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BATTLE OF WALONG, 18 OCT - 16 NOV 1962
Sources: Flash of the Khukri: History of 3 GR. Col. C.L. Proudfoot
Unsung heroes of the 62 War. Lt. Col. Gurdip Singh Kler
Indian Army after Independence. Major K.C. Praval
INTRODUCTION
The 1962 Chinese invasion is a tragic watershed in the military history of India. It exposed an inept Indian state both militarily and politically. But for most of the war, the fighting qualities of the Indian jawan and the young officers remained unchanged. Without a mention of the heroic resistance offered at Walong, no story of the 1962 war will be complete. Walong is a small hamlet located near the tri junction of Tibet, Burma and India. Situated on an ancient trade route, it was manned by an Assam Rifles post with a small airfield capable of only handling Indian Air Force Otters and Caribous. The hills surrounding Walong were between 10,000 to 16,000 feet. Air drops were the only way to support this sector. The Chinese carried occasional incursions through the Lohit Valley to familiarize themselves. In response, the 6th Kumaon was moved into the area in March 1962 with a company posted about 2 miles from the border. Meanwhile across the border, Chinese activity increased with posts moving closer to the border.
THE BATTLE
18 - 25 October 1962: The Initial Attacks
Although the 6th Kumaon was responsible for the Walong sector an Assam Rifles platoon was manning the post at the border. The 6th Kumaon were deployed as the following:
'A' Company - Richu NH 5200
'B' Company - East Ridge NH 5477
'C' Company - Kibithoo NH 5196
'D' Company - Ladders area NH 5483
Battalion Tactical Headquarters - Kibithoo
Battalion HQ with Admin elements - Walong NN5377
On October 18th, a recon patrol under Subedar Surendra Chand was sent to Hundred Hill (NH 4999). He recorded the presence of 2 Chinese officers and 50 OR (Other Ranks). In response one platoon of Assam Rifles was sent to Ninety Hill (NH 4990). It was under the control of Jemadar Bhairab Singh of A Coy. The 2 other platoons of A Coy were occupying Sangram NH 5199 and Richu. On October 21st light signals were observed on the Chinese side. In response Major Gamathinayagam of A Coy moved with a platoon, less a section, to the McMahon Ridge. One platoon was sent to Dichu Nullah to prevent any enemy advance from the Taluk Pass.
At 0015 a.m. on October 22nd, the Himalayan calm was shattered by the noise of Chinese mortar & machine gun fire. 300 enemy troops attacked the two platoons' position of A Coy and another 100 attacked Madiah Top (NH 5302). Accurate Indian 3" mortar fire however brought the attack to a brief halt. Little later, reinforced in numbers, the Chinese made another attack along with simultaneous assaults on Lohit II (NH 5303) and Laila (NH 5101). For 4 hours they were held back, till through sheer numbers they broke through. Naik Bahadur stepped in after his 1st and 2nd gunners were killed and manned the LMG. He kept on firing till a burst of automatic fire brought him down. The Indians withdrew to establish positions in Walong. D Coy under Lieutenant Bikram Singh was to provide the screening position at Ashi Hill (NH 5484) along with a mortar and MMG section. Lieutenant Singh had the planks over the Namti Nullah weakened from the Indian side.
When the Chinese came in at 3 a.m. on October 23rd, the first Chinese soldier stepped on the plank and fell into the nullah. As the following Chinese milled around, many lights were fired revealing the Chinese in a cramped path. The mortars and MMGs sighted on this section brought down accurate fire. About 200 Chinese troops were killed or wounded in this action against nine Indian fatalities. At 4 a.m. the screen was ordered to withdraw. Meanwhile the 4th Sikhs made contact with the enemy and subjected them to withering fire from 3" mortar, LMGs and MMGs. Meanwhile the Chinese had set off a bush fire and sneaked forward. Sensing the twin danger, Sepoy Piara Singh tried to douse the fire and fire at the enemy. Profusely bleeding he refused to be evacuated and died fighting to the end. On the night of October 25th, the Chinese tried another probe but the Sikhs held firm. As some of the Chinese started to close in, Sepoy Kewal Singh rushed out of his post and charged them with his bayonet killing a few in hand to hand combat. However he was mortally wounded.
26 - 13 November 1962: Reorganizing & Reinforcing
Over the next few days there were clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols as the Chinese rushed in reinforcements. On October 26th, B Coy of 4th Sikhs was out on an recon patrol when it was surrounded by the Chinese. While the outnumbered Indians were unable to break the encirclement, it was decided to attack the Chinese flank to surprise them. A unit led by Lance Naik Kartar Singh volunteered for the task. The unit sneaked in and launched an attack the Chinese. Surprised by this the enemy reeled in disarray allowing the encircled patrol to break free. Meanwhile the Indian defences were in a state of turmoil. Initially 5th Brigade was in charge of the Walong sector.
A reorganisation brought it under Headquarters 2nd Infantry Division which allotted Walong to the 181 Brigade belonging to 2nd Division. However the Divisional commander of 2nd Division objected, so the 11th Brigade under Brigadier N.C. Rawlley was asked to move to Walong. This changing and chopping was to the detriment of the defence of Walong. Furthermore to bring it up full brigade strength, initially 2/8 Gorkha Rifles was asked to move to Walong. But halfway through the move they were replaced by 3/3 Gorkha Rifles. Then suddenly 3/3 Gorkha Rifles was asked to move to Hayuliang. Finally when 11th Brigade took over the 3/3 Gorkhas were brought back to Walong.
So by November 3rd the following units were in place:
• 4th Sikhs
'A' Coy - Dong Hill East of Lohit river
'B' Coy - Maha Plateau, Ladders West of Lohit river
'C' Coy - Dong plateau
'D' Coy - Lachman Ridge
3" Mortar - Slopes of Dong Hill
• 3/3 Gorkhas
'A' Coy - Dong Plateau
'B' Coy - Dong Hill east of Lohit river
'C' Coy - Ladders Area
'D' Coy - Lachman Ridge
• 4th Dogras
1 Coy to reinforce Tri Junction area (arrived on 14th November)
Green Pimple Spur (NH 4983), which overlooked the Brigade defences was occupied by the Chinese. Since a further advance along this spur could mean the fall of the Walong airstrip, 'A' Coy was asked to retake it. Led by Captain Mathur the men moved into position for a morning assault on November 6th. Unfortunately at the last moment the promised mortar support did not come. Still at 8:50 a.m. to the cries of Kali Mata ki Jai they attacked. In spite of sustained Chinese mortar and machine gun fire the Kumaonis managed to force the forward Chinese posts to retreat. But the Kumaonis soon ran out of ammo but continued engaging in hand to hand combat. But now the determined Chinese fire forced a retreat. This was also the only option as even if they took Green Pimple they had no ammo to resist a counter attack. The company took defensive positions at 11,000 feet along the West Ridge. However weakened, it was attacked repeatedly by the Chinese and after the 5th attack it was relieved by Lt. Bikram Singh's D Coy.
Meanwhile the 4th Sikh had been aggressively patrolling, killing many of the enemy. However the 3 battalions were holding positions in such a manner that sub-units of one, were placed under another and two of the battalions held positions on both sides of the river. As seen from the above, the 4th Sikhs were spread across 6000 yards and an abnormally large frontage. The Gorkhas were spread across 3000 - 4000 yards. This made for poor command and control. The 6th Kumaon HQ was east of the river but they held the lines west of the river. The 4th Sikh and 3/3 Gorkhas held positions east of the river while their headquarters were west of the river. In addition to these 3 battalions there were a company of Assam Rifles, the 71 Heavy Mortar Battery, the 17 Field Regiment Battery, a platoon of 6 Mahar and a platoon of Engineers. This didn't make any sense and no commander tried to correct it. In spite of this all the units held firm against repeated probing attacks from the Chinese who were now at divisional strength.
14 - 16 November 1962: The Final Battle
As the enemy built up for the final attack, though the brigade's western flank became apparent, it was decided to launch a spoiling attack. The attack was to be launched on Yellow Pimple as it was dominated by the Tri Junction area. On 13th November the Btn, less Lt. Bikram's four platoons, marched to Tri Junction. At 9:30 a.m. on November 14th with the 4th Sikhs providing a diversion, Yellow Pimple was attacked by 2 companies under Captain B.N. Singh and Major Sharma. As the valiant Kumaonis charged up, they were met by heavy artillery and machine gun fire. Unfortunately the only fire support for the Kumaonis came from 3" mortars. Captain B.N. Singh's Coy reached about 20 meters from the top.
