then there are predictions that it’s about to fall apart, (inaudible). What is your take on that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: There are a lot of very dangerous things happening in Pakistan, perhaps more dangerous things happening in Pakistan than anywhere else on earth. That doesn’t make Pakistan as a nation dangerous. Pakistan as a nation, as a government, as a society, I see as generally moving in a positive direction, generally getting organized for long (inaudible), and trying to carry out moderate democratic government.

Now they say deadly enemy, several deadly enemies (inaudible), and it’s a very difficult task. I see that Pakistan’s, sort of, getting itself organized. I see the government and the army cooperating. I see a broad consensus in Pakistan that they need to take on the militants. But it’s a very challenging task because there are a lot of dangers, dangerous people, dangerous activities going on in Pakistan.

QUESTION: There has always been (inaudible) in the media and there are elements within the Pakistani establishment, especially the defense and the intelligence establishments which have not really believed, in the fight against al-Qaida and the Taliban, believed it is Pakistan’s fight. In fact they are sympathetic and supportive of the (inaudible) forces. Is that (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I don’t know. It’s a question that would have to be asked in Pakistan and answered in Pakistan. We don’t know the history, the history of Pakistan’s involvement with the anti-Soviet jihad, the groups that they funded -- with our money sometimes -- during the ‘80s. And then the history of the ‘90s and Pakistan’s working with them, supporting the Taliban. And the decisions in 2001 and 2002 to break with that.

So I think we understand this has been an evolving process. Where it stands right now I think is more of a (inaudible). What I do know is there’s a very clear commitment from the Pakistani government that appears to be supported by the military as well, to take on the militancy because the militancy is a threat to their vision, their shared vision of Pakistan as a moderate, democratic nation, a modern democratic nation.

I do think when they say this is Pakistan’s fight they’re truly committed in that way. I think that is shared by a broad section not only of the political (inaudible), but people throughout society including people in the military.

QUESTION: Something (inaudible) after the Vietnam War and this seems to (inaudible). Do you see us going the same way as (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: I don’t think anything similar happened, and I hope nobody feels the same way (inaudible) Cambodia (inaudible). No, I think you have to examine Pakistan on its own terms. It’s a very complicated place, but it’s a place where a lot of people are firmly committed to modernization, modern economy, a modern education system, modern army, firmly committed to democracy. And that offers a lot of hope. That certainly offers a lot of people we can work with.

QUESTION: One question about India. In view of the recent (inaudible) Indo-Soviet Nuclear Cooperation Treaty, what kind of reaction did it receive from Pakistan? Negative?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: Indo?

QUESTION: U.S.-India.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: You’ve seen what they said in public. They have a position that’s well known. (Inaudible) from them privately as (inaudible). I think the key to this is to understand that we are absolutely committed to working with Pakistan on Pakistan’s energy needs. And indeed during the strategic partnership meeting we had with the Foreign Minister and others who were here, we talked about Pakistan’s energy needs. We talked about how to improve the cooperation. And Pakistan’s energy problems are also balanced by Pakistan’s energy potential. Pakistan’s energy potential -- a lot of that is in coal, particularly clean coal; a lot of it’s in hydro power, in some of the mountainous areas of the country; a lot of it’s in alternate energy wind farms and other things down by the Macram coast.

So in the end we’re going to help Pakistan, work with Pakistan on Pakistan’s energy potential which has a uniquely Pakistani character. That’s where we really need to reinforce our efforts. And we heard very strongly from the Pakistan side they want us to do more. We told them we agreed. We’d try to step up our cooperation.

QUESTION: But no nuclear cooperation?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: It’s just not on the table.

QUESTION: This is only India specifically.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: The agreement we have with India is unique to India, not a model for anything else. But as I said, the goal is to help Pakistan with its energy needs.

When a kid turns on the light bulb to do his homework he doesn’t really care if the light comes from coal, hydro, nuclear or whatever. He cares that the light bulb goes on. We want to help turn the lights on for kids to do their homework.

