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Taiwan Armed Forces

We're not interested at all in "protecting Japan" or the Philippines.

Unfortunately you don't speak for the Government of Taiwan. Relations between Taiwan and Japan, tho checkered with colorful minor disagreements, remain stern and both are strategically aligned. In fact, Taiwan in the past as well as even in the present has time and time again requested Japan to sign a Taiwan-Japan Special Relations Act, and have invited Japan to consider a Security Pact with the island state.

Japan's strategic ambiguity , of course, prevents us from being too open at the moment. But rest assured that developments will happen , especially now that Japan's Legislature is paving the way towards more active defense and cooperation with our allies and partners.


:)

Taiwan-US-Japan Trilateral Security Dialogue conference papers

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@Nihonjin1051


We know Japan won't get involved if Taiwan is attacked, and we will not intervene to defend Japan in any situation that I can foresee. I can barely envision the US defending Japan unless attacked by North Korea. That's not to say I have something against the Japanese, I think I'm just being realistic.

I also don't foresee China ever blockading Japan unless gravely provoked, in which case we will definitely not intervene.

Also, we will never defend the Philippines for any reason. We will most likely provide humanitarian aid, but the Philippines has raised tensions with Malaysia and China and we wouldn't want to get entangled.
 
@Nihonjin1051


We know Japan won't get involved if Taiwan is attacked, and we will not intervene to defend Japan in any situation that I can foresee. I can barely envision the US defending Japan unless attacked by North Korea. That's not to say I have something against the Japanese, I think I'm just being realistic.

I also don't foresee China ever blockading Japan unless gravely provoked, in which case we will definitely not intervene.

Also, we will never defend the Philippines for any reason. We will most likely provide humanitarian aid, but the Philippines has raised tensions with Malaysia and China and we wouldn't want to get entangled.


Japan is unpredictable , we will do what is necessary for our national interest, as history has shown. I personally would like to see greater relations between Japan and Taiwan vis-a-vis military ties and military defense exercises , even a defense pact. Taiwan is , clearly, a vested entity for Japan. Taiwan's independence , prosperity, is strategically vital for Japan, given the deep economic ties of the two independent nations.
 
Unfortunately you don't speak for the Government of Taiwan. Relations between Taiwan and Japan, tho checkered with colorful minor disagreements, remain stern and both are strategically aligned. In fact, Taiwan in the past as well as even in the present has time and time again requested Japan to sign a Taiwan-Japan Special Relations Act, and have invited Japan to consider a Security Pact with the island state.

Japan's strategic ambiguity , of course, prevents us from being too open at the moment. But rest assured that developments will happen , especially now that Japan's Legislature is paving the way towards more active defense and cooperation with our allies and partners.


:)

Taiwan-US-Japan Trilateral Security Dialogue conference papers

3101612431471.jpg

Taiwan and Japan are allies for all practical purposes, but can't say so in public.

It is a fact that the majority of the population of Taiwan see themselves as Taiwanese, not chinese and wish to be independent. That's also the part of the population that see Japan as a friend and a role model. The Taiwanese pro China "fifth column" are a small minority and are on their way out.
The more noise that China makes, the stronger the Taiwanese feel about their Taiwanese identity.
 
Naval Contingent
  • Mobilization of the East Sea Fleet
  • Mobilization of the South Sea Fleet
  • Important to note: The mobilization of the East and South Sea Fleet to engage the Republic of China Navy (Taiwan) would leave the Chinese Coastline severely undermanned and would leave the entire Chinese naval defense placed solely on the PLAN North Sea Fleet --- to defend against the Japanese Navy (Japanese Maritine Self Defense Force) , which is in itself composed of the 4 fleets : 1st Escort Fleet -JMSDF, 2nd Escort Fleet - JMSDF, 3rd Escort Fleet- JMSDF, 4th Escort Fleet- JMSDF.
    • If Japan would remove its strategic ambiguity and come to the aid of Taiwan in her (Taiwan) hour of existential need, surely the JMSDF 1st Escort Fleet, supported by the JMSDF 2nd Escort Fleet would engage , draw out the PLAN North Sea Fleet and exterminate the enemy fleet.
    • The 1st and 2nd Escort Fleets would then meet with the JMSDF's 3rd, and 4th Escort Fleet to aid ROCN's Combined Fleet and (most likely) receive the naval mobilization of the US 7th Fleet, supported by the US Pacific Command.
      • The enemy naval force would be neutralized, i estimate.
Ground Contingent
  • PLA would have to mobilize at least, conservative estimate 100 divisions --- or 1 million for the invasion of Taiwan. And occupation.
  • Note that this invasion can only happen if the PLAN can neutralize enemy naval units; which won't be possible. As I have mentioned what will happen if the JMSDF and the US Navy intervene.
  • So, an invasion won't happen, it literally cannot happen.

