The Battle for Bajaur - PA seizes control

[Imran Khan]

LANDI KOTAL, Nov 10: Militants hijacked 13 containers carrying supplies for Nato forces from the highway linking Pakistan with Afghanistan after a brazen attack on Monday, as paramilitary personnel watched from the nearby Jamrud Fort.



The containers were ambushed by dozens of heavily armed men from Wazir Dhand, Teddi Bazaar and Sur Qamar on the Peshawar-Torkham highway. Several Khasadar checkpoints are located nearby.

“It happened on the international highway and you can imagine the implications this can have for us,” an official told Dawn.

He said Taliban seized the containers on the road and emptied them “in clear view of paramilitary personnel” deployed at Jamrud Fort, but they did not take any action.

The militants were later seen driving around in Jamrud area of Khyber Agency, near Peshawar, in military vehicles taken away from the containers. They had hoisted flags and banners of the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and its leader Baitullah Mehsud on the vehicles.

Local people said most of the militants in the group, including its leader, appeared to be from Afghanistan’s Nangrahar province and others from Mohmand and Waziristan.

The official said the local administration had been warning the government that Taliban were gaining strength in Jamrud and the issue had also been discussed during last week’s visit to Peshawar by the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Interior Affairs, Rehman Malik.

After desperate calls by the administration, helicopter gunships were sent to retrieve the goods, but by then the militants had managed to shift the merchandise, including wheat.

A 12-year-old schoolboy, Rahim Khan, was killed and six other people, among them two militants, were injured in a 15-minute attack by three helicopters in Ghundi Shaga area. The injured were taken to a hospital in Peshawar.

Officials said since paramilitary forces were deployed in strength to Bajaur and other areas, they did not have enough troops to combat the growing militancy in Jamrud.

Jamrud Political Tehsildar Bakhtiar Mohmand insisted that Khasadar personnel had fired at the militants to prevent the hijacking.

He alleged that Khyber Rifles did not help the Khasadars in preventing such attacks. Mr Mohmand said supporters of Baitullah Mehsud were involved in the incident. Local Taliban leader Mustafa Kamal threatened to retaliate if security forces did not stop shelling civilians in Khyber Agency.

Transporters of fuel and other supplies to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces in Afghanistan expressed concern over increasing incidents of hijacking of their vehicles and sale of the stolen goods. They said the government had not compensated them for the losses suffered in such incidents.

 

[S-2]

Alright. It seems that the GoP and P.A. have brought in the press corps to SEE what's going on in Bajaur. Good. Among others who may benefit, it will be interesting to see the reaction of those here to what is, for most, a "guerrilla war", but to any trained eye has become a conventional infantry-focused invasion campaign of a "foreign nation".

I say so only for two reasons- 1.) The AQAM came to Bajaur and made it their own and, 2.) The P.A. came to Bajaur and, even allowing F.C. advice on the local terrain, were strangers in a strange land- THEIR land.

This is a conventional battle. Make no mistake. These soldiers won't be passing out toys to children in the streets. The towns might actually not be recognizable any longer.

Read. Good NYT photos of some of the damage. All articles linked here-

Pakistanis Mired In Brutal Battle To Oust Taliban- NYT

This, from WAPO, speaks to the impact upon the tribal leaders, the occasional lashkars, and the vice they feel placed upon them by the taliban and GoP. There is competition for their loyalty and punishment where it's denied. The choices are harsh. Which less so?

For Pakistan's Tribesmen A Difficult, Deadly, Choice- WAPO

Anthony Lloyd weighs in again from the Times of London. This time in Tang Khata writing about military preparations of the taliban in this particular area-

Captured Battle Plans Show Strength and Training Of Taliban Forces- London Times

This is superb stuff. All of it. I'm frustrated by the paucity of news prior to the P.A. allowing these folks access. Seeing the photos gives some clues to part of the story, I'm sure. The GoP needed some time to brace themselves for the inevitable questions that'll ensue from this battle- which is hardly finished it seems.

Anyway, in the last two days I've received a much better view of the battlearea. Reading these articles, you will too.

 

[S-2]

Some thoughts-

"It was in response to the 2006 strike [Damadola] that the Taliban started taking over Bajaur, according to the government’s senior civilian official in the area, Shafirullah Khan.

Its methods were ruthless. Homeowners were coerced or paid to allow the militants to use their premises as bases, Mr. Khan said. Those who resisted were killed, often by beheading.

