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Talking to the Pakistan military II: An interview with a Navy Officer
The gentleman in question would be kept anonymous, as per his request, the details in the text have been modified to ensure that. He has served the PN as a commissioned officer and rose to a high rank and recently took retirement.
I took notes during the interview as recording it was declined.
Q. Sir, what direction do you think should the Pakistan Navy take?
A. In my view the PN (abbreviations are mine) should look to increase her operational capabilities, fleet size and look for more operational experience. Let me elaborate on the last points: people think that the Navy is only for the water bodies, and to some extent it’s true; however, we have entered an era where the lines and divisions of labour are more and more blurred so therefore all three services should have a more diversified operational breath and experience.
Q. Sir, could you elaborate this more?
A. Certainly, see, the Pakistan Navy was attacked by the terrorists in major operations. Now, was that through the sea? Through the river? No. It was not. The PAF suffered similar attacks; now in terms of the old the training doctrines and focus, the PAF focuses on the aerial aspect of defence and the navy similarly on the water. That’s true if we were to face a conventional threat; however, we are not, we are facing an unconventional threat. Therefore, our focus should be to be armed in such a manner to fully tackle that problem.
Let me use the example of the Pakistan Navy; we have an active force of PM (Pak Marines); the PAF does not have a similar force, in my view that is a limitation of the PAF operational capabilities, they should have such a force and it was discussed in a meeting in 2009 or 2008, I believe, having a branch like their Admin and Special Duties trained at par to fully tackle the threats from the present situation would be perfect.
Q. Would that not hinder the efficiency or readiness of our navy and air force to naval and aerial threats, their prime function, and make them more diffused?
A. This is the concept hurdle that makes the implementation of such a plan difficult; however, I do not agree to it. Of course you would maintain the operational capabilities in the areas concerned and make sure you are not understaffed, this would come in inter-service assignments and collaborations. If you look at the USA they have a long run practice to involve all branches of their military service in every conflict or engagement they have. If you were to go to Iraq right now, you would find Marines, Coast Guards, Air Force pilots in almost all of their military bases. Now, why is this so? What would a Marine be doing in Baghdad? He’s there to be an active part of the conflict and make the navy learn about how the performance in this conflict or theatre would affect them. The experiences of the Marines have shifted the focus of the Navy to go for more LCOs (? I’m not sure what this means, I forgot to ask him for this). Similarly, the Army has learned from the Marines, they have re-organised their operational divisions more on the lines of the Marines, simply, because they are much more effective.
Now, let me clarify this, for the army to learn that by themselves, they would have to experiment and while that’s fine in labs, it’s not so on the field: it means losing good men, tackling the bureaucracy, convincing the higher ups. However, if you’ve the guys who’re doing this with you, there needs to be no need for this process, and mind you, it takes precious time to reach that conclusion. More than that, nothing, no training, no exercises, can substitute for a real conflict (meaning really fighting on the field) and that’s what I meant by ‘operational experience’, it is the deciding factor for militaries since we began warfare.
Q. Would that mean if it’s implemented, sir, in very simple terms?
A. Well, it would mean that currently, in Pakistan, we have a number of active duty marines stationed in the red-zones (areas where the military is fighting). They would be under the command of the Army, of course, but would run their operations themselves. Like village X has problem, the Marines respond on the guidelines the PA but as an independent platoon (consisting solely of the Marines, later clarification was that it there should be mixes as well). Now what that would do is that that would firstly, take some burden off the PA, not in terms of manpower but operationally, provided the Marines come at par to PA, this sort of competition and strategy takes some time to implement fully and there are hiccups on the way but once it’s done it’s the best for the military.
Secondly, the Marines would get combat experience; they would develop the ways to face these challenges; now there should be something that should be noted. There is no difference in the officer quality of the army, navy and air force but there is a difference in the ways they think and that’s a good thing. Perhaps, I, as a navy officer, cannot see what a PAF officer can and similarly for the Army and vice versa. Therefore, by having common grounds for experience and exchange we are better able to evolve the best solutions for the problems we face as a military.