Air Contingent
  • Taiwanese Air Defense --- Multilayered Qualitative --- will wipe out an entire Air Fleet.
  • Again, without naval dominance, there is no ground invasion, and thus air dominance is near impossible.





The US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation and the 1997 Defense Guidelines indirectly tie Tokyo’s security to Taipei through obligations to help Washington maintain regional stability and support U.S military forces in East Asia. This has become more so with the recent changes in Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution and Japan’s Posture towards Proactive Contribution to Peace and Security.

These conditions mean that Japan will be involved in any Taiwan Strait conflict should Taiwan be attacked and the security alliance be called into action to keep the region stabilized. Thus the defense guidelines reinforce the link between Japanese security and Taiwan via the US-Japanese alliance to ensure a Japanese response to instability caused by conflict or refugee flows.

When Kajiyama Seiroku was chief cabinet secretary , he claimed that the geographical scope of the New U.S-Japan defense guidelines would cover a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, Tokyo has kept a strategic ambiguity about the guidelines by claiming that it is a situational rather than a geographical concept.

The indirect Tokyo-Taipei security relationship will be strengthened when Washington approves proposed Taiwanese participation in the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system together with Japan and the United States. This proposal cannot be disregarded. Even if Taiwan does not become a joint developer of the TMD, it still will enjoy an informal, quasisecurity relationship with Japan if the umbrella of the TMD is extended to Taiwan. This scenario is unpalatable to Beijing, which fears a TMD extension to Taiwan would create a “defacto alliance between Taipei and Tokyo and Washington” that could destroy any chance of a China-Taiwan Reunification.

Japan’s need to ensure its economic viability further cements the close ties between Taipei and Tokyo. As a major trading and energy importing nation, freedom of navigation is critical to Japan’s economic survival. It is a highly dependent nation on trade routes that pass through waters surrounding Taiwan for access to resources as well as to export markets in Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and the Americas. Hence, a cross-Strait conflict might disrupt Japan’s oil lifeline. Indeed, the stakes for Japan in the continued peace and stability in and around the Taiwan area are high. Apart from a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the domination of Taiwan and its surrounding waters by an unfriendly power would be interpreted by Tokyo as a threat to Japanese security and prosperity. The present divided jurisdiction of the Taiwan Strait between Beijing and Taipei is preferable to Tokyo than a vicinity exclusively dominated by the PRC.

Furthermore , if the PRC were to succeed in capturing Taiwan , it could use the island as a launching pad , along with Hainan Province and the Pracel Islands for its naval power to dominate Japan’s sea lanes in the South China Sa. Thus the continued existence of Taiwan as a political entity and military power distinct from the PRC holds great importance for Japan’s economic and geopolitical interests. If Japan were to increasingly fear a Chinese threat to its security, it commitantly will value its ties with Taiwan.

The ruling DPP had , on different occasions , urged Japan to adopt a Taiwan relations act similar to the one adopted by the United States. Taiwan implicitly is and has been asking Japan to underwrite its security vis-à-vis China. Despite these overtures from Taiwan and its concern about a potential Chinese threat, Japan has seemed to take a strategic ambiguous position. With recent forays into the region, however, it seems that Japan may be prepared to consider the Taiwanese forays to Japan, despite the Diaoyuitai / Senkaku Differences. A Japanese-Taiwanese Special Relations Act and perhaps a future Tokyo-Taipei TMD / Security Act would potentially negate any minor differences between the two countries and integrate a free, independent Taiwan with Japan, long term.


Regards,

Thanks for such a detailed post, what you have outlined is similar to a deterrence capability as any invasion would result in escalation which would be make the cost for China too high.

Now in my role as an analyst I have to find ways to think out of the box which means in this context breaking the deterrence. My understanding of defense matters and China - Taiwan equation is vastly limited so bear with me as I outline under what conditions Chinese Invasion would be successful based on my observance of past conflicts.

