The surprise is in a first strike against their radar just like in Desert Storm using cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. The only warning they'll get is the 5-10 minutes of a ballistic missile flight... or nothing if they fail to detect low flying cruise missiles.
The greatest asset and strength of the US military is the NCO corps. And you have nothing comparable in substance.
When I was active duty, I learned from a chief an apt analogy of experience and it goes this way...
Experience is like a staircase. The more steps and the wider each step, the better the staircase to use. The wider the step, the more you can use your full leg and with better balance on your foot, and the best step is when you can put your whole foot on it. The more steps, the easier it is to climb. So gain as much experience as possible and document everything, including your failures.
The first problem for the PLA is that it has no comparable experience. We are not talking about Chinese troops in the Korean War or the Vietnam War. We are talking about Chinese experience in military affairs in general. None in the past 300 yrs. Gunpowder may have came from China, but the gun and the inevitable tactics changes came from the West. The airplane did not came from China. The submarine did not came from China. The tank did not came from China. Each of these few examples changed combat tactics irrevocably. Changes in tactics creates changes in strategies, which creates changes in global power balance. So to continue with the staircase analogy, the PLA version have step one, 100 yrs gap, then step two. This leads to the second problem.
The second problem for the PLA is if/when it tries to replicate the US military as how you think the PLA will do. That is like a 16 yrs old who just like his driver's license, we put him into an F1 racer, then put him against professionals. He does know how the different pedals works, maybe even using a manual transmission. But does he know how to shift by just listening to the engine rpm and change gears without using the clutch pedal? It is called 'slip shifting'. So far, the PLA have not create anything that is analogous to a no clutch transmission. It means the PLA know how to
REPLICATE the shiny toys but lacks the operational insights on how to them use according to unique situations. And those insights came from experience that includes successes and failures.
When I told you about the standard four-ship formation and how the loss of one can negatively affect the mission, that is from experience. PLAAF pilots do not have the institutional memory on how to compensate for that. I often used the air war over Viet Nam as example. The US would field dozens of heavily laden fighter-bombers, but as soon as one of them got hit by a SAM or by MIG, the entire flight would jettison their bombs in order to survive. How US pilots evolved from that? You can guess. But you better believe it that PLAAF pilots are just as human as US pilots in their desire for self preservation.
The third problem for the PLA is: Does it know that the Taiwanese defense is unlike the Iraqi defense? Back in Desert Storm, no one helped the Iraqi on how to prepare against the US, largely because no one understood the technological depth of the US military. Before DS, the world laughed at the F-117 because of the few failures the jet has. After DS, the world knew that something worse (for US adversaries) is coming when the US retires the F-117. But that sobering thought came too late for Iraq. The PLA have nothing comparable and the US will advises Taiwan on the PLA's full technical capabilities. If the UK advised Iraq, the world would see a different Desert Storm outcome.
Taiwan is not a technological peer. They don't have AESA equipped destroyers with VLS, modern subs, a global satellite system, AESA equipped AWACs, a global satellite constellation, etc. They have no means of even touching PLAN destroyers or subs launching cruise missiles at their early warning radars and fixed air defenses.
Yes, Taiwan is a technology peer. The same way that Chinese auto companies are US peers. The same way that US auto companies are peers to Rolls Royce or Ferrari. The differences in builds are from demographics and price points, not because GM do not know how make a Ghost equivalent. Same for those AESA radar and other technologies. In combat, a single shot rifle is just as deadly as the machine gun.
The fourth problem for the PLA is that as far as PLAN ships goes, Taiwan can field a picket line of subs whose main job is to watch and communicate real time the positions of PLAN ships, even if the PLAN ships are moving, and Taiwanese artillery can make predictive algorithm for those PLAN ships. Just like the air force version, all Taiwanese defense has to do is impose a 1/4, more likely 1/3, casualty rates and China can kiss the amphibious invasion 再见.
Over Serbia, NATO conducted an 80-day air campaign and even that was barely enough to compel negotiations.
The fifth problem for the PLA is that unlike Serbia where NATO countries were not economically affected by the war, China
WILL be economically affected by a China-Taiwan war, so does the PLA have enough munition for less than 80 days and be powerful enough to compel submission? Not likely given the
third problem above. The word 'munition' includes carriers of munitions, like fighter-bombers or bombers. Taiwanese defense
WILL be successful in hitting some of the PLA fuel and munition depots on the mainland. All it need it 1/4 success rate. Then there is the Concealment, Camouflage, and Deception (CCD) regime. The PLA knows it has to contend with CCD by Taiwanese defense which will cost the PLA time to verify if the target is valid, and wasted munitions because the deception was successful. Verification requires time and human presence, preferably on-site presence, not just via satellite. On-site could mean boots on the ground or fast recon air. But either way, time is needed. So the longer the PLA has to conduct the war, the greater the economic damages to China.
The sixth problem for the PLA is the uncertainty of air superiority over Taiwan.
Take the runway, for example. In peacetime, the minimum requirement for a fighter-bomber is 5,000 ft by 50 ft. That is the minimum operational strip (MOS). For heavier platforms, there will be higher MOS-es. But as the US, EU, and ROCAF air forces demonstrated, we can get by with 4,000 ft by 30 ft, in other words, we can and have used the highways. As long as Taiwanese defense can inflict a 1/4 casualty rate on any PLA attack method, the ROCAF can survive and conduct counter air operations. The ROCAF do not have face the PLAAF on a 1-1 engagement basis. ROCAF fighter-bombers, or missiles of any type, just have to harass mainland PLA resources, like those fuel/ammo depots, to prolong the war, and the longer the war, the greater the resolve of the Taiwanese citizenry, and the greater the odds of US military involvement. Air superiority over Taiwan is not guaranteed and the PLA knows it. Taiwan know the window for the amphibious fleet launch is small: less than the 80-days over Serbia. And if the ROCAF survives beyond the 30-days mark, Taiwan will survive long enough to see China abandon the invasion.
And this is just a high level explanation of the problems the PLA must deal with
BEFORE the invasion fleet is launched.