As sustained enemy fire seemed to bog them down, Subedar Govind Singh charged forward with an LMG to destroy an enemy bunker. Meanwhile another enemy machine gun nest opened up on him and the brave Subedar charged that one too, silencing it, but in the process was killed. Inspired by this feat of bravery, Jemadar Trilok Singh likewise charged another MG nest but was swept by MG fire. The other company now had closed to 50 meters before they too ground to an halt. By now the Indians had lost 20 dead and Captain B.N. Singh was wounded. 2/Lt Khatri took over. The CO of the Btn, Colonel Madiah, decided to send the two reserve platoons to reinforce the attack.
Meanwhile the Chinese had stabilized their positions and at 8:30 p.m. made a battalion size counter attack. The two companies were surrounded and sustained hand-to-hand combat took place. However the darkness allowed some of them to disengage and even though they were subjected to heavy shelling, some of them under 2nd Lts. Khatri and Jindal inched their way back to Tri Junction. Exhausted and depleted the 6th Kumaonis now braced themselves for the final attack. At 4:30 a.m. on November 15th the Chinese attacked Tri Junction. For two hours they were pummeled with machine guns and mortars but the Kumaonis held. By 6 a.m. the attack fizzled out. However Captain Bhatia and 2nd Lt. Khatri were wounded. Now the Chinese established a OP about 200 yards from Tri Junction. The next series of attacks commenced at 6 p.m. on November 15th. It was followed by attacks every four hours with human wave tactics.
The 4th Dogra reinforcements found their way cut off and only 33 men made it through. But even these were welcome as they brought in much needed ammunition. 4 more Chinese attacks were repulsed but the Indians were running out of men and ammo. Meanwhile A Coy of 4th Sikh came under constant sniping. A patrol under Subedar Harnam Singh was sent to cut the enemy off, but was thrown back. At night the Chinese attacked. Wave after wave attacked, but the Sikhs held firm. Havildar Labh Singh was wounded thrice and each time rejoined the fighting after getting first aid. Soon the Coy had lost its commander and second-in-command along with two platoon commanders.
Subedar Harnam Singh and Massa Singh were wounded. Lance Havildar Kirpa Ram the battalion tradesman kept supplying ammo to the bunkers. On one of his runs he was hit and wounded but continued his task. Another hit killed him. Meanwhile D Coy was also attacked. After the first two waves were repelled, with dead Chinese littering the ground, a third wave followed. This time after bitter fighting the position fell. The few who straggled back spoke of the gallant company commander, Lt. Yog Palta. He moved from bunker to bunker encouraging his men, pausing to fire his Sten gun and hurl grenades. A burst of LMG fire hit him in the neck and with the death of the young commander the position fell. With ammo running out, the end was near. Still the Sikhs fought tenaciously. Two platoons were wiped out to a man. The Chinese dead were piling up all around. Finally the order to withdraw came and what was left of the Sikhs made their way back. Fittingly they were the only troops who captured some Chinese arms.
On November 16th, the Chinese launched an attack against all forward posts. Between 0500 and 0530 hours supported by artillery, mortar and machine gun fire, they attacked the 4th Sikh's A Coy at Maha plateau, north of the D Coy at Lacman Ridge. By 0530 the Sikh positions were overrun and the remaining Sikhs were ordered to withdraw. Now the Gorkhas of D Company were the next target. Subedar Kharak Bahadur commanding the forward platoon held fire till the Chinese closed in. The subsequent firing killed 12 Chinese and wounded 15. A second attack at 0630 hrs was also beaten back. The Chinese now tried to flank the company. Seeing this, Naik Keshar Bahadur Gurung picked his Bren and moved to a vantage point from where he kept engaging the enemy till ordered to withdraw.
By 1500 hrs the Chinese started closing in and the Coy Cdr., Captain K.N. Bavadam, could not contact the Btn or Bde HQ. So he decided to break through the Chinese cordon on his own. He and Subedar Kharak Bahadur evacuated Major Samatsar of 4th Sikh who had been wounded. As the withdrawal proceeded they were ambushed and outnumbered by Chinese units which had slipped around them. Naik Keshar Bahadur Gurung was hit on the hip but continued to fight till another round tore into his neck. He was mortally wounded. Havildar Chandra Bahadur Pun took over the Bren and provided covering firing till the last man was able to withdraw. Unfortunately he was killed in the process. D Company now found themselves in the abandoned positions of the 4th Sikhs C Coy. The Gorkhas occupied the positions and continued the fight. Finally as the Chinese started to rain in artillery, Captain Bavadam asked the Gorkhas to pull back. In this process a number of personnel were killed including Captain Bavadam.
C Coy in Ladders Post lower down the ridge, east of Maha Plateau was commanded by Major N.B. Chand. Maintaining strict fire control the Gorkhas were fighting fiercely. Their position on the Kibithu-Walong track, on the west bank of the Lohit river got its name from the steps cut into the rock face. The Gorkhas positions were in the rock caves. As long as support from the east bank existed, the Gorkhas were safe. The Chinese attacked on 15th morning and suffered heavily. Falling back they blasted the Gorkhas with bazooka fire for the whole day but failed to make any dent. That night they made a second attack and were again repulsed. On 16th morning the Gorkhas watched the attack on the Sikhs position east of the river. The river which was supposed to be un-fordable and un-crossable was crossed by the Chinese using rubber dinghies. Once the Sikhs position fell the Gorkhas were exposed. The Chinese lined up direct fire weapons across the bank and began to methodically blast the Ladders.
The Gorkha bunkers were collapsing one by one but the Gorkhas remained put. Many men were killed in the process and the Major ordered his men to the trenches. The Chinese still could not advance. At 1000 hours, the 4th Sikh's Btn HQ was asked for ammunition and reinforcements but the Sikhs could not spare any. By now, the 4th Sikhs, 4th Dogras and 6th Kumaon had withdrawn. Major Chand ordered his Coy to withdraw at 1630 hours, with most able to escape, except for Major Chand himself, who was captured. Meanwhile east of the Lohit river, A and B Coys, along with the Btn HQ, were in a fix too. The 4th Sikh's C Coy was attacked by the Chinese at midnight on 16th November. A platoon of B Coy was sent to reinforce 4th Sikh at High Plateau. By the time the Gorkhas reached there, the Sikhs were overrun and after a brief firefight the Gorkhas returned.
At 0600 hours, A Coy at Dong Plateau was subjected to heavy shelling and mortar fire. Under this cover the Chinese started edging closer. The shelling by the Chinese set fire to A Coy positions but the Gorkhas hung on tenaciously. At 1430 hrs the Chinese again resumed a build up and as the positions became untenable, Major Chatterjee was ordered to withdraw A and B Coys by Btn HQ. B Coy led by Major R.S. Virk was intercepted by the Chinese. This forced them to change route and they subsequently were lost. 6th Platoon made it to battalion HQ on November 17th only to find the Chinese already there. The rest crossed at Dantir Nallah at 2100 hours on November 16th and were on their way to the hills across Yepak when the Chinese ambushed them further confusing the group.
At the end, Majors Chatterjee and Thapa, Captains S.N. Kapil and G.S. Bajai (artillery) and 60 – 80 ORs were ambushed on November 16th. Except for Captain Bajaj and 2nd Lt. Madaiya who had escaped, the rest were captured. Brigade HQ's orders to withdraw never reached the Gorkhas. Due to this the Chinese had already moved into positions behind them where other units had withdrawn or had collapsed. At 7:30 a.m. on November 16th, the Chinese reinforced by 2 more brigades attacked with 120mm mortar fire. By now communication with Bde. HQ had been cut off. The supply route to Tri Junction was cut off. The only other pocket was at the West Ridge where 4 platoons under the valiant Lt. Bikram Singh. At 8:30 am this ad hoc company was attacked by close to 4000 Chinese troops.
From three sides, the Chinese poured in artillery and MG fire. But the Kumaonis held till 11 a.m. till the situation became militarily futile and orders were given to withdraw. As Lt. Bikram Singh started extricating his men he was cut down. The Chinese suffered terrible casualties (almost 5 times). By midday all troops were asked to withdraw. Some managed to get back through the treacherous terrain. But many NEVER GOT THE ORDERS. They slugged it out to the last man, to the last bullet. As Brigadier N.C. Rawlley said, "6th Kumaon at Tri Junction fought and fought and fought till there was nothing left. After this there was eerie silence." Sikhs, Kumaonis, Gorkhas and Dogras fought shoulder-to-shoulder to the bitter end. Two months after the cease-fire when the Indians returned they found that the Chinese had marked the positions of the dead. Many of the bunkers showed the dead where they had last manned their weapons.
Copyright © BHARAT RAKSHAK.
