You are talking about the use of tactical weapons when major thresholds have been breached, i.e. as a quasi strategic weapon. Other arguments, made by any, indicate the seeing of a tactical nuke more as a quasi-conventional weapon. The scenarios of use is completely different in both cases, even if the outcome may be the same.You particular scenario has less chance of happening, i.e. a breach of major thresholds.
As for your question on "putting the life of millions(there are no billions) at risk", the counter question that needs to be asked is that at what stage will Pakistan put all its people at risk? As a response for shallow thrusts that do not risk a total collapse of the Pakistani state? In any case, if Indian formations/assets are targeted in a nuclear strike, the dilemma would only be whether to respond to it in a tit for tat manner or overwhelmingly. There is not about to ever be a likelihood of no response. Either way, the ball will be lobbed back to the Pakistani court. 2 nukes on your soil (first one by you) enough or do you want to risk more? Don't worry about the doctrine too much, even without it being done as said, Pakistan would still suffer serious consequences. Explain, in such a scenario what logic would there be to use a nuke in the first place?
Precisely , what have you been getting from my post all along ? Well , the other arguments , more or less points to the Tactical nuclear being used a " gradual escalation " which is something I disagree with many members here , even though it falls within the concept . Because every Indian option exercised after that , will only add to the insecurity of Strategic Forces Command and bring them one step closer to " Use Em or Lose Em " scenario . Something which can be used as a final warning to " hope " the adversary to retreat itself and thus save both countries before an all out exchange happens . My particular scenario au contra-ire has a higher chance of doing what shouldn't be done , crippling/destroying the Pakistani conventional ability to fight/deter the Indian aggression without which the " objectives of Cold Start " is not possible , is a threshold . Whether you consider it one or not , because if that happens the country is at adversary's mercy next and its non conventional options are threatened .
Regarding India fighting a war within limits or not crossing the threshold(s) or red line(s) , I do not consider it possible realistically because the thresholds are of various dimensions and keep fluctuating according to ground realities and kept intentionally vague , you cant predict the enemy's thinking and response and the enemy is not going to take any assurance/guarantee from you . The mere realization of this fact is enough to say that the whole idea of " controlled war " is flawed . The total collapse of the Pakistani state is a threshold of the highest order , but there are several other before it , before it comes to that " ultimate one " . @
notorious_eagle Anything to add here , mate , on the assurance/guarantee being put forward by Indians , funny and laughable as they are , to not put the country in danger and not cross any red lines . If anyone here has some idea of the Game theory and in particular the Nash equilibrium , he will understand what I mean by that .
The counter question has already been answered many times in the thread by me , Pakistan will only choose to retaliate with a TNW strike first , ordering the SPD to get ready its " strategic nukes " , only if there's a danger to country's existence or integrity or a threshold has been / is in the process of / being crossed , not before . By the time , it comes to that , there would be nothing more to lose from our side so we will make our final bet - a warning strike and then wait for response for the other side to either retreat and control it , consider other options or go for the massive retaliation as planned resulting in nuclear holocaust . The dilemma first is to cross the border not knowing the thresholds and hoping to fight a war inside it with the added confusion and the fog of war , for now the conventional deterrence is enough to keep Indian Army at bay , but in future the India's mass mobilization capability in a short time will grow , will come to play . Consider it as a future safeguard , whatever you can bring now , Islamabad can deal with it conventionally . Well though you say it , what I think of the Indian political leadership is that they will push IA for other options other than a " point of no return " for a couple of IBG's , your thresholds aren't being crossed . Every nuclear strike ( whether strategic or tactical ) made after that , will just keep both countries going up on the escalation ladder until the MAD - the logical end to it happens . The logic to use a nuclear weapon first is to not let the country's fall at your mercy , because it exactly means if the conventional forces are down , Pakistan will lose the ability to launch nuclear weapons even and we know what that means . About " Pakistan will suffer serious consequences " , yes it will , because it will make sure that the enemy doesn't exist anymore too . Read the Samson's option and do not hope us to sign another treaty of Versailles .
India didn't cross the LC because the political class perceived an advantage to not doing so. There was no removal of that option from the table, on the contrary, it would have almost certainly been exercised if Pakistani held positions hadn't started falling like dominoes. That was pretty much understood by everyone concerned.
Nuclear deterrent did play a part in that decision to not cross both the Line of Control and International border . Of course , all options are kept at the table , but if the nuclear weapons haven't been here , wouldn't you have crossed the border and tried to invade the 84,000 km2 of Kashmir which you claim ?