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The Cold Start Doctrine Watch.

We should sign an agreement with the Chinese that in case of CSD implimentation,they will send 6-10 Chinese soldiers to set up a tent inside Indian territory.

On a serious note, Pakistan has the ability to obliterate Indian IGBs by other means,ie Thermobaric warheads.

kindly elaborate this
 
This a unique reading of defensive - All counter measures must then be defensive, and therefore "proactive Defense"? No, you have not been persuasive on this point -- What if India does an Israel ?? But his assumes that Pakistan are a Lebanon or Palestine-- plus I think if India did such a thing, it would be a God sent - What would be the immediate effect? It would allow the rallying of all political forces, the passing of certain "no longer controversial" security measures, allow a increase in the size of security forces, in sum think of the measures approved when the Indian public sick of terror attacks opted to create a security state - Pakistan pretends to be a security state, it needs a boot up it's behind to get it going and an Indian "raid" or two" should do the trick.

The defensive rhetoric is defined from the nature of the counter measure and not the measure itself, I am sure you can evalute the nature from tactical nature of the system. Next is the time frame, as I said, the disparity between the two forces will continue to grow, and india will not try any mis adventure even "hit and duck" for atleast the next two decades. Never enter a fight that you know you can't win. But my contention wrt to CSD will remain that ambiguity of the doctrine makes us paint the picture that we want to, hence maybe it's just a hoax to keep pakistani military planners busy, while India is busy amassing superior strength.
As far as pakistani military option to take kashmir or siachin is concerned if it still exists, they should do it now, with every passing day, Indian ability is growing and the disparity between Pak and Indian forces are increasing, so strike now whn the disparity is least, 20 years from now the situation will be a lot bleaker.

On a serious note, Pakistan has the ability to obliterate Indian IGBs by other means,ie Thermobaric warheads.

Do you know the size, nature , composition, locations, of the IBG's to make that claim. and from another post, did you have a red dawn marathon? go Wolverines?
 
The defensive rhetoric is defined from the nature of the counter measure and not the measure itself, I am sure you can evalute the nature from tactical nature of the system. Next is the time frame, as I said, the disparity between the two forces will continue to grow, and india will not try any mis adventure even "hit and duck" for atleast the next two decades. Never enter a fight that you know you can't win. But my contention wrt to CSD will remain that ambiguity of the doctrine makes us paint the picture that we want to, hence maybe it's just a hoax to keep pakistani military planners busy, while India is busy amassing superior strength.
As far as pakistani military option to take kashmir or siachin is concerned if it still exists, they should do it now, with every passing day, Indian ability is growing and the disparity between Pak and Indian forces are increasing, so strike now whn the disparity is least, 20 years from now the situation will be a lot bleaker.
Do you know the size, nature , composition, locations, of the IBG's to make that claim. and from another post, did you have a red dawn marathon? go Wolverines?

I encourage you to take note of international opinion regarding CSD - I understand the point you make about ambiguity, I would point out that international capital prefers transparency and predictability. With regard to kashmir and the possibility of the Pakistanis making an all out effort, I think this is just silly, the Pakistanis havbe argued that they are prepared to respond with tactical nukes, so it hardly makes sense that they should turn that on it's head and present the Indian with the exact same argument
 
As far as i have read about CSD, it has some major flaws in it up till now.

* A requirement of the CSD is to convert Indian Army's holding corps into Attacking corps by augmenting them with Armour, more fire power and converting regular infantry into mechanized. This is far from actual ground reality uptil now. Indians need to have atleast double number of tanks and IFV to convert this dream into reality.

* Current Indian Corps headquarters are located in Kolkata, Chandimander, Lucknow, Udhampur, Jaipur and Pune. On the other hand Pakistan army command structure is divided in Corps which are strategically located right at the borders. Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala, Multan and Karachi are all within 100km from border. Just at the start of hostilities no matter how fast Indian could deploy, Pakistan get a minimum of 72 hours window to counter-deploy its assets. Just right deployment means you won 80% battle.

