History of the T-90
T-90 MBT constructional originates from T-72 (object 172M), which was introduced to the Soviet Army in August 7th 1973, and which mass production in Uralwagonzawod (UWZ) in Nizim Tagile was started in 1974.
T-90 is the effect of modernization of T-72B (object 184), accepted to the army in 1985.
As the result, in the second half of the 80s, T-72BM was created, which differed from its predecessor the use of 2nd generation reactive armor: build in – in the chassis and turret, add-on – turret, chassis side. This armor allows to increase the resistance against HEAT projectiles and sabots. Apart from some small modifications, the vehicle almost did not differ much in combat characteristics from its predecessor. Production of this tank started in 1988.
The main constructors of Ural Construction Bureau of Transport Medium Construction Industry (UKBTM) at that time - Vladimir Potkin, knew that at the moment when T-72BM was constructed it conceded (mainly in firepower) not only to the already deployed T-80s but mainly to the western counterparts. The main shortage of the T-72 family comparing to other soviet and western constructions of that time was the lack of an advanced, automated fire control system. Although T-72B employed a simple but effective analog counter 1A40-1, but it was outdated at turn of the 80s not mentioning the tanks of the near future. Also it was very important to improve the night firing capabilities which was at that time quite limited by the use of active night vision equipments. As the result, it was decided to initialize a broad modernization of T-72BM, which main goal was to increase the combat effectiveness of the tank. Fist of all, it was recognized the need of a new, advanced fire control system (FCS), (in the Russian term, FCS with a high degree of automation is described as “fire control complex”
, which could give guarantee a combat effectiveness no worse than T-80U. It was impossible to think about a dramatic increase at that period, because apart from the well proven 1A45 Irtysz FCS on T-80U and T-80UD, there was nothing else available. Therefore the decision of the installation of 1A45 on T-72BM was not a surprise. The bright side of this was the much lower cost of modernization, shorter time between R&D and greater unification with the equipments already in service in the Soviet Army. The FCS only required relatively few changes to work with the autoloader which was different in design with the one used by T-80U/UD (in T-72, projectiles and satchels are stored horizontally, and the loading completes in 2 cycles, but in T-80 the satchels are placed vertically and the projectiles horizontally and the loading ends with 1 cycle). The modernized FCS is designated as 1A45T
In January 1989, the prototype of the tank, designated as Object 188 began its tests. Within 1.5 years the tank was tested intensively on test ranges near Moscow, in Siberia, middle Asia and factory test range of Uralwagonzawod, often in extreme weather conditions and terrain, also near the limit of the machine. At the end of the 60s and in the 70s, Soviet panzer equipments are usually tested on a test trail of 10000km which includes different terrain and climates of the huge country. When the tests of T-90 began, it was impossible to organize such experimental tests, but still the prototypes ran more than 14000 km – the mileage of the capital repair, without serious defects and breakdowns. The program starts with driving on asphalt/cement trails till the fuel was depleted. Nota bene, driving on hard surfaces at high speed is very hard for tracked vehicles due to the strong vibrations on the carriage elements and onboard equipments.
During this test, with rare stops to change crews, without turning off the engine, the tank drove more than 700km.
Imitation of leaking coolant during long marches – situation often seen with combat damage or service by low qualified crews, was also included in the test. During this test, the crew tanked only 35 liters of coolant instead of the required 90. In normal conditions, emergency signaling and engine cut-off systems would not allow further exploitation of the vehicle. However during tests all even unlikely events must be tested. In this case the engine survived the test despite running at maximum temperate for a prolonged period.