A well-known Afghan Taliban fighter, Zia ur-Rehman, directed and fortified the operation with his own men, bringing hundreds of fighters from Afghanistan last November, Mr. Khan said.

By last December, the Taliban had pushed government-armed local tribesmen, known as levees, out of their checkpoint at Loe Sam. By June, the Taliban had destroyed more than half of the 72 checkpoints in Bajaur." Perlez, NYT

Chicken or egg as to "response". That Zawahiri was targeted in Damadola suggests that AQAM was firmly affixed in this region. How long? Your guess is as good as mine but why not back to 2001-2002? Or 1981? Who knows Zawahiri's personal experience with the region such to catch his interest.

WHAT I DO KNOW is that one of those rare exceptions to battalion operations was run in neighboring Kunar in the early fall of 2007 by the 173rd Airborne Brigade. It centered on the Korengal valley. It was VERY effective. Not long after (November of 2007) large numbers of afghan taliban arrive from Kunar under the command of Rehman- as mentioned above.

We knew the intensity and manner in which these men fight. We'd nicely upset their plans to do the same to Kunar. None of this is particularly surprising in retrospect. The construction, though, of fortifications seems to have taken place right under the nose of tribal agents and other gov't officials in these areas. Half-mile tunnels with ventilation? You've got to be deaf, dumb, and blind to be unaware as a representative of the government.

Hmmm...I guess autonomous really means ABSENT altogether.

I can't see, given the high levels of re-construction that's required, endemic weakness/sympathy among the F.C. and the continuing vulnerability to attacks or coercion by the community that the army will be able to leave. It must remain to ensure the security necessary to reconstruct these towns and then maintain the government's permanent stamp.

So does anybody wish to guess whether Bajaur is the only case of this entrenched resistance awaiting your nation's army on Pakistani soil? If more lies elsewhere, one can only wonder from where the government will find the soldiers?

 

[Imran Khan]

Pakistani Taliban renew offer for talks
Tuesday, 11 Nov, 2008 | 09:52 PM PST |

File photo: Maulvi Umar, left, a Taliban spokesman, speaks as his bodyguard looks on during a press conference in Khar, Pakistan. AP

KHAR: The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has renewed its offer for talks with the government, saying tribal forces (Lashkars) are not a solution to the problem in the tribal region.


Seven militants were killed and several others wounded as security forces pounded suspected hideouts in different areas of Mamond and Nawagai with artillery shelling.

Military sources claimed that several hideouts of Taliban were destroyed. Several houses were also damaged as mortar shells hit them. However, there was no report of any casualty.

Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omar told newsmen from an undisclosed location that Taliban wanted dialogue with the government for restoration of peace in the tribal areas as well as other parts of the country.

He said Taliban are sincere in dialogue with the government since violence is in no one’s interest. He said the government has time and again rejected the Taliban’s offer.

To a question he said Taliban would never lay down weapons before talks, saying it would be a ‘shame for us to surrender before talks’. He said if the talks remained fruitful then they would not hesitate to lay down arms.

He on behalf of the Taliban leadership expressed deep concern over the military operation in Bajaur and other parts of the Frontier. He said the Taliban had never challenged the government’s writ in Bajaur, adding in the last three month Taliban have restricted their activities and only defensive measures had been taken.

He warned if the government did not stop its military action, the Taliban would launch major attacks on government installations. He said decisions in this regard would be taken in the Shura (Supreme Council) meeting to be held in November.

He said that the overall situation would be discussed at the meeting and a strategy would be devised to launch a decisive drive against the government.

The spokesman warned the government of stern action if it did not stop what he called ‘conspiracies’ of turning tribal people against the Taliban by establishing ‘government sponsored Lashkars’.

He also warned tribal elders against playing in the hands of the government, saying if they stick to their action, Taliban would have no other option but to wage war against the tribal Lashkars.



thanks for offer but our offer is die or fight

 

[Imran Khan]

ISAF commander to brief Pakistani leaders
By Amir Wasim

Tuesday, 11 Nov, 2008 | 09:04 PM PST |

File photo: US Gen David McKiernan, commander of the NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, speaks during an interview. AP

ISLAMABAD: The commander of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and US forces in Afghanistan General David McKiernan is coming to Pakistan to give a special briefing to a selected group of parliamentary members on Thursday, sources told Dawn on Tuesday.


