Swat Operation II

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Elite Police Force commandos refuse to serve in Swat

I guess it is obvious that the domestic militancy takes it's toll on the security agencies. I remember many Pakistani media reports rejoicing when any report of Indian security forces under stress doing these kind of duties came in.

There is a valid reason for them to refuse to serve I suppose, since it seems police operations are not very well coordinated at all.

Rather than post them in small groups over several villages, where they would be individually susceptible to mass attacks from militants, a different deployment and support strategy shoudl be looked at.

"Elite Police' are not supermen after all - they can only be useful if, like the SSG/SOTF, they are employed in the proper way and situation.

Perhaps turn them into rapid response teams, based out of several bases, from where they can patrol/respond in large groups. And provide them with APC's or something.

 

[Vinod2070]

There is a valid reason for them to refuse to serve I suppose, since it seems police operations are not very well coordinated at all.

Rather than post them in small groups over several villages, where they would be individually susceptible to mass attacks from militants, a different deployment and support strategy shoudl be looked at.

"Elite Police' are not supermen after all - they can only be useful if, like the SSG/SOTF, they are employed in the proper way and situation.

Perhaps turn them into rapid response teams, based out of several bases, from where they can patrol/respond in large groups. And provide them with APC's or something.

I agree. They have genuine concerns and they should be looked into and resolved. They are working in extremely tough situations and the rewards are not great.

What I was pointing out is that such a report from India would be taken as a sign of cowardice or worse. Also the odd reports of some Indian troops committing transgressions due to the stress related to their tough counter insurgency duties was made fun of by the Pakistan media.

I am hoping the domestic insurgency has given them a chance to understand the issue better. The troops are human beings too. The stress affects them as much as the rest of us. I have seen reports of Pakistani troops abandoning etc. due to the same reasons which was unheard of earlier.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I agree. They have genuine concerns and they should be looked into and resolved. They are working in extremely tough situations and the rewards are not great.

What I was pointing out is that such a report from India would be taken as a sign of cowardice or worse. Also the odd reports of some Indian troops committing transgressions due to the stress related to their tough counter insurgency duties was made fun of by the Pakistan media.

I am hoping the domestic insurgency has given them a chance to understand the issue better. The troops are human beings too. The stress affects them as much as the rest of us. I have seen reports of Pakistani troops abandoning etc. due to the same reasons which was unheard of earlier.

Lets not turn this into another India vs Pak - you can bring up the Elite force report when that sort of talk starts on a relevant thread.

 

[S-2]

"Rather than post them in small groups over several villages, where they would be individually susceptible to mass attacks from militants, a different deployment and support strategy shoudl be looked at."

I don't know what the EPF was established to do, but it sounds as though a considerable investment of time and resources has been made in it's creation to little effect. I wouldn't recruit for the force without making clear that it's no picnic and that people will likely be shooting at them a whole lot where they'll be going.

I'd also make clear that the mission is critical to the nat'l security of Pakistan. Of course, that's a message I'd prefer having long-since imbued in their minds. I'm not sure that they see worth in the mission. If so, that's not good at all. The war is inside your borders and the enemy are ostensibly "citizens" in too many cases. This bridge must be crossed.

These guys sound a bit more para-military than police. They also sound like they were meant to be some sort of S.W.A.T. (pardon the pun) reaction force. Maybe they ARE the backup. Given thirteen platoons so organized ink-blotted in SWAT, it reads like a good idea- if only they'll go.

Who's backing-up the backing-uppers?

SWAT is NWFP, no? It now reads every bit as bad or worse than Bajaur.

 

[Anwar2]

Dear S-2:

How about raising a New Jersey National Guards force to attack Bronx, NY and Camden, NJ to root out drugs, crime and murderous gangs. Deploy the 101 Airborne, an independent Armored brigade of M-1 tanks, three squadrons of F-16’s and all the Intel resources and UAV’s etc.

Then brief the force in your own words:
“”I'd also make clear that the mission is critical to the nat'l security of USA. Of course, that's a message I'd prefer having long-since imbued in their minds. I'm not sure that they see worth in the mission“”

In the end you will most probably have a bullet in the back of your head from your own soldiers!!

By comparison these guys are a lot better, they just don’t want to be part of America’s war.

