The Drag on India’s Military Growth

[Joe Shearer]

I have three points to make....

- Overall the article does sum up issues and history of Indian defence well

- US is trying hard to replace Russia as a supplier of weaponry and hence the article

- It might answer some questions from Pakistani members regarding outcome of 71 war and India's so called treachery when infact India made an equitable pact

I am glad you did. Strangely only Indian participants appear to have read the article, or attempted to understand it. It contains references to Indian military doctrine, at the level both of the military and of their superior civilian command echelons, which are illuminating. In the thread on the 62 war, I had mentioned to the originator the obvious difficulties faced by the Indian military on account of doctrinal problems. Now, by simply referring him to this article, I can present to him and to other interested readers an elegant, academically sound exposition of the core doctrine, around which subordinate elements revolve.

As for the Pakistani members agitated about the outcome of the 71 war, it is necessary to point out that that war is in fact over; it cannot be reversed in spite of their most urgent requests. It has value in contemporary terms only in explaining Pakistan's revanchiste complex, which has its military in its grip.

 

[huzihaidao12]

My understanding. The article criticized India's "restraint" policy, the civil service system has too many restrictions on the military development, Right?

 

[vandemataram]

That would be welcome, more than welcome; however....



...I was not being complimentary.

On the contrary.

:-(

Nor was I; I am amazed at the pains people take to reply and spend precious time replying to these posts

quite like trying to straighten a dog's tail

 

[Joe Shearer]

My understanding. The article criticized India's "restraint" policy, the civil service system has too many restrictions on the military development, Right?

Yes, indeed it did. That is the short, and correct answer. No doubt about it.

You might like to add that the civil service was also strongly guided by the wishes of the political classes; all variants and different groups thought on the same lines, the lines described in the article. Please take into account the enormous power of the politicians in India, and their ability to change things massively. Your pithy description sums up very well what the article sought to convey.

However, in order to do so, it had to describe the strategic restraint policy itself. In doing so, the article, perhaps unintentionally, put a light on the elephant in the room. This is India's reluctance to fight wars, or to put military force in any kind of decisive role in its relations with other nations.

This is the second, hidden layer, and it rewards a careful second read.

Put into the context of Sino-Indian relations, what does it mean?

It means that confronted by the increasing strength and capability of the PLA, the PLA AF and the PLA N, India will become increasingly defensive. The scenario that will unfold is that the PLA will have more and more ability to muster up to 25 divisions (375,000 troops) within one month to any point in Tibet, or Xinjiang, or Yunnan (please recall that the Sino-Indian border is handled by the two military districts of Lanzhou and Chengdu); the Indian Army has in mind raising its head-count by 30,000 more troops in the Brahmaputra valley and within marching distance, on foot and on 4WD vehicles, to most points in Arunachal Pradesh.

The PLA AF is pushing forward with its balanced policy of combining ground attack aircraft, interdiction aircraft, interceptors, air superiority fighters and strategic bombers; as the article points out, the Indian Air Force, because of doctrinal deficiencies, this time talking of doctrine at military level, has addressed air superiority, interception and interdiction; it has made no provision for ground attack and half-hearted attempts at building strength for strategic bombing.

However, the IAF, true to the tenets revealed in the article, is pushing in two squadrons of air superiority fighters into the region - a defensive reaction if there was one.

The PLA N is the worst placed of the three military arms of PRC to wage war against India. This is fortunate, because the Indian Navy is worst placed to defend India against China.

In a nutshell (the coconut is also a nut), this is what the article leads to.

 

[CardSharp]

So is this strategic restraint that is the cause of your pessimism about India?

 

[Joe Shearer]

So is this strategic restraint that is the cause of your pessimism about India?

Yes.

But only in case of war. My views are in two sections: reasons why India would do badly in a war with China, under present conditions (each of them reversible, actionable, fortunately, and will not be reversed, or acted upon due to Indian values and ethical positions which deny legitimacy to military responses.