QUESTION: There is (inaudible) very serious energy crisis.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: Absolutely. I think there’s a developing program by the government to address those energy needs. But yeah, there’s a lot to do, and unfortunately a lot of the energy investments take time so it’s hard to immediately satisfy the needs for energy that are appearing now.

QUESTION: Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER: Thank you very much. It’s good to see you all.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Haqqani stresses need to fight extremism with intelligent actions

WASHINGTON, Oct 18 (APP): Fighting terrorism requires intelligent actions, not just actions and in the case of Pakistan-Afghan border region the intelligent thing is that only Pakistani forces take anti-terror actions on its side, Islamabad’s envoy to the United States advocated in an interview.
Ambassador Husain Haqqani also empahsized it is time Washington paid attention to Pakistan in its own right and not in the context of some regional interests.

“I think it’s time for Pakistan and the United States to move away from their short-term, quid pro quo engagements, and develop a strategic partnership for peace in that region and for consolidation and strengthening of Pakistani democracy”.

“And, I think that while there will be disagreements between (US presidential) candidates on how to do that, I think that the important thing is that both presidential candidates in the United States understand the importance of Pakistan and they also understand that for stability in Pakistan, there must be democracy, and that Pakistan’s stability is important to American security,” Haqqani stated in an interview with Yale Global.

To a question on the fight against terrorism in the context of American forces incursion into a tribal village along the Afghan border on September 3, he said, “it was a mistake. It achieved no war aim, they did not get any terrorists or militants, they did not manage to kill al-Qaeda leaders or the Taliban, and it only served to enrage the Pakistani public.”

Since then, the envoy said, the Pakistani government has engaged with US officials on the issue. He felt they now understand that Pakistan itself has been taking action against militants.

“All wars require intelligent actions, not just actions. And the intelligent thing to do is to let Pakistan take care of the Pakistani side of the border because if it escalates, if American troops get inducted, they will have another theater of war without necessarily having any war aims being fulfilled.”

The elected government, he said, has asked the United States to help with counter-insurgency training. “We have asked the US to provide us the equipment that is needed for this kind of warfare.”

“This is different terrain, so we need different types of trained soldiers. The mistake under Musharraf was that the training was not there, the equipment was not there, and the soldiers were sent in large numbers. We sacrificed many lives in the process. Now, we are going to have an intelligent war. Now, I don’t know if you’ve noticed, in the last two to three weeks, in Bajaur, Pakistan has conducted a very methodical operation.

“Air power has been deployed. And, because it has been a methodical operation, several hundred militants and Taliban have been killed, and they are feeling the pressure, which is why they are attacking Pakistani cities again. We will have to bear that fear, and we will have to do something about protecting our cities against the suicide bombers as well,” Haqqani added.

Reiterating President (Asif Ali) Zardari and Prime Minister (Yousuf Raza) Gilani’s commitment to fight against terror, the envoy said: “This is Pakistan’s war. We have to save Pakistan from becoming a Taliban home. The Taliban’s vision is not our vision. The Taliban don’t want young women to ever receive an education. They have been blowing up schools in Pakistan.And more Pakistanis have been killed by suicide bombers than Americans have been killed, so we don’t look at this as an American war that we have to fight to please America.

We are fighting for our own nation, for our own future, and I think as long as the Americans understand that, and not withstanding any specific directive or not, the American forces will stay on the Afghan side of the border, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and NATO will work cooperatively to make sure that terrorists are denied the opportunity to organize and raise attacks on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border.”

 

[pkpatriotic]

WB urges development support for Pakistan
Sunday, October 26, 2008

WASHINGTON: World Bank President Robert Zoellick has said the next U.S. administration emerging from November 4 election must focus on long-term development partnership with Pakistan as part of efforts to ensure peace and stability in key South Asian region.

