STARFIGHTER in the PAF battle fleet

[dexter]

I have made this thread to gather all info regarding PAF F-104 Star Fighters in 1965 and 1971 from multiple sources so keep the discussion healthy and troll free.

F-104 Starfighters in PAKISTAN AIR FORCE:

Introduction:

by Columnist Gp Capt. SM HALI

Pakistan, which remained an important ally of the United States throughout the cold war was the first non-NATO country to equip with the F-104 Starfighter. The F-104 As and Bs provided to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) under the US Mutual Defence Assistance Programme entered service in 1961 and continued to fly until 1972 when dwindling spares support forced their early retirement. In all twelve F-104As and two F-104 Bs were transferred to Pakistan.

At PAF’s request, all its F-104As were refitted with the M-61 Gatling 20 mm gun, whereas its counterparts in the USAF had been divested of their guns on the assumption that all post-Korea air combat would occur at high speeds where only the wing tip-mounted Sidewinder missiles would be effective. The PAF’s foresight was amply rewarded in actual combat and the USAF too reverted to having machine guns as mandatory equipment on all its fighters in due course. The newer GWE- J-79-11 engine was also installed on the aircraft. This made the Pakistan F-104s somewhat unique: they had the gun and being the lightest of F-104 series with a more advanced J-79 engine enjoyed the best thrust-to-weight ratio.

The only PAF unit to be equipped with the F-104 was No 9 Air Superiority Squadron. The squadron flies the F-16 today. The in-commission rate of the F-104 during the first five years of service was over 80 % and all its systems performed with high reliability. The fighter was employed in the air-to-air role by the PAF and was used extensively for aerial gunnery against both banner targets and the Dart targets with excellent scores. In strafing attacks the M-61 gun was superbly accurate.

The F-104 Starfighters remained in service with Pakistan Air Force for twelve years and flew 11,690 hours. During the 1965 Pakistan-India War, the F-104s flew a total of 246 hours and 45 minutes while during the 1971 War, the F-104s flew a total of 103 hours and forty-five minutes.

F-104 56-798 seen during the early 70s.
End of a Legend:
By: Usman Shabbir and Yawar Mazhar

Despite limited numbers (the Jordanian F-104s were available only in the last part of the war); the Starfighters flew a total of 104 sorties during the war. A more detailed breakdown of the sorties is,

i) Air Defence (Day) – 56 sorties (incl 27 over battle area)
ii) Air Defence (Night) – 18 sorties
iii) Counter Air – 24 sorties
iv) Maritime Recce – 6 sorties

The remaining eight Jordanian F-104s supported by a PAF C-130 were flown back to Jordan about twenty days after the war ended. PAF offered Jordan one F-104 in lieu of the single Jordanian Starfighter lost, an offer which was declined by Jordan.

After the 1971 war due to continuous arms embargo and limited numbers due to accumulative attrition it became virtually impossible for Pakistan Air Force to maintain a reasonable in-commission rate on the F-104s. Subsequently it was decided by the PAF to phase it out of service in late 1972. This ended the memorable story of PAF and its love with an engineering marvel, remembered by many as a “missile with a man in it”.

After the phase out the remaining airframes were preserved at PAF Museum and various air bases as gate guardians. Out of the total 14 F-104s received six survived 11 years of service and two wars to earn their retirement. These six include four A models and two B models.

1965 Pakistan-India War:
During the 1965 War, PAF was forced to rely on its small force of F-104A Starfighters as high altitude interceptors and in its night fighting role, using the radar of its AN/ASG-14T1 fire-control system, in conjunction with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

After 1 September, the F-104s were extremely active in Air Defence and Air Superiority Operations, but of the 246 missions flown by F-104s during hostilities, 42 were at night against the IAF Canberras. The rudimentary fire-control radar met the Soviet high altitude bomber threat of the Cold War era for which it was designed but it could not illuminate small targets against ground clutter. The standard high speed intercept tactic employed by PAF’s F-104 pilots was to approach their targets from below, with a typical height differential of 2-3,000 feet, against a target they wished to acquire at a range of 10-15 kilomenters. This limitation was well known to the Canberra jet bomber pilots of IAF who attacked targets in Pakistan during the 1965 war. They adopted a standard hi-lo-hi profile to minimize the threat of interception. During most of their inbound and outbound flight over Pakistani territory the IAF Canberras would stay below about 1000 feet during their approach and exit phases. This posed a difficult night intercept problem. The PAF’s F-104s had in these circumstances to be used in an unconventional low-altitude intercept profile that severely challenged the capabilities of its airborne radar. To pick up the low flying bombers on their scope the F-104 pilots had to get down to about 300-500 feet above the ground to point their radars upward and clear of ground clutter at the enemy bombers. The problem was aggravated by the Canberra’s tail warning audio alarm that would go off the moment an F-104 got to a near astern position, and enable the bomber to take timely evasive action to shake off its pursuer.