 

[Vinod2070]

Swat's burning questions
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
Nasim Zehra

In Swat terror and fear are spreading. Government employees, including policemen, teachers and LHVs, walk around with resignations in their hands. In case they are accosted by armed militants opposed to the government and to women working they can produce these resignations to avoid being kidnapped, killed or punished. To avoid becoming targets of militants' wrath the LHVs are announcing through advertisements in local newspapers like Azadi that they have resigned.

People are terrorised. In addition to occasional high-profile political killings, in about the last three weeks targeted killings have also begun. The militants are killing people, slitting their heads and then keep their heads on their bodies and order that no one remove the bodies before midday. Policemen, social activists, ordinary citizens, political people and citizens have been killed.

Even in Mingora city people at work lock their doors.

Terrorised by the deteriorating security conditions at least 200,000 of Swat's 1.7 million population have left Swat. The local influentials who can financially and socially afford the exit option have exited. Major political families from Swat, including that of an ANP provincial minister from Matta, the Nazim of Swat's family and families of most ANP and PML-Q elected representatives. Union council ward level officeholders are giving in their resignations.

The civil administration, even in urban Swat, including Mingora, Kuzabandi, Imamdheri, Chaharbagh, Barikot and Saidu Sharif, is non-existent.

Curfew is imposed on Swat between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. From 11 a.m. to 4 p.m., the army and whatever is left of the police, is present in the city. At sundown for fear of travelling in the dark people begin heading home. Even in the army's presence people are scared. Journalists operate in total fear. According to one: "I have fear that if I talk to anyone it may go to the militants."

Burning of schools was unheard of in Swat and over 200 have been torched. The main source of livelihood for the locals, hotel and tourism, is at a complete standstill, if not almost destroyed.

In this acutely volatile and deteriorating security situation people's mobility is greatly restricted. Main bridges and main roads are either closed down or with excessive security checking vehicles' movement takes place at snail's pace. People complain that check posts are set up merely add to people's inconvenience without ever nabbing any militants.

Movement to Mingora from Matta and Khawaza khela is impossibly tedious. Similarly, movement on the Sangota side from Shangal to Khawaza Khela and from Mingora to Kalam valley has also become very difficult, especially after the suicide bombing.

The question that most residents of Swat may well ask is what, after all, has the army's presence done for the security of the locals? Despite the army's presence the situation has deteriorated. The army maintains the ANP's post-election accord with the militants gave them time to regroup and re-strengthen themselves.

The ANP also maintains the negotiations did not succeed because the army did not let the ANP honour the agreements in the accord. For example, release of militants. The army was dead against release of "criminals." The ANP recalls release of militants by the army to secure release of its own soldiers captured by militants in Waziristan. The army leadership also cynically questioned how those who were killing civilians would help the civilian administration "uphold the writ of the State."

The ANP believes, and perhaps correctly, that as a political force it had to give dialogue a chance. However, that dialogue has not yielded peace. The Army and ANP's inability to devise a unified approach towards dialogue must have contributed to the strengthening of the militants. Meanwhile, the non-political locals, including social activists, media personnel and influentials who were mindful of their own experiences, were complaining since the beginning of 2008 that the militants have an agenda which they will not give up as part of any peace deal with the ANP. They wanted closure of schools, women being kept away from any public space including schools. Throughout 2008 many complained the militants strengthened themselves. Weapons gathering by the militants was unstoppable, as was their free movement in and around and to and from Swat. In Swat people kept complaining that weapons were flowing into the city, but no one stopped the flow.

They complain the ANP never understood the nature of the problem while the army never went after them but in a half-hearted manner. Militants kept expanding influence, beyond Matta. Many complain that with two army check posts the militants moved freely between them.

Many argue that the army's strategy has never made sense to the locals because they have never managed to weaken the militants. For example, the army had people vacate Kuzabanday and Kabal. Then they bombarded their houses. There were minimal casualties and after the operation essentially the militants walked away, intact and undiminished. The population returned to the destroyed houses.

Some cynics complain the army is standing there and mostly protecting the militants. "When the army is there and the militants there too, but no action taken against the militants. What should we understand?" complained a resident from Swat now in Islamabad.

The army, many from Swat now in Peshawar complain, did not protect those who stood up against the Taliban. For example, a Khan near Peuchaar, who was opposed to the Taliban about two weeks ago. Five hundred Taliban surrounded his house. He and his son fought them through the night and then were finally killed. The calls to the army for help went unheard. The Army was stationed a couple of miles away.