Writing an article for an American daily, Zoellick said that both presidential candidates Democratic Barack Obama and Republican John McCain are alive to regional dangers in the context of security challenges but underscored success will take an approach, encompassing all the various trouble-shooting elements.

Both candidates have recognized the dangers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but success will take more than troops.

The earliest hard-edged test for the new administration will be synthesizing security, governance, legitimacy and development in a long-term partnership with both countries and with a wider coalition, from NATO to China and India, he advocates in an article due to appear in the Post on Sunday.

A successful wind-down in Iraq, a path of progress for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a push for peace and development in the Middle East will also set the context for achieving broader peace and security in the region, says Zoellick, who served as U.S. deputy secretary of state in 2005-06.

 

[Neo]

US professor says: Pak-US relations strained, await dire consequence​

BSS, Dhaka

The relations between the United States and its key ally Pakistan have recently been 'strained', said an American political scientist on Saturday, predicting that such waning ties would bring 'dire consequences' for both sides and the region as well.

Professor Charles H Kennedy of Wake Forest University said the six-decade-long relations between the two countries have not only sustained injuries at official levels, but also at people's level.

"More than 72 per cent Pakistan nationals view US presence in Afghanistan as a major threat to Pakistan's sovereignty," Kennedy told a seminar at Dhaka Club, referring to a recent survey in Pakistan and the US.

He said US military interventions around the world are viewed by the majority of Pakistanis as a measure to 'weaken Islamic world and castigate Muslims'.

On the other hand, he said, many US nationals believe that Pakistan has somewhat kept 'Taliban' alive in its restive frontier provinces bordering Afghanistan.

"Any distance would be disastrous for both sides," said Kennedy, also a charter member of North American Bangladesh Council.

He listed a number of recommendations for improving US- Pakistan ties that include changes in US unilateral policies towards Afghanistan and Pakistan and listening to the voice of their peoples.

The professor said the US needs to change its style of operation in the Pakistan-controlled remote tribal areas, where Taliban and Al-Qaeda members are believed to have been hiding to regroup for a massive offensive to offset President Bush's 'war against terror' agenda.

The operation has so far cost $3 trillion, a figure almost equivalent to China's one-year GDP, he added.

He said Pakistan deserves to have military and development assistance from the US, which on the other hand should involve its key ally, Pakistan, in its operation to quell insurgency and terrorism.

The opium business in Afghanistan, he said, should also be stopped to frustrate supply of money to terrorists.

 

[Vinod2070]

By Dr Farrukh Saleem
America's Pakistan-policy, or more appropriately Musharraf-policy, was fabricated by Vice President Dick Cheney, at the Old Executive Office Building, with input from the US Department of State at the Harry S Truman Building. Then came July 2008 and it all changed.

In July, the Indian embassy in Kabul was bombed. In July, the United States Senate confirmed US Army General Petraeus as commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM). In July, the prime minister of Pakistan, under Rule 3(3) of the Rules of Business of 1973, placed the ISI under the administrative, financial and operation control of the Interior Division (and withdrew the order the following morning). In July, the New York Times, quoting CIA sources, alleged "links between members of the spy service, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, or the ISI, and the militant network led by Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani (a major reshuffle in the army had become inevitable after all this)."

In July, the turf battle between the Department of State and the Department of Defence over Pakistan was won by Defence. Dick Cheney lost out to Robert Gates, the 22nd US secretary of defence, and (General) Michael Hayden, the 20th director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). From that point onwards, it was the CIA flying MQ-9 and RQ-9 predator unmanned aerial vehicles into Pakistani air space and General Petraeus had become the chief architect of America's war strategy in this region.

Pakistani decision makers have failed to read America's changing policy dynamics. They went begging to Saudi Arabia for the Saudi Oil Facility when the facility had to be negotiated in Washington. We went begging to President Bush when Bush had become a lame duck and Pakistan policy was being run out of the Department of Defence. We went begging to China when China did not dare become an obstacle to American national interests in Pakistan.

