The Pak-US Relationship

[muse]

EDITORIAL: Conditional aid

According to a report published in the Wall Street Journal, “The White House has started awarding billions of dollars in security assistance to Pakistan conditional on whether Islamabad shows progress on a secret scorecard of US objectives to combat al Qaeda and its militant allies and ease tensions.” As per the report, which US officials have denied, there are four ‘baskets’ or conditions that Pakistan must fulfil in order to get the desired military aid. These four baskets are: “Pakistani cooperation in exploiting the bin Laden compound; Pakistani cooperation with the war in Afghanistan; Pakistani cooperation with the US in conducting joint counterterrorism operations; and cooperation in improving the overall tone in bilateral relations.” The US recently suspended $ 800 million in military aid to Pakistan. The reasons are quite simple. The furore in Pakistan after the Raymond Davis affair and the Abbottabad raid led to stricter visa restrictions for US officials, removal of American trainers from Pakistan and a controversy regarding the movement of US diplomats. On the one hand, the Raymond Davis affair and Abbottabad raid fuelled anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and on the other the aftermath of these events irritated Washington. Following the May 2 raid, the US Congress questioned the rationale for opening its purse strings when it came to Pakistan’s military. For the first time, the US adopted a nuanced policy and did not touch civilian aid. The US needs to forge a relationship with the people of Pakistan instead of keeping it limited to dictators or the ruling elite. If US aid can improve the quality and standard of life of the people of Pakistan through development in the social sector, it would help quell anti-Americanism in the country.

US officials may deny the report related to conditional military and security aid, but it is hardly surprising. We have been predicting that the Pak-US relationship has gone into a nosedive due to Pakistan’s dual policies. US officials question Pakistan’s reliability and do not want to reward our military for its duplicity. Neither side has been able to paper over the cracks and repair the ruptures in the relationship. The condition of civilian supremacy over the military in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act is now being followed in spirit by the US policy-makers. As far as the war on terror is concerned, there was a dichotomy of interests from day one. General Pervez Musharraf took the Americans for a ride but his friend George Bush ignored it. This dichotomy still persists. Far from helping things, it has led to worsening the ties but both sides realise what is at stake. Thus in private both sides are trying to salvage whatever they can of this relationship since there are huge stakes for both Pakistan and the US.

The US is running out of time as the endgame in Afghanistan nears. They need to inflict maximum pain on al Qaeda in a limited time and reduce its capabilities. The US needs Pakistan to bring Mullah Omar to the negotiating table and act against the Haqqani network. Pakistan stands to lose far more than the US if it does not deliver because of the unequal relationship and our dependence on American aid. Therefore, we need to review our support to groups like the Haqqani network to assuage American mistrust and ensure cooperation with the US continues. A pragmatic and rational approach is required if terrorism is to be defeated and peace restored in the region.

 

[muse]

After the news that Pakistan Army is once again on the US dollar aid life line- Kiyani made a big show of saying that Pakistan army would use it's own funds but it seems his meeting with US ambassador made him capitulate once again - now this, yet another capitulation by the Jihadi army:


Row resolved over US diplomats` travel restrictions
By Our Correspondent



WASHINGTON: The US State Department said on Thursday that Washington and Islamabad had successfully resolved the dispute over travel restrictions placed on American diplomats in Pakistan.

Asked if the dispute with Pakistan over travel restrictions had been resolved, the department`s spokesperson Victoria Nuland said: “My understanding is it has, yes.”

Last week, the US launched fresh efforts to convince Pakistan`s security establishment to ease travel restrictions on its diplomats and review a decision of expelling American military trainers.

Diplomatic sources in Washington confirmed that both issues were discussed in a meeting last week between US Ambassador Cameron Munter and Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani at the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

According to these sources, US diplomats will no longer be required to carry a no objection certificate while travelling outside Islamabad.

The diplomats, however, will have to carry their identity cards with them every time they left the embassy, the sources said.

Pakistani diplomats in the US also have to carry similar identity papers with them.

At the State Department, spokesperson Nuland also indicated, although indirectly, that US diplomats in Pakistan would have to carry their identity cards with them while travelling.

“When I was posted in Belgium many times, I carried an identity card,” she said.

Asked if she had to carry an ID card while travelling inside Belgium, Ms Nuland said: “I don`t think my personal experience is relevant in this case. But the issue of whether diplomats have to carry identity cards is — it is common practice in many countries.”