Similarly there are other stories that the locals narrate. For example, about the Gujjars fighting the militants and the army, which was only 200-300 yards away, not protecting them. The army present told the Gujjars we have no orders so we cannot fight. Hence the Gujjar community opposed the militants and they were killed because the army provided them no protection and no support. Two or three weeks ago the local Peer was killed. He opposed the militants, and they killed him. After he was buried by his own people, the militants came and pulled his body out of the grave and hung it. The army was a few hundred yards away and calls were being made for help.

Public conjectures are endless and varied: the army has no will to go after the militants, the ANP is following the American line, the army and the militants are one, the army is trapping the ANP, the Police, the FC and the local citizens are being killed while the army is safe, if the army leaves the locals can make compromises with the militants and be in peace, the army is anyway scared of the militants; is it "scared" because it fears casualties, it does not understand the nature of the threat, etc.

Clearly the Pakistanis of Swat have zero faith in the institutions of their own country. Can we blame them?

Swat's burning questions

This is a mainstream Pakistani newspaper reporting from ground zero in SWAT! What exactly is happening there?

 

[Vinod2070]

Dear S-2:

How about raising a New Jersey National Guards force to attack Bronx, NY and Camden, NJ to root out drugs, crime and murderous gangs. Deploy the 101 Airborne, an independent Armored brigade of M-1 tanks, three squadrons of F-16’s and all the Intel resources and UAV’s etc.

Then brief the force in your own words:
“”I'd also make clear that the mission is critical to the nat'l security of USA. Of course, that's a message I'd prefer having long-since imbued in their minds. I'm not sure that they see worth in the mission“”

In the end you will most probably have a bullet in the back of your head from your own soldiers!!

By comparison these guys are a lot better, they just don’t want to be part of America’s war.

That is not what is mentioned in the report!

These guys are plain afraid for their lives. Though not without reason.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Desperate moves on to secure Swat — the lost valley​

By Ismail Khan

SWAT, known for its green meadows, gushing river and snow-capped mountains, has unfortunately come to relive its historic name, Suvastu — the white serpent — whose tenacity and viciousness has stung the political and military leadership so badly that both are now looking for new ways to put a lid on the monster of growing bloodshed and reclaim its fast-shrinking territory.

The idyllic valley has gone really bad, its image distorted beyond recognition. Pakistan’s most popular tourist destination is now haunted by death and fear; few officials now dare to go and serve there.

Nearly 800 policemen — half of the total sanctioned strength of police in Swat, have either deserted or proceeded on long leave on one pretext or the other.

Only one of the 600 police recruits trained by the military at the Punjab Regimental Centre in Mardan, volunteered to go and serve, while the others plainly refused to head to what is now being called the ‘valley of death’.

The second phase of the military operation Rah-i-Haq in July last to regain control of the northern district of the North-West Frontier Province appears to have made little headway.

Many analysts agree that the state writ has shrunk from Swat’s 5337square kilometre area to the limits of its regional headquarters of Mingora — a city of 36 square kilometres.

Indeed, local residents say militants routinely carry out patrolling in Mingora, where its central square, the Green Chowk, came to be known as ‘Chowk Zebahkhana’ or the slaughter square.

Just last month, militants dumped 27 bodies with a warning not to remove the corpses before 11 am. This coupled with sniper attacks forced the traffic cops to refuse duty in the city centre, prompting the military to impose a night curfew in the city, whose population has swelled in recent months for relative security.

Targeted killings have increased and those showing defiance were made examples for others. Pir Samiullah, who had taken on the militants, was killed and his body hung from a pole before it was removed and buried.

Pir’s death and the government’s inability and helplessness to respond in real-time and support him, is perhaps the last nail in the coffin. Officials acknowledge that encouraging and organizing popular support against the militants now is a pipe dream.

Civilian deaths

Contributing further to the already grim scenario is the growing negative public perception of the military operation that they say has killed more civilians than militants.

This public perception has been reinforced by rising civilian casualties, shrinking state authority, militants’ ability to strike anywhere and any time and military’s over-reliance on long-range artillery than putting boots on the ground.