PAF F-104 Starfighter and B-57 flight line.

Starfighter Strikes
By Wg Cdr Aftab Alam Khan, Pakistan Air Force (Retd):

The balloon went up on the morning of 6th September 1965. I got airborne with my wingman on a CAP mission. We climbed out under radar control, and were directed to the border near Kashmir. I was informed that the IAF had crossed the Pakistani border and were attacking ground positions approximately 80nm south of us. This meant that India had actually decided to start an all out war. We were immediately vectored to the area, and were soon over the site where the Indian aircraft were attacking. While dawn was breaking at 15,000 feet, it was still dark down below. I asked for permission to descend to ground level, but was denied. The reason given was that radio contact would be lost. I, however, decided to descend and leaving my wingman at 15,000 feet, to act as radio relay, I dove down and headed towards some flashes. As I reached the area, I was surprised to see that I was flying head-on into a formation of four IAF Mystere IV aircraft that were attacking ground targets. I was shocked more than I was surprised, as I felt a wave of anger leap through me. I had to shoot down these aircraft. I jettisoned my external fuel tanks and started to engage the Mysteres, as they turned into me. Maneuvering started at tree top level. I kept my eyes 'glued' on the target. I could feel the strain, under high 'G's', looking over the tail of the aircraft, keeping the enemy in sight, and skimming the trees at high speed. One mistake, and I would have hit the ground. If I had lost sight of the Mysteres, the fight would have been over. The F-104, with the afterburner blazing, at low altitude, was responding very well. I used the high speed take -off Flaps to improve the turning capability as required. The 'Stick Shaker' was a big help, in flying the aircraft to its limit.

The Mysteres would have no problem keeping the F-104 in sight because of its afterburner. After some hectic maneuvering, I was positioned behind two aircraft, but the other two were still not visible. I then spotted them, further ahead. Joy leapt through me; I armed my weapons, and decided to shoot the first two with missiles and the next two with guns. I fully realized that a confidential order prohibited me from using the missiles below 10, 000 ft. However, I was sure the missiles could be used effectively at any height, provided the targets could be discriminated from background heat sources. A distinct increase in missile tone ensured this. I set the wingspan of the Mystere IV, and started to recall the missile-firing checklist. 'Check Range', 'Check Tone', 'Check G's', 'Squeeze the trigger and hold'. I aimed the missile at the nearest aircraft, and heard the loud pitched missile tone. The sight indicated that I was in range. With all other requisite firing conditions met, I squeezed the trigger, and kept it pressed. I waited, only to note that the missile had not fired. As I looked towards the left missile, I saw a big flash, and the missile leaving the aircraft. The missile had taken, as stipulated in the manual, approx. 8/10ths of a second to fire after the trigger had been pressed but in combat, this seemed like an eternity. The flash of the missile blinded me for a few seconds. The radar controller who was also monitoring the radio of the Mystere's, immediately informed me that one Mystere had been shot down and that another had been damaged. I was then at once instructed to turn right and pick up visual contact with the other Mysteres, which were exiting. I turned as directed but could not see them.

On landing back, I was informed that the dog fight had taken place overhead the Rahwali Airfield where a low powered radar was located. The Mystere's wreckage had fallen close by; the other three had gotten away. It gave me great satisfaction and amusement to think the effect that would be created on the IAF when the tale of the encounter with, 'the F-104' was narrated by the pilots who got away. To quote Hussaini, the PAF's official aviation painter, 'Apart from being the first encounter to start the war in earnest, the engagement was also significant in other respects. It marked a new era in dogfighting at very low altitude. It was also the first combat kill by any Mach 2 aircraft and the first missile kill for the Pakistan Air Force'. Moreover, it was also proven that the F-104 and the Sidewinder missile were an effective weapon system at low altitude.