Clearly, America wants something from Pakistan that Pakistan is either not willing or incapable of delivering. In the meanwhile, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) claims that its net reserves amount to $4.3 billion which -- after accounting for gold and dollar repo agreements -- may in effect be a mere billion dollars or so. In essence, the SBP may not have enough money to pay for the following month's oil imports. Then there's interest payment on Pakistan bond falling due for payment in December and a $500 million principal repayment due in another three months. While all this goes on in Pakistan, America has to take care of her own worst recession since the Great Depression.

On October 14, parts of the new National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were leaked to McClatchy (32 daily newspapers and a total circulation of 3.3 million). Apparently, the NIE's conclusion on the state of Pakistan is: "no money, no energy, no government." Now, that is scary: "no government" in a nuclear-armed state.

On the other side of the border, all that General Petraeus has is one combat brigade. Petraeus cannot do much but buy time till he has at least three additional combat brigades. On September 23, Robert Gates said that Pakistan was facing an "existential threat." On October 31, Petraeus shall be taking over CENTCOM's command and get an additional combat brigade by December and two more by the summer of 2009. Petraeus will then be in a position to negotiate and that too from a position of strength.

November 4 is election day in America. In December, the SBP must pay interest due on its dollar bonds. On January 20, a new president of the United States will take office and whether it's Obama or McCain South Asia's war theatre is going to expand. In February, the SBP must pay back $500 million on a maturing dollar bond.

The News International - No. 1 English Newspaper from Pakistan - Saturday, December 30, 1899

Does this partly or fully explain the reason for China not coming to Pakistan's aid?

The scenario being painted is quite scary.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The News International - No. 1 English Newspaper from Pakistan - Saturday, December 30, 1899

Does this partly or fully explain the reason for China not coming to Pakistan's aid?

The scenario being painted is quite scary.

I believe the postulation of Defense winning out over State is pretty spot on, and has been mentioned in several newspapers.

The scary part is that if this continues, you have policy being determined by an agency that according to one senior US military official quoted in the NYT, 'sees Al Qaeda under every rock'.

That is, the CIA, as it did with the Iraq fiasco, is either fabricating intelligence to make its case, or is again leading everyone up the garden path in terms of poor analysis of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and ISI complicity.

This is also why I personally prefer Obama over McCain, though Pakistanis have always liked to think that 'Republicans are friendlier to Pakistan'. That is a flawed and superficial analysis. There is an account in the Times of Obama's meting with Gen. Patraeus (I'll post it later) in which he holds his own against him, and openly disagrees with him on the future Strategy of the US if he were to become President.

McCain, the doddering ultra-patriotic fool that he is, will continue to defer to the warmongers in the military and intelligence establishment, and their plan is one that will only lead to disaster - like I said, with defense winning over State, it seems the US policy has essentially become one of destroying one country after another in the pursuit of poorly defined goals, and then attempting to rebuild them.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Here is an excerpt from the article about Obama's interaction with Gen. Patraeus:

General David Petraeus deployed overwhelming force when he briefed Barack Obama and two other Senators in Baghdad last July. He knew Obama favored a 16-month timetable for the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Iraq, and he wanted to make the strongest possible case against it. And so, after he had presented an array of maps and charts and PowerPoint slides describing the current situation on the ground in great detail, Petraeus closed with a vigorous plea for "maximum flexibility" going forward.

Obama had a choice at that moment. He could thank Petraeus for the briefing and promise to take his views "under advisement." Or he could tell Petraeus what he really thought, a potentially contentious course of action — especially with a general not used to being confronted. Obama chose to speak his mind. "You know, if I were in your shoes, I would be making the exact same argument," he began. "Your job is to succeed in Iraq on as favorable terms as we can get. But my job as a potential Commander in Chief is to view your counsel and interests through the prism of our overall national security." Obama talked about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, the financial costs of the occupation of Iraq, the stress it was putting on the military.