1. Trojan Horse (Internal instability in Taiwan) - If China is able to get some decent support but not majority in favor re-unification in Taiwan and can further instigate these elements leading to insurgency or open rebellion like Russia did in Crimea then it would have proper context for invasion which is to protect the minorities. Success Probability ~ 20 - 25%

2. Russia - US conflict - If US is actively engaged with Russia then China can take a bold step to conduct this invasion w/o fear of US intervening. In such a case Japan may or may not be hesitant to come to Taiwan's aid independent of US. Success Probability ~ 20 - 25% If you combine this scenario with first then likelihood of success increases much more. Success Probability ~ 30 - 40% Similar situation was present in times of Indo-China war in 1962 when US was engaged with Russia in Cuban missile crisis.

3. Disruptive Technological Advances - Now this is really far fetched but If China acquires some defense capability in fields like nanotech or space age weapons like Americans did with Nukes which redefines or breaks deterrence for a short period of time and threatens to use it on Taiwan then Taiwan would have no option but to submit. Success Probability ~ 5 - 10%

P.S. I pulled the probability numbers out of my hat.
 
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Japan is unpredictable , we will do what is necessary for our national interest, as history has shown. I personally would like to see greater relations between Japan and Taiwan vis-a-vis military ties and military defense exercises , even a defense pact. Taiwan is , clearly, a vested entity for Japan. Taiwan's independence , prosperity, is strategically vital for Japan, given the deep economic ties of the two independent nations.

I'd rather see Japan handle it's relations with the Mainland in a mature and reasonable manner, instead of constantly trying to provoke all of its neighbors over islands that are worth almost nothing. If that simple task is done, I think even more Taiwanese would be favorable to closer cooperation.

Taiwan and Japan are allies for all practical purposes, but can't say so in public.

It is a fact that the majority of the population of Taiwan see themselves as Taiwanese, not chinese and wish to be independent. That's also the part of the population that see Japan as a friend and a role model. The Taiwanese pro China "fifth column" are a small minority and are on their way out.
The more noise that China makes, the stronger the Taiwanese feel about their Taiwanese identity.

The majority of Taiwanese do NOT want independence, but support the status quo. Most Taiwanese also support closer diplomatic and economic links with the PRC as well as most other nations. There is no "pro China fifth column," but the fact is sane Taiwanese want good and constantly improving relations with the PRC.

I won't dispute other things you have said.
 
I also don't foresee China ever blockading Japan unless gravely provoked, in which case we will definitely not intervene.

China does not have the means to blockade Japan. We would eradicate any enemy navy foolish enough to attempt that.
 
I'd rather see Japan handle it's relations with the Mainland in a mature and reasonable manner, instead of constantly trying to provoke all of its neighbors over islands that are worth almost nothing. If that simple task is done, I think even more Taiwanese would be favorable to closer cooperation.



The majority of Taiwanese do NOT want independence, but support the status quo. Most Taiwanese also support closer diplomatic and economic links with the PRC as well as most other nations. There is no "pro China fifth column," but the fact is sane Taiwanese want good and constantly improving relations with the PRC.

I won't dispute other things you have said.

Let me put it in another way: Most Taiwanese wish for independence, but don't ask for it because of the chinese threat and only because of the chinese threat, makes sense?

I see some Taiwanese here that the way they talk is really fifth column type because they support the mainland against the interest of Taiwan and of the majority of the Taiwanese people; they talk like ultranationalist chinese, that's the reason for the label.
 
Let me put it in another way: Most Taiwanese wish for independence, but don't ask for it because of the chinese threat and only because of the chinese threat, makes sense?

I see some Taiwanese here that the way they talk is really fifth column type because they support the mainland against the interest of Taiwan and of the majority of the Taiwanese people; they talk like ultranationalist chinese, that's the reason for the label.

Yet you just said most Taiwanese wish for independence because the Mainland threatens them. So if China stops threatening them, they will be less inclined to seek independence.
 
Yet you just said most Taiwanese wish for independence because the Mainland threatens them. So if China stops threatening them, they will be less inclined to seek independence.

Not really, what I said is that they wish for independence because they see themselves as Taiwanese, not chinese, they see themselves as a different country, but they don't move on that because it would mean war with China.
 
Not really, what I said is that they wish for independence because they see themselves as Taiwanese, not chinese, they see themselves as a different country, but they don't move on that because it would mean war with China.

Yet you said they see themselves as Taiwanese because China threatens them.
 
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