Mystery of the Downed Mystère
By Air Cdre. Kaiser Tufail, Pakistan Air Force (Retd):

The evening of 6th September 1965 saw mixed fortunes for the PAF after its pre-emptive strikes against IAF’s forward bases. Pathankot had been administered a crippling blow, with ten aircraft destroyed and several more damaged on the ground; however, the strikes against Adampur and Halwara proved largely futile. The latter strike was particularly costly, as PAF had lost two of its top pilots. The mood at Sargodha base was therefore as vengeful as it was sombre.

At the IAF Headquarters in Delhi, the Air Staff mulled over the response to PAF’s pre-emptive strikes of 6th September 1965 and came up with a belated plan to hit Sargodha. With Pathankot still nursing its wounds, it fell to the lot of Adampur and Halwara to spearhead IAF’s retaliation. Mystère IVAs from Adampur were to open the proceedings on the dawn of 7th September. As the orders got delegated, Wg Cdr O P Taneja, Officer Commanding of No 1 Sqn was assigned to lead the first twelve-ship raid on Sargodha, while Sqn Ldr ‘Mickey’ Jatar of No 8 Sqn was to lead an eight-ship attack against Bhagtanwala. Both strikes had a planned Time-On-Target (TOT) of 0530 hrs (PST), which was about fifteen minutes before sunrise, barely bright for accurate navigation and weapons delivery.

Despite marginal visibility, Jatar’s formation managed to reach Bhagtanwala; however, it turned out to be an exercise in futile rocketing and strafing of decoys at an emergency landing strip, which had been erroneously believed to be fully operational. A safe exit by the full complement was the only worthwhile achievement of No 8 Sqn.

Taneja’s raid was eventful though, with things starting to happen soon after take-off. Even before they had formed up in a stream of three sections of four Mystères each, two aircraft from the second section developed snags and aborted.

The ground reserve, Sqn Ldr A B Devayya, was called up to fill in. Shortly thereafter the third section had to abort the mission after its leader, Sqn Ldr Sudarshan Handa, lost visual contact with the formation ahead and drifted off course.

Although Sargodha already had a CAP of two Sabres and a lone Starfighter airborne, the first inkling of IAF’s arrival was the sight of six Mystères pulling up to deliver their attack at 0538 hrs (PST). Taneja’s raid had achieved complete surprise and Sargodha lay at the mercy of No 1 Sqn. “The first we knew about the raid was when we heard the thunder of rockets followed by the stutter of cannon,” recollected Gp Capt Zafar Masud, Station Commander Sargodha.

As at other operational bases, Sargodha too had its squadron of wooden decoys. Tanejas’s pilots were quick to train their guns and rockets on the enticing dummies, one of which obligingly caught fire. Implausible as it may seem, six of the real planes escaped unscathed, despite being dangerously exposed at the Operational Readiness Platform (ORP). Throwing away a rare opportunity of avenging Pathankot’s battering, the Mystères pulled out of their attack and exited.

Just as the six Mystères were re-forming on their way out, the lone reserve Mystère piloted by Devayya streamed in. Surviving the AAA fire, which by now had become quite intense and focused, he carried out a quick attack and scurried off at low level. Flt Lt Amjad Hussain Khan of No 9 Sqn, who had been flying the Starfighter, was ‘vectored’ by Sakesar radar to catch up with the raid exiting south-east; obviously, the first target he saw was the straggler, Sqn Ldr Devayya's Mystère.

Charging in at great speed, Amjad got behind Devayya's low-flying Mystère and let loose a Sidewinder missile, only to see it plonk into the ground. With a poor heat discrimination capability, the first generation heat-seekers could not tell the difference between jet exhaust and hot terrain.

Amjad had taken a chance at a mile-long shot but as he closed in, he switched to the deadly six-barrelled Vulcan revolver-cannon. Its 20mm bullets fired at such a tremendous rate that inside the cockpit, it sounded like a piece of canvas was being ripped up. Amjad recalls that as he opened fire, the bullets didn’t quite land on the aircraft. Realising that his pipper (gunsight aiming index) was a bit off-target he corrected and fired again. The Mystère broke to the right, appearing to pass through the stream discharging hundred bullets a second. Certain that the stricken aircraft was doomed, Amjad broke off to improve his tally.