This is in spite of the very visible and very vocal, sometimes uncouth fanboys who appear and irritate everyone (in fairness, these fanboys belong to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China without bias, fear or favour). This is in spite of the genuine desire among ordinary people to give the military a foundation infrastructure and equipment of the best. The core of the political classes, even the hyper-patriots, are deeply pessimistic about military power, and factor it out almost automatically when considering strategic matters.

But what I wish to leave you with is my assessment that if we can survive another twenty years, there will be little chance of armed conflict. Consider the facts. By twenty years from now, China's will to dominate its boundaries, its almost atavistic tendency to secure the west, will be mellowed and quietened down. It is from this point of time onwards that there will be major peace and peace dividends. For an insight into my thinking, look at the demographics of China and India for the foreseeable future; it is reassuring to peace-minded people.

Regards,

 

[huzihaidao12]

Yes, indeed it did. That is the short, and correct answer. No doubt about it.

You might like to add that the civil service was also strongly guided by the wishes of the political classes; all variants and different groups thought on the same lines, the lines described in the article. Please take into account the enormous power of the politicians in India, and their ability to change things massively. Your pithy description sums up very well what the article sought to convey.

However, in order to do so, it had to describe the strategic restraint policy itself. In doing so, the article, perhaps unintentionally, put a light on the elephant in the room. This is India's reluctance to fight wars, or to put military force in any kind of decisive role in its relations with other nations.

This is the second, hidden layer, and it rewards a careful second read.

Put into the context of Sino-Indian relations, what does it mean?

It means that confronted by the increasing strength and capability of the PLA, the PLA AF and the PLA N, India will become increasingly defensive. The scenario that will unfold is that the PLA will have more and more ability to muster up to 25 divisions (375,000 troops) within one month to any point in Tibet, or Xinjiang, or Yunnan (please recall that the Sino-Indian border is handled by the two military districts of Lanzhou and Chengdu); the Indian Army has in mind raising its head-count by 30,000 more troops in the Brahmaputra valley and within marching distance, on foot and on 4WD vehicles, to most points in Arunachal Pradesh.

The PLA AF is pushing forward with its balanced policy of combining ground attack aircraft, interdiction aircraft, interceptors, air superiority fighters and strategic bombers; as the article points out, the Indian Air Force, because of doctrinal deficiencies, this time talking of doctrine at military level, has addressed air superiority, interception and interdiction; it has made no provision for ground attack and half-hearted attempts at building strength for strategic bombing.

However, the IAF, true to the tenets revealed in the article, is pushing in two squadrons of air superiority fighters into the region - a defensive reaction if there was one.

The PLA N is the worst placed of the three military arms of PRC to wage war against India. This is fortunate, because the Indian Navy is worst placed to defend India against China.

In a nutshell (the coconut is also a nut), this is what the article leads to.

I do not want to mention "strategic restraint", that iust is a piece of cloth to cover up the situation of the Government of India.

Have you considered, in fact, the Indian Government's approach is appropriate? This may not be a "good, bad" choose to provide, but rather "bad, bad but not more" choose to provide. Indian officials and the government is so corrupt, but at least there is a relatively public information and media monitoring. But the military is a secret organization, how do you go out? Do you think the Indian army officers and government officials what is the difference? The military is more honest? Even without public oversight?

Indian Government does not trust the military, not the military more power, for fear of a coup? This concern is reasonable or excessive? Look at the situation in India, you should be more clear.

In other words, your concern is right, however, the Government of India also is right. Government of India only in the "bad, bad but not more" selected "bad but not more." Do you think?

Certainly a better option is to solve India and all countries the border issue, this is a really right direction.India and you think too much in the other direction, that is not answered.

 

[CardSharp]

Yes.

But only in case of war. My views are in two sections: reasons why India would do badly in a war with China, under present conditions (each of them reversible, actionable, fortunately, and will not be reversed, or acted upon due to Indian values and ethical positions which deny legitimacy to military responses.

This is in spite of the very visible and very vocal, sometimes uncouth fanboys who appear and irritate everyone (in fairness, these fanboys belong to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China without bias, fear or favour). This is in spite of the genuine desire among ordinary people to give the military a foundation infrastructure and equipment of the best. The core of the political classes, even the hyper-patriots, are deeply pessimistic about military power, and factor it out almost automatically when considering strategic matters.

