The Myth of 1965 Victory - Indian View

[SupermanKaPapa]

I came across countless messages from Pakistani members in many threads that Pak taught India a lesson or Pakistan won 1965 War or emerged victorious. I am very confused about this behavior. As far as i know, 1965 War was the start of the downfall for the Pakistan.

Here are some proofs about that.

Neutral assessments
There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had a upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below —

• According to the United States Library of Congress Country Studies: - The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.
• TIME magazine reported that India held 690 mi2 of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 mi2 of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Additionally, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily.The same article stated that - Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N.
• Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book "South Asia in world politics" – The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.
• In his book "National identity and geopolitical visions", Gertjan Dijkink writes – The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.
• An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's India, summarizing the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, is as follows: In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.
• In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote – India won the war. It gained 1,840 square kilometers of Pakistani territory: 640 square kilometers in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 square kilometers of the Sailkot sector; 380 square kilometers far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 square kilometers on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 square kilometers of Indian territory: 490 square kilometers in the Chhamb sector and 50 square kilometers around Khem Karan.
• Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a summary of the war – Although both sides lost heavily in men and materiel, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.
• "A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947" by Robert Johnson mentions – India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles of its own.
• An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's "Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment" – A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.
• English historian John Keay's "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war – The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.
• Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book "Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan" – Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.
• Newsweek magazine, however, praised the Pakistani military's ability to hold of the much larger Indian Army. – "By just the end of the week, in fact, it was clear that the Pakistanis were more than holding their own."

Ceasefire
The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25, 1966.

With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent. Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, India budged to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire. On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.

India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the ceasefire declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress. The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots. Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains. Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled "The Myth of 1965 Victory", allegedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent publication because the topic was "too sensitive."

India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India. In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On October 10, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala A Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain and on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.

The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.


Intelligence failures
Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate —

Indian miscalculations
Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.


Pakistani miscalculations
The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.

Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game – conducted in March 1965, at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan would win. Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock".

Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan, later said that the Pakistan Army, and not India, should be blamed for starting the war. However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analyzed in Pakistan, with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when then East Pakistan was invaded by India and seceded from West Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.


Involvement of other nations
The United States of America, which had previously supplied military equipment to India and Pakistan, imposed an embargo against further supplies to both countries once the war had started. The US was apprehensive that military equipment that it had provided to be used in a battle against communism, would instead be used by the countries to fight one another. The American embargo especially affected Pakistan since the majority of its equipment was provided by America. This would cause Pakistan to believe that it could not continue the war beyond September.

Following imposition of the American embargo, other NATO allies (including the UK) discontinued providing military equipment to the nations.

Both before and during the war, China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan. As such, India agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both borders.

India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. Pakistan, however, gained assistance from countries of Asia with large Islamic populations, including Turkey, Iran and Indonesia. The USSR was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to talks that it would host in Tashkent.


Aftermath
India
Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir. In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war —

• Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.

In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.

While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticized for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan. In his book "War in the modern world since 1815", noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates —

• India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.

As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the triservices of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.

China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons. Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict which irked India. At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India. These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy — India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India. From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union. After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far.


Pakistan
At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. September 6 is celebrated as 'Defence Day' in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised.


However, the Pakistani government was accused by foreign analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war.

Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster."

In his book "Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies", S.M. Burke writes —

• After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.

Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made. Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war. Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote –

• The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.

Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of occupying Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.

Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticized. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority – if not invincibility – of its armed forces, but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability for Ayub. The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.

One of the most far reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan. The cost of the 1965 war put an end to the impressive period economic growth Pakistan had experienced during early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970–71, defence spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of government expenditure.

Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides, leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States. After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.

Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir. Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir. In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector, although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrenghted infantry division (14 Division), sixteen planes and no tanks. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation war and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

Feel free to disagree............but as I said in another post; "To deny facts is not patriotism."

 

[American Eagle]

I was there in early stages of India-Pakistan 1965 War...wounded in Rann of Kutch end of January, 1965, when a skirmish came up which we "drove into enroute to never reached boar hunt area."

No one "won" the 1965 War. US supplied military parts and equipment to both Pakistan and India, while USSR also supplied military equipment and parts to India. Everyone, US and old USSR stopped pipeline supplies to force a stop to the war.

This was an idiotic war stirred up by Bhutto and General Musa, of course led into by President Ayub Khan, who had, as did Bhutto, a weird notion that one army was more ethnically capable vs. the other army, all of course pure non sense.

The long drawn out issue of Kashmir was and remains a pretext today to keep the people of Pakistan, and India, distracted from basic economic and freedom issues and needs.

Kashmir will be resolved, in my view, not by out of date religiosity on either side, but by a gradual process of opening the LOC on both sides to allow free flow of commerce and trade, leading to election of an all Kashmir Parliament, while India, Pakistan, and China, which took a piece of Kashmir circa 1960, retain foreign policy and overall national security controls as before....but with now opened up to free flow of people, ideas, and commerce...similar to the Andorran Model which took literally hundreds of years to put into place between France and Spain long ago.

An all Kashmir Parliament will move the whole process into a semi-autonomous outcome which is the best for now anyone could hope for.

Good facts in the Indian presentation.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

@ SupermanKaPapa

The videos that you posted are really interesting, especially the views of Air Marshal Noor Khan. An outstanding aviator and officer and a credit to his service. His views are a matter of record in print elsewhere- though i'm seeing these videos for the first time. Actually his role in the PAF is immeasureable. And ironically the same PA that had kept him on the sidelines needed his PAF to pull its chestnuts out of many fires.
This military operation (actually mis-adventure would be a better expression) was doomed to go wrong. It was based on insufficient and incorrect appreciation of the situation on the ground especially the political reality. Though there was some sketchy planning, unlike the 1948 ops which was purely opportunistic in nature. But most of all the conflict exposed a 'massive reality'- the need to have a large and stable economy to power the 'war machine'. As 'American Eagle' says, all the super powers/suppliers shut off their taps. But that is as far as weaponry is concerned. What about fuel (POL)? And that is only one (important) example. Your first post has touched on that topic, among others.
The information that you have quoted initially is verifiable from many (independent) sources and is incontrovertible. One example is the damage to the B-57 by SAMs as documented in this forum by 'American Eagle' himself. Actually there is even more, e.g. the de-classified cables etc from US State Dept. archives which help to create a larger picture. And there is so much more to talk about viz. the role of the then leaders and so on. But all this is important only to a genuinely introspective person. The rest will only put their heads somewhere......
i could discern the intention behind starting the thread. But be that as it may, only each one of us can (and will) choose how to view our history. And if any of us chooses to disown or disregard the historical facts (for whatever reasons) it will be to our own cost.
You did your bit, leave the rest to the others.