On the lookout for other Mystères, Amjad soon spotted one that was turning for him. To give himself enough manoeuvring room, Amjad pulled up for a ‘yo-yo’ bouncing upto 7,000 ft and then down to low level again. As he tried to get behind the Mystère, Amjad realised that he was up against a very determined pilot who was unwilling to give any quarter. Amjad was forced to do another ‘yo-yo’ to prevent an overshoot. The fight dragged on for a while and, with a series of turns into each other, developed into a classic ‘scissors’ manoeuvre. Manoeuvrability is not what the Starfighter was designed for. With diminutive, razor-sharp wings and a powerful engine, it could substitute as a rocket for astronaut training but when it came to air combat, perhaps a boulder could do better. This lesson drove home late for Amjad as he pressed the trigger a moment too long for a shot of opportunity, while crossing the Mystère’s tail. With little residual lift available for manoeuvring and high rate of closure, the inevitable happened — the Starfighter rammed into the stricken Mystère! His controls frozen, Amjad ejected with barely enough time for the parachute to blossom fully.

At Kot Nakka, a village about five miles south of Pindi Bhattian, people were starting their daily chores when they heard the sound of jets. Recalls Bashir Ahmed, who was then 37 years old, “two aircraft approached from the direction of Sargodha and got into a turning fight for several minutes. Then the rear aircraft started firing its cannon; it was, however, so fast that it collided with the front one. We saw the pilot of the rear aircraft come down by parachute; it was later learnt that his name was Amjad. The other aircraft went down across Jhang canal close to Hinduana village. Its pilot did not eject and was killed.” Like Bashir, many other residents of Kot Nakka saw the collision. According to them, the PAF pilot had heroically rammed his aircraft when he ran out of ammunition, a lore that survives to this day! After a regal horse ride till the village, Amjad was taken in a procession to Pindi Bhattian where he was applauded as a hero and profusely garlanded. Back to Sargodha by helicopter, Amjad was up for action the same evening.

Devayya had, in fact, survived the first volley of bullets and his aircraft was in control. Undaunted, he had chosen to fight on though he would hardly have enough fuel left to land back safely; but Devayya was destined never to return. Apparently incapacitated by the impact of the collision, he was unable to eject. His body was found intact, thrown clear of the wreckage; it was later buried by the villagers in the nearby fields.

Back at Adampur, an anxious Taneja kept waiting for Devayya so that he could join the mission debrief. Everyone hoped that Devayya was taking his time in No 32 Sqn Flight Lines while returning their borrowed aircraft. On inquiry from the Flight Lines, suspicions were confirmed that all was not well. With no details from any quarter, Devayya was eventually listed as missing in action.

Sonic Booms over Amritsar

After PAF shot down IAF Vampires over Chamb on September 1st, 1965,on 5th September, overjoiced by their first confirmed kill (a Sabre was lost to a Gnat a day earlier), IAF flew large formations of Hunters, MiG-21Fs, Gnats, Mystere IV-As and Canberras close to the border cities of Lahore, Gujranwala and Gujrat region. This was their show of power that they can attack anywhere in large numbers. Interceptions were called but no contact were made with the enemy as the IAF aircraft managed to get a clean getaway. The PAF higher command wanted to send a clear warning message to Indians, not to mess with Pakistan and the PAF was fully capable to meet the challenges. The war was not officially declared at that time. So F/L Farooq Umar, who was on dusk CAP mission over Kashmir, was ordered by the PAF CAS to break the sound barrier over the famous Indian city. He reached the city and crossed the sound barrier at low altitude. The PAF CAS Air Marshall Nur Khan, not satisfied, ordered for a second pass. The Starfighter came in again, this time in opposite direction and rocked the city with massive sonic booms. There was panic on the ground and even IAF did not come to intercept. Later that evening, All India Radio announced that Pakistan had rocketed Amritsar city!!!! Despite Indian Ack ack, F-104 headed back to Sargodha unscratched and landed safely. The war was still to come.

The painting depicts PAF F-104 piloted by F/L Farooq Umer, crossing sound barrier over Golden Temple, Amritsar, India.