 

[VCheng]

^^^ I said this weeks ago that these restrictions were all resolved, it is only being announced now.

 

[muse]

The Pakistan army now seems to have become very accomplished in telling Pakistanis one thing and doing something else - it is a testament to hope that there are still some Pakistanis who trust the army.

 

[VCheng]

The Pakistan army now seems to have become very accomplished in telling Pakistanis one thing and doing something else - it is a testament to hope that there are still some Pakistanis who trust the army.

It is not just the Army. The politicians lie, the bureaucracy lie, and I am sad to say, a lot of Pakistanis lie to each other too, under the garb of "musleyhat" and "bharam" and "rakh rakhaao" and similar social concepts.

 

[muse]

Friends, Not Masters II


Pak-US relations: terms of engagement


By Gen (r) Mirza Aslam Beg

Pakistan and the US have been allies for over half a century and Pakistan earned the distinction of being the ‘Most Allied Ally’ and the ‘Non-NATO Ally,’ and also enjoyed the blessings of strategic partnership, yet the relationship has been the roughest of all, marked by sanctions, aid and assistance cut-off, exploitation, violation of national sovereignty and betrayals. Yet Pakistan went to the extent of being foolish and naive, to join the American war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, in 1980 and again in 2001 against the brotherly Afghan people. The fall-out of these two wars has adversely affected Pakistan’s security. And as the things have gone wrong for the Americans, facing defeat in Afghanistan, Pakistan is being pressurised to do more and help the American exit from Afghanistan. Pakistan would definitely help, provided the terms of engagement are clearly defined, to achieve the purpose of a meaningful, multi-dimensional relationship, marked by trust and respect for each other.

Necessarily, the new terms of engagement must lead to an enduring strategic partnership, founded upon an ‘institutionalised mutual cooperation mechanism,’ to secure regional stability and a stable and prosperous future for Pakistan. There are many aspects to be considered and defined regarding terms of engagement, but only seven are mentioned here, which encompass the real issue. They are as follows:

Sovereign Equality. There must be respect and realisation of sovereignty of Pakistan, which has been wanting since 1960, when President Ayub Khan, pleaded in his book for ‘Friends and Not Masters.’ In fact, there are two obsessions, which are detrimental to equality in relationship. One is the notion of ‘power and pride of a great power’ and the other is the ‘vast disparity in the civilisational heritage of the two countries.’ Both are very critical issues of national sensibilities and demand very careful consideration.

Trust Deficit. Although we have been allies for over half a century yet we never enjoyed the trust needed for a meaningful partnership. There have been many ups and downs in the relationship during this period. It remained good, so long as the purpose was served. For example, Pentagon now says, “We have no choice but to maintain a strong relationship,” because exit from Afghanistan, without Pakistan’s support would be a disaster. I am sure, once, the exit is completed, Pakistan would again be abandoned. With such ‘withering feelings of love and hate’ between the two countries, there is very little hope of establishing an enduring friendship. Both the countries, particularly the Americans, therefore have to develop the mechanism to remove the existing trust deficit.

Hegemony. Pakistanis, as a nation do not relish hegemony, in any form and shape. It was our own fault that we could not eliminate West Pakistan’s hegemony over East Pakistan that preferred to drift away in 1971. Now the Americans want to establish Indian hegemony over the region, from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka and reduce Pakistan to a client state. This will never happen, because the Pakistani people love freedom, as much as the Afghans, who have sacrificed so much to win their freedom from the two hegemons, the Soviets and the Americans. Simply follow the Chinese example, who do not meddle into the internal affairs of others, nor do they try to establish military bases around the world, seeking primacy and global hegemony.

Exit from Afghanistan. The occupation of Afghanistan is the ‘Mother of All Evils,’ and therefore an exit from Afghanistan has to be carried out, on the basis of three principles: One. It is the winner, the Taliban, who must be allowed to lay down the terms for peace in Afghanistan. Two. The neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan that has suffered the most, as a result of foreign aggression in Afghanistan, must be on-board, to workout the mechanism for transfer of power, and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Three. All the countries involved in the invasion of Afghanistan must be made to pay the war damages. The Soviets, Americans and the European Union are the invaders, while India, Pakistan and others are the collaborators, including the United Nations, which authorised the invasion. They all have to pay for the crime, they committed.