But what I wish to leave you with is my assessment that if we can survive another twenty years, there will be little chance of armed conflict. Consider the facts. By twenty years from now, China's will to dominate its boundaries, its almost atavistic tendency to secure the west, will be mellowed and quietened down. It is from this point of time onwards that there will be major peace and peace dividends. For an insight into my thinking, look at the demographics of China and India for the foreseeable future; it is reassuring to peace-minded people.

Regards,

An aging Chinese population and a young Indian population? Going by the thesis that demographic bulges causes war, you would mean that by then China would be too old for war and India would still shy away from giving the military legitimacy?

You mention China's propensity to look west for expansion but I have a really hard time imagining expansion so far from the Chinese core area and the feasibility of out right conquests in the modern era.

I am intrigued, you seem to have history on your side. I'd be very interested in hearing the case.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Let us look at your post in some detail. As is customary in China, you have ended with the soup, so you will not mind my reversing the procedure and starting with it!

I do not want to mention "strategic restraint", that iust is a piece of cloth to cover up the situation of the Government of India.

Have you considered, in fact, the Indian Government's approach is appropriate? This may not be a "good, bad" choose to provide, but rather "bad, bad but not more" choose to provide. Indian officials and the government is so corrupt, but at least there is a relatively public information and media monitoring. But the military is a secret organization, how do you go out? Do you think the Indian army officers and government officials what is the difference? The military is more honest? Even without public oversight?

Indian Government does not trust the military, not the military more power, for fear of a coup? This concern is reasonable or excessive? Look at the situation in India, you should be more clear.

In other words, your concern is right, however, the Government of India also is right. Government of India only in the "bad, bad but not more" selected "bad but not more." Do you think?

Certainly a better option is to solve India and all countries the border issue, this is a really right direction.India and you think too much in the other direction, that is not answered.

Without any doubt, it is urgently necessary, from the Indian point of view, to resolve the border problem. If you track back my various comments on the issue, I have pointed out, notably in correspondence with CardSharp, that in my opinion, the next century belongs to China. We cannot foretell the future beyond that, but we may expect longer; it is not ruled out. It is not wise for a country to stay on bad terms with the new hegemon; CardSharp in fact warned of the consequences of that, pointing to the cramped, inhibited psychological and political situation of Vietnam. We have seen from published data on recent Chinese military exercises that we may need to match or to exceed the mobilisation capacity of the PLA even to defend ourselves, and that would mean building up 50 divisions within two months. An impossible task for the Indian Army, that has approximately 8 or 9 divisions earmarked for defence on the north. Considering that superior PLA tactics and strategy won them easy victories in 62, this 5 to 1 superiority on the side of the PLA, and the obvious alternatives for attack available to it, guarantee a massive defeat for the Indian Army, unless a truly revolutionary overhaul of the military and of political doctrine regarding the use of the military takes place. This will not take place.

From every point of view, it is urgent for us to make peace with China.

However, my point was not that we should not make peace; you are mistaken there.

My point is that we should keep our defences in good order, our military in good order, well after making peace, at least until the forces of demography start pulling the blanket a little more to the centre of the bed; today it is wholly on the Chinese side. The reason for this is the impulse of the people of China and every strong Chinese state to keep consolidating its western frontier. History indicates that China will keep moving west; she will have little or no interest in the south, unless we provoke her. Therefore, we have to keep on excellent terms with her, maintain a strong military, identify the two obvious avenues of attack that any intelligent person would select from if he was a PLA general, guard them and forestall any unhappy occurrence, and pray hard.

I do not want to mention "strategic restraint", that iust is a piece of cloth to cover up the situation of the Government of India.

You mistake the matter.

The subject of the paper was not a conscious, articulated doctrine of the Government of India. Rather, it was the authors view of the unspoken, unwritten doctrine, which, almost unknown even to the actors and believers in the doctrine, has guided the thinking and is a constant intellectual background to decision-making. It is not that the Government of India is presenting this as an excuse; it is that this has turned out to be the model which seems to fit its behaviour, across political parties and regime changes.

