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Tense times for the military
Thursday, September 20, 2007
Dr Adil Najam
These are tense times for the Pakistan military. The chief of army staff (COAS) is enmeshed in and distracted by the pressures of political wheeling and
dealings. There is an escalating civil war-like situation on our northwestern frontiers where soldiers are routinely being killed or kidnapped on a nearly
daily basis, military installations are being attacked, and military casualties are piling up. Most importantly, public resentment against the military
as an institution is as high as one can ever recall, and growing. Arguably, not since 1971 has the Pakistan military been under such internal strain.
All indications suggest that despite the strain, the Pakistan military remains a professional institution. There is no evidence that these pressures have
created serious internal fissures in either rank or file. At least, not yet. However, in looking to the future, we must be concerned lest these pressures
grow to an extent where they begin to undermine the integrity of the institution. After all, the integrity of the military is a key ingredient in the integrity
of the state.
The biggest danger is that internal pressures on the military could end up seriously impairing the bond of respect between society and military, which is
one of the fundamental foundations of the modern military; in fact, of the modern state. Let me repeat something I had written in these columns back in
June: "It is both sad and dangerous when a society begins to lose respect for its military. It is sad because it implies the breakdown of the social contract
between soldier and citizen. This contract is one amongst the many that are necessary for the cohesion of the nation-state. When it works, it is based
on bonds of common identity and mutual respect. This respect is necessary if it is to ultimately translate into the willingness of the former to lay down
his life, when needed, for the latter."
I had gone on to argue that this respect for the military, while necessary, can not be demanded or legislated. It has to be nurtured and earned. It is never
simply a matter of telling people that they must respect the military or threatening them with serious consequences if they don't. It is, rather, about
giving people a reason to continue respecting the institution of the military. One of the sad legacies of Gen. Musharraf's term as President -- particularly
the last year -- is a steady decline in this societal respect for the military. Although the society-military bond has not yet been broken, it has been
greatly weakened.
Of course, criticism of the power grabbing ploys of 'generals,' corruption by the 'top brass,' and resentment against the ubiquitous intrusion of senior
military officers in civilian institutions has been a permanent centerpiece of Pakistani conversations, even in times of civilian rule. But what we are
seeing today is qualitatively different. The object of public wrath is no longer just the excesses of the senior officers and usurpation by the military
bureaucracy. It is now directed at the fauj (military) as an institution. This level of public resentment is undeserved because the fault clearly does
not lie with the jawan in the trenches. However, public frustration with the excesses of those at the top is now so deep that everyone in the institution
is being sullied -- even those brave souls who are actually putting their lives on the line for our collective security and safety.
So much has gone wrong with Gen. Musharraf's government. The pivotal moment was the military operation that led to the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti. However,
a deeper cause of this disturbing turnaround in society-military relations has been military operations related to the so-called 'War on Terror' along
our northwestern borders, particularly in the Tribal Areas. The lack of military success in these operations notwithstanding, the real failure of these
operations has been political, not military. Irrespective of the strategic merits of these misadventures, the political failure of the Musharraf government
lies in its inability to convince Pakistanis that this is not a mercenary enterprise being fought on behalf of the Americans, but a truly Pakistani priority.
Even though this is, in fact, a truly Pakistani priority, the Musharraf government has been unable to convince Pakistanis that the alarming rise of militancy
and religious fanaticism is an existential threat to Pakistan's current peace and future stability. More importantly, it has not really tried very hard,
largely because it has been so very busy in trying to ensure its own political survival. The militants, on the other hand, have worked hard at and been
successful in portraying any action against them as a pro-American and anti-Islam act. As a result, the Pakistani public -- and, one has to assume, some
in the Pakistani military -- remain confused about who they are fighting, why, and for whom. The result of this confusion is not only a deepening of the
society-military divide, but also growing apprehensions and unease within the fighting ranks of the military itself. Such unease can be momentarily managed,
but cannot be indefinitely sustained.
