Since i see some confusion around here in understanding what CSD actually intended to achieve, here's something from the open source that hopefully will clear up some issue:
CSD
The aim of the new war fighting doctrine is to increase the Indian military strike options for a possibly retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan without invoking the Pakistani nuclear threshold in short aiming to create conditions of a limited war. The military policy of fighting a war with Pakistan as a LW envisages Cold Start Doctrine as a war fighting Doctrine for achieving the core objectives.
The Cold Start doctrine envisages an increase in the Indian military options based on a situation where Indian armed forces can have sufficient military success that can be used achieve limited political objectives before an international intervention or the conflict turns nuclear.
According to the recent statement General Deepak Kapoor (Indian COAS), “The possibility of limited war under a nuclear overhang is still a reality in South Asia.”8
The doctrine requires the re division of the Indian army from the existing three major strike corps into eight integrated battle groups(IGB) buffed by the mechanised , artillery and armoured divisions.9 The aim is to launch multiple strikes within seventy two hours of the first strike , approximately 50-70 km inside Pakistani territory, with close support of the air and naval components .
Furthermore CSD would entail combined operations between India’s three services and integrated battle groups for offensive actions against Pakistan without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.
To implement this doctrine India will restructure its army’s offensive power from three strike corps to eight smaller division-sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) that combine with mechanized infantry, artillery and armour. Indian Holding Corps or Pivot Corps would undertake limited offensive operation to give time to IBGs to strike hard on already softened targets by the Pivot Corps. The IBGs would be selfcontained and highly-mobile, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory with the major offensive in the first 96 hours.10
Main characteristics of the Cold Start Doctrine will be;
1. Element of Surprise
2. Integration among the armed forces
3. Quick, Swift and Day and Night Operations
4. Combine Mechanised Infantry, Artillery and Armour
5. Close air support/ massive fire power
6. Pivot corps (Holding Corps) Would act offensively
7. Aims would be Limited
8. Major offensive to be launched in the first 72/96 hours for IBGs to enter Pakistani territory and
achieve primary objectives.
9. Robust Command and Control
10. Strikes below the Pakistan’s nuclear threshold
11. To have a politico-military superiority in the interest of India.
Assumptions:
1)The operational success is based on the assumption that the deployment would be rapid achieving quick success;
2) element of surprise will be achieved ;
3) Pakistani response will be muted;
4) it will not invoke a Pakistani nuclear response;
5)sufficient military objectives will be achieved by the Indian army to paralyse a cohesive Pakistani response;
6) the operations would be conducted with rapid mobilization and on multiple fronts so as to achieve mission objectives before the international pressure can be crystallised. ~ Workshop on Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic
Stability in South Asia
(20-22 July 2010)-SASSI
-----------------------------------------
Cold Start
The Chief of Army Staff unveiled the new Cold Start concept in April 2004. The goal of
this limited war strategy is to launch a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan
before the international community could intercede, one that would inflict significant
harm on the Pakistan Army while denying Islamabad a justification to escalate the clash
to the nuclear level.21
Cold Start seeks to leverage India’s considerable conventional strength to respond to
Pakistan’s continued provocation.22 This concept requires a reorganization of the Indian
Army’s offensive power from the three large strike corps into eight smaller division-sized
“integrated battle groups” (IBGs) that combine mechanized infantry, artillery, and armor
in a manner reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s operational maneuver groups.23 The eight
battle groups would be prepared to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan along different
axes of advance. The ground operations of the IBGs require integration with close air
support from the Indian Air Force and naval aviation assets to provide highly mobile fire
support. According to Gurmeet Kanwal, director of the Army’s Center for Land Warfare
Studies, India is seeking to “mass firepower rather than forces.”24 In addition, the holding
corps are redesignated as “pivot corps” and would be bolstered by additional armor and
artillery. This would allow them to concurrently man defensive positions and undertake
limited offensive operations as necessary. Under the Cold Start concept, all elements of
the Indian military would engage in continuous operations, day and night, until their
military objectives were achieved.
Rather than deliver a catastrophic blow to Pakistan (i.e., cutting the country in two),
the goal of Cold Start would be to make shallow territorial gains, 50-80 kilometers deep,
that could be used in post-conflict negotiations to extract concessions from Islamabad.
Some commentators have emphasized the ability to quickly mass ground and air
firepower to deliver a punishing blow to the Pakistan Army, perceived to be the source of
much of Pakistan’s aggressive foreign policy, while not harming civilian centers.25
Although the operational details of Cold Start remain classified, it appears that the
goal would be to have three to five IBGs entering Pakistani territory within seventy-two
to ninety-six hours from the time the order to mobilize is issued.26 As Kanwal argues,
“[the IBGs] should be launching their break-in operations and crossing the ‘start line’
even as the holding (defensive) divisions are completing their deployment on the forward
obstacles. Only such simultaneity of operations will unhinge the enemy, break his
cohesion, and paralyze him into making mistakes from which he will not be able to
recover.”27
A major emphasis of Cold Start is on the speed of both deployment and operations.