 

[T-Faz]

Ending the Suspense
Friday, Sep. 17, 1965​

At dawn one morning last week, war came to the dusty Pakistan village of Dhankeal, near Lahore. Mystère jets of the Indian air force slammed rockets into a train at the station, killing three passengers and wounding eleven. Wakened by the explosions, a young peasant named Zakaullah clambered to the roof of his mud hut. "I saw planes in the sky," he said. "And suddenly they started throwing things with fire coming from them. Then one plane started to fall. It came down with a big noise."

Near by bearded Mohammed Sharif was leaving the village mosque after morning prayer when he looked up and saw the French-built Mystères in a dogfight with U.S.-made F-86 jets of the Pakistan air force. With peasant wisdom Sharif decided, "The Indians must be losing in Kashmir. Now they are trying to bother us down here." He urged the young men of the village to arm themselves with clubs and search through the cane and cornfields for downed Indian pilots.
Smeared Dung. To the hundreds of millions of illiterate Indian and Pakistani peasants in the villages, the war may be just another disaster to add to the constant plagues of drought, flood, tornado and poverty. Not so in the cities. New Delhi crowds danced in the streets at the rumor of Indian victories. As antiaircraft guns in Amritsar opened up on Pakistani planes, citizens cheered each white puff in the blue sky, shouting "Shoot him down! Kill him! Kill, kill, kill!" Workmen put up baffle walls in offices as protection against bomb blast, shopkeepers pasted strips of paper to window panes, husbands and fathers dug slit trenches outside their homes. As hospitals were hurriedly emptied to provide beds for expected wounded, Indians queued up to donate blood. The capital's mood was reflected by a businessman who said, "We've been kicked around too often. Let us lose 200 million people if we have to, and have done with it. Our national honor is at stake."

The same air of stern determination spread through Rawalpindi. Civil servants worked round the clock, and on the desks of key officials lay a blue volume of contingency papers labeled "War Book." Auto headlights were dimmed with smears of mud and cow dung, and trucks were camouflaged with leafy branches. For three successive nights, Indian bombers struck at Karachi's harbor installations, and the wail of air-raid sirens blended with the sobbing call to prayer of muezzins atop minarets. A bitter Pakistani official said, "Let's fight it out and get it over with. Either we become slaves of India, or India accepts us as an independent state. This suspense must end."

Shimmering Dust. The major theater of war is the broad Punjab plain, which stretches flat from horizon to horizon. It is lushly green, dotted with clumps of trees, laced by canals. The days are swelteringly hot, and dust clouds shimmer in the glaring sun. It is Rudyard Kipling country, immortalized in such books as Kim and Indian Tales. And the soldiers on both sides are very like the men Kipling so deeply revered. The officers are British-trained, and many are graduates of Sandhurst. They have the British manner, right down to clipped accents, mustaches and swagger sticks. The enlisted men are also right out of Kipling's pages—sturdy Jats and turbaned Sikhs, rawboned Pathans and sinewy Sindhis, volunteers all, whose regimental flags are inscribed with battle names ranging from Ypres and Gallipoli to El Alamein and Monte Cassino and Rangoon.

Since its army is much the larger (867,000 men to 253,000), India went on the attack in five widely separated sectors of the Punjab front—three columns aimed at encircling Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city, one thrust at Sialkot, and the last struck at Karachi via the town of Gadra. The Indians hoped to force the dispersion of the smaller but better-trained and -armed Pakistani forces and then chop them up piecemeal.

The strategy worked, at least partially. A Pakistani armored force that had driven 30 miles into Kashmir with the object of seizing Jammu city, and thus cutting off more than 100,000 Indian troops in Kashmir, slowed down before reaching its goal and detached tanks to defend Sialkot.

In the air, it was much the same story—Indian quantity and Pakistan quality. Indian pilots are flying a variety of fighters, from French Mystères and British Vampires to Russian MIG-21s and Indian-built Gnats. The Pakistanis have U.S. supersonic jets, which seem to have made a spectacular number of kills—Pakistani Air Vice Marshal Nur Khan claims that 108 Indian planes have been shot down. If true, that amounts to a fifth of the Indian air force.

At week's end, both armies were digging in along the Punjab plain, their battalions stretching 800 miles, from the Kashmir border to the Rann of Kutch on the Arabian Sea. New Delhi reported "very fierce fighting" around Lahore and Sialkot and said its tank forces had killed two Pakistani generals, but neither side was claiming major advances and the battle line appeared to be temporarily stable. No ground fighting at all was reported from East Pakistan, 1,000 miles from the Punjab front, although Shastri warned that Indian troops might move at any time. On the Indian side, there were innumerable reports of nightly drops by Pakistani paratroopers, but police and army patrols found no evidence that the reports were true.

Quavering Voice. When the British left India in 1947, it was commonly said that Pakistan got the military, and India the civil servants. The leaders of the two countries reflect the aphorism. Pakistan's President Mohammed Ayub Khan is a strapping six-footer who was educated at Sandhurst, fought valiantly in Burma in World War II. Before seizing control of his chaotic country in a bloodless military coup in 1958, Ayub Khan was commander in chief of Pakistan's army.