The experimental trail was carefully chosen – the harder the better – there were sections with many bumps which should be covered at high speed, and some snowdrifts a meter high. Even on segments like this, the mean speed was 35-40 km/h. During the trials in Siberia, the tank overcame sections on which the depth of snow were 1.1-1.3m. On ranges in middle Asia the temperature was 50C in shadows, and the trail was covered by loess which squeezed into everywhere, specially in the eyes and lungs of the tankers. During the drive, the dust went up tens of meters in the air and the crews could not see further than the barrel. The tank must retain is full capabilities under these conditions. If the air filter system fails, the engine will instantaneously fail, since it’s working at high temperature. The tanks ran 500km daily, equivalent of 10-12h. During the run on deserts they also tested the possibilities of using various fuels: diesel, benzene, kerosene also jet fuel. No problems were encountered and the mean speed on desert using benzene was 35km and 43km with kerosene and diesel.
The official trial program included also deep water fording. The tank drove at the bottom of 5m deep pool and the crew would turn of the engine. The tank will remain under water for an hour to check the tightness of the elements of the Sztora electro-optical countermeasure system and other equipments outside the tank.
No less important than drive testing, or maybe even more important, were the armament testing. They were done partially during the drive testing. For example during the marches , the fire control system was turned on for the entire march which meant 8-10 hours of work often at maximum load rarely seen in combat. The canon stabilization system was also on and often met the maximum angle, hitting the limiter. Every 2-3 minutes, the layer turned the turret 360 deg at the maximum angular speed. All of these in the desert or in the Siberian cold.
Firing test were conducted using all available ammunitions, in different environment and firing distance. During the official test, 24 guided missiles were fired at a distance of 4-5 km, with a hit each time. The firing of other types of ammunitions were also successful. During the tests more than 2000 projectiles and missiles were fired through the gun, and the barrels had to be changed twice.
A very important phase was the firing resistance tests. There are no information on the results of the tests, but it is know that the tank was fired upon from different distances with various types of weapons, concentration on the more vulnerable parts of the vehicle. During the mine resistance tests, an equivalent of the largest western antitank mine was detonated under one of the tracks. After the explosion, the tank was repaired by the crew in the field.
After the completion of the full test, on 27th of March 1991, with the decision of the minister of defense and defense industry, the tank was recommended for acceptance to enter service. However due to the politicians’ inability decide and the information of T-72s performance during Desert Storm, the final decision for acceptance was not made.
The experience from Iraq was regarded so important, that modification was needed in object 188. Although the Iraqi T-72 were destroyed by concentrated attacks by different weapon – including heavy artillery (including shipborn) and airforce but not the typical anti-tank weapons (according to M. Helda, Warhead hit distribution on main battle tanks in the Gulf War, Journal of Battlefield Technology vol 3, no 1/2000, only 14 T-72 retained direct combat damage). KB UWZ decided to improve the protection of object 188. This lead to the installation of the T5zU-1 Sztora-1 electro-optical system, which was able to actively counteract modern anti-tank media. Again, additional testing began, On 30th of September 1992 first tank of Object 188 from the trial series was sent for factory trials and on the 5th of October 1992, the government of The Russian Federation issued decree 759-58 which accepted T-90S to service in Russian Army.
Before official acceptance to service, it was decided that based on the official documents “tank T-72B modified (rus. Usowierszenstowannyj)” will be designated as T-72BU, however the president of Russia, Boris Jelcyn, recommended a completely new name T-90.
According the main constructor Vladirmir Potkin, T-90 was created based on the ample experience from many years of trials and exploitation of T-72 family. The use of newest equipment and protection measures gave the export version T-90S an advantage in combat effectiveness of 1.93-2.1 over T-72M1 (depending on the equipments on board). For comparison, the analogical ratio between T-72S against T-72M1 is 1.59 : 1. There are no exact data for the T-90 of the Russian Army against T-72A and T-72B, but its obvious that it is comparable or better than the export versions. Nota bene that the base construction had the predisposition for gradual improvement with little financial input.
Among the available Russian modernized tanks, T-90S can be regarded as the most successful for the superior concept of the program which is good combination of high battle effectiveness, price and durability.
T-90 - a knol by Anonymous