* CSD will not be applicable until Indians made new headquarters near Pakistani borders and areas of operation of each IBG. This is not looking to be happening till now. When it will happen it will give Pak Army the real position and expected points from where IBG will invade Pakistan. Again the real motive behind CSD of surprise attacks against Pakistan and off setting its OODA loop dont mature into reality.

* Some member here claim what if instead of 8, IA come up with 24 thrusts. Dear current Indian Armored strength not even make for 8 thrusts and you are talking about 24?? Armored thrust need a required mass to be effective. Neutral experts who are expert of tank warfare have written so much on Indo-Pak context. In both 1965 and 1971 wars both armies failed to make good use of armor. Both sides commanders use Tanks just to support Infantry. It was the main reason that despite of far superior armored at that time PA's thrust in Akhnoor sector breathed out in energy just before decisive action.

* An armored brigade attack is spread over a wide area. the front lies not less then 6km or so. At around 4 km from objective tanks are aligned in attack formation. Before that they move in long columns. Except Rajisthan desert no area of Indo-Pak border is suitable for divison sized or even brigade size armored thrusts. What happens is that if an armored attack faces natural obstacles like canals, fields filled with water, trees and villages. The attacks split into smaller portions. The books says that at no time Tank platoons should divert away so much that they loose visual contact with each other. The reason behind this logic is that units should support each other with direct fire at the needy time. In plains of Punjab, that logic kiss dust. Small squads became depended on their own, when they drift apart in different locations on a very wide front. In the heat of war, that's a very worrisome situation for any army. So the reality says that 8 IBG thrusts is not a very sound plan. The best Indians could come up is 3 fronts max at a time. This again will be very predictable and hence not a surprise for Pak Army.

* Air power remains a core competency in planning any invasion. Complete Air Superiority lies at the heart of CSD. If i says it is a prerequisite i will not be wrong. The reality is that it took US and its allies 100 days of continuous bombing in Desert Storm 1 to achieve air superiority. 400 days against Serbia. Now the hint is open for any person with a little IQ, what i am talking about. It is simply not possible for IAF to provide that kind of air cover for each IBG to carry out their tasks with impunity.

There are many other issues with CSD, which i cant recall right now. One thing i believe for Pakistan is to prepare for worst case scenario and dont be complacent via-a-vs India. This is my view, Pakistan should have atleast 2 Air born brigades. These brigades should be trained and equipped to deploy any where in Pakistan within 12 hours. This will allow PA to counter any surprise from IA.
 
IMO most of the Pakistani defenses would be taken out much before the 1st Indian soldier sets foot on Pak soil.

Absence of Mobile SAM batteries is a major cause of concern for Pak Military... similarly most casualties on Pak Airforce could be due to SAM if they try becoming offensive and launch strikes on Indian soil.
 
Without a doubt, support for proxies was and is a huge mistake - no two ways about it -- that still leaves the question of capability that India is building, doesn't it?

Whether mistake or not, they exist & will need to be dealt with.

It may be a perception that Pakistanis gloat about nuclear deterrent, on the other hand it is a fact that such a deterrent is exactly what Pakistan have achieved
Here I would put it to you that we have what we have called a mind set problem - the fact that the deterrent is in place is a source of angst among many Indians? Why should this be? After all, why is the existence of a deterrent such a problem?

Deterrence against what? A response to a terrorist attack? No one really argues that India is interested on overrunning Pakistan for fun. Deterrence is a fact but the gloating over it will only hasten the need for a response till one day there is an over reliance on the "deterrence" and might be dangerous to all concerned.