The visit of the allied forces commander has great significance as it is being undertaken in the backdrop of protests lodged by Pakistan over continuous violation of the country’s air space largely by US spy drones and missile attacks on tribal areas.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on the floor of the National Assembly on Tuesday declared that his government would take up the matter of the violation of the country’s air space with the new US administration.

Similarly, many government functionaries, including President Asif Zardari, have stated that the US missile attacks are proving to be counter-productive in the ongoing war against terrorism.

The briefing by the US general, the sources said, would be held at the residence of US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson.

Dawn has learnt that some 15 to 20 members of the parliament belonging to various political parties, mostly from the ruling coalition, have been invited to the briefing.

It is not clear as to what exactly prompted the US commander to visit Islamabad for this special briefing, but it is believed that the language of the consensus resolution passed at the conclusion of the in-camera joint sitting of the parliament last month has compelled the US general to explain Nato’s position.

The resolution calls for an ‘urgent review of national security strategy and revisit the methodology of combating terrorism in order to restore peace and stability to Pakistan and the region through an independent foreign policy.’

 

[S-2]

A superb opportunity to ask the questions lurking in the back of Pakistani politicians' minds about NATO/ISAF, their plans/operations, drug interdiction and disruption, levels of financial and moral commitment from contributing members, the Afghan gov't/ANA/ANP, India's involvement, PREDATOR and it's efficacy/cost as perceived by McKeirnan, border cooperation with F.C./P.A. forces, convoy security, civil reconstruction programs, and more...

Much more. Most of all, who's the threat and where they are.

If I were McKeirnan, I'd come prepared to address, educate, and force these politicians to ASK each and every question on my list and, again, MORE. I wouldn't leave nor let them leave until EXHAUSTED by the detail of my responses and the consequent sincerity and transparent disclosure. I'd bring my senior intelligence officer too and require that they grill him. I'd TEACH them how to do so by asking the questions that they can't imagine or are afraid to broach.

I hide nothing and force all issues to the surface so that your parliament possesses no misunderstanding of the threat and the nature of the commitment and work necessary to reverse this absymal misunderstanding of the stakes which are now being wagered by AQAM.

This on the heels of the COAS briefing/dog n' pony show for the parliament speaks to the resistance therein to face reality along the border. There is no balancing act here. AQAM hopes and continues to play for that desire, though. They see the evident wish of Pakistan's civilian politicians who'd wish this challenge away if possible and play to that visible weakness.

Hope you've some strong politicians ready to swallow some equally strong medicine. The news that they are about to hear isn't pretty but it starts there. Actually, I suspect that they've already heard it from your own military and simply persist in denial. After McKeirnan's done, I doubt that will still be the case.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

S-2:

So does anybody wish to guess whether Bajaur is the only case of this entrenched resistance awaiting your nation's army on Pakistani soil? If more lies elsewhere, one can only wonder from where the government will find the soldiers?

The challenges ahead will be as great, if not greater I am sure. Nonetheless, as I have said repeatedly, I see no easy way out of this unless US policy focuses on the excellent suggestions made by B Rubin, B Riedel and others, of an exertion of quiet but firm pressure on India and Pakistan towards tangible long term rapprochement, that allows for the release of further resources for the West.

It must focus on addressing Pakistani concerns around Indian activities in Afghanistan, as well as addressing concerns around the Durand, with respect to pushing the GoA to accept its finality, perhaps with minor adjustments, and the role of former NA officials in the GoA.

Pakistan may continue at the current pace, regardless of whether its concerns are addressed, since the militants do pose an existential threat, but the process can be accelerated tremendously were a more comprehensive and regional approach adopted to the situation,

 

[S-2]

"It must focus on addressing Pakistani concerns around Indian activities in Afghanistan, as well as addressing concerns around the Durand, with respect to pushing the GoA to accept its finality, perhaps with minor adjustments, and the role of former NA officials in the GoA."

Well add J&K to that list, which is central to your "reapproachment" and water and maybe we can find heaven on earth. I dunno.

So what to do in the meantime? How will a conference on the Durand line help this moment? Does it really matter EXACTLY where this line runs? Neither government seems to have visited it recently.

As to N.A.officials, it seems obvious to me that the afghani pashtu need to mobilize their considerable electorate and sweep clean the government as configured on the next election. Like the Iraqi sunni, you don't want to be on the outside looking in. Unlike the Iraqi sunni, you've a pashtu plurality in Afghanistan if not an absolute majority.