Though now a democratically elected President, Ayub Khan is still a military man and is running Pakistan's side of the war from the map room in his interim capital of Rawalpindi. He rallied his nation and his armed forces with a nationwide broadcast. In a voice quavering with emotion, Ayub declared that "the Indian rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan where ******* could build a homeland of their own. For 18 years they have been arming to crush us." The present Pakistani commander, General Mohammed Musa, also took to the radio to praise the courage of his troops. The army had got its teeth in the enemy, said Musa, and should "bite deeper and deeper until he is destroyed. And destroy him you will, God willing."

India's Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri (TIME cover, Aug. 13) is poles apart from Ayub Khan, physically, emotionally and personally. Scarcely 5 ft. tall, with a clerkish mien and a gentle, self-deprecating voice, the wonder is that Shastri ever became the head of the world's largest democratic state. But Shastri's meekness is deceptive, and, in Pakistani opinion at least, he is a determined, wily and resilient opponent.

Except for daily briefings by India's army chief of staff, tall, mustached General Joyanto N. Chaudhuri, Shastri stays aloof from the war. Explains an aide, "He feels this is a professional matter, and should be left to the professionals." Most of Shastri's day is spent with Parliament and in meetings with an emergency committee made up of five of his Cabinet ministers. Here, Shastri makes the decisions, overruling Defense Minister Yashwantrao B. Chavan, who opposed the digging of slit trenches in New Delhi for fear of alarming the population, and ordering that rationing machinery be set up in case it is needed later.

Once, as the crisis grew worse, he displayed temper, angrily denouncing the U.S. for its failure to condemn Pakistan for its infiltration of Kashmir. Railways Minister S. K. Patil calmed him down, saying "If America went to war in Guatemala or Uruguay, you would tell both sides to stop fighting. You wouldn't tell them who is at fault."

Late Lights. Yet despite the militant posture of both countries, and the lights burning late behind curtained windows in the war rooms of Rawalpindi and New Delhi, there are some curious inconsistencies in the conflict. Neither India nor Pakistan has yet declared war or even severed diplomatic relations. And the communiqués make it clear that none of the attacks represent a major effort; rarely is more than a brigade employed. So far, it has been a war of small battles between tanks, planes and artillery, with neither side trying for a quick knockout or decisive showdown. Since there have been no major infantry clashes, casualties have been less than they might have been—perhaps 1,700 dead on both sides.

What is unclear is whether the seeming hesitancy is a result of design or poor logistics. It has always been difficult to move large bodies of troops speedily in the subcontinent. On either side of the border, the roads are miserable and usually choked with oxcarts, camel caravans and wandering cows. The railways offer the best transportation, but trains—as at Dhankeal—are sitting ducks for rocket-firing jets.

Most of the world was begging the contestants to stop. Would-be mediators ranged from Canada's Prime Minister Lester Pearson to the leaders of Russia. There were some strange alignments. The Soviet Union—long a supporter of India—called for an instant truce. Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson did the same and urged all Commonwealth heads of state to follow suit. Red China gleefully came out for Pakistan, and on a Karachi visit last week, Foreign Minister Chen Yi pledged China's support of Pakistan in repelling "Indian armed provocation." Indonesian students in Djakarta joyfully wrecked the Indian embassy, screaming "Crush India, the imperialist lackey!"

Meager Results. At an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, Secretary-General U Thant was authorized to seek an end to the war. With the fervent support of every Council member, Thant flew from New York to see if world opinion meant anything to the combatants. Results were meager. In Rawalpindi, Thant spent most of his time pleading with Pakistan's rabidly anti-Indian Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto. Bhutto made Pakistan's position clear: no cease-fire unless it was accompanied by a definite commitment to settle the Kashmir question by self-determination for the Kashmiri people. When Thant left to try his luck in New Delhi, a Pakistani government spokesman derided his peace proposals as "the same old thing: Don't be bad boys, don't fight; negotiate."

The U.S. was caught in the middle. Washington officials watched in dismay as Pakistan and India clawed at each other with U.S. weapons and planes that had been given them for the express purpose of opposing Communist aggression. The U.S. wanted only to be friends with both powers, but was roundly denounced by each. Along Karachi streets, Americans heard the old, familiar chant: "Yankee, go home!" In India, two German tourists were beaten by a mob that thought they were Americans. Washington held only one trump card and promptly used it: all military supplies to both countries were suspended. Pakistan would be the first to feel the pinch since it is wholly dependent on U.S. spare parts and, unlike India, has no real industrial base for home production of arms. Eventually, the U.S. arms cutoff—in which Britain joined—could ground both sides' jet planes and halt their tanks, reducing the whole affair to an infantry war—but not before weeks have passed.

Frozen Feud. Though the air was filled with cries for peace, no one had any high hopes of getting it. The battle that has been joined on the Punjab plain has been building for hundreds of years. Ever since the 16th century Mogul invasion of India, ******* and Hindus have fought each other for control of the subcontinent. The age-old feud was put in cold storage during the long era of British rule, but burst into flame in all its old fury in 1947 as both India and Pakistan became independent.

The hatred lies bone-deep, and is cultural as well as religious. Hindus worship cows and ******* eat them. Hindus regard ******* as unclean, and ******* call Hindus caste-ridden. The great Sepoy Rebellion still rankles. When Moslem regiments revolted, Hindus helped the British to crush them.

With the coming of independence, both sides began a communal purge. ******* slaughtered Hindus in Pakistan, and Hindus slaughtered ******* in India. Fully 12 million refugees jammed the roads as they fled toward the nearest friendly border.

Scarcely had the riots stopped than fighting broke out again in the princely state of Kashmir. In accordance with their colonial policy of divide and rule, the British in 1846 had set up a Hindu ruling family over the 4,000,000 Kashmiris, who are 80% Moslem. About 100 years later, faced by a revolt of his Moslem subjects, the Hindu maharajah opted to join India in return for help in putting down the rebellion. As Indian troops poured in from the south, Pakistani tribesmen came downthe mountains in the northwest to help their Moslem brothers.