By moving forces into unpredictable locations at high speeds and making decisions faster
than their opponents can, the IBGs would seek to defeat Pakistani forces in the field by
disrupting their cohesion in line with the tenants of maneuver warfare. The Indian Army
would also seek to take advantage of surprise at both the strategic and the operational
levels to achieve a decision before outside powers such as the United States or China
could intervene on Pakistan’s behalf. There also appears to be an unspoken assumption
that rapid operations would prevent India’s civilian leadership from halting military
operations in progress, lest it have second thoughts or possess insufficient resolve.28
The perceived advantages of the Cold Start doctrine over its predecessor are six fold:
1. Forward-deployed division-sized units can be alerted and mobilized more quickly
than larger formations.29 If the battle groups and the pivot corps start closer to the
international border, their logistics requirements are significantly reduced,
enhancing their maneuverability and the ability to surprise.
2. Even though division-sized formations can “bite and hold” territory, they lack the
power to deliver a knockout blow. In the minds of Indian military planners, thisdenies Pakistan the “regime survival” justification for employing nuclear weapons
in response to India’s conventional attack.
3. Under Cold Start, the Indian Army can undertake a range of responses to a given
provocation rather than the all-or-nothing approach of the Sundarji doctrine. This
has the potential to enhance India’s ability to deter Pakistan, as Cold Start
presents a significantly more credible threat of retaliation which can create
uncertainty in the minds of Pakistani decision-makers about the level of impunity
their nuclear deterrent provides.30
4. Multiple divisions, operating independently, have the potential to disrupt or
incapacitate the Pakistani leadership’s decision-making cycle, as happened to the
French high command in the face of the German blitzkrieg of 1940.31 Indian
planners believe that when faced with offensive thrusts in as many as eight
different sectors, the Pakistani military would be hard-pressed to determine where
to concentrate its forces and which lines of advance to oppose.
5. Having eight units capable of offensive action rather than three significantly
increases the challenge for Pakistani intelligence’s limited reconnaissance assets
to monitor the status of all the IBGs, improving the chance of achieving surprise.
In a limited war, India’s overall goals would be less predictable than in a total
war, where the intent would almost certainly be to destroy Pakistan as a state. As
a result, Pakistan’s defense against Indian attacks would be more difficult because
the military objectives would be less obvious.32
6. If Pakistan were to use nuclear weapons against Indian forces, divisions would
present a significantly smaller target than would corps. The dispersed operations
by highly mobile units envisioned by Cold Start are the kind that would be
required on a nuclear battlefield.
From a tactical and operational standpoint, Cold Start is a creative attempt to formulate a
military solution to the security challenges on India’s western border. However, the
problems India faces are both political and military in nature. As a result, it is not clear
that limited war can enhance India’s ability to achieve its strategic goals. This issue,
along with several others is explored in the subsequent section.
Five Questions About Cold Start
As of mid-2008, Cold Start is in the experimental stage of development, having moved
beyond mere speculation, but still more than a decade away from achieving full
implementation.33 As a result, there are a number of outstanding questions about the
employment of Cold Start that remain to be answered. This section explores five of the
most pertinent issues surrounding the limited war concept.
1. Does the Indian army possess the resources necessary to execute Cold Start?
There is significant disagreement as to whether India possesses sufficient conventional
superiority over Pakistan to warrant discussion of a limited war strategy.34 Fighting on
the defensive, Pakistan would have the advantage of shorter lines of communication as
well as a network of linear obstacles and prepared fighting positions designed to blunt
India’s advance. In these circumstances, some analysts point to the conventional wisdom
of a 3 to 1 superiority in offensive strength at the tactical level as a requirement for
successful breakthrough operations and note that India’s deployed forces in the West
achieve only parity with their Pakistani counterparts.35 Others suggest that a 1.5 to 1
superiority in forces at the theatre level, which India possesses, would “guarantee” an
advantage in combat power ranging from 5 to 1 to 6 to 1 “on 3 or 4 decisive strike
axes.”36 As Stephen Biddle has noted, however, “Even outnumbered invaders can create
a large local advantage on a chosen frontage” by differentially concentrating forces
against a small section of the battle line and deploying fewer troops elsewhere.37 Turning
to the quality of the forces on the two sides, some experts have argued that the Pakistanis
are qualitatively superior to the Indians, which could make up for their numerical
inferiority.38 Others observers believe that when quality and sophistication of weapons
systems are taken into account, India’s relative superiority in military forces is
increased.39 Yet, still others contend that “neither side can undertake a major
conventional attack with a high degree of confidence in its success.”40 It is beyond the scope of this section to render a definitive judgment on the matter, rather it simply seeks
to highlight the considerable uncertainty surrounding the existing conventional balance.