Indians argue that the deterrent enabled the use of proxies, Pakistanis in turn argue that the unwillingness to discuss Kashmir meaningfully led to the proxies. Lets recall that there is a problem between us and only a resolution can allow us to move further to those excellent relations - without the resolution (regardless of how one thinks of the problem, it's a problem, right?) neither is secure and neither can move in the direction of creating international economic linkages in the region, and beyond

That solution unfortunately does not exist but in dreamland & as long as Pakistanis keep using proxies in the meantime, India too must take appropriate steps. As I said before, hope & pray is no substitute for policy. I'm not convinced that PA backed Musharraf's plan on Kashmir, if they do, they must make it clear & a solution will become that much closer. attempting to expand & reopen the terms will get Pakistan nowhere, the PPP government did that & India in response has become even more wary of agreeing to any deal with Pakistan. As a status quo power, India can live without a "solution".


-- one small example, imagine that Pakistan army leadership recognizes that the islamists are a net loss and must be jettisoned and are in fact jettisoned and imagine a offshore block with much promise is available and a bid of is a Pakistan-Indian is successful, can we even begin to think like this, without a resolution? Can India really make progress in A'stan and beyond without Pakistan? Honestly - you can talk Chahbahar till you are blue in the face but you are really going to tell me that the Iranian will facilitate your goods over his??????

Your points are valid but the moot point is whether India is willing to pay the asking price of Pakistan. That price, as existing, has no takers in India. Overplaying & over-emphasising the economic "benefits" will simply skew the real picture & confuse the situation. Whether India makes easier progress in Afghanistan or not, whether it gets an easier route to CAS or not, as long as the asking price of Pakistan remains the same, it is one that India isn't willing to pay, nothing will change till that changes.
 
Whether India makes easier progress in Afghanistan or not, whether it gets an easier route to CAS or not, as long as the asking price of Pakistan remains the same, it is one that India isn't willing to pay, nothing will change till that changes.


I am sure that will give most sleepless nights in Pakistan
 
* Current Indian Corps headquarters are located in Kolkata, Chandimander, Lucknow, Udhampur, Jaipur and Pune. On the other hand Pakistan army command structure is divided in Corps which are strategically located right at the borders. Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala, Multan and Karachi are all within 100km from border. Just at the start of hostilities no matter how fast Indian could deploy, Pakistan get a minimum of 72 hours window to counter-deploy its assets. Just right deployment means you won 80% battle.

Indian Corps HQ facing Pakistan are Udhampur, Srinagar, Leh, Nagrota, Jalandar, Ambala, Bhatinda, Jodhpur and Jaipur. I think, you are mixing up Commands with Corps. Each command has round 2 to 3 corps under it.
 
As far as i have read about CSD, it has some major flaws in it up till now.

* A requirement of the CSD is to convert Indian Army's holding corps into Attacking corps by augmenting them with Armour, more fire power and converting regular infantry into mechanized. This is far from actual ground reality uptil now. Indians need to have atleast double number of tanks and IFV to convert this dream into reality.

* Current Indian Corps headquarters are located in Kolkata, Chandimander, Lucknow, Udhampur, Jaipur and Pune. On the other hand Pakistan army command structure is divided in Corps which are strategically located right at the borders. Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala, Multan and Karachi are all within 100km from border. Just at the start of hostilities no matter how fast Indian could deploy, Pakistan get a minimum of 72 hours window to counter-deploy its assets. Just right deployment means you won 80% battle.

* CSD will not be applicable until Indians made new headquarters near Pakistani borders and areas of operation of each IBG. This is not looking to be happening till now. When it will happen it will give Pak Army the real position and expected points from where IBG will invade Pakistan. Again the real motive behind CSD of surprise attacks against Pakistan and off setting its OODA loop dont mature into reality.

* Some member here claim what if instead of 8, IA come up with 24 thrusts. Dear current Indian Armored strength not even make for 8 thrusts and you are talking about 24?? Armored thrust need a required mass to be effective. Neutral experts who are expert of tank warfare have written so much on Indo-Pak context. In both 1965 and 1971 wars both armies failed to make good use of armor. Both sides commanders use Tanks just to support Infantry. It was the main reason that despite of far superior armored at that time PA's thrust in Akhnoor sector breathed out in energy just before decisive action.