India and Pakistan brought charges before the United Nations, accusing each other of violence and aggression. By January 1949, the U.N. succeeded in drawing a cease-fire line that gave a third of Kashmir to Pakistan and twothirds to India. Four times since, the U.N. has ordered that a plebiscite be held to determine the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Though Jawaharlal Nehru once vowed to "abide by the will of the Kashmiri people," India has always found reasons to avoid holding the referendum. Ex-Defense Minister Krishna Menon has bluntly explained why India opposes the plebiscite: "Because we would lose it." The popular Moslem leader, Sheik Abdullah, first supported union with India. When he changed his mind, the Indians clapped him in jail.

In the years since 1949, the cease-fire line has been the scene of frequent gunfire. A total of 16,000 people—half of them civilians—have been killed. The 45-man U.N. peace-keeping team, headed by Australia's venerable General Robert Nimmo, has had neither the mandate nor the manpower to enforce a truce.

Nehru's Heart. Everything about the Kashmir problem is deeply emotional. The land itself produces little but scenery. Kashmir's mountain rim is so impenetrable that there is only one year-round road to the outside world—and it goes to Pakistan. Nehru was determined to keep Kashmir because it was his ancestral home and, as he put it, "a piece of my heart."

The most significant argument for Indian control of Kashmir relates to what New Delhi officials call the "fissiparous tendencies" of their country. If Kashmir could secede by holding a plebiscite, the argument runs, there would be nothing to prevent Madras or Kerala or any other state from doing the same thing. The warrior Sikhs of Punjab have long dreamed of an independent nation. In fact, a Sikh leader, Sant Fateh Singh, was scheduled last week to begin a fast that would be followed by self-immolation, to force Indian acceptance of Sikh autonomy. In deference to the war emergency, Singh has postponed both his fast and his suicide. Indians compare their situation to that of the U.S., which fought a four-year civil war for the preservation of the Union.

Asian Hitler. It is an article of faith in Pakistan that India's ultimate goal is to conquer the subcontinent by force. As Pakistan's U.N. ambassador emotionally put it last week, "What Hitler and the Nazis did in Europe, India has taken it upon herself to do in Asia."

From the first day of independence, Pakistan's foreign policy has been based on fear of India. Except for the Moslem religion, this fear is the only unifying force in the nation. Pakistan is, in fact, two countries separated by a 1,000-mile-wide corridor of intervening Indian territory. West Pakistan, an arid, sprawling land much like the American Southwest, is inhabited by 45 million tall, hardy, light-complexioned Pathans, Sindhis, and Punjabis, who dominate the government and the army. East Pakistan is small, waterlogged, and congested with a population of 55 million short, dark-complexioned Bengalis, who are usually protesting that they are ignored by the national government. In the west, Urdu is the dominant language; in the east, Bengali. They have different scripts and are completelydifferent languages. English is commonly used in government and business.

Pakistan, which means "Land of the Pure" in Urdu, is a country without a history and with very little identity. In the west, 86% of the people are illiterate, and most are under the thumb of zamindars, or landlords. In the east, the literacy rate is somewhat better, but the population density among the highest in the world. Two men have built the nation: Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the father of his country, and Mohammed Ayub Khan, who has ruled one way or another since 1958. Under Ayub, there has been an industrial surge that looks more spectacular than it is because the original base was so small. Compared even to India, Pakistan is today an industrial pygmy. Using his system of "Basic Democracy" to keep the vote in the hands of a privileged few, Ayub rules firmly but with considerable justice; he encourages foreign investment and gives tax credits to home-grown investors. He has also done much to mollify East Pakistan with a heavy increase in government capital outlay.

Despite its large population, East Pakistan is lightly held, with a single infantry division. New Delhi's propaganda insists that there will be no invasion, that India regards East Pakistan as a friendly neutral. Pakistani propaganda similarly works hard to woo the dominant Sikhs of India's Punjab, assuring them that every effort will be made to avoid damaging their sacred Golden Temple in Amritsar and urging that they sit out the war. Neither appeal is apt to be very successful.
Wet Cement. While Nehru's India preached neutralism, Pakistan early joined every alliance in sight. It was an original member of CENTO, it belongs to SEATO, and would have joined NATO if it could have. Pakistan signed a bilateral defense treaty with the U.S. in 1954 and supplied the U.S. with the Peshawar airfield as a convenient base for U-2 spy planes flying over Russia.

Once aligned with the U.S., marvelous things happened to Pakistan. Tanks, jet planes, new weapons, experts, food poured in. By last year, Pakistan had received $1.5 billion dollars in military aid and $3.5 billion in economic aid—about $50 per person. Relations reached their peak in 1961, when Ayub Khan rode a wave of popularity through the U.S. Speaking before a joint session of Congress, he said: "The only people who will stand by you in Asia are the people of Pakistan — provided you are prepared to stand by them." He boated up the Potomac to Mount Vernon with the Kennedys, flew to Lyndon Johnson's Texas ranch to write his name in fresh Friendship Walk cement. Vice President Johnson had met Ayub in Pakistan earlier that year and, in a rosy, fraternal glow, saw to it that a camel driver who reached for his outstretched hand got a free junket to the U.S.

Matter of Duty. The warmth lasted until the 1962 Sino-Indian war in the Himalayas. When the Indian army abruptly collapsed in Assam, Washington and London hastily poured in weapons and military supplies. The Pakistanis were livid. Officials charged that President Kennedy had broken his promise to consult with Ayub before making any arms shipments to India.

Ayub Khan derided the Chinese threat to India, pointing out that a major attack from Tibet would leave the Chinese dangling at the end of a 1,700-mile supply line. If China wanted to gobble up India, he said, the thrust would come through the Northeast Frontier and Burma. Anyway, Ayub demanded, what possible use to China would it be to take on the care and feeding of 480 million undernourished Indians? Washington flatly disagreed, insisting that Red China was the main enemy of both India and Pakistan. Ayub Khan had already made an effort to test this theory by offering in 1959 to join Nehru in a pact for the mutual defense of the subcontinent. Cracked Nehru, "Defense against whom?" and turned down the treaty.