At this time of great challenges for the Pakistan armed forces -- strategic, operational, and relational -- one would have wanted the full attention of
the military leadership to be focused on navigating through the stormy waters that the Armed Forces find themselves in. Instead, an added source of pressure
on the military is that its top leadership is greatly consumed by matters political rather than matters military. Gen. Musharraf's insistence on clinging
to the Presidency is not only a cause of many of the problems the military finds itself in, it is also a grave distraction from the search for possible
solutions. On the one hand, it fuels the public anger against the Armed Forces. On the other, his single-minded devotion to the idea necessitates that
not only he but many other senior military officials remain engrossed in political jugglery rather than on maters of military strategy and the management
of the Armed Forces. Given the politics we are passing through, military matters are bound to be neglected -- or at least relegated in importance; certainly
by the Chief of Army Staff but in all likelihood also by others in the senior most military leadership.
The post of chief of army staff was never meant to be a part-time position. But since Gen. Musharraf's passions now reside much more in his political office
than his military post, it has seemingly been relegated to a part-time activity. In fact, by suggesting that he is willing to vacate his military position
if guaranteed the Presidency, he has made clear which office he prefers.
It is not yet clear whether his offer to relinquish the COAS post if elected president is real or yet another 'bait and switch' tactic to gain a favorable
Supreme Court decision. However, if it does turn out to be real, it may be welcomed as much by those in uniform as by civilians. Even though his tenure
in power has brought great resources and privileges to the military, the fact of the matter is that he is now in danger of becoming a liability to his
own institution. Gen. Musharraf's departure as army chief will not, in and of itself, resolve all the challenges facing the Pakistan military today. But
it will help ease at least some of the tensions. Whether his doffing the uniform helps the cause of democracy in Pakistan or not remains unclear. However,
it is more and more clear that it will help rebuild the image of the armed forces.
The writer is a professor of international negotiation and diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, US, and founding editor
of Pakistaniat. com
Thursday, September 20, 2007
Dr Adil Najam
These are tense times for the Pakistan military. The chief of army staff (COAS) is enmeshed in and distracted by the pressures of political wheeling and
dealings. There is an escalating civil war-like situation on our northwestern frontiers where soldiers are routinely being killed or kidnapped on a nearly
daily basis, military installations are being attacked, and military casualties are piling up. Most importantly, public resentment against the military
as an institution is as high as one can ever recall, and growing. Arguably, not since 1971 has the Pakistan military been under such internal strain.
All indications suggest that despite the strain, the Pakistan military remains a professional institution. There is no evidence that these pressures have
created serious internal fissures in either rank or file. At least, not yet. However, in looking to the future, we must be concerned lest these pressures
grow to an extent where they begin to undermine the integrity of the institution. After all, the integrity of the military is a key ingredient in the integrity
of the state.
The biggest danger is that internal pressures on the military could end up seriously impairing the bond of respect between society and military, which is
one of the fundamental foundations of the modern military; in fact, of the modern state. Let me repeat something I had written in these columns back in
June: "It is both sad and dangerous when a society begins to lose respect for its military. It is sad because it implies the breakdown of the social contract
between soldier and citizen. This contract is one amongst the many that are necessary for the cohesion of the nation-state. When it works, it is based
on bonds of common identity and mutual respect. This respect is necessary if it is to ultimately translate into the willingness of the former to lay down
his life, when needed, for the latter."
I had gone on to argue that this respect for the military, while necessary, can not be demanded or legislated. It has to be nurtured and earned. It is never
simply a matter of telling people that they must respect the military or threatening them with serious consequences if they don't. It is, rather, about
giving people a reason to continue respecting the institution of the military. One of the sad legacies of Gen. Musharraf's term as President -- particularly
the last year -- is a steady decline in this societal respect for the military. Although the society-military bond has not yet been broken, it has been
greatly weakened.
