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The Northern Light Infantry - The Victors

Righteous_Fire

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Northern Light Infantry Regiment (NLI)

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Introduction

Gilgit Levies

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In 1889 a force with the name of Gilgit Levies was raised under the command of Colonel Algernon Durand. The force, in 1891, fought the battle of Nilt against Hunza. In 1913 Major JC Bridges reorganized the force on company basis and the force was thus named as Gilgit scouts.

Gilgit Scouts

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When Gilgit scouts were raised, its strength was 582. The recruitment in the Gilgit scouts was based on the recommendation of Mirs and Rajas of the area. Close relatives of Mirs and Rajas were used to be given direct viceroy commission in corps of Gilgit scouts.

Northern Scouts

In 1947 Gilgit Scouts reverted to their original duties of internal security under Pakistani Political agent of Northern Areas. 582 men of Gilgit scouts were placed under the command of Major Muhammad Tufail Shaheed (Nishan-e-Haider). The remaining personnel of the expanded Corps were designated as the Corps of Northern Scouts in November 1949.


Capture of Kargil and Batalik and the Victor Motto

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Gilgit scouts were the first battalion in 1948 to capture Kargil and Batalik. Were then warded the motto of Victors.

Karakoram Scouts

The northern scouts were bifurcated on 1st January 1964, and Karakoram scouts were raised with its Head Quarters at Skardu.

Northern Light Infantry Regiment



For centralization of administrative and operational control, the entire force was re-organized into 10 infantry units, 3 mountain batteries and a regimental centre with effect from 1 November 1975. Gilgit scouts were converted into 1st and 2nd Northern Light Infantry Battalion. After outstanding performance in the Kargil conflict of 1999, the entire Northern Light Infantry Regiment was given the status of regular infantry.



War Performance

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Liberation War 1947

Honorary Captain Muhammad Baber Khan took part in liberation war 1947/48. On partition, Gilgit agency was handed over to Maharaja of Kashmir by the British government. Brigadier Ghansara Singh arrived at Gilgit to take over the charge as Governor. Later on Major General H L Scott the chief of military staff of Kashmir also joined. The troops of Gilgit Scouts being 100% Muslim were in favour of accession to Pakistan. On 31 October 1947, in the afternoon, Honorary Captain Muhammad Baber Khan called the meeting of the Junior Commissioned Officers of Gilgit scouts in the Junior Commissioned Officers’ mess, where it was unanimously decided to over throw the dogra rule.

The governor surrendered on 1st November 1947. The Muslim company of 6 Jammu Kahmir infantry battalion coming to Gilgit from Bunji under command Captain Hassan Khan also joined the scouts. The scouts attacked and destroyed dogra check post and burnt Partab Bridge. The Sikh and dogra elements deserted and were later captured. 27000 sq miles were thus liberated from Dogra Raj. The force was then placed under command Major Muhammad Tufail Shaheed (Nishan-i-Haider), Honorary Captain Muhammad Baber Khan of 1st Northern Light Infantry Regiment who played the most vital role in the war of liberation (from Dogra Raj) in 1947.


Fighting at the Highest Battle Field in the World

Siachen border is the world’s highest battlefield. 1 Northern Light Infantry Battalion has the unique honour of being the first unit to defend Gyong and Gyari sectors. Battalion was ordered to move to Siachen in the first week of April 1984 from Gilgit under command Lieutenant Colonel Shuja Ullah Tarrar Tamgha-i- Basalat. The unit was involved in a successful combat with weather, terrain and the real enemy. 1 Northern Light Infantry Battalion did dumping of ammonition and ration and complete defence construction.

Action in Azad Kashmir

1st Northern Light Infantry Regiment remained involved in acts of gallantry while its tenure in Azad Kashmir. A number of successful fire raids were carried out on enemy.


Honours and Awards


Gilgit scouts and Northern scouts

War of Liberation and 1965 War


  • Sitara-i-Jurat - 5
  • Tamgha-i-Jurat - 8
  • Imtiazi Sanad - 25
  • C-In-C’s Commendation Card - 2



1971 War – Northern Scouts


  • Sitara-i-Jurat - 2
  • Tamgha-i-Jurat - 2
  • Imtiazi Sanad - 1



Karakoram Scouts

1965 War


  • Sitara-i-Jurat - 1
  • Tamgha-i-Jurat - 1
  • Tamgha-i-Basalat - 2
  • Imtiazi Sanad - 4


1971 War


  • Sitara-i-Jurat - 2
  • Tamgha-i-Jurat - 8
  • Imtiazi Sanad - 2


Nishan i Haider and Kargil war

Captain Karnal Sher Khan (1970–1999)