* An armored brigade attack is spread over a wide area. the front lies not less then 6km or so. At around 4 km from objective tanks are aligned in attack formation. Before that they move in long columns. Except Rajisthan desert no area of Indo-Pak border is suitable for divison sized or even brigade size armored thrusts. What happens is that if an armored attack faces natural obstacles like canals, fields filled with water, trees and villages. The attacks split into smaller portions. The books says that at no time Tank platoons should divert away so much that they loose visual contact with each other. The reason behind this logic is that units should support each other with direct fire at the needy time. In plains of Punjab, that logic kiss dust. Small squads became depended on their own, when they drift apart in different locations on a very wide front. In the heat of war, that's a very worrisome situation for any army. So the reality says that 8 IBG thrusts is not a very sound plan. The best Indians could come up is 3 fronts max at a time. This again will be very predictable and hence not a surprise for Pak Army.

* Air power remains a core competency in planning any invasion. Complete Air Superiority lies at the heart of CSD. If i says it is a prerequisite i will not be wrong. The reality is that it took US and its allies 100 days of continuous bombing in Desert Storm 1 to achieve air superiority. 400 days against Serbia. Now the hint is open for any person with a little IQ, what i am talking about. It is simply not possible for IAF to provide that kind of air cover for each IBG to carry out their tasks with impunity.

There are many other issues with CSD, which i cant recall right now. One thing i believe for Pakistan is to prepare for worst case scenario and dont be complacent via-a-vs India. This is my view, Pakistan should have atleast 2 Air born brigades. These brigades should be trained and equipped to deploy any where in Pakistan within 12 hours. This will allow PA to counter any surprise from IA.

i dont know why you are excited....the pak army will crumble within 72 hours in any conventional war...like in 1971...due to politcal appointments, no merit based selections in higher ranks...begun by pervez and continued by his successors.....the captains and majors and a few brigadiers will fight bravely and well but the higher leadership is just not up to the job.....the indian army may be only slightly better but it is much larger and has huge material resources.....unfortunately they will win...
 
Indian Corps HQ facing Pakistan are Udhampur, Srinagar, Leh, Nagrota, Jalandar, Ambala, Bhatinda, Jodhpur and Jaipur. I think, you are mixing up Commands with Corps. Each command has round 2 to 3 corps under it.

6 Commands
Operational Commands: Northern Command - HQ in Udhampur, Jammu & Kashmir.
..................................Western Command - HQ in Chandimandir, Chandigarh.
..................................South Western Command - HQ in Pathankot, Punjab.
..................................Central Command - HQ in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.
..................................Eastern Command - HQ in Kolkota, West Bengal.
..................................Southern Command - HQ in Pune, Maharashtra.


Corps: 13 Corps, consisting of 3 'Strike' Corps + 10 'Holding' Corps - including 1 Desert Corps.
Strike Corps:
Each Division is headed by [General Officer Commanding] (GOC) in the rank of Major General. It usually consists of 15,000 combat troops and 8,000 support elements. Currently, the Indian Army has 37 Divisions including 4 RAPIDs (Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Divisions), 18 Infantry Divisions, 10 Mountain Divisions, 3 Armoured Divisions and 2 Artillery Divisions. Each Division composes of several Brigades.

Eastern Command (Kolkata) --->
III Corps Dimapur (Holding) ---> 3 Mountain Divisions
IV Corps Tezpur (Holding) ---> 3 Mountain Divisions
XXXIII Corps Siliguri (Holding) ---> 3 Mountain Divisions + 1 Artillery Brigade
+ 1 Infantry Divisions attached to Eastern Command

Northern Command (Udhampur) --->
XIV Corps Leh (Holding) ---> 1 Mountain Division + 1 Infantry Division + 1 Artillery Brigade
XIV Corps Srinagar (Holding) ---> 1 Mountain Division + 1 Infantry Division + 1 Artillery Brigade
XVI Corps Nagrota (Holding/Offensive) ---> 3 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Brigade + 1 Artillery Brigade