 

[dexter]

F-104 Starfighter Air Superiority Missions:

Air Superiority Operations

To maintain its air superiority, and to capitalise on the decisive edge it had gained in air combat, the PAF made several determined attempts between 8 and 23 Spetember to lure IAF into air engagements, through prolongef CAPs and even fighter sweeps. The original plan to maintain continuous operation over the Sialkot, Lahore and Kasur areas to deter enemy from attacking Pak Army units and to intercept IAF close support aircraft.

Attempts were also made, particularly by the F-104s, to provoke the IAF into action by flying across the border into India. But the IAF invariably refused the challenge, although PAF fighters sometimes flew as far as Amritsar and beyond. Single F-104s patrolled almost daily for thirty minutes at a time between Halwara and Adampur at dawn and dusk without any Indian reaction, and at night the Starfighters penetrated as much as 100 miles into enemy territory to try and intercept the IAF Canberras, with no fear of opposition.

Even low level, daylight reconnaissance missions over the main IAF fighter airfields failed to produce any Indian reaction. One pilot from 9 Squadron, Flight Lieutenant Aftab Alam Khan, made as many as three visits during daylight to photograph Halwara, and found that the speed of the Starfighter gave the Indians no time to react at all, even after several passes over the airfield. The F-104s were also used to escort the slow photo reconnaissance RT-33s of 20 Squadron on missions deep into Indian territory, the presence of the Starfighters virtually guarenteeing that no air opposition would be encountered. A couple of Hunters were seen in the distance on one RT-33 escort mission to Halwara, but they stayed well clear of the PAF aircraft, which continued their task unmolested.

The pilots of No.9 Squadron competed fiercely, to undertake as many combat missions as they could. Never missing a chance to close with the enemy, hungry for combat. In the days that followed, the F-104 pilots noted that whenever they got airborne, the IAF grounded all its aircraft. This made it very difficult for the F-104 pilots to engage the enemy during daytime hours. Flt Lt Mushtaq, flying a F-104, made contact with the enemy, only to note that as he approached the target, the IAF Hunters disengaged well in time. Flt Lt 'Micky' Abbas in an F-104 had a similar episode. This experience would be repeated for the F-104 pilots for all daytime interceptions. Flt Lt Aftab personally patrolled in a lone F-104, at 30,000ft, deep inside Indian territory, over the two Indian fighter airfields of Adampur and Halwara for one hour, and there was no response from the Indian side, no IAF fighter aircraft were scrambled to engage the intruder leisurely loitering over Indian airbases. This was total air superiority, and it displayed the complete and utter supremacy the Starfighter enjoyed over the IAF. At medium and high altitudes the F-104 ruled the sky. The IAF refused to challenge the Starfighter, keeping at a safe arm's length distance from challenging it. The F-104 by controlling the sky at medium and high altitude, had reduced the workload for the F-86 's to the extent that the disparity in numbers was manageable.

Missed Opportunity
By: Wg Cdr Aftab Alam Khan, Pakistan Air Force (Retd.)

"The reconnaissance flights revealed that the forward IAF bases had only approximately forty aircraft each at Adampur and Halwara, and even fewer than that at Pathankot. Where were the rest of the IAF aircraft? This got me thinking, and I went on to study the map. Moving further east from the Indian Airfields of Adampur and Halwara were Agra and Delhi. These airfields were 350nm from Sargodha. There was no attack aircraft in the PAF inventory that could reach these airfields flying at low level. If an aircraft approached at a high altitude level, it could easily be intercepted. I, therefore presumed that the Indians would have the bulk of their aircraft at these bases, and because they were sure they could not be attacked, the aircraft would be in the open. Pakistan had the F-104A with the J-79-11A engine, which was very fuel-efficient. This gave the PAF F-104's an extended range capability. I marked the route and was surprised to note that if we took off with four tanks and jettisoned them as they went empty, we could reach these bases while maintaining a speed of 540 knots at low level. It would also allow us to make two gun attacks, exit at 600 knots to the border, climb to attain height and land back with 1000 lbs of fuel remaining.

The plan looked like a very exciting possibility to me. I thought of 'Pearl Harbor'; complete surprise could be achieved. I stayed up all night, made the Flight plan, and next morning made the proposal to my Squadron Commander. He told me that he was against submitting the proposal, as it was too risky. I then took the plan to the Wing Leader who had been my instructor on the Harvard T-6G. He said that it was a good plan but refused to take it any higher. I then went to the Base Commander. He said he liked it, but he would not make the proposal to the high command. There was nobody else to go to.....