Kashmir. The people of Kashmir have been deprived of their ‘right of self determination’ and their struggle, now has reached a point of decision. It cannot be ignored any more, as President Obama preferred to, under the Indian pressure. It is no more a back-burner issue, because, after the exit of the occupation forces from Afghanistan, Kashmiris struggle for freedom will heat-up and may well explode into the Indian face. If we fail to find a political solution soon enough, peace in South Asia, will remain hostage to Kashmir.

Nuclear Apartheid Policy.
Pakistan has been subjected to a nuclear apartheid policy by the West for no rhyme or reason, through senseless media hype, challenging Pakistan’ ability to provide security safeguards to its nuclear assets, and the threat of Islamic extremists. It’s all nonsense and is part of the ploy to keep Pakistan under pressure, knowing fully well, that as a nuclear capable state, Pakistan has ‘the best record of nuclear safety.’ There has been no accident, no leakage and no pilferage of fissile material ever. It is time now, to come to terms with Pakistan’s nuclear capability and its policy of minimum nuclear deterrence, which is India specific.

Pakistan and the US require some cool thinking and depth of perception, to remove the irritants, which have clouded our relations. We have to look beyond into the future and develop policies and plans, in harmony with the changing trends and temperament of the globalised world. The dogmas of the cold war period do not apply any more. In fact we have to invent, new rules of business, for an enduring partnership.

The writer is a former chief of army staff

 

[muse]

All of the points highlighted by the former COAS are unacceptable and non-starters for the US - in the meantime, Pakistan will cooperate with the US - grudgingly, cautiously, but it will cooperate.

 

[T-Faz]

The Pakistan army now seems to have become very accomplished in telling Pakistanis one thing and doing something else - it is a testament to hope that there are still some Pakistanis who trust the army.

This habit of saying one thing and doing another is common amongst all Pakistani's and the army is only mirroring this common habit.

So this should not be a surprise to anyone.

 

[VCheng]

It is not just the Army. The politicians lie, the bureaucracy lie, and I am sad to say, a lot of Pakistanis lie to each other too, under the garb of "musleyhat" and "bharam" and "rakh rakhaao" and similar social concepts.

This habit of saying one thing and doing another is common amongst all Pakistani's and the army is only mirroring this common habit.

So this should not be a surprise to anyone.

I am not surprised, like I said before.

 

[muse]

‘ Pakistan views India as the perpetual enemy and the US as an unfaithful ally’
By Malik Siraj Akbar

It’s a rare opportunity to come across an American diplomat who understands the South Asian culture and speaks fluent Urdu and Hindi. Former ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer, 66, is one of those rare individuals who are not only aware of the cultural nuances of the Indo-Pak region, but happens to be an elegant speaker of Hindi and Urdu. An ex-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, Schaffer, in her 30-year diplomatic career, has served as the US ambassador to Sri Lanka and worked at diplomatic missions in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. She has authored Pakistan’s Future and US Policy Options (2004) and India at the Crossroads: Confronting the Challenge of HIV/AIDS (2004). One of her popular books she co-authored with her husband Howard B. Schaffer, also a former US ambassador, is How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States.

A widely respected expert on South Asia, Ambassador Schaffer spoke exclusively with Dawn.com about Pakistan’s negotiating style with the United States.

Q. The United State and Pakistan have had three ‘marriages’ and two ‘divorces’. Are the interests that lead to an eventful marriage and factors which caused divorce always the same or do they keep changing with every new partnership?

A. The immediate impetus for the three marriages came from factors external to Pakistan such as the Cold War and Afghanistan. What caused the two divorces is different.

The first divorce came in 1965 during the Pakistan-India war when Pakistan used US-supplied weapons which Washington had warned were not supposed to be used against each other.

Pakistan’s nuclear program caused the second divorce. In the 1980s, the US restored a large aid program to Pakistan, but to get the aid through Congress, it also had to pass the Pressler Amendment. In 1990s, the US could no longer certify that Pakistan possessed a nuclear explosive device because of which its assistance had to be cut-off.

In both cases, divorce was the culmination of Pakistan’s unwillingness to accept US terms and conditions.

Q. What would you describe as the striking findings of your study about Pakistan’s negotiating style with the United States?