Battle of Walong, 18 Oct - 16 Nov 1962
=========================================================================================================================================================
The Battle of Chushul
L.N. Subramanian
Chushul was an important target for the Chinese. It lay on the road to Leh. A narrow sandy valley at an altitude of 4337 meters, It was bound to the north by the clear blue waters of the Pangong Tso (lake), the east and west by 5700 meter ranges and the Chushul airfield to the south. There is an opening in the eastern side known as the Spanggur gap, which led to Rudok a 100 kms to the east. As part of the forward policy a number of posts were established around Chushul. The J&K militia manned these posts. As tensions with the Chinese mounted Western Command requested a division of troops (4 Brigades) for an effective defence of Leh. Instead by September 62 only 114th Brigade with 2 battalions the 1/8th Gorkha Rifles and 5 Jat. These units were strung in pickets. They could at the most only serve as trip wires to any Chinese advance. They were targets for Chinese intimidation. In May Alpha post manned by a JCO and 14 Ors of J & K militia was surrounded by 2 companies of Chinese troops. The troops were told that the post had to be held at all costs. The Chinese stood 120 yards away and got into attack formation. The JCO still held his nerve and did not open fire. Finally the Chinese withdrew. In a similar incident on 10th July a Gorkha post was surrounded by 350 Chinese troops at 200 yards. The Chinese used loudspeakers to convince the Gorkhas that they should not be fighting for India. But Subhedar Jang Bahadur told them off in unparliamentary language. Once again the Chinese withdrew but the stage was being set for further confrontations.
The Chinese Strike
In Oct 62 the deployment of the Indian Army was as follows:
Daulat Beg Oldi and Chi Chap sector -14 J &K Militia plus 1 Coy 5th Jat
Galwan Valley Coy - 5 Jat
Chang Chnmo Valley - 5 Jat less 2 Coy
Chushul - Coy less platoon 1/8 Gorkha Rifles – Sirijap posts
Coy 1/8 Gorkha Rifles - Yalu Posts
2 Coys 1/8 Gorkha Rifles - Spanggur Gap
On the night of 19/20 October all the 14th J & K militias posts as well as the Galwan post held by 5 Jat was attacked. North of DBO at Chandini the post was held by Subedar Sonam Stobdan and 29 men. Attacked by 500 Chinese the men held out for a whole day. Only one man survived seriously wounded. Sub Sonam was awarded the MVC and Sepoys Chiring, Wangchuk and Phunchok were awarded VrCs. Galwan post held by Subedar Jang Bahadur Thapa’s men since July was reinforced by a company of 5 Jat led by Major Hasabnis. The Chinese pounded this post with artillery for a full day before overrunning it. Sub Thapa was amongst those killed. The attacks continued remorselessly. Post Parmodak at 17,000 feet, was held by a section of one NCO and 5 Ors. Soon the others were dead leaving only Havaldar Tulsi Ram. Undaunted he continued to pepper the advancing Chinese with LMG fire till he was gunned down. Likewise at Post Bishan at 18,645 feet, Company Havaldar Major Anand Ram and 12 men of the J & K militia were pounded by the Chinese for 45 minutes. The Chinese made two assaults but were beaten back. Surrounded Anand Ram found a gap along a steep precipice and extracted his men out one by one. So did Subedar Amar Singh and his platoon at Post Patrol Base south of the Galwan river. Although tasked with observing the Chinese and asked to withdraw if contact was made he stood his ground. He and most of his section was wiped out.
The next posts to be attacked were Srijap I and Srijap II. Held by the doughty Gorkhas led by Major Dhan Singh Thapa the Chinese pounded it with artillery from 6 am. In spite of this they beat back 2 Chinese asssaults. Meanwhile Naik Rabi Lal Thapa who had taken a storm boat from Thakung post saw this battle from 1000 metres. As the Chinese made a 3rd assault the Gorkhas leapt out with shouts of "Ayo Gorkhali". Khukris and bayonets clashed in a last grim battle. By 8.30 am it was over with most of the Gorkhas dead. A hundred Chinese were also strewn around. Major Dhan Singh Thapa was awarded the PVC.
By 22nd October the Chinese had cleared all posts north of Chushul. On Oct 27th they turned to the southern approaches. The posts Chang La and Jara La were attacked. For 4 hours its outnumbered defenders fought bravely. Jemadar Ishe Thundup commanding the Chang La post asked his men to withdraw and covered it himself. In the process the gallant jemadar was killed earning a posthumous MVC. The men at Jara La were surrounded but managed to break through in the night.
Chushul stood isolated with only the battalion headquarters of the 1/8th GR and a MMG section to defend it. However the Chinese also needed a break to regroup from the severe losses they had suffered. For 8 days they had thrown everything at the Indians from masses of troops supported by heavy artillery. The Indians had some small arms and 2 in mortars with very little ammunition. Still they had caused heavy casualties. Blue uniformed porters were seen carrying truckloads of wounded and dead at the end of each day’s battle. They suffered over 50 percent casualties.
Deployment of 114th Brigade
114th Brigade reeled backed in the face of the Chinese assault. All they could do was to concentrate its resources on the outskirts of Leh. If Leh fell it would open the door to the whole of Ladakh. Brigadier Raina was planning the deployment of his newly arrived 5th battalion, the 13th Kumaon when the orders arrived for him to move to Chushul to take over command of its defences. At first it seemed another one of those crazy plans that characterised the Indian response elsewhere against the Chinese. After all there were only the Bn HQ of 1/8 and MMG section at Chushul. But additional messages from Corps Headquarters clarified the situation. Leh was to become Divisional HQ for 3rd Infantry Division commanded by Maj Gen Budh Singh. Moving to Leh were the 70th and 163rd Infantry Brigades along with 2 tank troops, a field artillery regiment, a heavy mortar battery and other supporting arms. This was made possible by IAF An-12s.
114th Brigade now comprised of the 1st Jat,5th Jat, 13th Kumaon, 1/8th Gorkha Rifles and elements of J&K militia. In addition there were 2 troops of 20th Lancers, 38th Battery of 13 Field Regiment, a troop of 32 Heavy Mortar Regiment and company of Mahar Regiment MMG. It was in charge of the Lukung-Chushul-TsakaLa area a distance of 80 km. Brigadier Raina flew down to Chushul on 28th October with the rest of the Brigade HQ moving by road.
The Chinese could attack Chushul in three possible ways
1.From Tsaka La in the South down the mountains east of Dungti. This would have to be an infantry attack because of lack of motorable roads. They could also come down the Demchok – Dungti road allowing them to use armour and artillery. But this would mean a major battle at Dungti where 70th Brigade was deployed.
2. An attack via Thakung in the North West which gave them 2 options
a.advance along Marsmik La to Lukung and subsequently along Lukung – Thakung-Chushul
b.An waterborne assault across the Pongong Lake
3. The third way would be to attack Chushul via Rudok. This had motorable roads up to the forward posts allowing for an infantry attack supported by armour and artillery around the Spanggur Gap.
It seemed highly likely that the Chinese would take the third option. This meant 2 options for the defenders;
1.Holding the heights east of the Chushul Valley – Gurung Hill, Magar Hill and Rezang La
2.The heights on the west side of Chushul
The second option meant giving up the airfield and thus the first option was chosen. Accordingly the Brigade’s sector was divided into 2 sub sectors Lukung and Chushul.
The deployment was as follows:
Lukung – 5 Jat with a company at Tsaka La
Spanggur Gap – 1 Coy 1/8 Gorkha Rifles
Gurung Hill –1 Coy 1/8 Gorkha Rifles. Plus 2 troops of Tanks, Artillery
Rezang La – 1 Coy 13 Kumaon
Magar Hill – 2 Coys 13 Kumaon, Artillery
Thakung Heights – 2 Coys 1 Jat
Once allocated the troops started digging in and set up the defences. For once supplies started arriving in sufficient numbers. In fact there was a shortage of porters to carry the stores to forward positions. Under Brigadier Raina’s supervision every tankable approach was mined and covered by 106 mm recoilless guns. The Field Artillery and armour was hidden under cover. In addition dummy guns, tanks and fuel tanks were set up. Old disused bull dozers were made to look like tanks. With preparations the Indians awaited the Chinese attack.
The Battle
Brig Raina asked for situation reports from the various battalions. Only 1/8th GR and 13 Kumaon had been shelled. Raina ordered covering fire for the two battalions and the 25 pounders of the 38th Field Artillery replied back. By 0515 hrs the 1/8th GR reported enemy figures moving in the dark. At 0545 hrs the Chinese attacked the 2 platoons on Gurung hill commanded by Captain P.L.Kher. The Gorkhas beat back the attack. As the Chinese started an artillery bombardment in preparation for an attack the Indian gunners fired back in DF mode at Chinese preparation sites. Guided by OP 2nd Lt S.D. Goswami the artillery attack caught the Chinese in the open and the severe casualties forced them to abandon the attack.