Southern Command (Pune) --->
XXI Corps Bhopal (Offensive) ---> 1 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Davison + 1 RAPID + 1 Artillery Brigade + 1 Air Defense Brigade + 1 Engineering Brigade
XII Corps Jodhpur (Holding/Offensive) ---> 1 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Brigade + 1 RAPID + 1 Mechanized Brigade
1 Artillery Division attached to Southern Command


South Western Command (Jaipur) --->
X Corps Bhatinda (Offensive) ---> 1 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Brigade + 2 RAPID + 1 Air Defense Brigade + 1 Engineering Brigade
I Corps Mathura (Offensive) ---> 1 Mountain Division + 1 Armored Division + 1 RAPID + 1 Engineering Brigade
1 Artillery Division attached to South Western Command


Western Command (Chandimandir)
II Corps Ambala (Offensive) ---> 1 Infantry Division + 1 Armored Division + 1 RAPID + 1 Air Defense Brigade + 1 Engineering Brigade
IX Corps Yole (Offensive) ---> 2 Infantry Divisions + 2 Armored Brigades
XI Corps Jalandhar (Offensive) ---> 3 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Brigade + 1 Mechanized Brigade
1 Artillery Division attached to Western Command

Central Command (Lucknow) ---> No units attached
 
I am sure that will give most sleepless nights in Pakistan


I cannot actually figure out whether you were being sarcastic but I see too many Pakistanis emphasising the supposed economic benefits for India if India were to accommodate Pakistan over Kashmir. I'm not sure whether this opinion comes from hope or from a lifetime drilling in of the Hindu Bania being only interested in a profit. The simple truth is that India cannot be bought out on Kashmir. The only solution acceptable there is soft borders, greater autonomy etc. If that is acceptable to you, no further carrots are necessary, if that is not, then it must be also realised that there are no carrots whatsoever that can bring about a solution. Deterrence works both ways and as a status quo power, should theoretically benefit India. Pakistan use of proxies is after all a dangerous ploy. Leave alone the internal consequences of such an action, it only works even partially if India eschews a similar tactic. If not, with greater resources available with India & no shortage of pressure points, Pakistan can easily be hoisted on its own petard.
 
6 Commands
Operational Commands: Northern Command - HQ in Udhampur, Jammu & Kashmir.
..................................Western Command - HQ in Chandimandir, Chandigarh.
..................................South Western Command - HQ in Pathankot, Punjab.
..................................Central Command - HQ in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.
..................................Eastern Command - HQ in Kolkota, West Bengal.
..................................Southern Command - HQ in Pune, Maharashtra.


Corps: 13 Corps, consisting of 3 'Strike' Corps + 10 'Holding' Corps - including 1 Desert Corps.
Strike Corps:
Each Division is headed by [General Officer Commanding] (GOC) in the rank of Major General. It usually consists of 15,000 combat troops and 8,000 support elements. Currently, the Indian Army has 37 Divisions including 4 RAPIDs (Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Divisions), 18 Infantry Divisions, 10 Mountain Divisions, 3 Armoured Divisions and 2 Artillery Divisions. Each Division composes of several Brigades.

Eastern Command (Kolkata) --->
III Corps Dimapur (Holding) ---> 3 Mountain Divisions
IV Corps Tezpur (Holding) ---> 3 Mountain Divisions
XXXIII Corps Siliguri (Holding) ---> 3 Mountain Divisions + 1 Artillery Brigade
+ 1 Infantry Divisions attached to Eastern Command

Northern Command (Udhampur) --->
XIV Corps Leh (Holding) ---> 1 Mountain Division + 1 Infantry Division + 1 Artillery Brigade
XIV Corps Srinagar (Holding) ---> 1 Mountain Division + 1 Infantry Division + 1 Artillery Brigade
XVI Corps Nagrota (Holding/Offensive) ---> 3 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Brigade + 1 Artillery Brigade



Southern Command (Pune) --->
XXI Corps Bhopal (Offensive) ---> 1 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Davison + 1 RAPID + 1 Artillery Brigade + 1 Air Defense Brigade + 1 Engineering Brigade
XII Corps Jodhpur (Holding/Offensive) ---> 1 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Brigade + 1 RAPID + 1 Mechanized Brigade
1 Artillery Division attached to Southern Command