Ayub Khan had even less success with Nehru's successor, Shastri. After a private meeting in Karachi, Ayub said that Shastri was willing to compromise on Kashmir but felt he was not strong enough to convince his own government. Ayub added, "I told him that, as Prime Minister of India, it was his duty to build public opinion in favor of a satisfactory solution. He might be criticized by some elements, but the bulk of the Indian people would thank him for relieving them of a great anxiety." Ayub concluded that it was impossible to reach an agreement with the ambivalent and indirect Shastri. They settled into a tenuous coexistence that was punctuated by gunfire earlier this year in the border wasteland of the Rann of Kutch. Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson settled that one, bringing Ayub and Shastri to cautious compromise at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London last June.

Trip to Moscow. Pakistan's relations with Red China had been cool and correct. But after Ayub Khan's recriminations against Washington, things grew warmer. Negotiations were begun to define the 200-mile border with Tibet; Peking proved generous, handing over to Pakistan about 750 sq. mi. of disputed territory. As the Pakistanis turned willing, the Chinese turned eager. Trade expanded; an agreement was reached for Pakistan International Airlines to make biweekly flights between Karachi and Canton; China advanced a $60 million credit to Pakistan.

Ayub Khan returned from a visit to Peking nearly as ecstatic as he had been about the U.S. Campaigns were launched to stamp out flies, a la China. Ayub Khan, a devout Moslem and a confirmed free enterpriser, praised the Red Chinese dedication to work.

Pakistan was making a serious reappraisal of all its international relationships. Close ties were knit with Turkey and Iran, two Moslem neighbors and fellow members of CENTO. A long and dreary border scuffle with Afghanistan was partially resolved, and Pakistan ended a two-year closing of the Afghan frontier.

Ayub Khan even went to Moscow to patch up long-dilapidated fences. The Soviet Union had for many years defended India in the U.N., even interposing its veto to prevent censure of New Delhi for its failure to hold the Kashmir plebiscite. Now Russia, as worried as the U.S. by China's cozying up to Pakistan, made a joint statement advocating "resolute support" of peoples struggling for national liberation, which Pakistan interpreted as backing its stand on Kashmir. Like many heads of state before him, Ayub Khan was learning that it is better to get aid from both sides than to be a taken-for-granted partner of just one.

But there was still no progress on the Kashmir problem. Though dear to the hearts of all Pakistanis, it was a crashing bore to the U.N. and the world. Even worse, India was moving fast to end the fiction that there was even anything left to discuss. Nehru had announced in 1954 that Kashmir was an integral part of India but had done nothing to implement his words. Prime Minister Shastri was saying less but doing more. Early this year, he quietly let it be known that Indian civil servants would take over the state administration of Kashmir. To Pakistanis, this meant that the Kashmir question had to be reopened before the world —now or never.

Closed Routes. The instrument used was the mujahid, or local warrior. Subsequent Indian interrogations of captured mujahids indicate that they are mostly inhabitants of Azad (Free) Kashmir, the ***************** one-third of the state. As army veterans, they were given a brisk course of retraining, taught methods of sabotage. Last month they began crossing the porous cease-fire line with instructions to start an insurrection.

All in all, an estimated 3,000 mujahids made the trip. It seemed an obviously doomed operation. The Indian share of Kashmir is firmly held by 100,000 troops. Though most Kashmiri ******* would undoubtedly vote to join Pakistan, few showed any inclination to die for the cause. The infiltrators were rounded up or slain with considerable ease, but the outcries from the Indian government often made it sound as if Kashmir were being invaded by hordes of warlike Huns.

In order to "close the infiltration routes," Indians in battalion strength crossed the cease-fire line and occupied a series of abandoned Pakistani outposts. There was a pause of some days, presumably to test the Pakistani reaction. When nothing happened, the Indians moved forward two weeks ago in regimental and brigade strength. Two Pakistani hilltop positions were stormed at dawn. In the Punch-Uri sector, the Indians advanced 25 miles into Pakistani territory. A large salient in the 1949 U.N. cease-fire line that bulged toward Srinagar was swiftly erased, and India announced that the occupied ground was now Indian, as were the 5,000 dazed peasants who lived there.

By last week, the world's eyes were on Kashmir. Pakistan would either have to react strongly or abandon its claims. Within 48 hours, Ayub Khan made his military answer. A rumbling column of 70 powerful Patton tanks rolled across the Kashmir border far to the south, where the land is flat. The Indian villages of Chhamb and Dewa were swiftly taken. Backed by a brigade of infantry, and with its flanks protected by patrols of mujahids, the tanks rolled on, driving Indian defenders from village after village.

Indian jet fighters streaked from the sky to smash the armored spearhead. Fearful of losing the strategic city of Jammu, the Indian high command ordered the drive on Lahore, removing the battle from Kashmir to Pakistan proper, and changing a brush-fire war into a full-scale challenge. The escalation had increased, and the suspense was over. Whatever else Ayub Khan and Shastri accomplished last week, they had noisily reopened the question of Kashmir.

Phone 31489. Ostensibly, both armies were pursuing "defensive" advances, and always with the assurance that they were only being made to protect the national borders. New Delhi insisted that it was not at war with the Pakistan government or the Pakistan people. What then was it doing? Merely trying to convince the Pakistan army that it should not interfere with India's internal affairs, that is, Kashmir.
The same line was coming from Rawalpindi in slightly different wording. Pakistan's object was not to wage war either. Its only task was to convince India by "firmness" that it would be a good idea to let the Kashmiris have their plebiscite.

To the credit of both governments, each was doing what it could to damp down the possibility of religious massacres. Most of Pakistan's Hindus are in the East zone, so far little affected by the war. Pledges of loyalty to India came from many communities among the nation's 47 million Moslem subjects. Two ******* sit in Shastri's Cabinet, and there are many scattered through the government and the army. Shastri has urged "internal harmony" upon his countrymen.
This was vital, since both nations are in the throes of spy scares. New Delhi offered a $100 reward for every Pakistani spy captured, and an Indian news agency put out a special notice to Delhi citizens: "Anybody having information about paratroopers or any other matter pertaining to the present emergency may convey it to the authorities by phoning 31489."

In Karachi and New Delhi, young men raced through the streets pulling strangers' beards to make sure they were not false. A freelance photographer who went to Patna to snap pictures of the Ganges River for a U.S. magazine was arrested and jailed because the police, who had never seen equipment as sophisticated as his 200-mm. telephoto lens, thought it was an aerial camera. In Bombay, nocturnal cremations were banned lest they serve as fiery beacons for enemy aircraft.

Patna's police also spent one night cordoning off an area below a mysterious, wavering filament in the sky that they identified as a "rocket fuse." At dawn, they discovered someone had tied his paper kite to a pole, and the "fuse" was merely its fluttering string.
Closer Parity. Both the Indian and Pakistan governments were also dropping public hints as to the ground rules for future fighting. Each disclaimed any intention of bombing the other's jammed, slum-packed cities, which are easily flammable and prone to panic. And seemingly, neither side intends to launch a massive, win-the-war offensive with the aim of destroying the enemy's army and occupying his land.

Most military observers thought the fighting so far had gone about as expected. In the short run, Pakistan's small, highly trained army is more than a match for the Indians. But each skirmish and each day in the field reduces the efficiency of the U.S. weapons and equipment, and brings the Pakistanis toward closer parity with the Indians.

All of the Indian drives in the Punjab seem to have been stopped cold a short distance across the border. One unit attacking Lahore was severely handled and driven back into India, where it has dug in in defense of Ferozepore. But should the war be prolonged several more weeks, military men think that the more numerous Indian army will begin to prevail.

Peking Laughter. There is one imponderable: China. Even a military demonstration on the Himalayan front would seriously weaken the Indian effort. A Chinese offensive on the scale of their last one in 1962 would be more than India could handle, for New Delhi is barely equipped for a one-enemy war. It could never deal with two at once.
Who knew how Red China would react? Ayub, no friend of Communism, had not asked for aid from that quarter. Also, the Chinese might recall that in the 1962 clash with India, Ayub made clear to Delhi that Indian troops could safely be transferred from the Pakistan frontier to the Himalayas. True, Peking has been mumbling about Indian "aggression" in the border area. But these noises began long before the present conflict, and have not been significantly renewed. At the present moment, China's interests are well served by letting its two neighbors waste their scanty substance in war against each other. As an Indian official said grimly, "They must be laughing hard in Peking."

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842104-1,00.html

 

[T-Faz]

You might want to look up Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik and his hasty removal from Operation Grandslam.

Operation Grand Slam -DAWN Magazine; November 27, 2005

MODERN day war complicates rather than solves anything. A country goes to war either to defend its sovereignty in case of attack, or to overwhelm an adversary for political or territorial/material gains.

The War in 1965 was undertaken by General Ayub not for the first reason. Similarly, Hitler started WWII in 1940, Suharto annexed Eastern Timor in 1975, Gen Galteiri occupied Falkland Islands in 1982, and Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990 -- all for personal glory and political gains. Bush invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, for the black gold.

In 1965, the plan ‘Operation Gibraltar' involved sneaking a mixed force of 70,000, trained and regulars, into Indian-held Kashmir and invoke a general uprising in the local populace. The general feeling in the army high command was that Indians had no stomach of warfare and were no match for the superior. The war plan originated in the Foreign Office. The D-day was set for August 5, 1965.

Military high command took it to be as one blow, limited and confined operation, forgetting that war is not an isolated act and once started, it cannot be confined by time or space. Secondly, against defined and proclaimed logic, the military in Pakistan had taken over the political direction of the war.

Our scope is limited to the operation conducted on the Kashmir front under Maj-General Akhtar Malik where, given the opportunity and time, Pakistan could have dictated terms to India on other fronts (‘unexpectedly') opened later by India. But it was not to be. Much has been written about the change in command in the 1965 War, when late Maj-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, Commander 12 Division which had the responsibility for Jammu and Kashmir, was replaced by Maj. Gen. Yahya Khan, Commander 7 Div, and Akhnur was let off the hook, thereby saving the Indian forces a huge embarrassment.

Discussing the initial plans of ‘Operation Gibraltar', Ayub had put his finger at Akhnur across river Tawi, on the sand model asked: “But why don’t you go for the jugular?” General Malik asked for more money and men and Ayub readily agreed. (Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan Pakistan’s First Military Ruler’s Sange-meel Publications 1998 p.332)

The attack on Akhnur was given the code name ‘Operation Grand Slam’, to be launched after the ‘Operation Gibraltar'. Gen Akhtar Malik was assigned this task as he knew the area like the back of his hand, and he was a bold and audacious commander.

Gen. Malik had already captured Chamb on September 1, and was well poised to go for Akhnur on September 2, 1965 when he was relieved of command in a most bizarre mysterious manner, defying common sense and logic. Before Musa flew Malik back from the front, General Malik had offered his services to fight under Yahya’s command to take Akhnur.

General Musa, the C-n-C, flew with Gen Yahya on the front on September 2, 1965 to replace General Malik who would not hand over charge otherwise. Yahya was specifically asked by Musa not to advance. A pause of 48 hours was enough for Indian forces to regroup and blunt the Pakistani advance. The Indians also opened another front on Lahore, thus spreading Pakistan Forces thin along the western border. Having lost the initiative, now Pakistan was fighting for its survival. One can lose a battle or even a war, but in Kashmir at that time, it was a victory lost.

The prevailing view in GHQ was that Gen. Ayub had lost his nerve. (Altaf Gauhar p. 334) Shortly before his death, Bhutto had expressed similar views about Ayub, saying he used to panic during crises. (Col. Rafiuddin Bhutto kay akhri 323 din, Jang Publications 1992 p.61) Bhutto observed that Pakistan Army had yet to produce another fighting general of Akhtar Malik’s calibre and had Malik been allowed to advance in Chhamb-Jurian Sector, he would have played havoc with the Indian Forces. (Col Rafiuddin p.66)

After the 1965 War, the talk on change of command in Kashmir became taboo but with death of Gen Musa, the subject was discussed threadbare. The ISPR floated the idea that the change of command in 1965 was pre-planned. Brig. Gul Hassan (late Lt. Gen. and Army Chief), at that time, Director Military Operations, in his memoirs, denied the existence of any such planned change of command during the execution of Operation Grand Slam.

Secondly, Brig. Gul Hassan said he knew Gen. Malik well enough to say that he (Gen. Malik) would never have accepted a command for 24 hours for such a daunting assignment. What happened behind the scenes may never be known. (Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Akhri Commander-in-Chief, Dost Publications Isd. 1999 p.231-234)

Gen. Ayub published his biography Friends Not Master in 1967 but he failed to cover the 1965 War, as it was not a glorious chapter of his life. He tried to gloss over history.

As soon as Yahya took over from Musa as C-n-C in September 1966, he posted out Gen Malik on a CENTO assignment in Turkey. General Akhtar Malik died in 1969 in a car crash in Turkey. It could have been a target-assassination. General Malik had met the Jordanian Ambassador a few days earlier in Ankara. The Ambassador had asked General Malik to help upgrade the Jordanian Army, a job that was accepted by the latter.

It could be Mossad for Israel didn’t want Jordan to acquire the services of a professional general (according to an ex-Army Officer who asked not to be revealed). Israel has been deeply involved in anything that affects its security, especially its neighbours. In 1980, Mossad had eliminated an Egyptian nuclear physicist, Dr Yahia El Meshad, in Paris who had been helping Iraq in setting up its nuclear plant. (Claire Hoy & Victor Ostrovsky By Way of Deception Stoddart Publishing Co.Ltd. Toronto 1990 p.23)

According to officers who fought on Kashmir front, had General Malik been allowed to capture Akhnur, Ayub would not have ignored him for the post of C-n-C. The country as a consequence, would not have undergone the ensuring colossal tragedy of 1971. But that is a wishful afterthought.

Ayub, who had appointed Musa as his first Army Chief and Yahya as the next (the appointment of first almost cost us West Pakistan in 1965 and under the next one we lost East Pakistan in 1971), would not have liked a general of Akhtar Malik’s stature to command the Pakistan Army. Tragic but true!

Akhtar Hussain Malik - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

You also might want to look up these war heros:

Maj Gen Iftikhar Janjua, known as the hero of the Rann of Kutch

Iftikhar Janjua - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Also read about another war hero known as Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik

Abdul Ali Malik - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[T-Faz]

Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik made a brilliant strike across Chamb-Jaurian sector. He out- manoeuvred the Indians. He captured Akhnoor and was approaching Tawai river. The enemy was dislodged and Indians were planning further withdrawal for they could not withstand the onslaught of General Akhtar Hussain Malik.

It was reported that the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahdur Shastri directed Indian Air Force to get Gen Akhtar Hussain Mailk at any cost. He was making daring use of Helicopter directing his force.

Even an inveterate enemy of Ahmadis (He was an Ahmadi) - Shorish Kashmiri paid a tribute in an urdu couplet,

"The Land of Delhi is calling, Oh friends, Extend a helping hand to Akhtar Malik, oh friends."

Had Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik captured Jammu, The Kashmir Problem was automatically solved. The Indians would never been able to sustain their troops in landlocked Kashmir. And they would have to leave Kashmir.

Field Marshal Ayub, who was the President of Pakistan at that time, knew what this victory would mean: It would catapult Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik in public eye.

He wanted one of his cronies to take credit of this vital victory. He asked Gen Musa, the then Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army to take Gen Yahya by helicopter to Chamb-Jurian sector and ask Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik to hand over the command of the Operations.

Gen Malik: "Why changing horses in midstream"?

These are the orders of the boss. Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik handed over the command in utter disgust.

Gen Sarfraz Khan who commanded Lahore sector in 1965 in an article in Daily Jang Lahore September 6, 1984 said about this military victory snatched out of the hands of Gen Malik.

With what brilliant planning and bravery, Gen Akhtar Malik attacked Chamb, it can only be called a great victory. He was in position to capture Jurian as the enemy had been dislodged and they were to withdraw as further Pakistani advance was anticipated.

But it was not allowed to happen, a plan was already made to make Gen Yahya take credit of this victory.

The Indian Commander in Chef, General Chaudri, who was watching with dismay the crumbling defences of the Indian army in Chamb -Juraian sector, jumped upon the opportunity and launched an attack on Lahore.

The whole game was over. Pakistan was now involved in its own battle of life and death.

Here came the another hero of Pakistan army General Abdul Ali Malik.

Indian Commander in Chief Gen Chaudri made a bet with foreign Journalists and invited them to have cocktails with him in Lahore Gymkhana on September 8, made another brilliant move, he attacked Sialkot with hundreds of tanks.

India's plan was to make a direct thrust towards Wazirabad to capture commonly known GT Road and divide West Pakistan into two.

GOC Sialkot lost his nerves and ordered withdrawal to Sambrial. However, he had an Ahmadi Brigadier, Gen Abdul Ali. He told the GOC he would meet enemy right here at Chawinda and would not yield an inch of Pakistan soil. This Ahmadi had faith in Allah and the courage of his soldiers.

It was the most crucial battle of the whole war, where Indian tanks battled with Pakistan tanks. Gen Abdul Ali gave no quarter to the enemy, the tenacity and the bravery and superior skill in deployment of his tanks triumphed. Indian tanks fell back.

According to some reports, two thousands tanks on either side took part in it.

Battle of Chawinda is considered as the greatest tank battle after the battle of El Alameen fought by Field Marshal Montgomery with Field Marshal Rommel (the top German General).

 

[ramu]

I am going through you post and it gives an account of what people were thinking during the war. It is easy to post about the thoughts then but it still is a forum and people have to give thr reactions...

"Let's fight it out and get it over with. Either we become slaves of India, or India accepts us as an independent state. This suspense must end."

India accepted Pakistan as an independent state and it was Pakistan that decided to ferment trouble in 1965 that was unexpected not just by India but within the defence forces in Pakistan. So the comment that India accepts Pakistan is just ridiculous.

 

[ramu]

Since its army is much the larger (867,000 men to 253,000), India went on the attack in five widely separated sectors of the Punjab front—three columns aimed at encircling Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city, one thrust at Sialkot, and the last struck at Karachi via the town of Gadra. The Indians hoped to force the dispersion of the smaller but better-trained and -armed Pakistani forces and then chop them up piecemeal.

India fought on its strength and Pakistan used the element of surprise as its strength. The problem was the poor execution and myth that India will not escalate the large scale intrusion to a full blown war. India took a long time to decide on going to war but when it did, it did with full force. Pakistan forces were trained on US equipment that they received as aid for over 10 years before 1965. India was recouping from 1962 insult and this Pakistan intention was to clearly rub salt into its wounds.

Whatever the Indian intention, it was legitimate in terms of thwarting an adversary who had infiltrated with a false notion that India will give up Kashmir and will not have the will to fight a full scale war.

 

[ramu]

In the air, it was much the same story—Indian quantity and Pakistan quality. Indian pilots are flying a variety of fighters, from French Mystères and British Vampires to Russian MIG-21s and Indian-built Gnats. The Pakistanis have U.S. supersonic jets, which seem to have made a spectacular number of kills—Pakistani Air Vice Marshal Nur Khan claims that 108 Indian planes have been shot down. If true, that amounts to a fifth of the Indian air force.

Indians acquired the new platforms for Air force just before 1965 and the pilots were not fully equipped to fly the air crafts. Pakistan on the other hand had trained for long on the US fighters and were ready for the Indian assaults. The Pakistan air force was kept in the dark about 1965 and was not expected to participate as the war was expected to remain local to Kashmir.

In any case, the first few weeks of the war was a time for celebration in Pakistan as the BBC produced programs that suggested that Pakistan was making headway and cutting through Indian lines as knife cuts through butter. The Pakistan media went ga ga about patriotism and experimented with the notion of colonising India for a brief period in the height of the initial success.

 

[T-Faz]

This little sentence says it all.

When the British left India in 1947, it was commonly said that Pakistan got the military, and India the civil servants.

 

[ramu]

Quavering Voice. When the British left India in 1947, it was commonly said that Pakistan got the military, and India the civil servants. The leaders of the two countries reflect the aphorism. Pakistan's President Mohammed Ayub Khan is a strapping six-footer who was educated at Sandhurst, fought valiantly in Burma in World War II. Before seizing control of his chaotic country in a bloodless military coup in 1958, Ayub Khan was commander in chief of Pakistan's army.

Though now a democratically elected President, Ayub Khan is still a military man and is running Pakistan's side of the war from the map room in his interim capital of Rawalpindi. He rallied his nation and his armed forces with a nationwide broadcast. In a voice quavering with emotion, Ayub declared that "the Indian rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan where ******* could build a homeland of their own. For 18 years they have been arming to crush us." The present Pakistani commander, General Mohammed Musa, also took to the radio to praise the courage of his troops. The army had got its teeth in the enemy, said Musa, and should "bite deeper and deeper until he is destroyed. And destroy him you will, God willing."

Among all the enemies Pakistan had, Ayub Khan should be one of the top runners. For 18 years if India was arming to crush Pakistan, why did Ayub Khan decide to create trouble for himself by attacking India and giving India good reason to fight back ? It is surprising to see how gullible people can be on both sides.

Bite deeper and deeper and expect no fight .

 

[T-Faz]

And the truth was that it was Lord Mounbattens favorite secretary Nehru who allowed this to happen.

Ayub Khan had already made an effort to test this theory by offering in 1959 to join Nehru in a pact for the mutual defense of the subcontinent. Cracked Nehru, "Defense against whom?" and turned down the treaty.

And the truth about Kashmir.

Ex-Defense Minister Krishna Menon has bluntly explained why India opposes the plebiscite: "Because we would lose it." The popular Moslem leader, Sheik Abdullah, first supported union with India. When he changed his mind, the Indians clapped him in jail.

Nehru was determined to keep Kashmir because it was his ancestral home and, as he put it, "a piece of my heart."

 

[T-Faz]

Pakistani tribesmen came downthe mountains in the northwest to help their Moslem brothers. If raping women is how the tribesmen defined help, I am short of words. this thread is about 1965, so with no further comments, let us focus on that.

Dont get out of line, provide proof of this rape which is actually a favorite past time of your soldiers in Kashmir.

Delete this pathetic post of you cannot provide proof.

Also this was written by Time Magazine, not some third rate Indian news media outlet.

 

[ramu]

Indian jet fighters streaked from the sky to smash the armored spearhead. Fearful of losing the strategic city of Jammu, the Indian high command ordered the drive on Lahore, removing the battle from Kashmir to Pakistan proper, and changing a brush-fire war into a full-scale challenge. The escalation had increased, and the suspense was over. Whatever else Ayub Khan and Shastri accomplished last week, they had noisily reopened the question of Kashmir.

Looks like the author is not happy with India and on the count that India opened multiple fronts.

If India occupies Pakistan Punjab, will Pakistan limit the war to Punjab itself. Quite hilarious is the suggestion of a brush war.

 

[ramu]

Dont get out of line, provide proof of this rape which is actually a favorite past time of your soldiers in Kashmir.

Delete this pathetic post of you cannot provide proof.

Also this was written by Time Magazine, not some third rate Indian news media outlet.

I dont write without proof, so chill.

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

The tribal warriors quickly forgot the mission they were supposed to achieve, and succumbed prey to a vice deeply rooted in their culture and history — looting, pillaging and raping. Among their victims were some European nuns, presumably engaged in meditation and helping the poor. Why some of our senior officers could not keep such characters under control is of course another matter, but Kashmiri opinion quickly turned against the infiltrators. The rape of the nuns brought along international disapprobation and condemnation.