A "spirited" conversation ensued, one person who was in the room told me. "It wasn't a perfunctory recitation of talking points. They were arguing their respective positions, in a respectful way." The other two Senators — Chuck Hagel and Jack Reed — told Petraeus they agreed with Obama. According to both Obama and Petraeus, the meeting — which lasted twice as long as the usual congressional briefing — ended agreeably. Petraeus said he understood that Obama's perspective was, necessarily, going to be more strategic. Obama said that the timetable obviously would have to be flexible. But the Senator from Illinois had laid down his marker: if elected President, he would be in charge. Unlike George W. Bush, who had given Petraeus complete authority over the war — an unprecedented abdication of presidential responsibility (and unlike John McCain, whose hero worship of Petraeus bordered on the unseemly) — Obama would insist on a rigorous chain of command.

Why Barack Obama Is Winning - TIME

I would also like to draw your attention to the highlighted comment of Patraeus. What does that imply?

It implies the very thing some of us have been pointing out since the US made the decision to put boots on the ground in Pakistan, and Defense reportedly won over State, that the US policies being formulated at that point lost sight of the long term repercussions, and lost any long term strategic value (in terms of regional stability), and instead focused on short term tactical gains.

This is why I called some on another forum 'militaristic'. People who, due to their professions, were all gung-ho about this change, because they had no desire to focus on long term goals, or for that matter any desire to define what a feasible long term goal is in the context of the Afghan-Pakistan conflict.

Its a limited militaristic view of 'with us or against us', in which the only thing that is paramount is 'killing the bunnies', and how to get Pakistan to 'kill more bunnies'. That view is essentially what Patraeus acknowledged, and that view is the dangerous view that prevailed and led to the Angor Adda raid.

 

[Kharian_Beast]

I don't care what people say, but the financial and terrorist crises was part of a plan initiated by the US since 2001. Musharraf and Bush bled the country, then passed it on to incapable thieves who are going to suck it dry.

 

[dr.umer]

Wrong Way in Pakistan​

27 Oct 2008

By Marvin G. Weinbaum

In its eagerness to reverse the mounting insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States has embarked on a policy course that could shatter our vital strategic partnership with Pakistan. By allowing American combat forces to freely conduct raids into Pakistani territory, a move that President Bush authorized in July, the United States intends to pressure Pakistani leaders to step up the fight against militants ensconced in the borderlands. But this policy threatens cooperation between the two countries, possibly to the breaking point.

Pakistani insurgents, initially staggered by the U.S. reaction to the Sept. 11 attacks, have rebuilt their organizations in the border regions; from those havens, they launch attacks against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan. The 80,000 to 120,000 Pakistani troops that have engaged the insurgents since 2003 have been funded by the United States at a cost of $1 billion a year. Yet whether it is because troops are ill-equipped, poorly trained or unmotivated, operations have been inconsistent and incomplete.

As the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda have regrouped, Washington has come to question the sincerity of Pakistan's effort. U.S. officials, concerned that elements in Pakistan's security forces are sympathetic to the insurgents and more interested in protecting than pursuing them, understandably want to deal with the threat if Pakistan will not or cannot.

But there is too much at stake for the United States to risk dangerous, misguided policies. Neither intrusions by U.S. Special Forces nor missile attacks by drones will, by themselves, take out the thousands of insurgents and their allies along the frontier. They also cannot seriously disrupt the global terrorist network. No one proposes deploying the tens of thousands of U.S. troops that it would take to saturate the tribal region and sustain any successes. And fighting a united tribal nation on its turf would cause massive civilian casualties. Even a more covert U.S. approach, designed to play radicalized tribal groups against one another, would likely reveal that their hatred for America exceeds any historic or personal animosities.