Meanwhile 13th Kumaon was asked to send out a patrol led by Major Jatar to see what was happening with C company at Rezang La. The phone wires were dead. Meanwhile the radio crackled with Kher reporting a second attack forming. Once again Goswami brought down accurate fire. The Chinese advanced line after line. The artillery and MMGs were tearing big gaps in the advancing Chinese. At 150 yards Kher ordered his men to open fire. Meanwhile other Chinese troops were streaming down the gullies leading to Gurung hill from the Spanggur Gap. Now the AMX 13 tanks of B Squadron 20th Lancers commanded by 2nd Lt S.P.S. Baswani were thrown in the fray. As Baswani tried to fire his gun he found the automatic loading gear had frozen. He switched to manual. After a few rounds the loader thawed out. The crews pumped out HE shells decimating ranks of advancing Chinese. As they ran out of ammunition they withdrew to reload. On their return they found the Chinese still swarming in huge numbers. Even for the concept of human waves this was unprecedented. Inspite of whole lines being decimated the Chinese pressed forward desperate to take Gurung Hill at any cost. By 0900 hours they reached the forward posts mannned by Jemadar Amar Bahadur Gurung. Intially the Gorkhas were thrown back but the valiant Gurung led a khukri charge and retook the positions. However he was mortally wounded. Meanwhile Kher was wounded and as he watched the Chinese attack again develop he had 2 options. Stand and fight and be overrun or withdraw to Camel’s back where he had a better chance. He opted for the second and called for artillery fire on his own positions to give him a chance to disengage. Meanwhile Goswami continued to direct fire from his OP. The 3 others in his post were dead. After ordering fire on his position he started to withdraw on Kher’s order when he was hit. He collapsed and lay their till a patrol found him in the night and brought him back. But the severe cold had caused frost bite and his legs had to be amputated. Goswami was awarded the MVC. The other 3 men Tech Assistant Gurdeep Singh received the VrC and signallers Naik Pritam Singh and Lance Naik Sarwan Sin gh received the Sena Medals. The Chinese had achieved half their aim of taking the 2 shoulders. With Gurung Hill in their hands they now turned their attention on Magar Hill.
Meanwhile lets shift our attention to Rezang La. This was a massive feature of 5180 metres. It was defended by C company of 13th Kumaon led by Major Shaitan Singh. They were deployed over a 2 km frontage with a total of 118 men. The 3 platoons 7th led by Jemadar Surja 3000 yards north of the pass,9th led by Jemadar Ramchandra was 1100 yards south of 7th platoons position and 8th platoon was deployed a further 1600 yards south with company headquarters behind them along with the 3 in mortars. Unfortunately due to the shortage of guns 13th Kumaon unlike the men at Gurung Hill did not have artillery cover which were needed for the more important posts. Although they were well entrenched they did not have mines as well as adequate overhead protection for the command posts.
Every morning the Company would put out 3 Ops and every evening the platoons would send out 3 LPs. In addition patrols consisting of an Nco and 3 men would constantly move about each platoon overlapping with the other. With the distances between the Rezang La and the others there was very little support that could be given. The men at Rezang La were to fight till the "last man , last round". In spite of this expectation morale continued to be high.
On the night of the 17th the LPs as usual went forward. At 22oo hrs a storm blew up lashing the area with heavy winds and snow for about 2 hours. When it subsided the fresh snow helped in seeing out to 600 meters. At 0200 the LP from 8th platoon saw a body of troops half a mile away moving up the pass.The LP commander Lance Naik Brij Lal rushed back to inform the platoon HQ. Platoon HQ sent an LMG out to the LP post. On returning to the post with section commander Hukum Chand it was found that the Chinese were less than 250 yards away. Along with Lance Naik Ram Singh and his LMG section they moved further down to engage the Chinese. Since the Chinese were now moving rapisly Hukum Chand fired a red very light as well as opened a burst of LMG fire to warn the rest of the company. There was silence now from the LP. Meanwhile the burst of LMG fire had the brought the rest of the company to a rapid stand to. As Shaitan Singh checked on the wireless of the various positions.
Meanwhile a Chinese patrol snuck up and cut the lines to the battalion headquarters. The Company lines were now silent. The platoons were ordered to put out patrols to see what was happening. At 0435 all platoons reported heavy shelling. The barrage went on for 20 minutes. Naik Ram Kunwar in charge of the mortars reported that No 1 mortar position was hit. The crew were killed and the optical sight was damaged. A new crew was assembled. Meanwhile for some reason nobody from 5 Jat under 13 Kumaon seemed to have reported the tell tale flashes of the shelling.
Meanwhile Shaitan Singh ordered the platoons to watch their flanks as the first attack was probably a feint. Meanwhile Naik Sahi Ram and his LMG section which had moved forward to cover a rentrant saw a Chinese column come up carelesly. When the column came close the section opened up with LMG and grenades leaving the column decimated.
Now at 0505 hours both Hari Ram and Surja saw attacks forming up against their platoon positions. They requested mortar support. Under the Ops accurate sighting the mortars hammered the Chinese attack caausing heavy casualties. By 0515 the attacks had been beaten back. Over the next 50 minutes there was a couple of skirmishes with Chinese patrols. For some reason the Chinese seemed to just walk in with no tactical movement of any sort.
Now the Chinese realised that this was no walkover and started forming for a more tactical assault. Jemadar Surja watching the attack forming up asked Lance Naik Ram Singh to take an LMG and move 40 yards forward towards some rocks along with Gulab Singh. The Chinese meanwhile brought in a MMG and set it up 600 yards from the platoon lines. Then under a 10 minute mortar barrage they attacked. With the MMG covering them they advanced to about 40 yards when Surja ordered his men to open fire. The fire from the platoon lines as well as the LMG fire from the left broke up the attack. However the MMG was causing problems with 3 dead and a few more with serious head wounds. Surja now had only 11 men with him. It became imperative to take out the MMG. Gulab Singh volunteered for the job. Along with Ram Singh he worked his way 500 yards down the left to the cover of some rocks. As they peered over the rocks at the MMG 70 yards away they also saw a platoon sized unit in a depression. Realising that they had been lucky to come this far the 2 men charged the 70 yards with the cry " Data Shri Krishna ki Jai". 30 yards away the MMG opened up and Gulab Singh fell. Ram Singh still continued firing from the hip till a burst of MMG fire hit him. He fell only 5 feet away from the MMG. The mission to knock the MMG out had failed by a few feet.
Meanwhile 7th platoon also continued to get hammered by mortar fire. Then an MMG was dragged up opposite them and they too were under MMG fire. The combination of continuous mortar and MMG fire was taking its toll. The No 2 mortar postion was hit killing its crew. A bullet passed through Ram Kunwar miraculously missing his spine. He continued to reorganise, forming a new time consisting of Lance Naik siri Ram for the No 1 mortar and himself and Naik Surat Singh for the No 2 unit.
The wait was on for the next Chinese attack. It had become clear that the Chinese planned to finish of 7 and 8 platoon before taking on the 9th paltoon and CHQ. At 0655 hrs the sun rose and the Chinese artillery began again. Naik Chandgi Ram’s 3rd Section and Hukum Singhs 1st section opened up and cut down the first two waves. Regrouping the Chinese launched two more attacks which were also beaten back. But now the Kumaonis were down to a few men. As the 5th attack was launched. Chandgi Ram led his men into a bayonet charge. Likewise Hari Ram took the second section in a counter attack which temporarily stabilised the situation. But the Chinese threw in yet another wave alos engulfed Rugha Nath’s 1ste section. With that attack 8 platoon ceased to exist. At 7th platoon as the barrage lifted Surja saw a mass of grey at 40 yards. Calmly he called up HQ to tell them that they were going out to meet the assault. A vicious hand to hand fight ensued in which all the men were killed. All were found with multiple bullet and bayonet wounds. At 0800 hours the Chinese fired a green light signalling the end of 7th and 8th platoons.
The Chinese now were regrouping in the area where they had wiped out 7th platoon. Yet the fight was not over. A little distance away Naik Sahi Ram watched with controlled fury. He had wondered why he was not called back to the platoons main position but like a good soldier waited at his position. When he saw the Chinese regrouping he realised that they his platoon was no more. He waited for the Chinese to assemble before he let rip with his LMG. The bunched up Chinese did not expect this and were mowed down in large numbers. The Chinese fled and Sahi Ram settled back awaiting the next attack. The Chinese brought in recoiless guns and methodically destroyed his positions. Shaitan Singh gauged the situation and decided that the best position for him to make his stand would be the No 7 platoons position. After Sahi Ram’s devastating fire the position was clear of Chinese. He called up 9th platoon Jemadar Ramchander and told him to leave 2 LMGs to engage the Chinese while the rest of the men moved to the bump. The 2 LMGs were under Sepoy Nihal Singh and Harphul Singh. Harphul already having lost his brother in law and his nephew was thirsting for revenge. The mortars now without ammo were to be disabled and all maps and other documents burned. The men moved in singl file. After they had covered 600 yards tragedy struck. An unseen MMG coughed to life and mowed down the attacking Kumaonis. Major Shaitan Singh was hit and pulled by Phul Singh to cover. 32 men were killed. Meanwhile back at 9 platoons postion the few men left behind were under attack. With the odds arrayed against them Lance Havaldar Balbir Singh led his 3 men into swirling mass of grey. Ram Kunwar and the remaining men fired off their last riunds before machine gun fire killed them. The 2 LMG men and the MMG had been duelling for 10 minutes now. Harphul finally managed to hit one of the crew neutralizing one MMG briefly. A 75 mm antitank rocket exploded amongst his postion killing him instantly. Nihal singh continued to fire till he was hit on both elbows and could not hold on anymore.