A. There are three big influences on Pakistan’s negating style with the United States. The first is Pakistan’s view of its place in the world with India as the perpetual enemy and the US as an unfaithful ally. The second is the supreme importance of personal connections in the Pakistani culture. The third influence is the complicated structure of the government and complex relationship between the military, civil administration and the bureaucracy.

Pakistan tries to put the United States on a guilt trip and has been remarkably successful in doing that.

Q. The United States has historically personalised rather than institutionalise relations with Pakistan. How much has that benefitted both the countries?

A. Both the sides have personalised the relationship. Without some degree of personalisation you are not going to get anywhere with a Pakistani leader. But by allowing the personal relationship to substitute for an institutional one, the United States makes itself vulnerable to the guilt trip.

Q. Do you see a dichotomy between the objectives of a US-Pakistan strategic alliance and expectations of both the countries from each other?

A. Yes. This is the real challenge of US-Pakistan relationship. The assumption during all three alliances was that our strategic interests were the same. In fact, they had some points in common, but were not the same. The key to these differences in each case has been India.

For Pakistanis, India is the long-term existential threat. For the United States, India is not an enemy. In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s prime objective is to minimize Indian influence but the US goal is to minimise the al Qaeda influence. These are not the same.

Q. How much is the growing US-India alliance going to influence US-Pakistan ties?

A. I have no doubt that the US-India relationship makes a lot of Pakistanis uncomfortable. They see this as inconsistent with US-Pakistan relationship. If you had a real economic revival in Pakistan at rates comparable with India, you would see the balance of Pakistan’s interests changing in such a way that the US-India relationship would seem less threatening to Pakistan.

Q. Why has the United States rephrased the term “Indo-Pak” and categorised Pakistan into the newly coined term “******”?

A. I hate the term ******. It sounds demeaning in Pakistan. The term and the bureaucratic structure are the products of the decision by President Obama and Secretary Clinton to bring in Richard Holbrooke as the envoy.

Richard Holbrooke was a man of enormous talent. I think the term was his because he meant you can’t only talk about Afghanistan and forget Pakistan. He was trying to convey the message that Afghanistan was sitting next door to Pakistan.

There was a lot of speculation whether Ambassador Holbrooke’s mandate should include India. From the American point of view, the decision not to include India was correct, because a special envoy whose chief responsibility is Pakistan cannot effectively broker with India.

Q. Why is the United States reluctant to play the role of a mediator between India and Pakistan on Kashmir dispute?

A. The US believes that without the strong support of both India and Pakistan no such effort could succeed. India hates the idea of third-party intervention. The US has urged both countries to work things out directly on their various problems, including Kashmir.

Q. In your book, you mention the element of lies in diplomatic relations. Do both the countries lie to each other? What have been the biggest historic lies told to each other?

A. In American court rooms when you are sworn in as a witness, you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth or nothing but the truth. “Nothing but the truth” is the easiest standard to meet while “the whole truth” is the hardest standard to meet. Neither of the governments has met the standard of telling the whole truth. We have, on a number of occasions, withheld things from one and other.

Sometimes, Pakistan has also fallen short of the standard of “nothing but the truth.” For example, when President Musharraf came to the United States and was asked about Daniel Pearl, he said he was “sure” that Pearl was alive. Afterwards, it became clear that Daniel Pearl was already dead and it seemed likely that Musharraf actually knew this. He may have considered that as the right thing to do in protecting Pakistan’s security interests.

We need to understand the impact lies have on both sides. An American official who believes he has been lied to takes this as a real insult to his intelligence and friendship with the other side.

Having lived in Pakistan, I would say it is almost impossible that no one in the army knew that Osama bin Laden was living in Abbottabad.

Q. Are there any phases in the US-Pakistan relation where you find Pakistan successfully influencing American policies?

A. Yes. Pakistan achieved some of its objectives by applying American cultural traits. One instance is Pakistan’s success in 1999 in obtaining a refund of the money it had paid for F-16 aircraft. The Pakistani diplomats based their argument to the United States on the concept of fairness —- which is very important in US culture— and hired a lawyer to file a lawsuit against the US government. Everyone accuses the Americans of being overly legalistic but this time the Pakistanis turned the tables. They used their understanding of US procedure and culture to obtain a result that was very important.

Q. Which US government in the history would you rate as the most Pakistan-friendly?

A. There are a lot of governments which have done really important things for Pakistan. The whole China connection for President Richard Nixon was something that fit in his strategic framework. George W. Bush initiated the big aid program for Pakistan which was carried over by the Obama administration.