As an historian, I find myself fully in agreement with it, as it aptly sums up the reality of 2, 400 years of history. You will agree that such a large body of evidence is not to be ignored.

Have you considered, in fact, the Indian Government's approach is appropriate? This may not be a "good, bad" choose to provide, but rather "bad, bad but not more" choose to provide. Indian officials and the government is so corrupt, but at least there is a relatively public information and media monitoring. But the military is a secret organization, how do you go out? Do you think the Indian army officers and government officials what is the difference? The military is more honest? Even without public oversight?

I understand your argument that the Government of India, rightly, has selected the lesser of two evils: between Bad and Worse, it has selected Bad. You have based this on the relative transparency of government and civil service decision-making, which is open to public gaze, against the secretive, manipulative ways of the military.

First, unlike Pakistan, the military is not a secretive organisation, not as far as the civilian leadership is concerned; the situation is far more like the PLA, but without commissars. I can go into detail; for the time being, to allow the argument to flow smoothly, please trust me on this.

There is very little that happens within the military that is not known outside, at least in small circles of people connected with the general administrative structure and that social segment. I can cite personal examples of this numbering in the hundreds; other more closely connected people can increase that many times.

It has been designed that things should be like this. The concentrations of force have also been designed so that there is no coup-making capacity, if you look at the disposition of divisions and their physical locations. Promotions to higher rank are under very close scrutiny. The kind of high-handed action that can take place in nearby countries is inconceivable.

Finally, the politicians wield ruthless power over the military. Please look up the case of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat and the Defence Minister, George Fernandes.

And, yes, the military has been more honest, even without public oversight, except in one instance, one type of behaviour, which I will not go into.

Indian Government does not trust the military, not the military more power, for fear of a coup? This concern is reasonable or excessive? Look at the situation in India, you should be more clear.

This was a concern in the early days, but is not a concern today. There were incidents in the early days; the Chief of Staff, General Cariappa, was a hugely respected General, whom the troops loved. He was outspoken and didn't mince his words. He was able to look Nehru in the eye and tell him that he, Nehru, was wrong. Nehru, in spite of his other good points, was a tyrant and a dictator in close personal relations, and this was perhaps not the behaviour he wanted. Nehru started fearing, or chose to fear, the possibility of a coup (Ayub staged his coup soon afterward, after being extended in his tenure several times by Iskandar Mirza; no Indian COAS has had an extended stay, leaving no time to plot and plan and enter into conspiracy).

Subsequently, under General Thimayya, an unfortunate article was printed, titled "Thimayya of India". This, too, upset the Prime Minister, and he took swift, somewhat treacherous action to humiliate Thimayya. Nehru's response to this mental state of his own was to try and put a hand-picked man into the top seat. Unfortunately, he also chose to embark on an ill-advised adventure with our neighbours, and his candidate proved conclusively that he was no good as a general. General Chaudhuri was brought in, and he was not a weakling. But he was ultra-conservative, and lost us major gains in 65 due to this.

Finally, General, later Field Marshal Manekshaw, was a player in the last such drama. Manekshaw, in spite of his many sterling qualities, talked too much, too often, and made remarks, harmless in themselves, which were not popular in a country where its neighbour had seen two military dictators next door already. Be it as it may, retribution was swift and decisive; the Field Marshal never spoke out of turn again.

I can say that since his time, there has never been an instance of the COAS, or any of the other two chiefs being at loggerheads with the civilians, except for Vishnu Bhagwat. Many of us feel that he was right, but the Defence Minister was also right to exercise his authority.

In other words, your concern is right, however, the Government of India also is right. Government of India only in the "bad, bad but not more" selected "bad but not more." Do you think?

I admit that this is a logical possibility, but for the reasons mentioned, the history of South Asia, personally I prefer the strategic restraint theory as better explaining our behaviour in the last 60+ years.

 

[Joe Shearer]

An aging Chinese population and a young Indian population? Going by the thesis that demographic bulges causes war, you would mean that by then China would be too old for war and India would still shy away from giving the military legitimacy?