No credible data is available to estimate the number of civilian casualties in the seven-month-old operation due to police absence in most militant-controlled areas and therefore, the resultant lack of reporting. But police officials say the figure ran in hundreds.

The damage caused to property and infrastructure since the emergence of militancy in Swat has been evaluated at Rs3 billion, according to a senior government official, as militants blow up bridges and schools. The number of schools blown up or torched now stands at 181 – the highest perhaps in any insurgency anywhere in the world in an area as small as Swat.

The battle for the airwaves in Swat has taken a new turn. Radical cleric Maulana Fazlullah is back on the air but even his radio has proved to be too weak against his lieutenant Shah Doran whose broadcastes are heard far and wide, thanks to a 500 KV transmitter to defeat government’s efforts to jam his sermons.

The government now plans to overcome the problem by setting up a one megawatt transmitter that, it believes, would effectively silence the militant radio propaganda.

With state authority on the wane in Swat, relationship between the political and military leadership also took a sharp plunge.

Frustration is mounting within the ANP. On December 18, at a parliamentary party meeting at the chief minister’s house, seven of its lawmakers from Swat threatened to resign. “They were very depressed,” said a senior party leader present in the meeting.

Predictably, the issue came up again for discussion at a cabinet meeting the following day, followed by public criticism by Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain that the government was “not satisfied with the military operation”.

Not a child’s play

An interview to a private television channel by senior party leader Hashim Babar accusing the security establishment of fomenting militancy, rubbed more salt into the wounds, sources within the ANP and security establishment acknowledge.

“The military was not happy,” a party official admitted. The ANP MPA from Swat, Mr Ayub Ashari, was called and given a piece of mind, as one official put it: “We have lost 142 men in Swat since July last. This is not child’s play. This is no friendly match,” a visibly angry security official said.

The ANP leaders defend their public statements and one of whom said: “When you see that the operation is not effective and is going on and on, causing more collateral damage, then how can you remain indifferent?”

“The militants have taken over Fata and now they want to take over the province. It’s clear. So should we remain silent and play second fiddle?” he asked. “We have been constrained to re-think our support to the military operation,” he said.

Security officials say that the political leadership at the helm was also to blame for failing to put in place a civil administration that responds to public needs and generate public support.

“We should have had the back-up support from the police and the civil administration which is not there. This has put us on the back foot,” the security official said.

“It’s a tough area and when you operate in an area where you don’t know who the enemy is and who your friends are, it makes things a lot more difficult,” he said.

But before things could reach breaking point, Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani intervened. On December 25, in a meeting with the army chief, the political leadership agreed to overcome its differences with the military high command and devise a new strategy.

Shariah law

But that may leave another issue unaddressed. Both sides are piqued that the federal government was also dragging its feet on the amendments proposed in the so-called Shariah regulation promulgated in 1999.

The amendments, part of the May 2008 agreement with the militants in Swat, say the ANP leaders are central to helping restore peace in Malakand Provincially-Administered Tribal Area, of which Swat is a district.

President Asif Zardari returned the summary containing the proposed amendments with observations.

“Being head of a secular liberal party, he is worried that introducing Shariah in Malakand would harm his international image,” they said.

“What we are trying to do is to convince him that we are not enacting a new law. These are amendments to a law that already exists,” explained the senior ANP leader.

The new strategy, however, has already been put in motion. While the NWFP government awaits Mr Zardari’s approval to the amendments, it is working on a public statement that would commit the government to introduce Islamic judicial system in Malakand.

The statement – a suggestion by octogenarian Sufi Muhammad – is still in the works and does not include a time-frame. In return, the head of the banned Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi, has offered to leave his protest camp at Timergarah in native Dir and go to Swat to convince the militants to lay down their arms.

“I am an old man. I know I may be killed in the process but it’s worth the sacrifice,” a source privy to behind-the-scene negotiations quoted him as saying.

The security official concurred. “Whether the government introduces the amendments or issues a public statement, it would deny the militants the moral high ground of fighting for Shariah.”

Simultaneously, the government is also working, albeit quietly, to incorporate some of Sufi Muhammad’s suggestions in the proposed amendments to make it more acceptable to him and strengthen his hands vis-à-vis the militants.

New strategy

The military, meanwhile, has begun to implement the new strategy since last week which, it says, would focus more on consolidating and securing the main supply routes and urban and rural centres “by putting more boots on the ground.”

