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The End of the Bush-Mush Affair
By Dan Froomkin
Special to washingtonpost.com
Tuesday, August 19, 2008; 11:45 AM
President Bush's stormy relationship with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is finally over.
Long after it became apparent that Musharraf was leading him on, and long after it was clear that Musharraf was on his way out the door, Bush still stood by his man.
But now that Musharraf is gone, having resigned in the face of impeachment, Bush is left to pick up the pieces.
Anwar Iqbal writes in Dawn, Pakistan's most widely read English-language newspaper: "Diplomatic sources in Washington described President Bush as Mr Musharraf's 'last holdout' in the US capital. Others in the Bush administration -- including Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice -- had long given up on Mr Musharraf. But Mr Bush remained faithful to the person he considered a close ally and a personal friend."
Iqbal writes that Bush finally faced up to the inevitable about three weeks ago, after Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani flew to Washington for an intervention: "By the time Prime Minister Gilani met Mr Bush on July 28, Pakistani lobbyists were satisfied that they had neutralised the pro-Musharraf lobby in Washington.
"'President Bush was the last holdout,' said [a think-tank expert who worked with the Pakistani ambassador to Washington]. 'But after a good luncheon at the White House with people who had their hearts in the right place, Mr Bush also realised that he can no longer save Mr Musharraf'.
"The prime minister took a team of 'Musharraf experts' with him to the luncheon and they played a key role in persuading Mr Bush to stop supporting the Pakistani leader.
"'Once this was done, the Pakistanis knew that the Americans will no longer try to save Mr Musharraf, so they made their move [for impeachment],' the expert said.
"While Mr Bush had accepted the argument that Mr Musharraf could no longer be saved, he still wanted to make sure that the Pakistani leader was not penalised.
"Besides sending his own ambassador to the coalition leaders to negotiate a safe exit, indemnity from penalisation and a secure stay in Pakistan or abroad for Mr Musharraf, Mr Bush also asked two key allies -- Britain and Saudi Arabia -- to help."
Jane Perlez writes in the New York Times that Musharraf announced his resignation "after months of belated recognition by American officials that he had become a waning asset in the campaign against terrorism.
"The decision removes from Pakistan's political stage the leader who for nearly nine years served as one of the United States' most important -- and ultimately unreliable -- allies. . . .
"'We've said for years that Musharraf is our best bet, and my fear is that we are about to discover how true that was,' one senior Bush administration official said, acknowledging that the United States had stuck with Mr. Musharraf for too long and developed few other relationships in Pakistan to fall back on.
"Administration officials will now have to find allies within the fractious civilian government, which has so far shown scant interest in taking on militants from the Taliban and Al Qaeda who have roosted in Pakistan's badlands along the border with Afghanistan.
"At the same time, suspicions between the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies and their militaries are deepening, and relations between the countries are at their lowest point since Mr. Musharraf pledged to ally Pakistan with the United States after the 9/11 attacks.
"Among the greatest concerns, senior American officials say, is the durability of new controls over Pakistan's nuclear program."
Michael Abramowitz and Glenn Kessler write in The Washington Post: "For years, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had no stronger supporter than President Bush. . . "[A]fter seven years of unstinting support for the onetime army general, including more than $10 billion in U.S. assistance for Pakistan since the 2001 attacks, the Bush administration finally concluded -- too late, in the view of its critics -- that time was up for Musharraf. . . .
"The shift from the Bush administration on Musharraf has been slow in coming. Even last fall, after Musharraf imposed emergency rule, Bush stood by the Pakistani president, offering only muted criticism and lauding him as 'a strong fighter against extremists and radicals' in the region. Although Musharraf's party was routed in elections this year, Bush telephoned the Pakistani president in May to say he looked forward to his continuing role in strengthening U.S.-Pakistan ties.
"'Certain folks hung on to him,' said a State Department official involved in Pakistan policy. . . .
"Despite the hope in some quarters of Washington that Musharraf could remain in his job, Bush administration officials said yesterday that they had been gradually preparing for his departure. . . .
"'We're confident that we will maintain a good relationship with the government of Pakistan,' White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe told reporters in Crawford, Tex., where the president is spending the week at his ranch."