You mention China's propensity to look west for expansion but I have a really hard time imagining expansion so far from the Chinese core area and the feasibility of out right conquests in the modern era.

I am intrigued, you seem to have history on your side. I'd be very interested in hearing the case.

Please allow me to present the full case by morning tomorrow your time, as I will have to do some reference to Chinese history texts.

My short answer is that China would be too rich for war, and India would continue to reject militarism as a concept in that time period.

Regarding westward expansion away from Chinese core areas, would you not consider Gansu a Chinese core area? Or, to be a little more venturesome, Qing Hai? What is core today might not have been so core during the T'ang.

More later.

Regards,

 

[CardSharp]

This was a concern in the early days, but is not a concern today. There were incidents in the early days; the Chief of Staff, General Cariappa, was a hugely respected General, whom the troops loved. He was outspoken and didn't mince his words. He was able to look Nehru in the eye and tell him that he, Nehru, was wrong. Nehru, in spite of his other good points, was a tyrant and a dictator in close personal relations, and this was perhaps not the behaviour he wanted. Nehru started fearing, or chose to fear, the possibility of a coup (Ayub staged his coup soon afterward, after being extended in his tenure several times by Iskandar Mirza; no Indian COAS has had an extended stay, leaving no time to plot and plan and enter into conspiracy).

Subsequently, under General Thimayya, an unfortunate article was printed, titled "Thimayya of India". This, too, upset the Prime Minister, and he took swift, somewhat treacherous action to humiliate Thimayya. Nehru's response to this mental state of his own was to try and put a hand-picked man into the top seat. Unfortunately, he also chose to embark on an ill-advised adventure with our neighbours, and his candidate proved conclusively that he was no good as a general. General Chaudhuri was brought in, and he was not a weakling. But he was ultra-conservative, and lost us major gains in 65 due to this.

Finally, General, later Field Marshal Manekshaw, was a player in the last such drama. Manekshaw, in spite of his many sterling qualities, talked too much, too often, and made remarks, harmless in themselves, which were not popular in a country where its neighbour had seen two military dictators next door already. Be it as it may, retribution was swift and decisive; the Field Marshal never spoke out of turn again.

I can say that since his time, there has never been an instance of the COAS, or any of the other two chiefs being at loggerheads with the civilians, except for Vishnu Bhagwat. Many of us feel that he was right, but the Defence Minister was also right to exercise his authority.



I admit that this is a logical possibility, but for the reasons mentioned, the history of South Asia, personally I prefer the strategic restraint theory as better explaining our behaviour in the last 60+ years.

I've not had time to read more about the 1962 "when generals fail" book that I scanned the intro from. but I do recall his description of General Thimayya and how Nehru effectively and politically broke the man out of fear when that British author published Thimayya of India.

It seems the roots of the 1962 defeat can be traced to that event.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I've not had time to read more about the 1962 "when generals fail" book that I scanned the intro from. but I do recall his description of General Thimayya and how Nehru effectively and politically broke the man out of fear when that British author published Thimayya of India.

It seems the roots of the 1962 defeat can be traced to that event.

A little more than that. It was not just the humiliation and (effective) removal of a single general, it was the subversion of the entire top echelon of the Army. Generals like Muchu Chaudhuri, Kumaramangalam, Harbaksh Singh, Prem Bhagat, Manekshaw and Gopal Bewoor (4 out of which 6 became chiefs later) were sidelined by the Kaul boys (an Army usage, and the pun was intentional).

Even earlier than that, the Army was wound down in various respects. Its equipment was allowed to fall into disrepair. One defence minister, a religious nut, wanted them to convert their footwear to canvas shoes, to avoid using cow-leather, alien to that minister's belief system. While the Pakistan Army was strengthening its artillery and learning modern methods of tactical organisation, getting familiar with Pentomic organisations, the Indian Army was trying to hang on to its boots.

This was an Army which had still in service soldiers who had seen service in WWII, which ended a mere 17 years before, and notable service, both in western and eastern theatres, distinguished service at that. Bhagat was a VC, Manekshaw was an MC, K was a prisoner of war who made three separate escape bids. It was not the bunch of losers to which their leaders converted them.