Presently, it has four brigades in Swat including one from Rawalpindi overseen by a GOC (General Officer Commanding). “We have made some adjustments and we should be okay with it,” the official said.

To begin with, the military is gearing up to secure Mingora and its outer-parameters.

For its part, the government has agreed to depute three MPAs from Swat to set up a secured camp office in Mingora to touch base with their electorate and garner the essential public support.

But analysts say that while there has to be a more concerted and focussed military operation to overcome the militancy, the government too needs to devise a back-up socio-economic development plan to put in place once an area is cleared and returned to the civil administration.

“This is a fight to defend a state system. There is growing cynicism amongst the people in Swat whose feeling of helplessness has been compounded by the state to provide security and social service delivery. This is where we all have to act, the sooner the better. The blame-game is not going to take us anywhere,” a senior official said.

Desperate moves on to secure Swat — the lost valley -DAWN - Top Stories; January 15, 2009

--------------------------------------

A very insightful look into what has gone wrong in Swat. 'Boots on the ground' seems to be the major issue, and the relative lack of it this time around, compared to the first phase, where troops fought to take hilltops, peaks and other militant outposts, has been apparent.

I am not sure whether this is because of the situation in Bajaur and Khyber, with troops being diverted there for ops. The current tension with India and the deployment of troops from the North West to the Indian border to match the Indian deployments and activations may have also played a role here.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

But that may leave another issue unaddressed. Both sides are piqued that the federal government was also dragging its feet on the amendments proposed in the so-called Shariah regulation promulgated in 1999.

The amendments, part of the May 2008 agreement with the militants in Swat, say the ANP leaders are central to helping restore peace in Malakand Provincially-Administered Tribal Area, of which Swat is a district.

President Asif Zardari returned the summary containing the proposed amendments with observations.

“Being head of a secular liberal party, he is worried that introducing Shariah in Malakand would harm his international image,” they said.

Zardari is wrong on this. Some sort of Shairah with democratic elements to it (such as elections of officials etc.) will have to be conceded and implemented in both Swat and FATA. Without doing that, the GoP will always be on the back foot in terms of the propaganda war and alienating the Taliban from the people by denying them their 'cause'.

The key here is to do this on our terms, and not give up too much, such as restrictions on education etc.

In the long run, when government writ is imposed and society has a chance to heal, the laws can always be modified.

 

[IceCold]

Desperate moves on to secure Swat — the lost valley​

By Ismail Khan

SWAT, known for its green meadows, gushing river and snow-capped mountains, has unfortunately come to relive its historic name, Suvastu — the white serpent — whose tenacity and viciousness has stung the political and military leadership so badly that both are now looking for new ways to put a lid on the monster of growing bloodshed and reclaim its fast-shrinking territory.

The idyllic valley has gone really bad, its image distorted beyond recognition. Pakistan’s most popular tourist destination is now haunted by death and fear; few officials now dare to go and serve there.

Nearly 800 policemen — half of the total sanctioned strength of police in Swat, have either deserted or proceeded on long leave on one pretext or the other.

Only one of the 600 police recruits trained by the military at the Punjab Regimental Centre in Mardan, volunteered to go and serve, while the others plainly refused to head to what is now being called the ‘valley of death’.

The second phase of the military operation Rah-i-Haq in July last to regain control of the northern district of the North-West Frontier Province appears to have made little headway.

Many analysts agree that the state writ has shrunk from Swat’s 5337square kilometre area to the limits of its regional headquarters of Mingora — a city of 36 square kilometres.

Indeed, local residents say militants routinely carry out patrolling in Mingora, where its central square, the Green Chowk, came to be known as ‘Chowk Zebahkhana’ or the slaughter square.

Just last month, militants dumped 27 bodies with a warning not to remove the corpses before 11 am. This coupled with sniper attacks forced the traffic cops to refuse duty in the city centre, prompting the military to impose a night curfew in the city, whose population has swelled in recent months for relative security.

Targeted killings have increased and those showing defiance were made examples for others. Pir Samiullah, who had taken on the militants, was killed and his body hung from a pole before it was removed and buried.

Pir’s death and the government’s inability and helplessness to respond in real-time and support him, is perhaps the last nail in the coffin. Officials acknowledge that encouraging and organizing popular support against the militants now is a pipe dream.