Sooner or later, given enough elections of reasonable fairness, and God knows that the outside scrutiny is upon Afghanistan, the Pashtu natural weight of vote will assert itself. Long-term, the bigger question might be how the rights of other ethnicities are protected without a considerable coalition of opponents weighing in against the pashtu. Hmmm..I guess that describes the N.A.

 

[Neo]

S-2:

The challenges ahead will be as great, if not greater I am sure. Nonetheless, as I have said repeatedly, I see no easy way out of this unless US policy focuses on the excellent suggestions made by B Rubin, B Riedel and others, of an exertion of quiet but firm pressure on India and Pakistan towards tangible long term rapprochement, that allows for the release of further resources for the West.

It must focus on addressing Pakistani concerns around Indian activities in Afghanistan, as well as addressing concerns around the Durand, with respect to pushing the GoA to accept its finality, perhaps with minor adjustments, and the role of former NA officials in the GoA.

Pakistan may continue at the current pace, regardless of whether its concerns are addressed, since the militants do pose an existential threat, but the process can be accelerated tremendously were a more comprehensive and regional approach adopted to the situation,

"It must focus on addressing Pakistani concerns around Indian activities in Afghanistan, as well as addressing concerns around the Durand, with respect to pushing the GoA to accept its finality, perhaps with minor adjustments, and the role of former NA officials in the GoA."

Well add J&K to that list, which is central to your "reapproachment" and water and maybe we can find heaven on earth. I dunno.

So what to do in the meantime? How will a conference on the Durand line help this moment? Does it really matter EXACTLY where this line runs? Neither government seems to have visited it recently.

Sir,

Pakistan should have linked her support for WoT to our strategic gains from resolving Durand Line and LoC issues in the first place but its still not too late to review the policy since US is doung the same, i.e. linking aid to results.

Durand Line needs to be solved sooner or later and its in our interest to enforce a final settlement before US leaves Afghanistan.
Otoh Kashmir is more important than Durand Line, since 90% of our waters runs thru this region and 170 million Pakistani's lives depend on it. Recent controvery around the Chenab water blockade by India and the Kishanganga Dam have proven how vital it is to secure water flow. India simply can not be trusted...

 

[S-2]

"Durand Line needs to be solved sooner or later and its in our interest to enforce a final settlement before US leaves Afghanistan."

Let's move this one back for two reasons- 1.) We're not going anywhere soon. The problem of Afghanistan is sufficiently compelling to require our serious attention for a decade or two IMHO and, 2.) why not therefore wait to attain a pashtu parliamentary majority and dominance of the GoA to facilitate these negotiations with a government more culturally attenuated to your concerns or, perhaps, you're concerned that Afghan nationalism might usurp/trump shared ethnicity and tribal affiliations?

"Otoh Kashmir is more important than Durand Line, since 90% of our waters runs thru this region and 170 million Pakistani's lives depend on it. Recent controvery around the Chenab water blockade by India and the Kishanganga Dam have proven how vital it is to secure water flow. India simply can not be trusted..."

Is it simply water, though, even if that seems sufficient imperative by itself? There seems more than water to drive Pakistani motivations WRT J&K. Again, if both sides see the issue as a zero-sum equation, there's little opportunity for an accord. I'd love to see the PRC involved here, as too the other nations of S.E. Asia.

Name me a river in the region, and they're ALL massive, that doesn't source in the Himalayas. As such, it would seem that many nations are equally affected as downstream users. The Mekong, for example, serves China, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

"Pakistan should have linked her support for WoT to our strategic gains from resolving Durand Line and LoC issues in the first place but its still not too late to review the policy since US is doung the same, i.e. linking aid to results."

You saw a "window of opportunity" in 2001 then that I didn't see. That said, you must weigh who can better sustain a freeze in relations. If a cold war breaks out along the Durand Line and Pakistan withdraws from the WoT, how does that help you with the Durand line or anything else?

Would not that still leave you with an internal insurgency which would require instead accomodation and acquiescence in the face of a reduced ability to defeat this threat absent external assistance? Wouldn't it leave you with an external enemy of some note were you to attempt to deflect these internal insurgents elsewhere? How would it endanger your current trade status with America and would that matter?

There's some petulance to your suggestion of leverage that doesn't strike me as serious. Testing it in this manner to resolve an issue along the Durand Line that, IMHO, can wait under the circumstances for more favorable political conditions to arise would seem a dangerous gambit played with an empty hand.