It is not for nothing that those who care feel bitter about 62. Not bitter against the Chinese, but bitter about our own incompetent leaders. Fortunately, the PRC was the only competent leadership we have ever had to face in war.

 

[huzihaidao12]

Let us look at your post in some detail. As is customary in China, you have ended with the soup, so you will not mind my reversing the procedure and starting with it!



Without any doubt, it is urgently necessary, from the Indian point of view, to resolve the border problem. If you track back my various comments on the issue, I have pointed out, notably in correspondence with CardSharp, that in my opinion, the next century belongs to China. We cannot foretell the future beyond that, but we may expect longer; it is not ruled out. It is not wise for a country to stay on bad terms with the new hegemon; CardSharp in fact warned of the consequences of that, pointing to the cramped, inhibited psychological and political situation of Vietnam. We have seen from published data on recent Chinese military exercises that we may need to match or to exceed the mobilisation capacity of the PLA even to defend ourselves, and that would mean building up 50 divisions within two months. An impossible task for the Indian Army, that has approximately 8 or 9 divisions earmarked for defence on the north. Considering that superior PLA tactics and strategy won them easy victories in 62, this 5 to 1 superiority on the side of the PLA, and the obvious alternatives for attack available to it, guarantee a massive defeat for the Indian Army, unless a truly revolutionary overhaul of the military and of political doctrine regarding the use of the military takes place. This will not take place.

From every point of view, it is urgent for us to make peace with China.

However, my point was not that we should not make peace; you are mistaken there.

My point is that we should keep our defences in good order, our military in good order, well after making peace, at least until the forces of demography start pulling the blanket a little more to the centre of the bed; today it is wholly on the Chinese side. The reason for this is the impulse of the people of China and every strong Chinese state to keep consolidating its western frontier. History indicates that China will keep moving west; she will have little or no interest in the south, unless we provoke her. Therefore, we have to keep on excellent terms with her, maintain a strong military, identify the two obvious avenues of attack that any intelligent person would select from if he was a PLA general, guard them and forestall any unhappy occurrence, and pray hard.



You mistake the matter.

The subject of the paper was not a conscious, articulated doctrine of the Government of India. Rather, it was the authors view of the unspoken, unwritten doctrine, which, almost unknown even to the actors and believers in the doctrine, has guided the thinking and is a constant intellectual background to decision-making. It is not that the Government of India is presenting this as an excuse; it is that this has turned out to be the model which seems to fit its behaviour, across political parties and regime changes.

As an historian, I find myself fully in agreement with it, as it aptly sums up the reality of 2, 400 years of history. You will agree that such a large body of evidence is not to be ignored.




I understand your argument that the Government of India, rightly, has selected the lesser of two evils: between Bad and Worse, it has selected Bad. You have based this on the relative transparency of government and civil service decision-making, which is open to public gaze, against the secretive, manipulative ways of the military.

First, unlike Pakistan, the military is not a secretive organisation, not as far as the civilian leadership is concerned; the situation is far more like the PLA, but without commissars. I can go into detail; for the time being, to allow the argument to flow smoothly, please trust me on this.

There is very little that happens within the military that is not known outside, at least in small circles of people connected with the general administrative structure and that social segment. I can cite personal examples of this numbering in the hundreds; other more closely connected people can increase that many times.

It has been designed that things should be like this. The concentrations of force have also been designed so that there is no coup-making capacity, if you look at the disposition of divisions and their physical locations. Promotions to higher rank are under very close scrutiny. The kind of high-handed action that can take place in nearby countries is inconceivable.

Finally, the politicians wield ruthless power over the military. Please look up the case of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat and the Defence Minister, George Fernandes.

And, yes, the military has been more honest, even without public oversight, except in one instance, one type of behaviour, which I will not go into.