As Ram Kunwar disabled the mortars and was moving away he was hit by rifle fire. He saw the Chinese 20 yards away. Angry he took a rifle and went inside the command post. The first Chines soldier to peek in received a round into his head. The remaining Chinese threw a flurry of hand grenades to silence him. Phul Singh along with OP Jai Narian tried to drag Shaitan Singh. But the gaping hole in his back was draining his life out. Finally as Shaitan Singh stopped breathing they moved back to the main lines. Incredibly both Nihal Singh and Ram Kunwar managed to slip out enemy captivity and make it back to safety. Of the 118 men at Rezang La 109 men laid down their lives. 5 men were captured and only 4 men returned back alive.
With the fall of Rezang La the men on Magar Hill now awaited the anticipated Chinese attack. The gunners at Magar Hill were itching to get have a go. At one point a Chinese column was marching up the gully between Rezang La and Gurung Hill. The guns were moved into direct firing mode. Wisely the Chinese decided not to attack. At another point the Chinese moved in mortars in the Spanggur Gap. Sighted by the Magar observation post they were immediately shelled. One mortar was knocked off and the rest scampered back to safety. But with Gurung in their hands the Chinese now could regroup and roll down the hill and overrun the Gorkhas and Kumaonis and take the airfield. This would cut off troops deployed eastwards including those on Magar Hill.
With over one thousand Chinese killed for 140 Indian dead the Brigade had achieved its primary task. It was now decided to pull all troops to positions in depth and wait for the second round. Accordingly in the night the units withdrew with smart discipline taking with them every piece of equipment. Except for a couple of disabled tanks and empty fuel containers and other junk everything else was pulled out. The depth positions had better tactical advantages. To attack these positions the Chinese would have to come up from the lower heights. Also their build up will have to be in the open. The attack will have to traverse through the Chushul Valley an ideal killing field.
The Cease Fire
The second round never came. On 21st November the Chinese declared a ceasefire. The Indian Army and 114th Brigade was justifiably proud of its conduct during the battle of Chushul. Outnumbered 10 to 1 they had fought with considerable elan and tactical skills inflicting horrendous casualties on the Chinese. There was no vain sacrifice of lives due to egos. Peking radio admitted to having suffered its worst casualties at Rezang La. Ironically it could have also been a indicator of things to come. The Indian Army was just coming to grips with this war. Barely a fraction of the Army had been involved. It was possible that the Battle at Chushul was a sign that the remainder of the war was going to be much harder and a notice to us that if the country had not lost it’s nerves the end of this war could have been on better terms.
Copyright © Bharat Rakshak
BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITORÂ Volume 3(3)
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BATTLE OF NAMKA CHU, 10 OCT - 16 NOV 1962
"I can tell this House that at no time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces in better condition, in finer fettle, and with the background of our far greater industrial production...to help them, than they are today. I am not boasting about them or comparing them with any other country's, but I am quite confident that our defence forces are well capable of looking after our security."
- Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru addressing the Lok Sabha on 25th November 1959.
INTRODUCTION
Namka Chu a name seared in Indian memory, a place where the decisions made by a pacifist Prime Minister, an arrogant Defence Minister and a politically connected General caused the rout of a proud Brigade with many of its men dying like animals in a cage.Namka Chu, a gorge situated east of the remote Tri Junction of Tibet, Bhutan and India. It is 200 km from the railhead of Misamari and 60 km from the road head of Tawang. The Nyamjang river flows through from Tibet and enters India at Khinzemane. It meets Namka Chu 1½ miles south of Khinzemane.Local grazers used seven improvised bridges to take their cattle across the Namka Chu. They were from East to West known as Nos I - V, Log bridge and Temporary bridge. Following Hathung La route to Dhola Post, the track hit Bridge I. Across it the track forked, the eastward branch reached Khinzemane, the one going North West along the river and re-crossing to the South across Bridge II. This led to Dhola Post opposite Bridge III.
A little away was Bridge IV and close to Tsangle was Bridge V. Between IV and V were the Log and Temporary bridges. The bridges were useless when the river was in spate. In October one could walk across the river bed. The Thagla ridge which sprawls from west to east overlooks Namka Chu and has four prominent passes Dum Dum La (17,000 feet), Karpola II (16,000 feet), Yamatso La (16,000 feet) and Thag La (14,000 feet).To get to Tawang the road traverses from Misamari up to 2743 metres to a place called Eagle's Nest, another 200 metres to Bomdi La. Then it drops to 1676 metres to Dirang Dzong, followed by an ascent to Se La at 4180 metres, another drop to 1524 metres to Jang with a final climb to Tawang (3048) metres. From here the journey had to be along tracks with mules and porters. There were no staging areas for acclimatisation.
PRELUDE
The dispute in this area revolved around Thagla Ridge. The Chinese claimed it was on the Tibetan side and India claimed it was on its side of the McMahon line. Accordingly in 1959 an Assam Rifles post was established at Khinzemane. The Chinese disputed it and a force of 200 Chinese pushed back the weak Indian force towards the bridge on the Nyamjang Chu at Drokung Samba which they claimed was the McMahon line.After the Chinese retired the Indians again reoccupied the post. The Chinese again tried to dislodge but this time were resisted by the Assam Rifles. This time they withdrew and started a chain diplomatic exchanges between the two Governments.
Under Nehru's forward policy some extra posts were ordered to be deployed on the McMahon line. One such post was proposed at the Tri junction. A party under Captain Mahabir Prasad from 1 Sikh went to locate the post. However due to heavy snowfall it could not access it, so they located the post at Che Dong on the southern bank of the Namka Chu. While the post was dominated by the surrounding area, it was easy to maintain with access to water. However this should have been a temporary post and should have been relocated at a later time. For some reason it never was. An Assam Rifles unit was sent to man it.
The Namka Chu TerrainOn September 8th, Chinese troops laid siege to the Assam Rifles post. In order to get a quick response the post commander inflated the number to 600 enemy troops. In many other places similar situations were met with an order to stay put. Probably because the higher number, the 7th Inf Bde were ordered to move in and evict the Chinese. The 7th Brigade was part of 4th Division commanded by Major General Niranjan Prasad.At this time two battalions of 7th Brigade, the 9 Punjab and 1 Sikh were in Towang, the 1/9 Gorkha Rifles in Misamari on its way back after a 3-year tenure in NEFA. There was no airfield and all maintenance was by air drops. Raw and un-acclimatised troops with cotton uniforms and canvas shoes were sent into the mountains. All this was done under public clamour and alerted the Chinese. The first man to protest was Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh. When Lt. Gen. Sen in charge of Eastern Command refused to heed his advice, he followed it up with a written protest.
14 Sept - 09 Oct 1962: Deployment
The 7th Inf. Bde. was commanded by Brigadier J.P. Dalvi and consisted of 9 Punjab, 4 Grenadiers, 2 Rajputs and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles plus some symbolic artillery. 9 Punjab was led by Lt. Col. R.N. Mishra. With harvesting time in the region the men had to move everything by themselves for the long arduous trek. Each man carried one blanket, 100 rounds of ammo, 2 grenades, 3 days rations and LMG clips. It came to 35 kg per person.After a forced march it reached Bridge 1 on September 14. Next morning leaving one company behind at Bridge I, Lt. Col. Mishra took the rest to Bridge II, where a company of Chinese troops was in position both sides of Namka Chu. Ignoring the Chinese shouts in Hindi to go back, he left two companies about 50 metres away and took the last one to the Che Dong post. The logs at Bridge II were destroyed and a 50-man Chinese detachment occupied the opposite side.