Immediately after the war, the Air Chief ordered a high altitude recee mission of the airfields at Agra and Dehli. This was to be flown by the B-57F (Droopy), a four engined Fanjet modified B-57 that had replaced the U 2, and was flown by Pakistani pilots. The reccee Flight revealed that Agra and Dehli were sprawling with aircraft. If the F-104 had attacked Dehli and Agra, it could have been a historic day for the PAF, as well as for the IAF to remember. This was the greatest chance missed by the PAF and the F-104. After the war I had a chance to discuss the plan with the Air Chief, he said that he would definitely ordered the attack if it had been brought to his notice."

The Last Flight
By: Wg Cdr Aftab Alam Khan, Pakistan Air Force (Retd)

A cease-fire had been agreed to, and the fighting was to stop at 3 am on 23rd September, 1965. I was told to confirm the same from the air. The visibility was excellent, but it was a dark night. From 30,000ft, I could see the firing along the bombline. It looked like a ping pong match. Exactly at 3 a.m. the firing started to slow down and then it stopped completely. I made the report and was ordered to land back at the home base. As I came on for final approach, I noticed the runway was tilted to the left, I turned left, and discovered that I was no longer aligned with the runway. I approached the runway in a zig- zag manner and decided to go around and try again. I guess the stress, fatigue and landing conditions were creating illusions. I asked for my Squadron Commander, who came immediately, I explained the problem, and he gave me the necessary instructions. The next approach was worse, after which I had fuel left for two further attempts. I tried again, and was told to overshoot. My Squadron Commander then told me to eject on the down wind; he was getting the helicopter airborne. Now I only had 200lbs of fuel left, just enough for one last approach. At this time the air traffic controller requested permission to switch on the entire airfield’s lights, as the war was over. As soon as this was done, my senses returned to normal, and a safe landing was carried out. Thus ended the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The F-104 and myself had seen the start, and we saw it finish, a lucky and historic coincidence.

F-104's Successfull Night Interception:

By: Wg Cdr Aftab Alam Khan, Pakistan Air Force (Retd)

The F-104 was the only night fighter with the PAF. Its radar was good for high altitude, line astern missile attack, but was unusable below 5000 ft, because of ground clutter. Also, if the target started to turn, it was not possible to deliver a missile attack. These were the limitations of the system. The IAF Canberra bombers would operate at night, usually below 500 feet. One aircraft would drop flares while others bombed the targets. After delivering their ordinance they would exit at low altitude, but as they approached the border, the Canberra's would start climbing. At this time the F-104's would be vectored for the intercept. The IAF had also installed tail warning radars on their Canberras. As the F-104 started to get into a firing position, the bombers would start a defensive turn and radar contact would be lost. Twice, I had made radar contact but as I closed into missile range, the aircraft executed a defensive maneuver. Only Sqn Ldr Jamal A Khan was lucky enough to shoot down a Canberra. He executed a perfect 'text book ' attack, with a missile launch. The Canberra Pilot was captured. He stated that the tail warning radar made very annoying beeping sounds at low level, therefore, he had switched it off, and he had forgotten to switch it on again as he had climbed out. Although the F-104 made only one night kill, it did achieve an ancillary objective, i.e. it did prevent the enemy from doing damage. The threat or fear of the F-104, forced the Canberras to operate at low altitude levels, once over Pakistani airspace. This prevented the attacking pilots from making determined attacks. They did not, or could not properly identify their targets, and thus dropped their bombs at random, doing little or no damage.

As the 1965 war progressed, a radar controller assigned to the army gun radar unit told me that the army radar could spot the IAF Canberras very clearly at night, but the track length was limited to approximately 20 NM. I realized that this was good enough for the F- 104 to make an interception. With its high speed it could position itself behind the target very quickly, and once this was done, the F-104 could be aligned with the help of its InfraRed (IR) gunsight for a missile or a gun attack. The Canberra tail warning radar was ineffective at low altitude. To get the system functioning, only a radio had to be installed in the army radar unit. The war ended before the system was made effective and put into practice.