 

[muse]

Gentlemen (persons), I offer below a piece that I think will further your interesting discussion:


From Great Game to Grand Bargain
Barnett Rubin & Ahmed Rashid


The “Great Game” is no fun anymore. Nineteenth-century British imperialists used that term to describe the British-Russian struggle for mastery in Afghanistan and Central Asia. More than a century later, the game continues. But now, the number of players has exploded, those living on the chessboard have become players, and the intensity of the violence and the threats that it produces affect the entire globe.

Afghanistan has been at war for three decades, and that war is spreading to Pakistan and beyond. A time-out needs to be called so that the players, including President-elect Barack Obama, can negotiate a new bargain for the region.

Securing Afghanistan and its region will require an international presence for many years. Building up Afghanistan’s security forces is at most a stopgap measure, as the country cannot sustain forces of the size that it now needs. Only a regional and global agreement to place Afghanistan’s stability above other objectives can make long-term stability possible by enabling Afghanistan to survive with security forces that it can afford. Such agreement, however, will require political and diplomatic initiatives both inside and outside of the country.

In Afghanistan, the United States and NATO must make clear that they are at war with Al-Qaeda and those who support its global objectives, but have no objection if either the Afghan or Pakistani government negotiates with insurgents who renounce ties to Osama bin Laden. In exchange for such guarantees, international forces could largely withdraw, leaving a force to secure a political agreement and to train Afghan security forces.

But a political settlement within Afghanistan cannot succeed without a regional grand bargain. The first Great Game was resolved a century ago by making Afghanistan a buffer state in which outsiders did not interfere. Today, however, Afghanistan is the scene not only of the War on Terror, but also of longstanding Afghan-Pakistani disputes, the India-Pakistan conflict, domestic struggles in Pakistan, US-Iranian antagonism, Russian concerns about NATO, Sunni-Shia rivalry, and struggles over regional energy infrastructure.

These conflicts will continue as long as the US treats stabilising Afghanistan as subordinate to other goals, accompanied by all the risks entailed by terrorist resurgence and a regional security crisis. This is why Obama must adopt a bold diplomatic initiative that encompasses the entire region and help resolve longstanding disputes between Afghanistan’s neighbours. Such an initiative must include a comprehensive regional aid and development package.

In addition, the US must rebalance its regional posture by reducing its dependence on Pakistan’s military. Obama will need firmly to support Pakistan’s fragile elected government as it tries to gain control over the army and intelligence apparatus and thus reverse decades of support for militants.

Dialogue with Iran and Russia over common interests in Afghanistan — both helped the US in 2001 — would place more pressure on Pakistan. At the same time, the US and other powers with a stake in Afghanistan must seek to reduce Indian activities in Afghanistan that Pakistan sees as threatening, or, if those policies are not threatening, assure greater transparency for them.

This objective requires more than “pressuring” Pakistan. The Pakistani security establishment believes that it faces a US-Indian-Afghan alliance aimed at undermining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and even dismembering the Pakistani state. Civilian leaders evaluate Pakistan’s national interests differently, but they, too, cannot be indifferent to Pakistan’s chronic sense of insecurity.

Pakistan does not have border agreements with either India, with whom it disputes the incorporation of Kashmir, or Afghanistan, which has never explicitly recognised the Durand Line, the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan also claims that the Northern Alliance, part of the anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan, is working with India from within Afghanistan’s security services. And the US-India nuclear deal effectively recognises India’s legitimacy as a nuclear power while continuing to treat Pakistan, with its record of proliferation, as a pariah.

Pressure will not work if Pakistan’s leaders believe that their country’s survival is at stake. Instead, the new US administration should help to create a broad multilateral framework for the region, one aimed at building a genuine consensus on the goal of achieving Afghan stability by addressing the legitimate sources of Pakistan’s insecurity while strengthening opposition to disruptive Pakistani behaviour.

A first step could be establishing a contact group for the region, authorised by the United Nations Security Council. This contact group could promote dialogue between India and Pakistan about their respective interests in Afghanistan and about finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute; seek a long-term political strategy from the Pakistani government for the future of the tribal agencies; move Afghanistan and Pakistan toward discussions on frontier issues, and promote a regional plan for economic development and integration. China, the largest investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, could help finance projects of common interest.