Civilian deaths

Contributing further to the already grim scenario is the growing negative public perception of the military operation that they say has killed more civilians than militants.

This public perception has been reinforced by rising civilian casualties, shrinking state authority, militants’ ability to strike anywhere and any time and military’s over-reliance on long-range artillery than putting boots on the ground.

No credible data is available to estimate the number of civilian casualties in the seven-month-old operation due to police absence in most militant-controlled areas and therefore, the resultant lack of reporting. But police officials say the figure ran in hundreds.

The damage caused to property and infrastructure since the emergence of militancy in Swat has been evaluated at Rs3 billion, according to a senior government official, as militants blow up bridges and schools. The number of schools blown up or torched now stands at 181 – the highest perhaps in any insurgency anywhere in the world in an area as small as Swat.

The battle for the airwaves in Swat has taken a new turn. Radical cleric Maulana Fazlullah is back on the air but even his radio has proved to be too weak against his lieutenant Shah Doran whose broadcastes are heard far and wide, thanks to a 500 KV transmitter to defeat government’s efforts to jam his sermons.

The government now plans to overcome the problem by setting up a one megawatt transmitter that, it believes, would effectively silence the militant radio propaganda.

With state authority on the wane in Swat, relationship between the political and military leadership also took a sharp plunge.

Frustration is mounting within the ANP. On December 18, at a parliamentary party meeting at the chief minister’s house, seven of its lawmakers from Swat threatened to resign. “They were very depressed,” said a senior party leader present in the meeting.

Predictably, the issue came up again for discussion at a cabinet meeting the following day, followed by public criticism by Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain that the government was “not satisfied with the military operation”.

Not a child’s play

An interview to a private television channel by senior party leader Hashim Babar accusing the security establishment of fomenting militancy, rubbed more salt into the wounds, sources within the ANP and security establishment acknowledge.

“The military was not happy,” a party official admitted. The ANP MPA from Swat, Mr Ayub Ashari, was called and given a piece of mind, as one official put it: “We have lost 142 men in Swat since July last. This is not child’s play. This is no friendly match,” a visibly angry security official said.

The ANP leaders defend their public statements and one of whom said: “When you see that the operation is not effective and is going on and on, causing more collateral damage, then how can you remain indifferent?”

“The militants have taken over Fata and now they want to take over the province. It’s clear. So should we remain silent and play second fiddle?” he asked. “We have been constrained to re-think our support to the military operation,” he said.

Security officials say that the political leadership at the helm was also to blame for failing to put in place a civil administration that responds to public needs and generate public support.

“We should have had the back-up support from the police and the civil administration which is not there. This has put us on the back foot,” the security official said.

“It’s a tough area and when you operate in an area where you don’t know who the enemy is and who your friends are, it makes things a lot more difficult,” he said.

But before things could reach breaking point, Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani intervened. On December 25, in a meeting with the army chief, the political leadership agreed to overcome its differences with the military high command and devise a new strategy.

Shariah law

But that may leave another issue unaddressed. Both sides are piqued that the federal government was also dragging its feet on the amendments proposed in the so-called Shariah regulation promulgated in 1999.

The amendments, part of the May 2008 agreement with the militants in Swat, say the ANP leaders are central to helping restore peace in Malakand Provincially-Administered Tribal Area, of which Swat is a district.

President Asif Zardari returned the summary containing the proposed amendments with observations.

“Being head of a secular liberal party, he is worried that introducing Shariah in Malakand would harm his international image,” they said.

“What we are trying to do is to convince him that we are not enacting a new law. These are amendments to a law that already exists,” explained the senior ANP leader.

The new strategy, however, has already been put in motion. While the NWFP government awaits Mr Zardari’s approval to the amendments, it is working on a public statement that would commit the government to introduce Islamic judicial system in Malakand.

The statement – a suggestion by octogenarian Sufi Muhammad – is still in the works and does not include a time-frame. In return, the head of the banned Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi, has offered to leave his protest camp at Timergarah in native Dir and go to Swat to convince the militants to lay down their arms.

“I am an old man. I know I may be killed in the process but it’s worth the sacrifice,” a source privy to behind-the-scene negotiations quoted him as saying.

The security official concurred. “Whether the government introduces the amendments or issues a public statement, it would deny the militants the moral high ground of fighting for Shariah.”