Pakistan Army's official statement is as follows;

"Captain Karnal Sher Khan emerged as the symbol of mettle and courage during the Kargil conflict on the Line of Control (LoC). He set personal examples of bravery and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. He defended the five strategic posts, which he established with his Jawan's at the height of some 17,000 feet at Gultary, and repulsed many Indian attacks.After many abortive attempts, the enemy on July 5 ringed the post of Capt. Sher Khan with the help of two battalion and unleashed heavy Mortar firing and managed to capture some part of the post. Despite facing all odds, he lead a counter-attack and re- captured the lost parts.But during the course he was hit by the machine-gun fire and embraced Shahadat or martyrdom at the same post. He is the first officer from the NWFP province to be awarded with Nishan-e-Haider."



Lalak Jan Shaahed (1967 – 7 July 1999)

"He emerged as the symbol of mettle and courage during the Kargil conflict on the Line of Control (LoC). He set personal examples of bravery and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. He defended the strategic posts. During the conflict he embraced Shahadat or martyrdom. He is the first Army man from the Northern Areas now Gilgit Baltistan to be awarded with Nishan-e-Haider."


http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=162&rnd=462
http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=318
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/rgt-nli.htm
 
Son of The Mountains - The Tiger of Tiger Hill : Lalak Jan Shaheed - From whom the mountains learn of courage




............Lalak Jan Shaahed was born in Yasin, Ghizer District, in the Northern Areas, Pakistan. After school he joined the Pakistan Army, and reached the rank of Havaldar. As a junior officer in the Northern Light Infantry, Jan fought against India in the Kargil War of 1999. He volunteered to be deployed on the front lines and drove back a number of attacks by the Indian army.

Tiger Hill in the Kargil Sector had been occupied by 11 men of 12 NLI (Northern Light Infantry) unit of the Pakistan Army. One of these men was Subedar Sikander, the person who was responsible, with 10 other men, to hold back India's offensive long enough to force the Division at Siachen to retreat. His 2IC (Second in Command) was Havaldar Major Lalak Jan.The 10 men of 12 NLI were told by Subedar Sikander to change their positions while firing back at the attacking Indian forces. As the men followed the orders, they managed to bluff the Indians into believing that the size of the force was much more than 11.

On 1st of July, 1999, the 18 Grenadiers Battalion (India) launched a fierce attack on Tiger Hill by virtue of artillery shelling of the occupied bunkers. Subedar Sikandar placed his men in such positions that they managed to repulse the attack without any loss of life on their own part. It is not known how many men were lost by the 18 Grenadiers Battalion. On the morning of 2nd July 1999, amidst the mist, the 18 Grenadiers launched another attack on Tiger Hills. Subedar Sikandar ordered his men to retreat to a secret bunker. Once the men were safe, he ordered Lalak Jan to descend Tiger Hill, and amidst the Indian Artillery shelling plant the landmines in the area in front of the Indians. The impossibility of the task was realized by all, but the Subedar insisted that the army has sent them down to fight, and that they would have to complete this task if they were to make a dent in the Indian offensive. Planting the landmines was the only way for them to damage the Indian armor and artillery, as none of the 11 men of 12 NLI had any heavy weaponry. The Subedar insisted that the mist would help Lalak Jan as well, and the Indians would not be expecting it either.

Accepting the daunting task, Lalak Jan descended Tiger Hills amidst the mist. The remaining men gave him as fierce a cover as possible to distract the Indians. Lalak Jan used his natural mountaineering ability to the fullest in the snow clad area and planted the landmines in such a manner that the Indians would encounter them in case they tried to move forward towards the hill. Lalak Jan returned, having successfully planted the mines as ordered. The trap was now set. All that the men required to do now was to lure the
Indians into it.

Subedar Sikandar told his men to gradually reduce the firing to a standstill. About two hours after firing ceased from the Pakistan side, the Indians thought that they had managed to clear the area of the insurgents. Hence they began to move forward. The landmines wrought havoc with their initial forward movements. The Indians suffered heavy casualties, however, as they have not publicized this incident, the exact amount of damage is not known. The damage was in any case, severe enough that 18 Grenadiers did not attack Tiger Hills for at least 3 to 4 more days, until they were supported by another Indian Unit, eight Sikh.