The next night the Punjabis at Bridge II crept in close forcing the Chinese to move most of their troops to the north bank.Meanwhile Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh's protests were causing a problem for the Government and the Army HQ. To avoid the impasse, General Thapar and Lt. Gen. Sen formed 4 Corps to handle NEFA leaving 33 Corps with Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh. Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul was put in charge of 4 Corps - an most unusual step for a Chief of General Staff (CGS) to to do with direct access to the Prime Minister.Lt. Gen. Kaul took charge on October 4th. Meanwhile 2 Rajput and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles had reached Lumpu. The men were in cotton uniforms, canvas shoes and were living in the open after marching through slushy roads. The 4 Grenadiers who had arrived at Tawang a few days earlier were in no better shape.The buildup of troops to Tsangdhar was slow. There were no porters and everything had to back packed.
Furthermore poor planning in the air drops did not help. Instead of snow clothes & ammo they got tent pegs, kerosene was dropped in 200L barrels. Many rolled down slopes and although some could be retrieved, many were given up. Especially high were losses from drops by C119s due to the higher speed of the aircraft.Meanwhile two platoons of MMGs from 6 Mahar and 34 Heavy Mortar Regiment reached Lumpu. The mortars had no ammo. A little later four 75mm guns of the 17 Field Parachute regiment were dropped at Tsangdhar.On October 6th, Lt. Gen. Kaul and Maj. Gen. Prasad made their way to Namka Chu. The Brigade HQ was located at Rongla and Tactical HQ at Zimithang. The troops were extended on a frontage of 12 miles or 20,000 yards - more than 6 times their normal frontage. Furthermore the Corps, Divisional and Brigade commanders were all there. Lt. Gen. Kaul now seeing for himself the deathtrap set up for the Indian troops tried get all available resources. He sent a message to Eastern Command for "marshalling of all military and air resources."
Late in the game Lt. Gen. Kaul realised what he had gotten into and was now desperate. The Govt. however was not ready to escalate the border clash into an all out war. Meanwhile the Grenadiers, Rajput and Gorkhas were on the way to Tsangdhar. The units had marched through severe cold, with groups of 3 men sharing 2 sheets. As mentioned they were in cotton uniforms resulting in a good deal of sick casualties; frostbite and pulmonary disorders. Two Gorkhas died of pulmonary-edema the next day.So Lt. Gen. Kaul now turned to his pet 'positional warfare' theory while Major General Prasad and Brigadier Dalvi wanted to find a way from their untenable position. The Chinese meanwhile had advantage of position and had now mustered up to a division at Thagla.
So Lt. Gen. Kaul set his plans in motion on the morning of October 8th. He decided that 2 Rajput would occupy Yamatso La west of Thag La peak as it was unoccupied using the Tseng-Jong approach. Brigadier Dalvi was stunned. The plan meant moving a battalion to a peak 16,000 feet above sea level under Chinese view with no artillery support. Brigadier Dalvi convinced Lt. Gen. Kaul to at least send a patrol of 9 Punjab to find a suitable crossing place for the Rajputs and cover them by taking positions at Tseng Jong. The Rajputs, less one company, left behind at Bridge 1 were to advance on first light October 10th.
The patrol of 9 Punjab led by Major Choudhary left on October 8th and established itself by 3 p.m. Meanwhile two companies of the 2 Rajput was in the Bridge 4 area with the rest at Dhola post. It was as unprepared with only 90 sleeping bags, no ammo for its 3" mortars.Meanwhile the close proximity between Chinese and Indian troops caused skirmishes. A grenade attack on September 20th on the Punjabis, was met with effective retaliation. 4 Punjabis were wounded and 1 Chinese was killed. October 9th passed uneventfully except for a grenade attack in the Bridge 4 area. One more platoon from the 9 Punjab had reinforced the Tseung Jong area and one section from it, was stationed at the spur of Karpo La II.
10 October 1962: The Skirmishes Begin
October 10th dawned without a hint of what was to come. At first light, Lt. Gen. Kaul was shaving while his batman was preparing tea. Suddenly the calm of the morning was shattered by the incessant fire of small arms fire and the thumps of mortars. The Tseung Jong position had come under fire and was retaliating. Around 8:00 a.m., 600 Chinese troops attacked the post.The Indians totaled 56 men with only pouch ammunition. Still they beat back the first assault. Around 9:30 a.m. the Chinese attacked a second time. By now the section at Karpo La II had moved to the flank of the Chinese. When the Chinese emerged, it opened up on them inflicting heavy casualties. The Chinese retaliated by bringing down mortar fire.As the first fire rang out the Rajputs were strung on the Southern bank of the Namka Chu. According to their orders they were hurrying up to Yamatso La. The forward company was about 450 meters from the Temporary bridge with Lt. Col. Maha Singh Rikh following behind with the second company.Lt. Gen. Kaul now proceeded to give another order. He asked Lt. Col. Rikh to hold on and set defensive positions. Protests about the positions being dominated by the Thag La ridge were brushed aside. He then left handing over command to Brigadier Dalvi saying, "It is your battle." Moreover a company of the 1/9 Gorkhas had to accompany the party to provide protection.
Meanwhile Major Chaudhary was asking for mortar and machine gun fire. Brigadier Dalvi had two 3" mortars and two machine guns but he had to make the painful decision of not opening fire as the retaliatory fire from the south bank would decimate the Rajputs who were still milling around. Helplessly they watched the Chinese reinforcements clamber up for a second attack.The Chinese attacked a third time from three directions and at this time Major Chaudhary asked the unit to withdraw. By that time the Chinese were on Major Chaudhary's position, hand-to-hand combat was in process. Somehow he withdrew what was left of his two platoons. Sepoy Kanshi Ram brought back a AK-47 snatched from a Chinese soldier. The withdrawal was made possible by the gallantry of Naik Chain Singh. Asking his men to fall back, Naik Singh covered their withdrawal with an LMG, till he was gunned down by a machine gun burst. Major Chaudhary, Sepoy Ram and Naik Singh were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. The Punjabis outnumbered 20 to 1 lost 6 dead, 11 wounded and 5 missing. Peking Radio admitted to a 100 casualties.Later that day the Chinese buried our men with full military honours in view of our men. It was a clever move to beguile the Indians into complacency. Meanwhile the Chinese started reinforcing their positions with more troops and heavy mortars. A long line of mules and porters were seen carrying equipment. Firing lines were cleared with mechanical saws, and barbed wire & punji sticks used to defend their positions.
Meanwhile the Grenadiers, led by Lt. Col. K.S. Harihar Singh, arrived and started deploying. The Chinese taunted them for their efforts to cut trees with machetes and digging tools. Attempts to withdraw the Punjabis from Tsangle were rebuffed by Lt. Gen. Kaul. The Lt. Gen. who was sick, instead of giving up his command and admitting himself to the hospital, went to his residence and commanded from from his sick bed. In the Army of 1962 this no longer seemed strange.On October 18th the Chinese preparations intensified. Officers were holding conferences and pointing out Indian positions at Namka Chu and Tsangdhar. Bearings were taken and noted down. Tsangle Post and Bridge V came under fire for 90 minutes. With a foot of snow falling, Brigadier Dalvi was forced to take whatever snow clothes from the men at Namka Chu and give it to those in Tsangle. A company of the 1/9 Gorkha Rifles was ordered to be deployed at Tsangle. Brigadier Dalvi protested at this piece meal deployment but was threatened with a court martial.The next day the Chinese activities climaxed. The Rajputs counted 2000 men with stores in the area between Tseng-Jong and Temporary Bridge. Mules and porters came across Thag La. Men were laying tape markers for night assaults. Brigadier Dalvi protested again asking to withdraw his men from this deathtrap. He offered to resign, rather than watch his men get massacred. Brigadier Dalvi thought the attack was going to come the next day and in three days his brigade would be wiped out. Major General Prasad promised he will be there the next day to share the fate of the brigade.