Greg Miller writes in the Los Angeles Times: "Musharraf was arguably the administration's most important ally in the fight against Islamic extremists. But when he resigned the presidency Monday, senior counter-terrorism officials in the U.S. government said there was more relief than anxiety rippling through their ranks that the drama over Musharraf's fate had ended.
"Even at the height of his powers, the man who long commanded Pakistan's army had produced uneven results in countering the militant threat based in his country's northwest, said U.S. intelligence officials, all of whom requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the relationship.
"They complained that Musharraf had failed to root out elements of the Pakistani intelligence service that remain sympathetic to the Taliban, which has regained strength and appears to move easily across the border into Afghanistan to attack U.S. troops.
"'From the American point of view, we wildly mis-estimated him and we wildly mis-estimated Pakistani capabilities,' said Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution, who was visiting Pakistan this week. . . .
"Last week, Ted Gistaro, the U.S. national intelligence officer for transnational threats, warned that Al Qaeda had 'strengthened its safe haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas by deepening its alliances with Pakistani militants,' and said it 'now has many of the operational and organizational advantages it once enjoyed across the border in Afghanistan, albeit on a smaller and less secure scale.'
"Critics said the revival of the extremist threat signals the failure of the Bush-Musharraf partnership.
"'It ends an era marked by great cooperation but unfulfilled expectations,' said analyst Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University."
Daniel Dombey, Andrew Ward and Amy Kazmin write in the Financial Times: "During the closest years of their relationship, between 2001 and last year, Mr Bush rarely let an opportunity go without lauding Mr Musharraf for his tough stand on 'radicals' and 'extremists'
"But eventually, the Pakistani leader's star fell, even with Mr Bush, after a new democratically elected government came to power in Islamabad this year and proceeded to sideline Mr Musharraf.
"'The US was like a partner that has been cheated on for years and refuses to see the reality,' said Frederic Grare, a specialist on Pakistan at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington. He argued that the Bush administration overpersonalised its dealings with Mr Musharraf, brushed aside signs of Pakistani support for the Taliban and failed to perceive his lack of political support."
Deb Riechmann writes for the Associated Press: "'Bush came to call him the indispensable man,' said Bruce Riedel, a senior adviser to three presidents on Middle East and South Asian affairs. 'In the end, he also became the man who couldn't deliver. Bush was very slow to realize that he either had been had by Musharraf or that Musharraf was not up to the task. Historians will debate this for years.'"
For more on the history of the Bush-Mush relationship, see my November 19 column, Bush's Crush on Musharraf, which was prompted by articles in the Washington Post and New York Times describing how Musharraf wooed and won Bush shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Michael Abramowitz wrote that week in The Washington Post: "Over the course of a dozen private meetings and numerous phone conversations . . . the savvy and well-spoken Pakistani president has made a point of cementing his personal relationship with Bush. Musharraf has regaled the U.S. president with stories of his youth in Punjab, his empathy for rank-and-file soldiers and his desire to reform the education system in Pakistan, according to individuals familiar with those conversations."
Sheryl Gay Stolberg wrote then in the New York Times: "Experts in United States-Pakistan relations said General Musharraf has played the union masterfully, by convincing Mr. Bush that he alone can keep Pakistan stable. Kamran Bokhari, an analyst for Stratfor, a private intelligence company, who met with General Musharraf in January, said the general viewed Mr. Bush with some condescension."
The New York Times editorial board writes: "For seven years, the Bush administration enabled Mr. Musharraf -- believing that he was the best ally for the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. He never delivered on that promise. And Pakistan's people deeply resent Washington for propping up the dictator.
With Mr. Musharraf finally out of the picture, it is time to focus American policy on his dangerous and dangerously neglected country."
Juan Cole writes for Salon: "It is a measure of the Bush administration's broken foreign policy that the departure of Pervez Musharraf, the corrupt, longtime military dictator of Pakistan, is provoking fears in Washington of 'instability.' Despite Bush's warm embrace, Musharraf gutted the rule of law in Pakistan over the previous year and a half, including sacking its Supreme Court. He attempted to do away with press freedom, failed to provide security for campaigning politicians and strove to postpone elections indefinitely.
"The Bush administration has made a regular practice of undermining democracy in places where local politics don't play out to its liking, and in that, at least, Musharraf was a true partner. But stability derives not from a tyrannical brake on popular aspirations; it derives from the free play of the political process. Musharraf's resignation from office, in fact, marks Pakistan's first chance for a decent political future since 1977."