South Western Command (Jaipur) --->
X Corps Bhatinda (Offensive) ---> 1 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Brigade + 2 RAPID + 1 Air Defense Brigade + 1 Engineering Brigade
I Corps Mathura (Offensive) ---> 1 Mountain Division + 1 Armored Division + 1 RAPID + 1 Engineering Brigade
1 Artillery Division attached to South Western Command


Western Command (Chandimandir)
II Corps Ambala (Offensive) ---> 1 Infantry Division + 1 Armored Division + 1 RAPID + 1 Air Defense Brigade + 1 Engineering Brigade
IX Corps Yole (Offensive) ---> 2 Infantry Divisions + 2 Armored Brigades
XI Corps Jalandhar (Offensive) ---> 3 Infantry Divisions + 1 Armored Brigade + 1 Mechanized Brigade
1 Artillery Division attached to Western Command

Central Command (Lucknow) ---> No units attached

My friend, my point was, which you have proved in your above post is the number of Corps facing Pakistan, is what I had mentioned.:tup:
 
It's funny how Mr Saran first announces:
In a wide-ranging speech on India’s nuclear weapons’ programme and the country’s nuclear doctrine, Shyam Saran, chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board, declared in New Delhi on April 24 that India’s plans to put in place a triad of land-based, air-delivered and submarine-based nuclear forces had made good progress.

At least two legs of the triad, including a ‘modest arsenal’, nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles, both in fixed underground silos and those mounted on mobile rail and road-based platforms, were fully operational. The third leg of the triad, namely a sea-based deterrent, was ‘work in progress’
, Saran said, and was expected to be in place by 2015 or 2016.
and then in the same breath, implies:
If Saran is to be believed, this formidable body of ‘evidence’ is proof of a ‘Pakistani mindset which seeks parity with and even overtaking India’,a cardinal sin in India’s eyes. Behind this sinister design, Saran detects a Pakistani effort to win ‘prestige’ in the Islamic world.

Buddah sathya gya hai...
 
For some reason, i see that CSD will look like a 21st centuary version of the Battle of Chawindah.

Youre right in saying that it represents a mindset in India. I have been discussing CSD with a friend at NDU for some time, now.

Pakistan is weak and exausted by fighting these Takfiris. Should the Umreeki and Farangi draw down allow us a breather from their proxies, we need to share the lunch with the Indians.

There are plenty of useful idiots up for sale in Indian Naxal belt and beyond. Forget Kashmiris for a moment,even Afghanistan. Our first transaction in India post 2014 has to be with Naxals as they will bring good return on investment.

Naxals should be our new friends as they can be made to hide our footprints. I don't see CSD coming
into play,however i do see the Terrorism trade thrive for the forseeable future in the S.Continent.


@muse @Icarus @Irfan Baloch @Xeric

Excellent points made, however, one must keep in mind that:

1) It will be difficult to provide material support to the Naxals, seeing as they occupy states that do not share a common border with us.

2) The Naxals are not really a separatist movement, they are more of a political rebellion.

3) We lack the resources to sustain an Insurgency in India.

4) Whatever, we sow will come back to haunt us. Case in point, present situation.

I can safely say that the age of proxy wars is over for Pakistan, I don't think Pakistan will be investing in another proxy for the foreseeable future.
 
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Excellent points made, however, one must keep in mind that:

1) It will be difficult to provide material support to the Naxals, seeing as they occupy states that do not share a common border with us.

2) The Naxals are not really a separatist movement, they are more of a political rebellion.

3) We lack the resources to sustain an Insurgency in India.

4) Whatever, we sow will come back to haunt us. Case in point, present situation.

I can safely say that the age of proxy wars is over for Pakistan, I don't think Pakistan will be investing in another proxy for the foreseeable future.

Well said Sir, in my view it is easier to say keh hum agar mazeed pangay na lein to behter hey.
 
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