This was a concern in the early days, but is not a concern today. There were incidents in the early days; the Chief of Staff, General Cariappa, was a hugely respected General, whom the troops loved. He was outspoken and didn't mince his words. He was able to look Nehru in the eye and tell him that he, Nehru, was wrong. Nehru, in spite of his other good points, was a tyrant and a dictator in close personal relations, and this was perhaps not the behaviour he wanted. Nehru started fearing, or chose to fear, the possibility of a coup (Ayub staged his coup soon afterward, after being extended in his tenure several times by Iskandar Mirza; no Indian COAS has had an extended stay, leaving no time to plot and plan and enter into conspiracy).

Subsequently, under General Thimayya, an unfortunate article was printed, titled "Thimayya of India". This, too, upset the Prime Minister, and he took swift, somewhat treacherous action to humiliate Thimayya. Nehru's response to this mental state of his own was to try and put a hand-picked man into the top seat. Unfortunately, he also chose to embark on an ill-advised adventure with our neighbours, and his candidate proved conclusively that he was no good as a general. General Chaudhuri was brought in, and he was not a weakling. But he was ultra-conservative, and lost us major gains in 65 due to this.

Finally, General, later Field Marshal Manekshaw, was a player in the last such drama. Manekshaw, in spite of his many sterling qualities, talked too much, too often, and made remarks, harmless in themselves, which were not popular in a country where its neighbour had seen two military dictators next door already. Be it as it may, retribution was swift and decisive; the Field Marshal never spoke out of turn again.

I can say that since his time, there has never been an instance of the COAS, or any of the other two chiefs being at loggerheads with the civilians, except for Vishnu Bhagwat. Many of us feel that he was right, but the Defence Minister was also right to exercise his authority.



I admit that this is a logical possibility, but for the reasons mentioned, the history of South Asia, personally I prefer the strategic restraint theory as better explaining our behaviour in the last 60+ years.

If India can have a more realistic, more the crisis attitude to solve solveborder issues and China, that is a very good thing for China and India.

Regrettable,, I have said do not want to mention any of India's "strategic restraint" and even the Indian government, not big use will in external , in fact, "strategic restraint" This is a piece of cloth to cover up the domestic policies of India, how to suppress the military requirements, India's civil service system requires a "statement", that is "strategic restraint" piece of cloth.

Or directly said that India can not even solve their own city's infrastructure, how to solve infrastructure of border areas , which is capacity, not subjective to a "restraint." And in recent years, the Indian government began to pay attention to this issue, which is India's news, I think it is not disputed.

In addition, Joe , you think the Indian army to clean, even without public scrutiny. I have no trust, you look at the U.S. military to know. Even if the U.S. military, there are a lot of corruption, ah, waste. And this is not a "democracy" ideology. With a belief in the individual or collective. You know what I mean? Do not believe any person or group in clean, but only believe the system, in fact, the Indian military has a serious corruption, but it is not surprising, as other countries, but varying degrees. In addition, the armed forces of any country is a secret organization, no doubt.

You think there will be no problem, the Indian military to get more power. I can only say, do not release the tiger cage, that is a dangerous attempt, its problem may be not now, but in the future, after some changes. Your view is very shortsighted. Do you really want to take a simple trust that the military? Even if U.S, it is also very careful approach.

You are right, the Indian government is also correct. All different in the judgments and choices. It is India's problem

 

[KS]

The PLA N is the worst placed of the three military arms of PRC to wage war against India. This is fortunate, because the Indian Navy is worst placed to defend India against China.

Can you please elaborate on this one for purely informational purpose?

 

[Joe Shearer]

If India can have a more realistic, more the crisis attitude to solve solveborder issues and China, that is a very good thing for China and India.

Dear huzihaidao12

Please go back to the third line of my last post; I have already agreed that this needs to be done. Just to spell it out in unmistakable detail, I concur with you: a realistic, urgent attitude by India will be helpful for both China and India.

I hope that this statement puts my views beyond doubt, and that you have no further need to refer to this point again! ;-)

Regrettable,, I have said do not want to mention any of India's "strategic restraint" and even the Indian government, not big use will in external , in fact, "strategic restraint" This is a piece of cloth to cover up the domestic policies of India, how to suppress the military requirements, India's civil service system requires a "statement", that is "strategic restraint" piece of cloth.