By Dan Froomkin
Special to washingtonpost.com
Tuesday, August 19, 2008; 11:45 AM
President Bush's stormy relationship with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is finally over.
Long after it became apparent that Musharraf was leading him on, and long after it was clear that Musharraf was on his way out the door, Bush still stood by his man.
But now that Musharraf is gone, having resigned in the face of impeachment, Bush is left to pick up the pieces.
Anwar Iqbal writes in Dawn, Pakistan's most widely read English-language newspaper: "Diplomatic sources in Washington described President Bush as Mr Musharraf's 'last holdout' in the US capital. Others in the Bush administration -- including Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice -- had long given up on Mr Musharraf. But Mr Bush remained faithful to the person he considered a close ally and a personal friend."
Iqbal writes that Bush finally faced up to the inevitable about three weeks ago, after Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani flew to Washington for an intervention: "By the time Prime Minister Gilani met Mr Bush on July 28, Pakistani lobbyists were satisfied that they had neutralised the pro-Musharraf lobby in Washington.
"'President Bush was the last holdout,' said [a think-tank expert who worked with the Pakistani ambassador to Washington]. 'But after a good luncheon at the White House with people who had their hearts in the right place, Mr Bush also realised that he can no longer save Mr Musharraf'.
"The prime minister took a team of 'Musharraf experts' with him to the luncheon and they played a key role in persuading Mr Bush to stop supporting the Pakistani leader.
"'Once this was done, the Pakistanis knew that the Americans will no longer try to save Mr Musharraf, so they made their move [for impeachment],' the expert said.
"While Mr Bush had accepted the argument that Mr Musharraf could no longer be saved, he still wanted to make sure that the Pakistani leader was not penalised.
"Besides sending his own ambassador to the coalition leaders to negotiate a safe exit, indemnity from penalisation and a secure stay in Pakistan or abroad for Mr Musharraf, Mr Bush also asked two key allies -- Britain and Saudi Arabia -- to help."
Jane Perlez writes in the New York Times that Musharraf announced his resignation "after months of belated recognition by American officials that he had become a waning asset in the campaign against terrorism.
"The decision removes from Pakistan's political stage the leader who for nearly nine years served as one of the United States' most important -- and ultimately unreliable -- allies. . . .
"'We've said for years that Musharraf is our best bet, and my fear is that we are about to discover how true that was,' one senior Bush administration official said, acknowledging that the United States had stuck with Mr. Musharraf for too long and developed few other relationships in Pakistan to fall back on.
"Administration officials will now have to find allies within the fractious civilian government, which has so far shown scant interest in taking on militants from the Taliban and Al Qaeda who have roosted in Pakistan's badlands along the border with Afghanistan.
"At the same time, suspicions between the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies and their militaries are deepening, and relations between the countries are at their lowest point since Mr. Musharraf pledged to ally Pakistan with the United States after the 9/11 attacks.
"Among the greatest concerns, senior American officials say, is the durability of new controls over Pakistan's nuclear program."
Michael Abramowitz and Glenn Kessler write in The Washington Post: "For years, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had no stronger supporter than President Bush. . . "[A]fter seven years of unstinting support for the onetime army general, including more than $10 billion in U.S. assistance for Pakistan since the 2001 attacks, the Bush administration finally concluded -- too late, in the view of its critics -- that time was up for Musharraf. . . .
"The shift from the Bush administration on Musharraf has been slow in coming. Even last fall, after Musharraf imposed emergency rule, Bush stood by the Pakistani president, offering only muted criticism and lauding him as 'a strong fighter against extremists and radicals' in the region. Although Musharraf's party was routed in elections this year, Bush telephoned the Pakistani president in May to say he looked forward to his continuing role in strengthening U.S.-Pakistan ties.
"'Certain folks hung on to him,' said a State Department official involved in Pakistan policy. . . .
"Despite the hope in some quarters of Washington that Musharraf could remain in his job, Bush administration officials said yesterday that they had been gradually preparing for his departure. . . .
"'We're confident that we will maintain a good relationship with the government of Pakistan,' White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe told reporters in Crawford, Tex., where the president is spending the week at his ranch."
Greg Miller writes in the Los Angeles Times: "Musharraf was arguably the administration's most important ally in the fight against Islamic extremists. But when he resigned the presidency Monday, senior counter-terrorism officials in the U.S. government said there was more relief than anxiety rippling through their ranks that the drama over Musharraf's fate had ended.