Looking within the Indian Army, at present there appear to be significant material
shortfalls that call into question its ability to execute Cold Start in the near-term. The
army’s tank corps suffers from a low operational readiness rate because much of its
equipment is at the end of its service life. Although several hundred T-90 tanks recently
acquired from Russia possess significant battlefield capabilities, they are at best a “silver
bullet” force. Similarly, the integrated battle groups will require organic self-propelled
artillery to have the mobility and firepower necessary to accomplish their mission. Yet,
by one estimate, the army possesses only 10% of the self-propelled guns it needs.41 In
addition, there are serious questions as to whether the army possesses the mobility and
logistical capability to implement Cold Start. It is estimated that only thirty-five percent
of the army is equipped to move about India, and an even smaller portion possesses the
mobility to mount cross-border operations.42 Similarly, one recent assessment suggests
that the armed forces possess less than 15% of the helicopter airlift capability Cold Start
would require to move men and material.43 Limited supplies of spare parts, primitive
logistical networks, and inadequate maintenance facilities will also hinder offensive
operations.44 The army is attempting to gain the necessary funds to address these issues
as part of its modernization program, however, India’s defense budget is limited, and
both the air force and the navy are pressing their own competing claims. 45
Even more deficient than the Indian Army’s material shortfall is its lack of officers
capable of executing Cold Start operations. A Cold Start-style maneuver doctrine
requires high-quality junior officers who possess the initiative and flexibility to react to
changing circumstances on the battlefield without explicit instructions from their
superiors. This poses a significant challenge for the army which, as an institution, has
demonstrated an unwillingness to entrust authority to junior officers and NCOs.46
Furthermore it faces a shortage of more than 11,000 junior officers, while those it does
have are the product of a military education system that emphasizes rote learning and the
careful implementation of “schoolhouse solutions” rather than free thinking.47 A
conservative institutional culture that is resistant to change with subordinate units tightly
controlled by higher command does not foster the initiative and creativity demanded by
maneuver warfare. 48
2. Have the other services embraced the Cold Start concept?
As an army concept for warfare on land, Cold Start places the other two services in a
subordinate combat role. This is particularly true of the air force. Cold Start employs
airpower according to the army’s own vision of joint warfare, where elements of all three
services are under the control of a unified (presumably army) commander. As Y.I. Patel
notes, this plan runs counter to the Indian Air Force’s own concept of joint operations,
which involves the services fighting wars separately but according to a coordinated
plan.49 Furthermore, the air force believes that attaching aircraft to specific ground units
in a defined geographic space, as the integrated battle group concept requires, is a
fundamental misuse of airpower that fails to leverage the air force’s numerical superiority
over its Pakistani counterparts.50 Given the army’s previously mentioned shortages of
self-propelled artillery, close air support takes on an ever more vital role in Cold Start as
the IBGs will require highly mobile firepower of the type provided by attack helicopters
and ground attack aircraft.
This issue is unlikely to be resolved quickly, as the air force continues to focus its
efforts on air-to-air combat and strategic bombing while downplaying the importance of
close air support as a core mission.51 This can be seen in the IAFs recent acquisition
pattern which has focused on air superiority platforms such as advanced fighter aircraft
and airborne early warning systems. Moreover, the focus on the IAF’s own new
doctrine, which reportedly emphasizes deep attack and strategic reach, appears to be
moving further away from the types of missions Cold Start would require.52 An
operational Cold Start capability would, therefore, require the air force to support the
strategy at a level at which it has heretofore been unwilling to do.
In the absence of the appointment of a chief of the Integrated Defense Staff, India’s
three services function largely autonomously. Strong joint leadership would be required
to force the army and the air force to integrate their wartime strategies and plans and
overcome inter-service rivalries. Such leadership is unlikely to be forthcoming in the
near term, suggesting that service-specific rather than joint warfighting strategies will
continue to proliferate within the Indian military.
3. Does India posses the civil-military structures necessary to manage limited war in a
nuclear environment?