On 6th July, both 18 Grenadiers and eight Sikh attacked Tiger Hills in the fiercest of Tiger Hill battles or the Kargil Operation. Some of the Indian soldiers launched an attack from the steeper side of the hill. The NLI was not expecting an attack from this side. The NLI fought this battle at a heavy cost. Seven of the 11 men were killed, including Subedar Sikander. The Indians had managed to destroy a number of the Tiger Hill bunkers by either a hand to hand fight or by dropping a grenade into it. Only Lalak Jan and three other men remained. The onslaught of the Indians was continuing and they were rapidly advancing towards capturing the hill.

Lalak Jan, who was now the senior most person around, placed his men in strategic positions, at least two to three per person, and told them to fire without staying in one position. These four men, pitted against an enemy much superior in number and weaponry, managed to repulse the Indian onslaught by sheer courage and determination.

On 7th July 1999, 18 Grenadiers and eight Sikh launched yet another offensive. This was a successful attack. Two of Lalak Jan's men were killed. Lalak Jan and his only other remaining comrade in arms, Bakhmal Jan were both seriously injured. Not giving up, Lalak Jan got hold of an LMG and while Bakhmal Jan provided him with the ammunition, the two men kept trying to repulse the Indian attack. Lalak Jan's left arm had been rendered useless as he had received a bullet in it. Bakhmal Jan, unable to sustain his injuries, died while supplying the ammunition to Lalak Jan. From there on, in one of the most stunning demonstrations of determination, Lalak Jan held up the two units of the Indian Army for four complete hours. The Indian offensive finally slowed down and they descended Tiger Hills. The reason for this is not known, perhaps they thought that they could shell the bunker in which Lalak Jan was positioned.

After the Indian offensive had subsided, reinforcements (5 to 6 men) were sent to Tiger Hill under Captain Amer. When he saw the condition of Lalak Jan he told him to go back to the base camp as his arm was in no condition to be used. Lalak Jan told the captain that he did not want to die on a hospital bed, but would rather die in the battlefield. He told his Captain that he should not worry about the arm.

While this was going on at the hill, the Indians started shelling from a secret bunker in an adjacent hill. By that time the command of the handful of troops at Tiger Hill had been taken up by Captain Amer. He realized that the fire was coming from a secret bunker and also directed fire towards it, but the effort was in vain. The exact reason for the failure of this fire by the Pakistanis is not known. It could have been because of one of three reasons:

  • 1) The secret bunker was very well designed and protected by the Indians
  • 2) the fire was not directed properly or
  • 3) the bunker was not in the range of the light weaponry possessed by the Pakistanis atop Tiger Hill.


There was only one way left to counter the secret Indian bunker; it had to be blown up from a closer range. When the injured Lalak Jan volunteered for the mission, his plea was immediately rejected by the captain, who was of the opinion that he would do it himself. However, Lalak Jan persuaded him, giving him his previous landmine installation experience coupled with his mountaineering skills as the explanation. The Captain agreed.

Lalak Jan put a bag of explosives on his back, and while shouldering an AK-47 descended Tiger Hills for the second time amidst heavy Indian shelling. Managing to avoid being seen by the Indian forces, and utilising his knowledge of the hills to take cover, he located the secret bunker and threw the explosives inside the bunker. The bunker, which was also an ammunition dump, blew up in what was probably the biggest blast of the entire Kargil Operation. Lalak Jan managed to take cover, but the Indian Army lost 19 to 20 men inside and nearby the bunker.

The other Indian soldiers saw Lalak Jan and opened fire on him. Surrounded from all sides by Indian fire, Lalak Jan tried to resist and returned fire. He sustained serious injuries as a result of heavy mortar shelling, but managed to defend his position and frustrate the Indian attack before dying at his post.

On 15th of September 1999, the commanding officer of 12 NLI sent two commando forces to Tiger Hills to recover the body of Lalak Jan. The two forces were called 'Ababeel' and 'Uqaab'. Ababeel provided the fire cover while Uqaab went into the destroyed enemy bunker to retrieve the body of Lalak Jan. When his body was found, Lalak Jan had his AK-47 clinched to his chest.

Pakistan awarded him the Nishan-i-Haider, Pakistan's highest military award, for extraordinary gallantry. Since Pakistan's creation, only ten soldiers in all have received this honour.