I disagree.

A theory formulated by the Brookings Institute, this paper, in 2010, cannot be retrofitted on the Indian government and the bureaucracy for the previous 63 years. The theory can only try to put that government and that bureaucracy's actions within a framework, it cannot create the framework at a point of time before today.

There was never any theoretical formulation of this sort, so its use by the civil service as a piece of cloth is obviously not possible; the use of a non-existent thing is not possible.

Or directly said that India can not even solve their own city's infrastructure, how to solve infrastructure of border areas , which is capacity, not subjective to a "restraint." And in recent years, the Indian government began to pay attention to this issue, which is India's news, I think it is not disputed.

Countries do not hold territory depending on how they can solve the infrastructural or other problems of that territory. If I may say this without hurting your feelings, you are making innovations in political science with your statement.

In addition, Joe , you think the Indian army to clean, even without public scrutiny.

No.

Your post stated:

Do you think the Indian army officers and government officials what is the difference? The military is more honest? Even without public oversight?


I answered that, saying 'Yes'. The military is more honest.

I did not answer saying that the military is without fault.

It is a relative matter; the Indian military is relatively cleaner, compared to the Indian civil service.

I have no trust, you look at the U.S. military to know. Even if the U.S. military, there are a lot of corruption, ah, waste. And this is not a "democracy" ideology. With a belief in the individual or collective. You know what I mean? Do not believe any person or group in clean, but only believe the system,

The most powerful wing of the Indian government is the Indian Finance Ministry. Corruption takes place among politicians and bureaucrats only if and when the Finance Ministry, and its organs, decide to let it happen. Usually the Finance Minister has to know that something wrong is going on, for it to go on.

There is no affiliation between the Finance Ministry and the military. Military accounts are separately maintained by a branch designated Defence Accounts. These accountants are vigilant in checking examples of 'waste', but not when these are due to the actions of the minister in charge. If you have any examples, I can prove to your entire satisfaction how each originated from the Minister in charge.

I say this because you are unlikely to know the details of the Indian Army's own corruption. That takes the shape of doing favours to each other. The Corps Commander at the time of the Kargil Incident was absent at crucial times, because he was inaugurating a golf tournament in which his son-in-law was playing. Certain senior officers were punished when they bought lawn mowers for maintaining golf greens with surplus funds after buying other transport equipment. A senior general persuaded the local Corps Commander to give a no-objection certificate for the use of a piece of land next to military property, but not military property itself, for building a school, where he was to be the Director after his retirement. These are the cases that occur. The big ones involve politicians exclusively.

Comparing the Indian military to the US is, I am sorry to use harsh words, completely ridiculous.

in fact, the Indian military has a serious corruption, but it is not surprising, as other countries, but varying degrees. In addition, the armed forces of any country is a secret organization, no doubt.

You think there will be no problem, the Indian military to get more power. I can only say, do not release the tiger cage, that is a dangerous attempt, its problem may be not now, but in the future, after some changes. Your view is very shortsighted. Do you really want to take a simple trust that the military? Even if U.S, it is also very careful approach.

In this, as in the question of border disputes between India and smaller neighbours, it is your fanciful thinking, not backed, not supported by a single small piece of evidence. We are back to the bachelor being told not to beat his wife.

I am unable to deal with your statements unless you have some facts to put forward. It seems that you are thinking of some other military and addressing these faults to the Indian military.

I am not a militarist, far from it. If anything, I have been bitterly critical of present Indian military leadership, for technical reasons. Knowing them closely as I do, I find these repeated charges of corruption, with no evidence, very disturbing.

Please produce facts; without facts, this amounts only to aggressive needling.

You are right, the Indian government is also correct. All different in the judgments and choices. It is India's problem

It is indeed, as you pointed out originally, not I. These choices have to be taken by an elected government, because that is the way we work, that is the way we are organised.

In conclusion, I really would like you to examine your posts and see for yourself that making unsupported allegations does not make for a good meaningful discussion. More facts, please, and less of our fears and inclinations.

Regards,