So by October 19th the troops were deployed as follows;
• 4 Grenadiers, commanded by Lt. Col. K.S. Harihar Singh
- 1 Bn less 2 Coy - Bridge I
- 1 Coy - Drokung Sambha (under Div HQ)
- 1 Coy - Serkhim with 1 platoon at Hathung La
• 9 Punjab, commanded by Lt. Col. R.N. Misra
- 1 Bn less 1 Coy - Bridge II
- 1 Coy - Bridge V and Tsangle
• 2 Rajput, commanded by Lt. Col. M.S. Rikh
Total Strength - 513 men, 8 Officers
- 1 Bn less 3 Coy - Bridge IV
- A Coy - Bridge III
- B Coy - Log Bridge
- C Coy - Temporary Bridge
• 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, commanded by Lt. Col. B.S. Ahluwalia
- 1 Bn less 2 Coy - Che Dong - Tsangdhar Track
- 1 Coy - behind Bridge II (near Brigade HQ)
- 1 Coy less platoon - Tsangdhar
- 1 Platoon - between Tsangdhar and Bridge V
• Assam Rifles
1 Platoon - Che Dong
• 34 Heavy Mortar Battery less platoon - Tsangdhar (no ammo)
• Field Regiment - 17 Para
1 Troop - Tsangdhar (2 operational - 260 rounds of ammo, no radio sets for OP)
• 6 Mahar
1 MG Coy less platoon*
(*Platoon with 1/9 GR, rest with Rajputs at Bridge V)
• 100 Field Coy - Rong La
• Brigade HQ - 100 yards behind Rola (Dhola Post)
Against this the Chinese forces consisted of 11th Division with 3 regiments (equal to a brigade).On the night of the 19th the Chinese went into their forming up areas. In utter contempt of the Indians across the river, they lit fires to warm themselves. To Major Gurdial, the 2-in-C of the 2 Rajputs, the idea of his under strength battalion fighting the hardened veterans of the Korean war seemed suicidal. He looked around at his isolated weak companies, un-acclimatised & weak, 150 rds/rifleman, 17 magazines (28 rounds) per LMG and 2 grenades per soldier. The battalion's 3" mortars had 60 rounds of ammo, equal to five minutes firing time.The night was dark and bitter cold. The stars stood out brightly. The sentries of 2 Rajput stood wrapped in blankets shuffling around to keep warm. The men were huddled in twos and threes for warmth. Still sleep eluded them as they waited for the stand to at 0430 hours.Unknown to them in the thousands of yards that separated the posts, with visibility under 20 yards, Chinese infantry columns were infiltrating through the large gaps. Fording the river was easy. To avoid slipping they removed their shoes and walked barefoot across. Once across they dried and wore warm socks. They quickly moved past the link roads where Indian patrols might operate.
The overhead communication wires were left alone to be cut just before the attack so that the Indians may not be alerted.Once in the dark shadows of the coniferous forests the noises were muffled by the thick moss on rocks. Slowly the Chinese columns gathered into battalions. Each got into a position above and behind the Rajput companies. Other columns likewise moved to the Tsangdhar position to take on the Gorkhas. Other Chinese columns had moved 2 nights before and gone to Hathung La to carry out blocking movements. The fires and other activity of the earlier nights had kept the defenders focus on the front. The plan was to hit like a battering ram at the centre, into the Rajputs, and the left flank and cutting off the rest of the troops.At 4:30 hours Lt. Col. Rikh was woken up by his batman. Outside the temp was well below zero and the fires lit by the Chinese still flickered. His adjutant, Captain Bhatia, who was to be posted to Poona soon was checking with the companies & patrols and they reported all was well. The first pre dawn light could be seen when the darkness was broken by the hollow booming sound of mortars. The muzzle flashes were followed by a pause before the valley erupted in a roar. It was 0514 hours and the Battle of Namka Chu had begun.
20 October 1962: The Battle
At 5:14 a.m. 150 guns and mortars opened upon all the localities at Namka Chu and Tsangdhar. The 82mm and 120mm rounds crashed into trees & rocks, forcing the men in the open to take refuge in the bunkers whose firing bays faced forwards. It continued for an hour, as the Indians helplessly watched unable to counter it with any weapon. The Indian 3" mortars made an futile attempt to fire back. Even as they tried to get the range right, the Chinese ranged in on them and blew them away. The signals bunker was zeroed in quickly using 75mm recoilless guns, and blown up, killing all in it including Captain Mangat - the Signals Officer.
Progress of Battle After an hour or so there was a brief lull for 7 - 15 minutes before the Chinese bugles and whistles for an infantry attack became audible. To the shock of the defenders, the attack was from above and behind. This meant their trenches were exposed and they had to scramble out of their bunker to face upwards.At Temporary Bridge, Subedar Dashrath Singh realised what was happening and moved Naik Roshan Singh's section to a bump 150 yards upslope. Barely had Roshan's men taken position when the Chinese came into view. With AK-47s opening up, they charged. Roshan and his men poured fire into the bunched up Chinese cutting down many.
2nd Lt Onkar Dubey with 7th platoon along with Subedar Janam Singh rushed with 15 LMG clips and 2 men to support Roshan. From the flanks he and his men poured fire on the Chinese breaking up two attacks. Firing the last 2 clips at the enemy he was severely wounded in the stomach & chest and fell down unconscious. He was later taken prisoner.Meanwhile Subedar Dashrath Singh's men turned uphill and opened fire on the advancing Chinese. The Chinese rushed down using cover from tree to tree. Dashrath and his men repulsed 3 attacks. On the fourth they came in to hand-to-hand combat losing four more men. Subedar Dashrath fell unconscious and was taken POW. On the eastern flank, Major B.K. Pant's D Coy platoon under Jemadar J.N. Bose came under attack. The crescendo of AK-47 fire overshadowed the noise of Indian LMGs and rifles.
Roshan's unit was finally overcome with every man killed. The attention now turned to Jemadar Bose's platoon. After three waves of assault there were only 10 men surviving. The gallant Bengali led the remaining men into a bayonet charge. Most of the men were killed. Major B.K. Pant meanwhile tried to rally the men. Hit at the beginning of the battle in the leg he had to take over after Major Sethi was killed in the first round of mortar attacks which collapsed his bunker.Hobbling from position to position he kept inspiring his men on. He was hit again in the stomach and leg. Still he continued to inspire his men to break a fourth attack. At this point the enemy targeted him and hit him all over with machine gun fire. He uttered the Regiment's war cry before his last breath.
Meanwhile at Log Bridge, B Company was having its own problems. As the first shells landed, Lt. Subhash Chander reacted quickly and turned his men around to face uphill. However a salvo of mortar shells set fire to his command post as well as the company kitchen. The resulting fire to ghee & wheat engulfed the post trapping him inside and burning him to death.Subedar Har Lal, of 5th platoon, now rallied his men quickly dispersing them amongst the trees and rocks. He kept exhorting his men and when ammo ran out asked them to use their rifles as lathis. Jemadar Gian Chand's 4th platoon too got a few minutes to get into position amongst the trees. They held of 3 waves of attacks before he too was overwhelmed.With Subedar Mohan Lal killed early in the battle only Naik Hoshiar with 6th platoon was left. With the other two platoons absorbing the first few attacks, 6th platoon got more time to get into position. Using their Lee Enfield .303s they inflicted heavy damage. In spite of firing upwards, the Rajputs were effective because the ricocheting bullets continued to drop the Chinese.
Little by little the superior volume of the Chinese AK-47s overwhelmed the Indians. With ammunition running out the Chinese moved in. Each and every soldier had to be overcome by hand-to-hand to combat. Percussion grenades were extensively used. As Naik Hoshiar ran out of ammo he grabbed a Sten gun and was trying to reload when a percussion grenade exploded, hitting him in the arms & chest. As he regained consciousness, he found four Chinese holding him. A services wrestler, Naik Hoshiar struggled for some time before being overpowered.Meanwhile the area under Bridge IV continued to get pounded with the Btn HQ getting special attention. Major Gurdial, 2-in-C, under mortar fire rallied his men around. Seeing no enemy activity across the river he realised the attack was coming from uphill. Frantically he tried to set the Vickers MG around to face uphill. Men were being hurried out of bunkers to face uphill. Lt. Bhup Singh joined up with Lt. Col. Rikh in the Btn command post.
The full brunt of the attack struck Lt. Bhup's 12th platoon under Jemadar Biswas, the Btn command post in the centre and Subedar Ram Chander's C platoon to the east. The bunched up Chinese were cut down by volley's of rifle and LMG fire. Yet the Chinese continued to attack. The advantage of the Ak-47s along with HE and percussion grenades thrown down proved decisive. The Indians had to throw uphill, a task much harder.As the men in the upper slopes struggled, some of the men in the lower slopes started withdrawing towards Bridge III including the 11 platoon led by Subedar B.C. Roy. Meanwhile the now depleted C Coy and the Btn HQ had held off two attacks. The Chinese attacked a third time from the south and south west. With Major Gurdial rallying them, they desperately tried to fight back but succumbed to the inevitable. Major Gurdial was overpowered and captured.
With the flanking platoons almost wiped out to a man the remnants fell back to the battalion bunker. Captain Bhatia and Lt. Col. Rikh and a few others were now in the bunker. The Chinese opened up with a machine gun trying to break through the bunker. When that failed, a Chinese soldier crawled up to the bunker and threw a grenade just as Lt. Col. Rikh was peeping out. The grenade hit his rifle and exploded, breaking his jaw and cutting his lips. Lt. Bhup rushed out and shot the Chinese soldier and dragged Lt. Col. Rikh back in. He was propped up and given an LMG to resume firing.Another Chinese LMG burst through the door killing Captain Bhatia and hit Lt. Col. Rikh again in the shoulder breaking it. He however managed to gun down the Chinese soldier. Yet another Chinese broke through and rounds hit him in the elbow and leg, consequently breaking them. The pain and loss of blood caused him to collapse. Lt. Bhup continued to hold them off with one jawan. The Chinese had now encircled three sides and were pouring machine gun fire. Finally the defenders' ammunition ran out. On this the Chinese threw percussion grenades and overpowered Lt. Bhup and the jawan.