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http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fast_rulz/message/5821
 
Organizational Structure​

The regiment's soldiers are drawn from small tribes in mountainous areas and are less prone to altitude sickness and cold temperatures that characterize mountain warfare. The unit was therefore chosen to fight against Indian forces in the 1999 Kargil War, which took place in the mountains of Kashmir. Small NLI infantry units slipped past Indian forces at the Line of Control and seized strategically important high points from which they later attacked the Indians. At that time the NLI was a 14-battalion-strong force. Three more battalions -- the 15, 16 and 17 NLI -- were being raised. Of these, the 3, 4, 5 and 7 battalions took part in the intrusion across the Batalik-Chorbatla-Turtuk sectors. Elements of the 12 NLI occupied Tiger Hill and the Mushkoh Valley while the 6 and 11 NLI were spread across the Drass-Tololing-Kaksar sectors.

By one account the execution of the whole operation was entrusted to 62 Infantry Brigade at Skardu with 82 Brigade at Minimarg, 32 Brigade at Kel serving as coordinators. By another account the four infantry battalions were

  • 3 NLI Battalion (ex 323 Infantry Brigade) at Dansam
  • 4 NLI Battalion (FCNA Reserve) at Gilgit
  • 5 NLI Battalion (ex 82 Infantry Brigade) at Minimarg
  • 6 NLI Battalion (ex 62 Infantry Brigade) at Skardu

Gilgit headquarters of the Forces Command Northern Area was assigned the role of supervising the entire operation. The NLI experienced intense combat, and one of its men was posthumously honored with a Nishan-e-Haider award--Pakistan's highest award for military valor. Most of the officers who led the NLI battalions in Kargil were from other regiments and included Punjabis, Mohajirs and Pathans.
 
Just to add, and one of my dad's unit officer who got transferred to NLI after its induction into the army & currently in the Swat operation theater, told me that NLI units have showed bravery unmatched by any other units in the theater. He told me that at the start of the operation one of the units suffered 4 casualties in an ambush & after that no more dead casualties only wounded casualties. Whenever the NLI soldiers came into ambush, they would go after the retreating taliban ambush party & take them at their time of rest. many times it had happened & now the taliban don't ambush the NLI soldiers. They have Excellent tracking capabilities & ability to go after them in the mountains as they are mountain warfare troops. The operational areas commander refuse to let go their NLI units to some other area commander & would fight to retain them & also was told that in the last operation in SWA, baitullah mehsid was very paranoid of these troops that in the peace deal he had asked for the withdrawal of these units & that was due to their fighting performance & the most dreaded tactic they employed against taliban snipers was that whenever they used to catch a sniper they would take out his eyes and then let him go to find his own way to his base. This scared the **** out of the taliban and sniper fire on these troops ceased. This last tactic made BM to ask for their withdrawal as this tactic proved very devastating for the moral of the taliban.

I hope NLI soldiers are taken into SSG more & more or the SOTF as they are the best fighters for mountain warfare & more of the NLI units should be raised & officers from the NA should be inducted.
 
To Taimi: Thanx man! :tup:

Note: I would like to ask our Bros here, especially those who have served in the army or know such guys, to contribute to this thread by giving relevant information on the NLI, provided that it isnt sensitive, bad for our security, includes exact names of Personnel and Army Units or any info about them that can cause damage to the security of the Army, NLI or Pakistan :tup:

All contributions will be welcomed

:pakistan:
 
Note: I have also posted this in the NLI thread but because of the overlapping nature of the operations that ultimately led to the victory at Zojila, it also belong in this thread.

NLI's Golden Traditions - Liberators of Gilgit Baltistan​



The Kashmir and Northern Areas Campaign 1947-48​

The Battle For Zojila !!​

I guess, many of you guys might not have heard this name before, nor the importance that it signifies for our dear Motherland. A region that can be as rugged as the ancient Himalaya.
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And more beautiful than the mythical Shang ri La.


Strategically, it is one of the most important locations for the control of the entire Northern Areas that comprise what is now Gilgit and Baltistan Areas of Pakistan.


This is a description of the brave men who sacrificed their lives for the Motherland and liberated our Northern Areas, thus safeguarding it forever against the march of the cunning enemy. In particular, it is a description of "The Battle for Zojila" and "Major Mohammad Khan Jarral (Sher- e Jang)"



The Conqueror of Zojila - Northern Areas of Pakistan​

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Mohammad Khan Jarral, got commission on 28th March 1942 from IMA Dehra Doon. During 2nd world war he served with the 2nd Jammu & Kashmir Rifles and went to Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Lebonan and Palestine. In May 1946, Major Jarral, captain at the time was appointed commandant 5th Garrison Police company to curb Sheikh Abdullah's anti-state civil disturbance. On partition he was appointed Adjutant Gilgit Scouts, on 8th August 1947 at Gilgit.