"Even at the height of his powers, the man who long commanded Pakistan's army had produced uneven results in countering the militant threat based in his country's northwest, said U.S. intelligence officials, all of whom requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the relationship.
"They complained that Musharraf had failed to root out elements of the Pakistani intelligence service that remain sympathetic to the Taliban, which has regained strength and appears to move easily across the border into Afghanistan to attack U.S. troops.
"'From the American point of view, we wildly mis-estimated him and we wildly mis-estimated Pakistani capabilities,' said Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution, who was visiting Pakistan this week. . . .
"Last week, Ted Gistaro, the U.S. national intelligence officer for transnational threats, warned that Al Qaeda had 'strengthened its safe haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas by deepening its alliances with Pakistani militants,' and said it 'now has many of the operational and organizational advantages it once enjoyed across the border in Afghanistan, albeit on a smaller and less secure scale.'
"Critics said the revival of the extremist threat signals the failure of the Bush-Musharraf partnership.
"'It ends an era marked by great cooperation but unfulfilled expectations,' said analyst Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University."
Daniel Dombey, Andrew Ward and Amy Kazmin write in the Financial Times: "During the closest years of their relationship, between 2001 and last year, Mr Bush rarely let an opportunity go without lauding Mr Musharraf for his tough stand on 'radicals' and 'extremists'
"But eventually, the Pakistani leader's star fell, even with Mr Bush, after a new democratically elected government came to power in Islamabad this year and proceeded to sideline Mr Musharraf.
"'The US was like a partner that has been cheated on for years and refuses to see the reality,' said Frederic Grare, a specialist on Pakistan at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington. He argued that the Bush administration overpersonalised its dealings with Mr Musharraf, brushed aside signs of Pakistani support for the Taliban and failed to perceive his lack of political support."
Deb Riechmann writes for the Associated Press: "'Bush came to call him the indispensable man,' said Bruce Riedel, a senior adviser to three presidents on Middle East and South Asian affairs. 'In the end, he also became the man who couldn't deliver. Bush was very slow to realize that he either had been had by Musharraf or that Musharraf was not up to the task. Historians will debate this for years.'"
For more on the history of the Bush-Mush relationship, see my November 19 column, Bush's Crush on Musharraf, which was prompted by articles in the Washington Post and New York Times describing how Musharraf wooed and won Bush shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Michael Abramowitz wrote that week in The Washington Post: "Over the course of a dozen private meetings and numerous phone conversations . . . the savvy and well-spoken Pakistani president has made a point of cementing his personal relationship with Bush. Musharraf has regaled the U.S. president with stories of his youth in Punjab, his empathy for rank-and-file soldiers and his desire to reform the education system in Pakistan, according to individuals familiar with those conversations."
Sheryl Gay Stolberg wrote then in the New York Times: "Experts in United States-Pakistan relations said General Musharraf has played the union masterfully, by convincing Mr. Bush that he alone can keep Pakistan stable. Kamran Bokhari, an analyst for Stratfor, a private intelligence company, who met with General Musharraf in January, said the general viewed Mr. Bush with some condescension."
The New York Times editorial board writes: "For seven years, the Bush administration enabled Mr. Musharraf -- believing that he was the best ally for the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. He never delivered on that promise. And Pakistan's people deeply resent Washington for propping up the dictator.
With Mr. Musharraf finally out of the picture, it is time to focus American policy on his dangerous and dangerously neglected country."
Juan Cole writes for Salon: "It is a measure of the Bush administration's broken foreign policy that the departure of Pervez Musharraf, the corrupt, longtime military dictator of Pakistan, is provoking fears in Washington of 'instability.' Despite Bush's warm embrace, Musharraf gutted the rule of law in Pakistan over the previous year and a half, including sacking its Supreme Court. He attempted to do away with press freedom, failed to provide security for campaigning politicians and strove to postpone elections indefinitely.
"The Bush administration has made a regular practice of undermining democracy in places where local politics don't play out to its liking, and in that, at least, Musharraf was a true partner. But stability derives not from a tyrannical brake on popular aspirations; it derives from the free play of the political process. Musharraf's resignation from office, in fact, marks Pakistan's first chance for a decent political future since 1977."