I’ve served in Baluchistan and it’s the number 2 area where we can face problems, besides from Quetta and some key targets the main brunt of insurgency would be around Gwadar, where the Navy is. If that happens, and there is a good possibility that it will, the Marines would (he means if the Marines have enough experience in the COIN operations) then be able to completely handle the COIN themselves.
On a grander level, take the PAF in, they are focusing on aerial combat against the miscreants but the need for the moment is CAS (Close Air Support), which is mainly provided by the PA. If however, we focus on jointness, the PAF would then be sending some her best pilots in combined operations with the army for CAS and other aerial related tasks, now this would again pull in the same process because the way each officer and each service looks at and solves the problem are different and having various diverse solutions in a more open loop would ensure arriving at better, more efficient solutions.
Q. Are not joint operations, like the recent exercise by the military, already being done?
A. That is the start of this direction and, if you ask me, the very first step. The co-ops we have are on very macro levels, I’m talking about micro levels, and there is also another problem: the army often side-steps the other services and this has cost us. Just look at Kargil, regardless of all other controversy, from a military point of view, not only the PAF but the PN should have been in the loop from the start, so at least we can be prepared. I’m sure had we been a much more coordinated and balanced military, the PAF would have made sure that a better plan was hammered out by fully taking in the possible scenarios that could come up not only from the ground but from the air, which is exactly what happened. The PAF would know better that the PA of the threats from the air, I’ve already said this, the services think differently but each line of thought is just as important to be heard.
Q. Besides the operational and organisational strategy you have outlined, what other direction can the Pakistani military and the navy in particular adopt?
A. I would say that we need to work out the military system we have. First, I would say that we need to have our officers spend a year or so of basic military training and education in one institution, like our Indian counterparts, in my view, we see officers of other services too late in our careers to appreciate their perspectives and concerns. If we have that during our initial training, we would be a much more cohesive military and joint operations would be much easier.
I’m glad that Gen. Kiyani said, ‘systems are more important than individuals...’ this should be our focus. It’s a proud moment for us to see the ceremony of the change of command but there’s something that was never even discussed in the papers or the media: Admiral Sandila was the first in line for the post of CJSC, ideally it should see the PAF and PN as well but it’s mostly dominated by the PA and that leads to problems, structurally and in terms of inter-service relations. As an example, I would point out to the repeated efforts of the PN to bring into the light the conditions of our merchant fleet. We’ve repeatedly tried to get governments, civilian and military, to focus on this aspect as Indian blockade would cripple us sooner than the enemy but there has been no attention to it and mind you, it’s a jugular, we’re talking about.
I believe, Inshallah, our next step would be to address this issue.
As for the navy, I think, we should try to strengthen our submarine arm, first, as realistically, it’s the only way to counter India; secondly, we should then focus on our surface fleet, it is paramount and the only way in which we can keep ourselves updated to naval tactics and also we should be looking forward to collaborations like CTF-150 we get to learn from other navies that way.
There is also another thing, I mean this within the coming few decades, we should not only aim to be a defensive naval power but an offensive one in the region, should the need present itself; like for India in 1971 (referring to Indian naval campaign against Pakistan), and for that we need a good surface fleet, first and foremost.
Next, I would say that Pakistan needs a well oiled naval aviation arm for both defensive and offensive capabilities. I would say that getting UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles/drones) would be great for the navy.
Last but not the least we need to develop indigenous capabilities for all military, especially the navy, and cooperate with brotherly nations for this. See, Indian international power is growing and ours should be growing with it but sadly it’s going the other way. In the future having some fleet out at sea to challenge India could maintain deterrence but as of now that seems impossible and this might be out of the question if things so the way they are going. Yet in any case, we’ve always been as good as our officers and we might get beaten but we will never be broken.
@Pakistanisage @Alpha1 @Secur @Slav Defence @RescueRanger @Icarus @Xeric @fatman17 @Armstrong @asad71 @Aeronaut @WebMaster @jhungary @Joe Shearer @arslan @Oscar
The gentleman in question would be kept anonymous, as per his request, the details in the text have been modified to ensure that. He has served the PN as a commissioned officer and rose to a high rank and recently took retirement.