Q. What do you think are the causes of growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan?

A. Some anti-Americanism is the inevitable byproduct of the United States being the most powerful country in the world, which makes it a magnet for discontent. Anti-Americanism has become much stronger now because there is a widespread perception in the Islamic world and particularly in Pakistan that the Muslims are being treated with injustice by the west in general and the United States in particular.
This is intensified by the message that is being put out not just by the Islamic militant groups and right-wing parties but also by the government of Pakistan suggesting that Pakistan’s present troubles are entirely the fault of the United States. I don’t agree with that statement. I think frankly no country can blame its entire troubles on anybody else.

If enough important people in Pakistan pointing fingers at the United States for its domestic troubles then it becomes easier to believe that than to search for the roots of homegrown problems.

Q. Pakistanis complain that the Americans do not sufficiently acknowledge and appreciate their contributions in the war on terror.

A. The Americans value Pakistan’s contributions but they also feel betrayed by some of the moves Pakistan is making particular by continuing the relationship with insurgent groups in Afghanistan which are killing American soldiers. Both sides have some reasons to complain that the other side is not respecting their sensitivities. In order to achieve an American policy that is in some sense more responsive to Pakistan’s need, you also need a Pakistani policy that is more responsive to US needs.

Q. Are the US and Pakistan going to avoid a third divorce this time?

A. I hope so. We have always tried to develop a strategic relationship in which the Americans and Pakistanis know that they are both together for long term. That is desirable but not feasible at the moment. A lot of damage has been done since the beginning of 2011. The fallout from the Raymond Davis case and the aftereffects of the bin Laden raid have left the army feeling embarrassed and the Americans feel betrayed. This is not a good recipe for both the sides embracing each other. What we need now is to have some smaller, more specific successes, and build on those. Perhaps the recent arrest of Al-Mauritani will be a good beginning.

Malik Siraj Akbar is based in Washington DC as a Hubert Humphrey Fellow at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), a project of the Center for Public Integrity.Twitter: @MalikSirajAkbar

 

[Imran Akhtar]

yas pak US relationship is very dengerous pakistan. US and Pakistan remain allies in the international fight against terrorism but relations have been worsening. The US is accusing Pakistan of failing to rein in Taleban and al-Qaeda militants that take refuge in its border region and, as Barbara Plett reports, there is growing anger among Pakistanis towards the US.

 

[muse]

US-Pakistan crisis: the either/or tribe
By Ejaz Haider
Published: September 27, 2011

Somehow, in trying to respond to the United States, we are missing the essential point in the present crisis that has the potential to spiral. So far, we have indignantly challenged the veracity of Admiral Mike Mullen’s accusations and rejected them. That was important but has been done. We now need to go beyond that and to beyond belong some hard facts and choices.

Fact 1: The US is accusing Pakistan of waging a proxy war on it and is putting on a full court press to get the latter to fall in line. This is different from merely alleging that the Network is killing GIs or that its activities are preventing the US from stabilising Afghanistan. Those are the effects; the cause is Pakistan’s support to the Network and, by extrapolation, Islamabad’s active effort to defeat Washington’s interests in Afghanistan. The ally is in fact, according to this narrative, working against the US and is the enemy.

Fact 2: Having done so, Washington has locked itself in a commitment trap — i.e., it cannot simply sit back and let the crisis deescalate unless Pakistan is visibly seen to be doing something to address the US concerns.

Fact 3: By accusing Pakistan of directly supporting the Haqqani Network, the contention over an operation in North Waziristan acquires a different meaning; it is not just about physically occupying that area — though in terms of visibility that is now more urgent than ever — but withdrawing the alleged support to the Haqqanis and accepting Washington’s demands in line with the latter’s interests in Afghanistan and the region.

This narrative can be challenged at many levels and rejected, as has been done, and is being done. But it should be clear that it is not enough to say that this is bollocks. That doesn’t make policy, especially if we are convinced, as it appears from our narrative, that the US is wounded and needs to scapegoat someone. That would in fact mean the dice is loaded against Pakistan anyway.

So, is it a simple choice between escalating and capitulating? No. Those who are suggesting this either/or approach should get out of this business and start doing something more useful.