Of course, criticism of the power grabbing ploys of 'generals,' corruption by the 'top brass,' and resentment against the ubiquitous intrusion of senior
military officers in civilian institutions has been a permanent centerpiece of Pakistani conversations, even in times of civilian rule. But what we are
seeing today is qualitatively different. The object of public wrath is no longer just the excesses of the senior officers and usurpation by the military
bureaucracy. It is now directed at the fauj (military) as an institution. This level of public resentment is undeserved because the fault clearly does
not lie with the jawan in the trenches. However, public frustration with the excesses of those at the top is now so deep that everyone in the institution
is being sullied -- even those brave souls who are actually putting their lives on the line for our collective security and safety.
So much has gone wrong with Gen. Musharraf's government. The pivotal moment was the military operation that led to the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti. However,
a deeper cause of this disturbing turnaround in society-military relations has been military operations related to the so-called 'War on Terror' along
our northwestern borders, particularly in the Tribal Areas. The lack of military success in these operations notwithstanding, the real failure of these
operations has been political, not military. Irrespective of the strategic merits of these misadventures, the political failure of the Musharraf government
lies in its inability to convince Pakistanis that this is not a mercenary enterprise being fought on behalf of the Americans, but a truly Pakistani priority.
Even though this is, in fact, a truly Pakistani priority, the Musharraf government has been unable to convince Pakistanis that the alarming rise of militancy
and religious fanaticism is an existential threat to Pakistan's current peace and future stability. More importantly, it has not really tried very hard,
largely because it has been so very busy in trying to ensure its own political survival. The militants, on the other hand, have worked hard at and been
successful in portraying any action against them as a pro-American and anti-Islam act. As a result, the Pakistani public -- and, one has to assume, some
in the Pakistani military -- remain confused about who they are fighting, why, and for whom. The result of this confusion is not only a deepening of the
society-military divide, but also growing apprehensions and unease within the fighting ranks of the military itself. Such unease can be momentarily managed,
but cannot be indefinitely sustained.
At this time of great challenges for the Pakistan armed forces -- strategic, operational, and relational -- one would have wanted the full attention of
the military leadership to be focused on navigating through the stormy waters that the Armed Forces find themselves in. Instead, an added source of pressure
on the military is that its top leadership is greatly consumed by matters political rather than matters military. Gen. Musharraf's insistence on clinging
to the Presidency is not only a cause of many of the problems the military finds itself in, it is also a grave distraction from the search for possible
solutions. On the one hand, it fuels the public anger against the Armed Forces. On the other, his single-minded devotion to the idea necessitates that
not only he but many other senior military officials remain engrossed in political jugglery rather than on maters of military strategy and the management
of the Armed Forces. Given the politics we are passing through, military matters are bound to be neglected -- or at least relegated in importance; certainly
by the Chief of Army Staff but in all likelihood also by others in the senior most military leadership.
The post of chief of army staff was never meant to be a part-time position. But since Gen. Musharraf's passions now reside much more in his political office
than his military post, it has seemingly been relegated to a part-time activity. In fact, by suggesting that he is willing to vacate his military position
if guaranteed the Presidency, he has made clear which office he prefers.
It is not yet clear whether his offer to relinquish the COAS post if elected president is real or yet another 'bait and switch' tactic to gain a favorable
Supreme Court decision. However, if it does turn out to be real, it may be welcomed as much by those in uniform as by civilians. Even though his tenure
in power has brought great resources and privileges to the military, the fact of the matter is that he is now in danger of becoming a liability to his
own institution. Gen. Musharraf's departure as army chief will not, in and of itself, resolve all the challenges facing the Pakistan military today. But
it will help ease at least some of the tensions. Whether his doffing the uniform helps the cause of democracy in Pakistan or not remains unclear. However,
it is more and more clear that it will help rebuild the image of the armed forces.
The writer is a professor of international negotiation and diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, US, and founding editor
of Pakistaniat. com