Flying the high speed F-104 at night in war time conditions was hazardous. The environment was as hostile and dangerous as the enemy. When there was no moon visible, the nights were pitch dark, as the blackout was complete. Haze and poor visibility was common. The runway lights were switched on once the aircraft was about to pitch out for a landing, we were lucky if we could see the airfield lights on downwind, and turning base. The landing conditions were severe. The TACANs were not aligned with the runways, there were no approach lights, ILS or VASI. It was under these conditions that Flt Lt Abbasi, while making an approach, crashed short of the runway. The F-104 was completely destroyed but he miraculously escaped and survived to fly again.

END OF A NIGHT INTRUDER
0409 HOURS, 21 SEPTEMBER 1965 - FAZILKA AREA

In the closing days of the September 1965 War an Indian Canberra on a night bombing raid against Sargodha was shot down by an F-104 near the border and its pilot who ejected was captured.

The painter chose the only moment of the episode when some details could have become clearly visible on an otherwise dark night. The area was brightly lit up when the burning, sprialling Canberra, hit at 32,000 feet, reflected light off a layer of clouds at 10,000 feet. The pilot of F-104 was Squadron Leader Jamal A Khan (later Chief of the Air Staff) and the Controller Squadron Leader Anwar Ahmad from Sakesar Radar. This is said to be the only confirmed missile kill at night in actual combat by an F-104 Starfighter anywhere in the World.

 

[dexter]

Run … it’s a 104:

Sikky's Gnat at Pasrur.
By Air Cdre. Kaiser Tufail, Pakistan Air Force (Retd):

The loss of four Vampires on the opening day of the ’65 War was a major blow to the morale of the IAF and, it was felt in all quarters that something had to be done urgently. A grudge fight was, therefore, planned and the nimble Gnat was chosen as the most suitable fighter. Its small size, good turning ability and fast acceleration were seen to be lethal attributes vis-à-vis PAF’s main fighter, the Sabre. A detachment of eight Gnats from Ambala-based No 23 Squadron was flown to Pathankot and Sqn Ldr William Greene was deputed to lead it. Greene had done his Fighter Leader’s Course from UK and was busy imparting his air combat skills to the Squadron pilots when the war broke out. The more senior Flight Commander, Sqn Ldr Brij Pal Singh Sikand held no grudge in ceding command of the detachment to Greene, in view of the latter’s experience.

Soon after landing at Pathankot on the evening of 2nd September, Greene was told plainly in an Operations brief that the patrolling Sabres had to be tackled at any cost. The plan consisted of four Mystères luring the Sabres, while eight low flying Gnats popped up and pounced from two different directions. While the plan was bold, the large number of aircraft demanded a high order of formation integrity and radio discipline. Also, the operation had to be conducted swiftly since the Gnat’s limited fuel did not permit a prolonged turning fight.

As the IAF had expected, the morning of 3rd September saw PAF Combat Air Patrols over Akhnur area. Pak Army’s 7 Division had put in a request for air cover while its reinforcing elements forded River Tawi during the offensive against Akhnur. At first light, two Sabres and a Starfighter started a vigil which was continued an hour later by another similar trio. The Sabre pair included Flt Lt Yusuf Ali Khan and Flg Off Abdul Khaliq of No 11 Squadron. The singleton was flown by No 9 Squadron’s Flg Off Abbas Mirza, whose schoolboy looks belied his proficiency at handling the aerodynamic wonder that was the F-104 Starfighter.

After patrolling for a while, the Sabres were warned about four bogeys approaching Akhnur at high altitude. Outnumbered two to one, Yusuf decided to go for them anyway and asked for intercept instructions. Before he could pick contact with the reported bogeys up in the sky, his eyes caught a glimpse of four Gnats zooming from below. Yusuf immediately ordered jettisoning of drop tanks but one of his wingmen’s tanks did not go. While groping with the switches to sort the problem, Abdul Khaliq lost sight of his Leader and, in effect ended up being a liability. Yusuf, therefore, instructed him to head for home and impulsively decided to handle the complex situation all by himself.