Pakistan needs to coolly appreciate the options available to the US and to herself. The situation is far more complex for both sides to embark on a direct confrontation without calculating the risks. Quite often, intransigence on issue X is deception because an actor is actually playing for gains on issue Y.

Even allowing for asymmetry, going up on the escalatory ladder by the stronger side is not a neat job. The further up the ladder any side would go, the less likely the chances of success because of what Herman Kahn called a “‘spasm war’ in which both sides would lose all” even as “sufficient asymmetry of capabilities at lower levels would ensure that an intolerable burden would be put on the side forced to raise the stakes”.

This is what Kahn described as escalation dominance: “[The]… capacity, other things being equal, to enable the side possessing it to enjoy marked advantages in given regions of the escalation ladder.” But once escalation begins, there is likely to be “the jet effect of the competing capabilities on the rung being occupied, the estimate by each side of what would happen if the confrontation moved to these other rungs, and the means each side has to shift the confrontation to these other rungs”.

Straightforward? No. “The major difficulty with this approach in operational terms was [and remains] that the escalation ladder was [is] unable to appear as clearly in practice as in theory.”

There are competing capabilities on both sides and both know that. The US also knows that in any confrontation involving military options, Pakistan has options to respond. The calculation for the US would not be how much punishment it can mete out to Pakistan, which can be enormous, but how much of it she can take. That can be a sobering thought.

Given this, it would rely more on non-military punishment, at least in the days to come — combining it with military actions that may not test Pakistan’s red lines overtly — to compel Pakistan to at least do some, if not all, of its bidding. It is important to note that despite the accusations, Mullen told the US lawmakers that a “flawed and strained engagement with Pakistan is better than disengagement”. The relationship cannot be broken because of US constraints. So, how does the US balance its strategy of compellence with its limitations?

The answer should determine Pakistan’s responses. The space relates to the knowledge that Pakistan cannot afford escalation but equally that the US cannot go up the ladder without the risk of jet effect.

This is where non-military means come in. The US could stop bilateral aid to Pakistan. But it also knows that that is unlikely to hurt Pakistan too much. In fact, some economists have argued that such an act may well be to the advantage of Pakistan. However, that is not the only lever. The US can influence other financial support — the IMF, World Bank, other IFIs, state donors that run various projects, etc. There are also other programmes in the development, health and education sectors.

Beyond that lie export quotas, both bilateral and others: if the US declares Pakistan a state sponsoring ‘terrorism’, that would unleash a sanctions regime which will severely impact Pakistan’s access to capital. They have done this with many states, including Iran and Sudan (both are better placed because of oil to take the brunt).

If money flows are terribly hit, Pakistan’s economy, already tottering, could begin to unravel. This coupled with selective military actions that seek to avoid direct confrontation with Pakistani troops could be a plausible scenario.

But what is important to note is the paradox: by killing the fiction of a strategic partnership with Pakistan and upping the ante, the US has also lost the leverage it had when, for instance, it mounted the Abbottabad raid. And if Pakistan begins to unravel, that could pose its own dangers to US interests. So, we now have a Pakistan that doesn’t want escalation but is more prone to reacting to US actions. That means a lesser ability by the US to compel Pakistan to change its behaviour through overt actions that could beget a response.

Other actors like India, China, Saudi Arabia and Iran thrown into the equation make the calculus even more complex. Both sides are therefore faced with the tremendous challenge of managing risks associated with any spiralling effect at a time when they are getting locked into commitment traps.

Corollary: Let’s get rid of either/or analyses and begin to formulate a strategy informed by the terrible complexity of the situation.

 

[Patrician]

Muse, an article doesn't have to be colorful (literally) to be intellectually appealing.

 

[muse]

Muse, an article doesn't have to be colorful (literally) to be intellectually appealing.

I take your point - I'm just really used to reading with a highlighter and find the lack of one to be a challenge and compensate

 

[Developereo]

Q. How much is the growing US-India alliance going to influence US-Pakistan ties?

A. I have no doubt that the US-India relationship makes a lot of Pakistanis uncomfortable. They see this as inconsistent with US-Pakistan relationship. If you had a real economic revival in Pakistan at rates comparable with India, you would see the balance of Pakistan’s interests changing in such a way that the US-India relationship would seem less threatening to Pakistan.

Until Kashmir is resolved, India will continue to be Pakistan's greatest enemy. The fact that the US tends to condescendingly brush aside this central fact destroys their credibility with Pakistanis.