I took notes during the interview as recording it was declined.
Q. Sir, what direction do you think should the Pakistan Navy take?
A. In my view the PN (abbreviations are mine) should look to increase her operational capabilities, fleet size and look for more operational experience. Let me elaborate on the last points: people think that the Navy is only for the water bodies, and to some extent it’s true; however, we have entered an era where the lines and divisions of labour are more and more blurred so therefore all three services should have a more diversified operational breath and experience.
Q. Sir, could you elaborate this more?
A. Certainly, see, the Pakistan Navy was attacked by the terrorists in major operations. Now, was that through the sea? Through the river? No. It was not. The PAF suffered similar attacks; now in terms of the old the training doctrines and focus, the PAF focuses on the aerial aspect of defence and the navy similarly on the water. That’s true if we were to face a conventional threat; however, we are not, we are facing an unconventional threat. Therefore, our focus should be to be armed in such a manner to fully tackle that problem.
Let me use the example of the Pakistan Navy; we have an active force of PM (Pak Marines); the PAF does not have a similar force, in my view that is a limitation of the PAF operational capabilities, they should have such a force and it was discussed in a meeting in 2009 or 2008, I believe, having a branch like their Admin and Special Duties trained at par to fully tackle the threats from the present situation would be perfect.
Q. Would that not hinder the efficiency or readiness of our navy and air force to naval and aerial threats, their prime function, and make them more diffused?
A. This is the concept hurdle that makes the implementation of such a plan difficult; however, I do not agree to it. Of course you would maintain the operational capabilities in the areas concerned and make sure you are not understaffed, this would come in inter-service assignments and collaborations. If you look at the USA they have a long run practice to involve all branches of their military service in every conflict or engagement they have. If you were to go to Iraq right now, you would find Marines, Coast Guards, Air Force pilots in almost all of their military bases. Now, why is this so? What would a Marine be doing in Baghdad? He’s there to be an active part of the conflict and make the navy learn about how the performance in this conflict or theatre would affect them. The experiences of the Marines have shifted the focus of the Navy to go for more LCOs (? I’m not sure what this means, I forgot to ask him for this). Similarly, the Army has learned from the Marines, they have re-organised their operational divisions more on the lines of the Marines, simply, because they are much more effective.
Now, let me clarify this, for the army to learn that by themselves, they would have to experiment and while that’s fine in labs, it’s not so on the field: it means losing good men, tackling the bureaucracy, convincing the higher ups. However, if you’ve the guys who’re doing this with you, there needs to be no need for this process, and mind you, it takes precious time to reach that conclusion. More than that, nothing, no training, no exercises, can substitute for a real conflict (meaning really fighting on the field) and that’s what I meant by ‘operational experience’, it is the deciding factor for militaries since we began warfare.
Q. Would that mean if it’s implemented, sir, in very simple terms?
A. Well, it would mean that currently, in Pakistan, we have a number of active duty marines stationed in the red-zones (areas where the military is fighting). They would be under the command of the Army, of course, but would run their operations themselves. Like village X has problem, the Marines respond on the guidelines the PA but as an independent platoon (consisting solely of the Marines, later clarification was that it there should be mixes as well). Now what that would do is that that would firstly, take some burden off the PA, not in terms of manpower but operationally, provided the Marines come at par to PA, this sort of competition and strategy takes some time to implement fully and there are hiccups on the way but once it’s done it’s the best for the military.
Secondly, the Marines would get combat experience; they would develop the ways to face these challenges; now there should be something that should be noted. There is no difference in the officer quality of the army, navy and air force but there is a difference in the ways they think and that’s a good thing. Perhaps, I, as a navy officer, cannot see what a PAF officer can and similarly for the Army and vice versa. Therefore, by having common grounds for experience and exchange we are better able to evolve the best solutions for the problems we face as a military.
