PanzerKiel
MILITARY PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Dec 5, 2006
- Messages
- 4,205
- Reaction score
- 199
- Country
- Location
It is interesting to see the nature of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and India basing it on the works of famous French Strategist Andre Beaufre.
It has been established by him that deterrence in a bilateral situation results because of an unfavourable comparison between the risk and the issue at stake. Mathematically, deterrence should begin to operate when the risk becomes greater than the stake.
Between two nuclear rivals, one with first use policy and the other with no first use policy, the distinction lies between the side which fires first and the side which replies in retaliation. He who fires first would appear to have all the advantages.... a point worthy of noting in the state of Nuclear Deterrence between India and Pakistan.
During the evolution of nuclear doctrines in cold war era, for some time interest centered upon the first strike. Then gradually the likelihood of first strike became more remote as the second strike began to appear more certain and more destructive. Conversely, if the first strike were highly effective, the second strike would be weak or problematic and in this case first strike became increasingly probable. The conclusion, was therefore, reached that capacity for riposte (term used by Andre Beaufre for second strike) was the key to nuclear deterrence, whereas capability to reduce the riposte was the key to nuclear initiative.
Andre Beaufre gives out some typical bilateral nuclear situations, which can be taken as a guide to evaluate the nuclear stability and viability of deterrence in sub-continent. These situations are:-
Pakistan therefore needs to see its nuclear deterrence in terms of disincentives for an aggressor.
Some points which can help us reach some logical conclusions....
Some recommendations......
It has been established by him that deterrence in a bilateral situation results because of an unfavourable comparison between the risk and the issue at stake. Mathematically, deterrence should begin to operate when the risk becomes greater than the stake.
Between two nuclear rivals, one with first use policy and the other with no first use policy, the distinction lies between the side which fires first and the side which replies in retaliation. He who fires first would appear to have all the advantages.... a point worthy of noting in the state of Nuclear Deterrence between India and Pakistan.
During the evolution of nuclear doctrines in cold war era, for some time interest centered upon the first strike. Then gradually the likelihood of first strike became more remote as the second strike began to appear more certain and more destructive. Conversely, if the first strike were highly effective, the second strike would be weak or problematic and in this case first strike became increasingly probable. The conclusion, was therefore, reached that capacity for riposte (term used by Andre Beaufre for second strike) was the key to nuclear deterrence, whereas capability to reduce the riposte was the key to nuclear initiative.
Andre Beaufre gives out some typical bilateral nuclear situations, which can be taken as a guide to evaluate the nuclear stability and viability of deterrence in sub-continent. These situations are:-
- Absolute Stability. When both sides consider that they are threatened by a riposte which is unacceptable whatever the stake?
- Absolute Instability. When each side is confident that there will be no riposte provided he fires first.
- Absolute Superiority. To one side, or the other (two situations), when one or the other is confident that if he fires first there will be no riposte.
- Deterrence Stability and War Prevention. Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin further reinforce the nature of Absolute Stability by indicating that, “A balance of deterrence – a situation in which the incentives on both sides to initiate war are outweighed by the disincentives is stable".
Pakistan therefore needs to see its nuclear deterrence in terms of disincentives for an aggressor.
Some points which can help us reach some logical conclusions....
- Changing Geo-Strategic Environment and Its Implications for Pakistan Nuclear Deterrence. India and USA are moving towards a strategic relationship. As such they have defined international peace within their terms and their relations with other states within these parameters. As India’s strategic relationship with the US increases by leaps and bounds, it can also increase belligerency towards Pakistan. The changes in emerging geo-strategic environment therefore impact the deterrence stability, which comprises three essential elements: crisis stability, arms race stability and political stability.
- Relevance of Indian Nuclear Capability . Indian Credible Nuclear Deterrence as V. N. Khanna puts it may change according to the changing environment in the Region. Therefore it remains open ended. It can therefore be concluded that it is not Pakistan specific. However, the proponents of Indian nuclear targeting philosophy invariably keep Pakistan as the focus of planning for nuclear strikes.
- Concept of Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrence. Pakistan’s Concept of Minimum Deterrence is based on a small nuclear force with a first use option. It is evident that a deterrence built around handful of weapons, declared commitment not to indulge in arms race can lose its value in not so distant a future.
- Enemy’s First Strike. It is dependent on numbers, yields, surveillance capability, range and accuracy of delivery means. Our deterrence in this case will depend on survivability and numbers in nuclear arsenal. It therefore requires that we have enough numbers and yield left with us to cause unacceptable damage after riding through enemy’s first strike.
- Quantitative Aspects. It is dependent on hardening, dispersal, passive and active defensive measures. Our geographical depth is limited and the cost of ABM systems makes it unaffordable.
- Efficacy of Own Delivery Means. It hinges on the quality of own delivery means and the defensibility of airspace by the enemy. This factor was considered so important in upsetting the state of mutual deterrence during Cold War between USA and USSR, that they signed an ABM treaty for limiting such anti-missile systems.
- No Arms Race But Sufficient Credible Nuclear Deterrence. In order to have a credible deterrence, some sort of enhancement of our nuclear potential both quantitatively as well as qualitatively is inevitable to maintain the stability of mutual deterrence.. However we need not to get into an open-ended arms race. Numbers beyond optimum become irrelevant. General (Retired) Mirza Aslam Baig opines what comprises Minimal Nuclear Deterrence is a national issue, a function of the political and military judgment related to adversary’s capability.
- Financial Implications. Indian economy is growing at a phenomenal pace. We cannot afford to get into a conventional as well as nuclear arms race, as our adversary is bent upon exploiting this weakness. However, a false perception needs to be cleared that maintenance and enhancement of nuclear capability is cost prohibitive. Enhancement of nuclear potential for Pakistan is far cheaper than conventional capability.
Some recommendations......
- Sufficiency. All future planning of war will be predicated on the viability and credibility of our nuclear deterrence therefore we must continue development of a credible 'sufficient' nuclear capability in terms of warheads and delivery means vis-à-vis perceived threat.
- Second Strike Capability. In view of ambiguity about first use in Indian Nuclear Doctrine, Indo- US and Indo Israel nexus and uncertainty in West about safety of Pakistan's Nuclear arsenal, an assured second strike capability based on a triad of delivery means, is extremely essential to maintain a credible minimum deterrence.
- Command and Control. An extremely efficient command and control system based on multiple and layered channels of command and control will enhance survivability and reliability of credible deterrence.
- Control of Escalation. As unconventional warfare is likely to be the dominant form of warfare in foreseeable future, therefore there is a need to have reliable deterrence to avoid escalating to all out conventional war which Pakistan may not be in a position to fight.
- Strengthening State Institutions. Due to the full spectrum nature of future war straddling over all elements of national power, there is a need to suitably reinforce our other state institutions dealing with issues like diplomacy, economic management, media, internal security etcetera to ensure acceptability of our nuclear deterrence.