So what is left? There simply are no quick fixes. The cooperation of the Pakistani military and its intelligence services, working with a civilian government, remains indispensable. At the moment, however, the Pakistani people offer no support; polls reveal that fewer than 20 percent of Pakistanis view the United States favorably. The U.S. invasion of Iraq galvanized their belief that, as in Afghanistan, the war was essentially about defeating Muslims. The United States alienated even our Pakistani friends by pursuing policies that came to be perceived as trying to salvage the presidency of Pervez Musharraf and thwart democratic processes.

While there is some comfort to be found in President Asif Ali Zardari's views on combating terrorism, having Zadari as Musharraf's replacement in the role of U.S. point man will not help to build a popular consensus against extremism. Just last week the Parliament voted unanimously to condemn the latest U.S. missile attack on Pakistani territory. If Zardari tries to blunt criticism of the United States, his governing coalition could be threatened. And the likely victor as prime minister in a new election, Nawaz Sharif, has a strongly jaundiced view of U.S. involvement in the frontier and Afghanistan.

Proposals geared toward helping the United States regain the trust of Pakistanis are under consideration. Most, like the Biden-Lugar bill, recognize the importance of nonmilitary assistance that addresses Pakistan's endemic social problems and infrastructure deficits. Measures that help Pakistan weather its economic crisis will have an effect, as will a more favorable trade policy, especially on textiles. The United States can also be more convincing in its commitment to civilian rule and democracy.

By contrast, openly violating Pakistan's territory will make matters worse. And Pakistan can easily retaliate. Most supplies for U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan are delivered to the port of Karachi and then shipped by road to Afghanistan. Early last month, trucks seeking to cross the border were stopped, a warning of what might happen if U.S. raids continue. Pakistan's most senior military officer, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, has said the army will defend Pakistani sovereignty at all costs. Cross-border raids risk provoking direct confrontation between U.S. and Pakistani forces and could accelerate the growing dissension in military ranks over continued Pakistani alignment with the United States.

Terrorist sanctuaries are unacceptable. But eliminating them requires Pakistan's cooperation. The bombing of the Marriott in Islamabad last month was a reminder that we are fighting different faces of the same war. Continuing to carry out uninvited, inconclusive U.S. cross-border attacks will make finding cooperation with Pakistan more elusive.

The writer is a scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute and a former State Department intelligence and research analyst on Pakistan and Afghanistan.

 

[Vinod2070]

Here is an excerpt from the article about Obama's interaction with Gen. Patraeus:



I would also like to draw your attention to the highlighted comment of Patraeus. What does that imply?

It implies the very thing some of us have been pointing out since the US made the decision to put boots on the ground in Pakistan, and Defense reportedly won over State, that the US policies being formulated at that point lost sight of the long term repercussions, and lost any long term strategic value (in terms of regional stability), and instead focused on short term tactical gains.

This is why I called some on another forum 'militaristic'. People who, due to their professions, were all gung-ho about this change, because they had no desire to focus on long term goals, or for that matter any desire to define what a feasible long term goal is in the context of the Afghan-Pakistan conflict.

Its a limited militaristic view of 'with us or against us', in which the only thing that is paramount is 'killing the bunnies', and how to get Pakistan to 'kill more bunnies'. That view is essentially what Patraeus acknowledged, and that view is the dangerous view that prevailed and led to the Angor Adda raid.

Thx. for sharing this. And yes its a bit confusing as to which President will be good for the USA and the world.

Obama has shown less sensitivity to Pakistani sensitivities (pardon the pun) than McCain who has a bit of cold war mindset and remembers Pakistani friendship and contributions.

McCain is also more pro-free trade and less protective compared to Obama. I know that for Pakistan that may be a lower priority than the security issues but once you have dealt with them you will need a less protectionist USA president than Obama.

So a mixed bag. Both have their pluses and minuses and let the best man win.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Wrong Way in Pakistan​

27 Oct 2008

By Marvin G. Weinbaum

In its eagerness to reverse the mounting insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States has embarked on a policy course that could shatter our vital strategic partnership with Pakistan. By allowing American combat forces to freely conduct raids into Pakistani territory, a move that President Bush authorized in July, the United States intends to pressure Pakistani leaders to step up the fight against militants ensconced in the borderlands. But this policy threatens cooperation between the two countries, possibly to the breaking point.