I’ve served in Baluchistan and it’s the number 2 area where we can face problems, besides from Quetta and some key targets the main brunt of insurgency would be around Gwadar, where the Navy is. If that happens, and there is a good possibility that it will, the Marines would (he means if the Marines have enough experience in the COIN operations) then be able to completely handle the COIN themselves.
On a grander level, take the PAF in, they are focusing on aerial combat against the miscreants but the need for the moment is CAS (Close Air Support), which is mainly provided by the PA. If however, we focus on jointness, the PAF would then be sending some her best pilots in combined operations with the army for CAS and other aerial related tasks, now this would again pull in the same process because the way each officer and each service looks at and solves the problem are different and having various diverse solutions in a more open loop would ensure arriving at better, more efficient solutions.
Q. Are not joint operations, like the recent exercise by the military, already being done?
A. That is the start of this direction and, if you ask me, the very first step. The co-ops we have are on very macro levels, I’m talking about micro levels, and there is also another problem: the army often side-steps the other services and this has cost us. Just look at Kargil, regardless of all other controversy, from a military point of view, not only the PAF but the PN should have been in the loop from the start, so at least we can be prepared. I’m sure had we been a much more coordinated and balanced military, the PAF would have made sure that a better plan was hammered out by fully taking in the possible scenarios that could come up not only from the ground but from the air, which is exactly what happened. The PAF would know better that the PA of the threats from the air, I’ve already said this, the services think differently but each line of thought is just as important to be heard.
Q. Besides the operational and organisational strategy you have outlined, what other direction can the Pakistani military and the navy in particular adopt?
A. I would say that we need to work out the military system we have. First, I would say that we need to have our officers spend a year or so of basic military training and education in one institution, like our Indian counterparts, in my view, we see officers of other services too late in our careers to appreciate their perspectives and concerns. If we have that during our initial training, we would be a much more cohesive military and joint operations would be much easier.
I’m glad that Gen. Kiyani said, ‘systems are more important than individuals...’ this should be our focus. It’s a proud moment for us to see the ceremony of the change of command but there’s something that was never even discussed in the papers or the media: Admiral Sandila was the first in line for the post of CJSC, ideally it should see the PAF and PN as well but it’s mostly dominated by the PA and that leads to problems, structurally and in terms of inter-service relations. As an example, I would point out to the repeated efforts of the PN to bring into the light the conditions of our merchant fleet. We’ve repeatedly tried to get governments, civilian and military, to focus on this aspect as Indian blockade would cripple us sooner than the enemy but there has been no attention to it and mind you, it’s a jugular, we’re talking about.
I believe, Inshallah, our next step would be to address this issue.
As for the navy, I think, we should try to strengthen our submarine arm, first, as realistically, it’s the only way to counter India; secondly, we should then focus on our surface fleet, it is paramount and the only way in which we can keep ourselves updated to naval tactics and also we should be looking forward to collaborations like CTF-150 we get to learn from other navies that way.
There is also another thing, I mean this within the coming few decades, we should not only aim to be a defensive naval power but an offensive one in the region, should the need present itself; like for India in 1971 (referring to Indian naval campaign against Pakistan), and for that we need a good surface fleet, first and foremost.
Next, I would say that Pakistan needs a well oiled naval aviation arm for both defensive and offensive capabilities. I would say that getting UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles/drones) would be great for the navy.
Last but not the least we need to develop indigenous capabilities for all military, especially the navy, and cooperate with brotherly nations for this. See, Indian international power is growing and ours should be growing with it but sadly it’s going the other way. In the future having some fleet out at sea to challenge India could maintain deterrence but as of now that seems impossible and this might be out of the question if things so the way they are going. Yet in any case, we’ve always been as good as our officers and we might get beaten but we will never be broken.
@Pakistanisage @Alpha1 @Secur @Slav Defence @RescueRanger @Icarus @Xeric @fatman17 @Armstrong @asad71 @Aeronaut @WebMaster @jhungary @Joe Shearer @arslan @Oscar
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