A successful initiative will require exploratory talks and an evolving road map. Today, such suggestions may seem audacious, naive, or impossible; but, without such audacity, there is little hope for Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the region as a whole. —DT-PS

Barnett R Rubin is Director of Studies at the Asia Society and a senior Fellow at New York University’s Centre on International Cooperation. Ahmed Rashid’s most recent book is Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia

 

[Imran Khan]

FATA is base camp of talaban from more then thirty years

any proove ?

it is impossible to defeat them when local tribes are giving them full support,which is decisive factor .

nothing more then BS.who spport these ***** mullahas

 

[Imran Khan]

’Copters bomb militants to recover US vehicles



Wednesday, November 12, 2008

By our correspondent

BARA: Enraged residents blocked the busy Pak-Afghan highway on Tuesday to protest the death of a student during an assault by military gunship helicopters on the militants loyal to Baitullah Mehsud as choppers continued to pound suspected hideouts of the militants in the Khyber Agency for the second consecutive day on Tuesday.

Aerial attacks were conducted against the militants in Janda Baba Ziarat of the Mullagori area in Jamrud Tehsil of the tribal agency. However, there were no reports of any casualty in the attack.

Residents said anti-Taliban fighters, who had set up a trench, narrowly escaped being hit in the strafing by two gunship helicopters. The militants had escaped by then and apparently remained unhurt in the attack.

Earlier, about 30 to 35 militants riding a Humvee armoured personnel carrier and a jeep of the US Army drove towards the Mullagori area from Jamrud. They had snatched the two vehicles on Monday after having waylaid 13 trailers transporting supplies for the US-led Nato forces in Afghanistan.

Tribesmen in Mullagori area said the militants abandoned the two snatched vehicles on the road near Malakanano village after learning about the arrival of up to 500 personnel of the Army, Frontier Corps and Khasadar. The troops took the vehicles into their possession. The fate of another Humvee vehicle was not known.

The militants had snatched 13 trailers and not 15 as reported earlier. They had intercepted the trailers at four points in the Sur Kamar and other areas beyond Jamrud in the Khyber Pass and hijacked them along with the drivers, who were later freed. The militants emptied the containers, mostly carrying wheat, and distributed the goods among the people and kept some for their own use.

One of the trailers was loaded with two Humvees and jeeps, which were captured by the militants and driven around later on the Jamrud Road. The militants even put a white-cloth banner inscribed with the name of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud on one of the Humvees.

Tribal sources said the trailers may have been retrieved but all had been emptied. The authorities had reportedly offered Rs 1 million to the militants and sent a Jirga to urge them to release the trailers and the snatched Humvees. However, the militants refused to do so. It forced the political administration of the Khyber Agency to request the Army helicopters to attack the militants. The aerial attack scattered the militants but there was also collateral damage with a boy getting killed and four other civilians receiving injuries.

On Tuesday, relatives of the deceased boy, Rahim, along with local residents, brought the body to the Pak-Afghan highway in Jamrud. The protesters blocked the international route for hours, bringing the vehicular traffic to a complete stop.

 

[Imran Khan]

Taliban renew offer for talks



By Our Correspondent

KHAR, Nov 11: The outlawed Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has renewed its offer to hold talks with the government and said that use of tribal lashkars is not a solution to the problem in the tribal region.

The group’s spokesman Maulvi Omar told newsmen that the TTP wanted dialogue with the government for restoring peace in the tribal areas and other parts of the country.

He claimed that the Taliban were sincere in their offer because violence was in no-one’s interest.

Replying to a question, he said the Taliban would never lay down weapons before the opening of dialogue but they would do so if talks proved to be fruitful.

He expressed concern over the military operation in Bajaur and other areas and said that the Taliban had never challenged the government’s writ in Bajaur.

Claiming that the Taliban had reduced their activities over the past three months and taken only defensive measures, he threatened to launch major attacks on government installations if the military action was not stopped.

He said that the Taliban shura would meet at the end of the current month to prepare plan for a decisive campaign against the government.

He warned the government against pitting tribal people against the Taliban by setting up lashkars and said the government had resorted to the move after having failed to achieve its objective through military operations.

He also warned tribal elders against “playing in the hands of the government,” and said the Taliban would wage a war against them if they formed lashkars.

 

[S-2]

Silly me. I posted this article in the BAJAUR thread this morning. Doesn't everybody hang each and every post of mine?