Policymakers contemplating limited war must craft a strategy and related objectives that
are achievable by the use of military force yet sufficiently limited to ensure that the
conflict does not escalate to the nuclear threshold. Clear policy objectives are of utmost importance in limited wars because they must overcome both internal and external
pressures to expand the scope of a conflict. Wars have a way of taking on a life of their
own: Once lives have been lost, money has been spent, and territory has changed hands,
leaders could face tremendous pressure to expand the scope or objectives of a conflict. In
theory, clearly defined strategic objectives with a properly developed correlation between
means and ends could be an effective way to prevent the escalation of a conflict. In
practice, the selection of ways and means to conduct a limited campaign can be
challenging for a national security bureaucracy such as India’s, which is characterized by
a high degree of disconnection between civil and military authorities.53
In peacetime, the country’s elected leadership is often disengaged from security
matters and provides the military with only vague planning guidance.54 Within India’s
defense community, civilian bureaucrats at the Ministry of Defense dominate decisionmaking,
while the uniformed military is largely excluded from the security policymaking
process. The impact of this disconnect between politicians and the military is apparent
when evaluating Operation Parakram, which lacked clear objectives and terminated with
inconclusive results. This raises questions about the ability of India’s civilian leaders to
set the kind of concrete objectives and associated military tasks that would be necessary
to successfully engage in limited warfare between two nuclear powers.
4. Where would Cold Start be employed?
At present, it is not necessarily clear where a Cold Start-style limited military operation
would be directed: Against ****** training camps in Kashmir or their support bases in
Punjab and Sindh? In pursuit of militants crossing the line-of-control? Against
vulnerable parts of Pakistan as part of a response to a terrorist attack within India? There
is an implicit assumption behind Cold Start that punishment inflicted by limited
conventional strikes can persuade Pakistan to halt its support for Kashmiri militants.55
Theorists of both limited war and coercion have suggested that an asymmetry of interests
in the particular issue being contested is an important pre-condition for the successful use
of limited force to change an opponent’s behavior.56 Yet, the issue of Kashmir is not a
peripheral one for either India or Pakistan. As Paul Kapur notes, the disposition of the
disputed territory has both important symbolic and strategic implications for the two countries.57 As a result, it is not necessarily clear that a sufficient level of punishment can
be inflicted on Pakistan to change its behavior without crossing its nuclear threshold.
5. Can India undertake limited conventional operations against Pakistan without
triggering a nuclear response?
Preventing escalation in limited war requires clear signaling of intentions by both sides.
However, by its very purpose, maneuver warfare seeks to surprise, confuse and disorient
the adversary’s decision-makers. Furthermore, it is not necessarily clear that politicalmilitary
objectives that are considered limited in New Delhi will be viewed the same way
in Islamabad or Rawalpindi. Cold Start envisions “limited” thrusts into Pakistan to a
depth of 50-80 km. Yet as Raja Mohan notes, “in no past war [between India and
Pakistan] has there been a penetration of the territory of the other side beyond 15-20
kilometers.”58 Given that a number of important Pakistani cities, as well as transport
networks and lines of communication, lie close to the international border, it is easy to
see how these limited offensives could be perceived to be quite unlimited.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that in a future conflict Pakistan would play by India’s
rules. As one Indian official has noted, “The idea that Pakistan will cooperate in a
conflict and comply with India’s wishes to fight a limited war is ridiculous. It will be
naturally in [Pakistan’s] interest to keep any conflagration as unlimited as possible.”59
Although the exact conditions under which Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons
remain ambiguous, it has not ruled out employing them in response to a conventional
attack. The clearest articulation of Pakistan’s “red lines” comes from Lt. Gen. Khalid
Kidwai, who, while head of the Strategic Plans Division, outlined the general conditions
under which nuclear weapons could be used: India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large
part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; India
blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically; or India pushes Pakistan into
political destabilization or creates large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan.60
The development of the Cold Start doctrine and associated improvements in the
army’s conventional war fighting capabilities has significant implications for stability on
the subcontinent. Analysts such as Ashley Tellis have argued that the cornerstone of the
“ugly stability” that has persisted between India and Pakistan is a product of the
incapacity of either side to gain its political objectives through conventional war.61 As
the asymmetry between India and Pakistan’s conventional military power grows, Pakistan will come under increasing pressure to rely on its nuclear arsenal for selfdefense.
An operational Cold Start capability could lead Pakistan to lower its nuclear red
line, put its nuclear weapons on a higher state of readiness, develop tactical nuclear
weapons, or undertake some equally destabilizing course of action.62
As the five questions explored in this section indicate, there is still a considerable
need to think through the implications of Cold Start for India’s national security goals.
Fostering public discussion of these types of national security matters can help ensure
that India’s military doctrines are well aligned with the country’s grand strategy. That
issue is explored in the subsequent section. ~ A paper prepared for
Cold Start: India’s New Strategic Doctrine and its Implications
Naval Postgraduate School
29-30 May 2008
Monterey, CA
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Asfsoos, it didnt work up well for the indians.