Pakistani insurgents, initially staggered by the U.S. reaction to the Sept. 11 attacks, have rebuilt their organizations in the border regions; from those havens, they launch attacks against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan. The 80,000 to 120,000 Pakistani troops that have engaged the insurgents since 2003 have been funded by the United States at a cost of $1 billion a year. Yet whether it is because troops are ill-equipped, poorly trained or unmotivated, operations have been inconsistent and incomplete.

As the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda have regrouped, Washington has come to question the sincerity of Pakistan's effort. U.S. officials, concerned that elements in Pakistan's security forces are sympathetic to the insurgents and more interested in protecting than pursuing them, understandably want to deal with the threat if Pakistan will not or cannot.

But there is too much at stake for the United States to risk dangerous, misguided policies. Neither intrusions by U.S. Special Forces nor missile attacks by drones will, by themselves, take out the thousands of insurgents and their allies along the frontier. They also cannot seriously disrupt the global terrorist network. No one proposes deploying the tens of thousands of U.S. troops that it would take to saturate the tribal region and sustain any successes. And fighting a united tribal nation on its turf would cause massive civilian casualties. Even a more covert U.S. approach, designed to play radicalized tribal groups against one another, would likely reveal that their hatred for America exceeds any historic or personal animosities.

So what is left? There simply are no quick fixes. The cooperation of the Pakistani military and its intelligence services, working with a civilian government, remains indispensable. At the moment, however, the Pakistani people offer no support; polls reveal that fewer than 20 percent of Pakistanis view the United States favorably. The U.S. invasion of Iraq galvanized their belief that, as in Afghanistan, the war was essentially about defeating Muslims. The United States alienated even our Pakistani friends by pursuing policies that came to be perceived as trying to salvage the presidency of Pervez Musharraf and thwart democratic processes.

While there is some comfort to be found in President Asif Ali Zardari's views on combating terrorism, having Zadari as Musharraf's replacement in the role of U.S. point man will not help to build a popular consensus against extremism. Just last week the Parliament voted unanimously to condemn the latest U.S. missile attack on Pakistani territory. If Zardari tries to blunt criticism of the United States, his governing coalition could be threatened. And the likely victor as prime minister in a new election, Nawaz Sharif, has a strongly jaundiced view of U.S. involvement in the frontier and Afghanistan.

Proposals geared toward helping the United States regain the trust of Pakistanis are under consideration. Most, like the Biden-Lugar bill, recognize the importance of nonmilitary assistance that addresses Pakistan's endemic social problems and infrastructure deficits. Measures that help Pakistan weather its economic crisis will have an effect, as will a more favorable trade policy, especially on textiles. The United States can also be more convincing in its commitment to civilian rule and democracy.

By contrast, openly violating Pakistan's territory will make matters worse. And Pakistan can easily retaliate. Most supplies for U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan are delivered to the port of Karachi and then shipped by road to Afghanistan. Early last month, trucks seeking to cross the border were stopped, a warning of what might happen if U.S. raids continue. Pakistan's most senior military officer, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, has said the army will defend Pakistani sovereignty at all costs. Cross-border raids risk provoking direct confrontation between U.S. and Pakistani forces and could accelerate the growing dissension in military ranks over continued Pakistani alignment with the United States.

Terrorist sanctuaries are unacceptable. But eliminating them requires Pakistan's cooperation. The bombing of the Marriott in Islamabad last month was a reminder that we are fighting different faces of the same war. Continuing to carry out uninvited, inconclusive U.S. cross-border attacks will make finding cooperation with Pakistan more elusive.

The writer is a scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute and a former State Department intelligence and research analyst on Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I'd say this is also essentially along the lines of what I argued.