The fourth and last locality, Bridge 3, was held by A company with a platoon of Assam Rifles holding the Che Dong are. The Assam Rifles held the top of the spur while 2 platoons No.1 and No.2, held the lower slopes 600 hundred feet below. A 3rd platoon held a position another 800 feet lower overlooking Bridge 3. The initial hour long shelling drove the Assam Rifles unit from the post. As the shelling lifted Captain Ravi Eipe began to move towards the Assam Rifles post to get a better view. As he approached there was firing from the post. Thinking it was the AR men firing in panic he shouted out. Soon he saw some figures in khaki and realised the Chinese had already taken over the post. He alerted Company Havildar Major Saudagar Singh's men to reposition themselves just as the attack began.The Chinese then attacked from the top and the West. Facing them were the 2 platoons of CHM Singh and Subedar Basdeo Singh. CHM Saudagar's men had reorganised and took a heavy toll on the attacking Chinese. CHM Singh himself snatched an AK-47 from a Chinese soldier and blew away 5 Chinese soldiers. By 0700 hours the platoons were being swarmed by Chinese troops. 1 platoon got cut off and fought to the death.
Captain Eipe was hit on the shoulder and could not take any further part. The remnants of the battered 2 and 3rd platoons were asked to withdraw. With this the last Rajput position was overrun. Temporary and Log Bridge were overpowered and the systematic mopping up began. The attack had begun at 5:14 a.m. with the shelling lasting till 6:30 a.m. By 9:30 a.m. mopping operations were in full swing till it ended at 11:30 a.m.The main positions of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles were above Che Dong on a track from the Assam Rifles post. 'D' Coy held the central location with 'A' and 'C' Coy on either side. The fourth company was above bridge II protecting the Brigade HQ. As the Gorkhas were getting into their morning stand, the first salvo of Chinese shells hit their positions. As the officers scrambled to figure the situations they found the telephone lines were dead. Now the Chinese who had infiltrated past them in the last 2 nights launched their attack. The Gorkhas fought back.
Their 3" mortars opened up only to be silenced by the Chinese guns. By 6:25 a.m., C Coy was under attack by 500 Chinese troops. Company Commander, Captain Gambhir, was killed and 2nd Lt. Dogra, platoon commander, was wounded. Lt. Col. Ahluwalia asked Subedar Major Jit Bahdur Chetri to take his men and reinforce 2nd Lt. Dogra's platoon. By 7:15 a.m. 2nd Lt. Dogra's platoon was overrun. Wounded, he continued to fight with an LMG allowing the remnants of his platoon to fall back. Subedar Dhan Bahadur Chand also covered with an LMG.By 7:30 a.m., A Coy was under attack from rear as well as the front. Lt. Col. Ahluwalia was wounded in the shoulder as hand-to-hand fighting began. With no hope, the CO ordered a withdrawal towards Tsangdhar. Meanwhile word came of Subedar Chetri's platoon being encircled and captured. Captain Mahabir Prasad and Lt. Mahindra were wounded and missing. The Gorkhas fell back in confusion. One lot went towards the Tsangdhar track the other towards Bridge II.
Many of the attempts to reach Karpo La II or Rong La were thwarted by the Chinese who got there ahead of them. Even at this point there were defiant attacks of bravery. Subedar Bhab Bahadur Katwal with 15 men was heading for Karpo La I. The route was blocked by a Chinese MMG. Subedar Bahadur lead his men in a charge with the Gorkha war cry, Ayo Gorkhali (The Gorkhas have come). The machine gun chattered and then there was silence. All the men were killed or wounded & captured. Small parties of men however did make it across the Chinese encirclement and reached Bhutan. Many others perished due to the cold & starvation as they tried to make their way in the cold, hostile and desolate mountains with no blankets or winter clothing.The Sikh Para Gunners also displayed an astonishing defiance. With no ammo they took up LMGs & rifles and fought the Chinese after the Gorkha platoons were overrun. The Chinese encircled them and called them to surrender. They refused and continued fighting till they ran out of ammo. One third were killed and the rest were wounded and captured.
7th Brigade had lost all cohesion within the first hour of the battle. By 8 a.m. the first stragglers of the 1/9 Gorkha's came back to HQs with news that the Btn was overrun. This meant his middle & left defences were already broken. Small arms fire was now homing in on Brigade HQ. Brigadier Dalvi now got Div HQ's permission to leave Rong La and fall back to Tsangdhar hoping to reform and fight.The Rajputs and Gorkhas were expected to fall back to Tsangdhar. Brigadier Dalvi and his men left for Tsangdhar after destroying all documents. However they soon found that Tsangdhar was already breached and changed directions to Serkhim. The group wandered around for days avoiding Chinese patrols. At one point they had been without food for 66 hours. Sometime on the morning of October 22nd they ran into a Chinese Company and were captured.At Bridge II, the 9 Punjab had not been shelled. After communications with Brigade HQ was cut off, they remained in touch with Div HQ. At 11 a.m. on October 20th, Major General Prasad ordered them to withdraw to Hathung La. The withdrawal attracted heavy Chinese mortar fire. This was followed by an attack on the positions of 'D' Coy under Major Chaudhary.
Once again repeated attacks collapsed the defence and all the men went down fighting. Another group of 20 men under Havildar Malkiat Singh were on their way to reinforce the Tsangla defences. They stumbled into a large Chinese force. In the unequal encounter, the Punjabis inflicted heavy casualties before going down. Havildar Singh was amongst those who were killed. With the Chinese reaching Hathung La before the Punjabis, they too had to take the route through Bhutan.At Drokung Samba, C Coy of Grenadiers came under attack from three sides by a battalion of the Chinese. Soon the bridge was blown up cutting off any withdrawal. With no hopes, the men under 2nd Lt. Rao fought wave after wave of attacks. Most including the 2nd Lt. Rao were killed. The rest of the Grenadiers at Bridge I received orders to pull out and managed to escape through Bhutan. It took them 17 days.Thus ended the Battle of Namka Chu. The word 'battle' is grossly misleading, for what was essentially a massacre. Within the first hour of the battle 7th Brigade had lost all cohesiveness. It was then essentially a desperately one-sided battle with many Indian platoons fighting to the death, to the last round, last man.
The 2 Rajputs suffered horrendously but lived up to the Regiment's reputation. Of the 513 all ranks, 282 were killed that morning, 81 were wounded and captured, 90 were captured unwounded. Only 60 men, mostly rear elements got away.The Gorkhas lost 80 dead, 44 wounded and 102 captured. The 7th Brigade lost a total of 493 men that morning. The Chinese also lost heavily. Lt. Col. Rikh was captured & subjected to repeated interrogations on the characteristics of the Rajputs. He was told it was because the Chinese suffered their maximum casualties in NEFA (North East Frontier Agency).In the bitter flush of defeat, the valour of these men went un-recognised. In the small village of Lumpu, on the track leading to the Hathung La pass, stands a memorial. A memorial consisting of a tin shed under which loose wooden boards are stacked with names of those who fell in the battle. To rub salt in the wounds, not all the men are mentioned. This is considered sufficient to honour them!
A poem by Ms. Harji Malik captures the anguish of the men;
As the brutal rock shatters the placid glass
into a thousand irreparable fragment
A bitter grief is hurled at normalcy and peace.
Never will they be quite complete again
The crack of pain and death will always show
The weeping of wives bereft, of the anguished old
Will echo down the years of history
The wasted unspent lives, the loss of years
Too many to be counted
Too precious to be valued
A generation unborn, man's immortality...
there is the bitterness
So violent that the heart revolts and weeps
unceasing, arid, unshed tears
The sense of shame, of betrayal unforgivable
Never to be redeemed
Of sacrifice avoidable, insensate
that is the guilt we share
The valley is silent shrouded in death's immobility final and absolute.
But the soundless cry from the mountains beats upon our ears
Pitiless and Undeniable
We died, unsecured, helpless
We were your soldiers, men of bravery and pride
Yet we died like animals, trapped in a cage with no escape
Massacred at will, denied the dignity of battle
With the cold burning flame of anger and resolution
With the courage both of the living and the dead.
Avenge our un-played lives
Redeem the unredeemable sacrifice
In freedom and integrity
Let this be your inheritance
and our unwritten epitaph.
Copyright © BHARAT RAKSHAK.
Battle of Namka Chu, 10 Oct - 16 Nov 1962
this is long but they are great war stories,histories of Indian Army
The sacrifices made by our Army,for our country,for our future must always be remembered.....
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