Simultaneously, the government is also working, albeit quietly, to incorporate some of Sufi Muhammad’s suggestions in the proposed amendments to make it more acceptable to him and strengthen his hands vis-à-vis the militants.

New strategy

The military, meanwhile, has begun to implement the new strategy since last week which, it says, would focus more on consolidating and securing the main supply routes and urban and rural centres “by putting more boots on the ground.”

Presently, it has four brigades in Swat including one from Rawalpindi overseen by a GOC (General Officer Commanding). “We have made some adjustments and we should be okay with it,” the official said.

To begin with, the military is gearing up to secure Mingora and its outer-parameters.

For its part, the government has agreed to depute three MPAs from Swat to set up a secured camp office in Mingora to touch base with their electorate and garner the essential public support.

But analysts say that while there has to be a more concerted and focussed military operation to overcome the militancy, the government too needs to devise a back-up socio-economic development plan to put in place once an area is cleared and returned to the civil administration.

“This is a fight to defend a state system. There is growing cynicism amongst the people in Swat whose feeling of helplessness has been compounded by the state to provide security and social service delivery. This is where we all have to act, the sooner the better. The blame-game is not going to take us anywhere,” a senior official said.

Desperate moves on to secure Swat — the lost valley -DAWN - Top Stories; January 15, 2009

--------------------------------------

A very insightful look into what has gone wrong in Swat. 'Boots on the ground' seems to be the major issue, and the relative lack of it this time around, compared to the first phase, where troops fought to take hilltops, peaks and other militant outposts, has been apparent.

I am not sure whether this is because of the situation in Bajaur and Khyber, with troops being diverted there for ops. The current tension with India and the deployment of troops from the North West to the Indian border to match the Indian deployments and activations may have also played a role here.

IMO army and FC along with the police should be pulled out, and special services group should be given the task to handle the mess, take out high value targets such as Mulla FM and his ilks without remorse and severely disrupt the enemy infrastructure something the SSG is very good at. If we put more boots on the ground, that means we may have to suffer heavy casualties, if we air strike, that means we may have to suffer collateral damage, this is the only way IMO.

 

[Anwar2]

"" Without doing that, the GoP will always be on the back foot in terms of the propaganda war and alienating the Taliban from the people by denying them their 'cause'.""

With due respect .... this is Pure Fantasy!!

The people of Swat have been butchered and humiliated, they mostly find common cause with Taliban.

 

[Anwar2]

Dear IceCold:
You probably have an exaggerated view of the effectiveness of SSG. SSG has been misused and abused in almost every operation in FATA and Bajaur. The last time they were used for their true purpose was in 1971, with lack luster results.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

"" Without doing that, the GoP will always be on the back foot in terms of the propaganda war and alienating the Taliban from the people by denying them their 'cause'.""

With due respect .... this is Pure Fantasy!!

The people of Swat have been butchered and humiliated, they mostly find common cause with Taliban.

The people of Swat have been 'butchered and humiliated' by the Taliban, the murder and abuse of the Pir being a recent example. The 'slaughter square' isn't named after the military's actions, in case you missed that in the article, but because of taliban atrocities.

If anything the people are fed up with both the Taliban and the Army, since the former has subjected them to atrocities and mayhem, while the latter has been ineffective at curbing the former, and inflicted collateral damage in the process.

The only 'fantasies' here are your dissembling attempts to paint the Taliban in as positive a light as possible - still no calls for their disarmament and disbanding I see. Still no words of condemnation for their campaign of slaughter, coercion and destruction.

 

[Omar1984]

Now what? Pakistan lost Swat to the Taliban?

Swat's economy used to be relied on tourists. Many people from all across Pakistan used to visit Swat.

Now that the taliban is there no one will ever visit Swat.

What a shame. I hope Pakistani army can kick out those taliban but looks like Taliban have gained control of the beautiful valley

 

[ejaz007]

‘Large number’ of Taliban commanders killed

Staff Report

MINGORA: Security forces killed and injured a ‘large number’ of Taliban and their operation commanders in Manglour and its adjoining areas on Thursday, according to an Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) statement. The statement, however, only named four dead Taliban commanders. It said that security forces retaliated against a Taliban attack at a checkpost in Manglour early on Thursday and “inflicted heavy losses on the other side”.

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan