The Enigma of Military Rule in Pakistan

[Tiki Tam Tam]

The Enigma of Military Rule in Pakistan

Columnist AHMAD FARUQUI examines military rule in the country.

General Musharraf has completed his first year in office as Pakistan’s Chief Executive, a role that he serves in addition to being Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had laid out an ambitious domestic agenda soon after coming to power dealing with Pakistan’s perennial problems of economic mismanagement, corruption, and law and order. Much of this domestic agenda remains unfinished. In addition, the problem of Kashmir continues to fester, draining Pakistan of vital financial resources and international rapport. The United States has tilted decisively toward India, and much of the world is distancing itself from Pakistan. Such international isolation is to be expected, since there are hardly any other military governments around.

It is time to take stock of what military rule has accomplished in Pakistan. General Musharraf is the fourth in a line of army chiefs who seized power on essentially the same pretext: getting rid of venal politicians, saving the economy from bankruptcy, and preserving the security and integrity of the country. None of the past three military rulers successfully achieved these goals, and all of them left their office involuntarily.

Based on this history, it is possible to make three recommendations regarding the military’s political, fiscal and warfighting roles. First, it is clear that Pakistan’s political leadership has not lived upto the trust that its electorate has reposed in them. However, the military’s solution of stepping in and taking over has not worked either, since it ceases to be a neutral arbiter. It has not been able to deal with Pakistan’s chronic problems of corruption and economic mismanagement any better than the politicians. A solution to this impasse may be for the people of Pakistan to empower the military to exercise extra-parliamentary authority under extraordinary circumstances.

The military would be empowered to cast a vote of no-confidence in a rogue government that has hijacked the legislature to serve its own ends. It would then arrange for new elections to be held within ninety days, and hand over power to the new government. The mere granting of such a role to the military would keep governments in line, and obviate the need for the military to actually step in. It would also preserve the independence of the judiciary, and put a stop to the practice of forcing out judges who do not approve a coup d’etat. This extra-parliamentary role should be granted by the people to the military through a referendum, and not seized by the military on the power of its guns. Thus, when the military does step in, the world’s major powers will have no need to isolate a rogue military regime by cutting off the foreign aid that is essential to Pakistan’s continued economic well being.

It may be appropriate for Pakistan to create a power sharing structure similar to Turkey’s where the military plays a constitutional role in government through participation in the High Command of the National Security Council (MGK). Although civilian supremacy over the military is not fully established, “there is little reason to expect a direct military intervention in Turkey. When officers feel some kind of intervention is absolutely necessary, they make that intervention by mobilizing the democratic forces and by trying to stay within the legal framework.” The military serves as a protector of democracy. It does not view itself in competition with the political elite, and plays the role of a non-partisan arbiter.

Second, the military needs to provide a transparent analysis of its fiscal expenditures which, along with debt servicing, account for almost 50% of the government budget. Currently, no details are provided on defence spending. This tradition goes back to the days of Liaquat Ali Khan when reasons of national security were cited for not providing details below the total amount. The military, in conjunction with the civilian government, needs to lay out a strategic doctrine for dealing with threats to national security, and derive a rationale for its force levels. In the United States, “armed force is a ‘support function’: the military does not set the nation’s security policy or its overseas security goals.” It has been argued that the force levels are twice as large as needed to deal with the threat posed by India. The military needs to provide details of spending by service, by capital and operating costs, and by sub-headings under these broad categories, such as expenditures by type of weapon system. Such analysis is routinely provided in all democratic countries, including India.

Third, consistent with John Keegan’s dictum that martial law is the canker of all armies, the Pakistani military has become corrupted by military rule and has lost its warfighting capabilities. It should implement the recommendations of the War Commission which found that [T]he process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958, [and] these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact, intensified when Martial Law was imposed in the country once again in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan. The Commission concluded with a strongly worded call for book[ing] these senior army commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their professional incompetence... [Thus] proper and firm disciplinary action, and not merely retirement from service, is necessary to ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war... uch action would... serve to emphasize the concept of professional accountability which appears to have been forgotten by senior army officers since their involvement in politics, civil administration and Martial Law duties.

Retired Air Marshal Nur Khan has asked that the army should admit that mistakes were committed so that it becomes a moral force, and not just a mercenary army. He suggests that Musharraf should set up an independent judicial commission that would review all classified reports about all military failures and make them public. It should fix the responsibility wherever it falls, punish the culprits, whether living or dead, complete its job within one year, and allow the Pakistani nation and the Armed Forces to move on. Contrary to this advice, Musharraf has stated a desire to “forget the bitterness of the past and move forward,” expressed his firm opposition to trying the people named in the War Commission report, and concluded: “Something happened 30 years ago. Why do we want to live in history? As a Pakistani, I would like to forget 1971.”

Learning only occurs when one is willing to accept failure. Such an approach was adopted in the US in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, and produced dramatic results during the 1991 Gulf War. The Egyptian Army learned from its defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967, and improved greatly by the time of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The eventual Egyptian offensive across the Suez Canal resulted in a near debacle for Israel. The Agarnat Commission, appointed to study Israel’s lack of preparedness, released a brief excerpt from its report in April 1974. This was “political dynamite,” and resulted not only in the dismissal of senior military officers, but also the resignations of Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan. The top echelons of the Pakistani military need to rethink their strategy of continuing to ignore their troubled history. George Santayana could have been speaking to them when he penned his immortal words: Those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/enigma.htm

Interesting.

But has one seen why democracy fails in Pakistan?

How and who creates the environment for a military take over?

So, why blame the Pakistan Army?