When the Liberation war of the Northern areas started in 1947-48 he joined hands with the Muslim freedom fighters against Maharaja Hari Singh's rule.He was given the command of the combined force consisting of "A" and "B" wings of the Gilgit scouts with the task of capturing Zoji La and then if possible to advance towards Sonamarg and Srinagar. Major Jarral during the early outset of the Kashmir Liberation war captured Bunji in the last week of October, 1947 and liberated Astore area down to Gurez by the middle of November, 1947.

He attacked the Skardu Fort during the night of 11/12 Feburary, 1948. He ambushed and defeated the first indian Relief Column lead by Brigadier Faqir Singh at Thorgopari, 15 miles south of Skardu- Srinagar Road, on 17th March, 1948. The action of Thorgopari paved the way for Captain Jarral's subsequent successes in Baltistan area. He again ambushed and dislodged and humiliated the 2nd Indian Relief Column known as Indian Z-Brigade lead by Brigadier Sanporan Singh at Paskuta.

The enemy now knew that he was up against the determined men of Major Jarral's force. Two Indian Generals, Thimayya and Srinagesh, were personally present with Brigader Atal during planning and mounting of an attack at Zoji La. It shows the great importance the indians gave to it.

Captain Jarral had built up the defences well and the credit goes to his ingenuity in organizing his positions in such a manner that the enemy could not capture even the outlying bunkers and trenches.

On June 12, 1948 Major Jarral lead an attack on the two forward Indian companies at Khoru and Gumri. On June 22, Jarral's men made a surprise dawn attack on the pickets. The enemy thus startled and demoralized, called in air crafts to bomb and strafe the area. As the day went on, the Indians gradually kept losing ground. Eventually, a hand-to hand fight started. The enemy was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy casualties.

A few other pickets were similarly attacked and captured. Simultaneously, Major Jarral was working his way up along the main axis and when the Patiala's realized that their rear was threatened, they withdrew in a disorder. The battle lasted for twenty days and Zoji La was captured on July 7, 1948 by Captain Mohammad Khan Jarral. The enemy lost about 400 men and large quantities of ammunition and other stores fell into the hands of Jarral's force.

It is also interesting to put on record that Major Jarral defeated General Srinagesh who was his former company commander at IMA Dehra Doon from where he got King's Commission.

Major Jarral's courage and bravery against all the odds completely changed the whole scenario of the Liberation war of Northern Areas in 1947-48.

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Major Mohammad Khan Jarral with the officers from AK Regiment


Note: The Operation at that time involved contribution from both the then NLI (Gilgit Scouts) as well as the AJ Regiment units at the time.

=====================================
References:

1) jarral Rajput - Official Website
2) File:Zojila Road.jpg - Wikimedia Commons
3) dsc02309 pictures from hiking & backpacking photos on webshots
4) : PANUN - KASHMIR ::- A HOMELAND FOR KASHMIRI PANDITS

:pakistan:
 
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He told me that at the start of the operation one of the units suffered 4 casualties in an ambush & after that no more dead casualties only wounded casualties. Whenever the NLI soldiers came into ambush, they would go after the retreating taliban ambush party & take them at their time of rest. many times it had happened & now the taliban don't ambush the NLI soldiers. They have Excellent tracking capabilities & ability to go after them in the mountains as they are mountain warfare troops.

Excellent, using insurgency tactics against insurgents, I like it.

:pakistan:
 
Excellent, using insurgency tactics against insurgents, I like it.

:pakistan:

like LALAK JAN(shaheed) , NLI is full of soilders , who can trap enemy in the mountains , & can destroy it, single handedly, these exelent , natural born mountain warriors , never ask much, but they give thier lives with hounor.
I think , Our indian counter parts will never forget , the KARGILL war & NLI, where they had seen how , can these mountian warriors engage them & how can they , COUNTER ATTACK without of any huge support.:cheers::pakistan:

NLI & KARGILL war will always remain , in my heart !forever.
because, that war made my belive on allaha , stronger then ever, & i feel GREAT to be a part of that , deadlist & action packed war.which was fought by the both sides , with unseen bravery !:tup:
i think , after that kind of succses full , nasty performences NLI deserved better equipment & close air support , which was never there for them.:agree::pakistan:



i guss, KARGILL was the deadlist of the wars in the recent times, for both PA & IA.:tup:
 
I appriciate sacrifices in Kargil operation given by pakistani soliders but then decision to give all area back to indians was painful for me! and this was one of the stupid things which Musharraf and Naws done.

Real sad thing was how NLI was left alone under Mirage 2000 of IAF and bofor guns of IA. There was no plane of retreat that is where NLI suffered most.
 
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