The four Mystères, having apparently lured the patrolling Sabres, turned north and exited the battle area, leaving the Gnats to strike from behind. Led by Greene, the front Gnat section consisted of Flg Off M R Murdeshwar as No 2, Sqn Ldr Sikand as No 3 and Flg Off V S Pathania as No 4. Following instructions of Wg Cdr Dandapani, the seasoned controller at Amritsar Radar, the Gnat formation continued to look out for the Sabres but to no avail. Yusuf, in the meantime, dove down unnoticed from almost 30,000 ft and without much ado, was able to place his missile sighting reticle on one of the Gnats. A loud growl indicating Sidewinder lock-on was just what Yusuf could have asked for, in this one-versus-many scenario. Ready to press the missile firing button, he was rattled by a series of thuds on his aircraft. Confounded at what could have gone wrong at the vital moment, he looked back only to see a pair of Gnats behind him! The Gnats that were in front, meanwhile, broke to the left, obviously having been warned by the rear pair just in time.

Flt Lt Trevor Keelor and Flt Lt S Krishnaswamy, who were trailing the front Gnat section, had been able to sandwich Yusuf’s Sabre while he was busy with his quarry. Keelor opened up with the Gnat’s 30mm cannon causing extensive damage to the Sabre. A large portion of the elevator had been blown off, but Yusuf continued dogfighting somewhat shakily. Hearing his plight on the radio, Abdul Khaliq made an attempt to rejoin the fight, as he had not gone much far. Luckily, the Sabres were able to pair up again and they continued to help each other fight their way out of the cloud of six Gnats.

Flt Lt Farooq Haider, who had been controlling the fight from Sakesar Radar, apprehended the gravity of the situation and directed Mirza’s nearby Starfighter into the midst of ongoing combat. The fearsome reputation of the Starfighter was not unfounded, it appeared, as the Gnats went helter skelter on sighting it. Abdul Khaliq, who at this time was being chased by Pathania, thus managed to get a lucky reprieve.

“Pajh oye … 104 eeee,” Sikand shouted out to Pathania in inimitable Punjabi (the English translation, “Run … it’s a 104” just cannot grasp the hint of mad rush in the expression). The ‘104’ did not stay in the fight for long as the idea was to charge in at supersonic speed and try a pot shot or, simply overwhelm the adversaries with sheer awe. Mirza did his act a couple of times before leaving the scene; it had a salutary effect, as the dogfight broke off and the Gnats started egressing. Sikand, who had initiated the panic call, broke off too, but in an opposite direction, thus losing contact with his wingman as well as the rest of the formation.

At Sakesar Radar, Farooq was keeping abreast of the situation. Anticipating the need for reinforcement, he had scrambled another Starfighter to the scene. Flown by Flt Lt Hakimullah, it arrived a bit late for the Gnats which had turned away. One Gnat, however, was seen to be behaving strangely; having gone back, it turned about and re-entered Pakistani airspace. Hakimullah, who was supersonic at this time, was directed towards the errant intruder. Though Hakimullah could not sight the tiny Gnat at the speed he was flying, he learnt from Sakesar that his adversary had slowed down to what appeared like landing speed. Hakimullah set up orbit over the area, wondering if a forced landing was in progress. Shortly thereafter, to his utter surprise, he picked contact with a Gnat taxiing down the disused Pasrur airstrip near Sialkot.

When Greene and his formation members landed, they were in celebratory mood for what was believed to be Keelor’s kill. They were expecting Sikand, the gregarious fellow that he was, to join in any time for a hearty beer session. Little did they know that their Flight Commander was in Pakistani custody following a bizarre episode.

During interrogation Sikand claimed that almost all his systems failed soon after he was separated from his formation. Once he had lost visual contact with everyone, he tried to communicate on the radio, but found it dead. His guns too had jammed, fuel flow had become erratic and the fuel quantity was low; incredibly, his compass also went berserk and he lost his bearings. If there was any hope of making it back, the Starfighters snuffed it. Under the circumstances, the airstrip that he saw was a godsend, no matter that he stepped off his Gnat as a vanquished airman.

Yusuf somehow managed to keep his badly damaged aircraft in control and, extricated out of the battle area alongwith his wingman. With marginal fuel as well as a dead radio, he made it to Sargodha; however, after landing he discovered that there was no hydraulic pressure for braking, and the Sabre ended up in the over-run arrester barrier without further damage. For having fought single-handedly against six Gnats and, also for recovering a badly damaged aircraft, Yusuf was awarded a Sitara-i-Jur’at. Keelor, who claimed having seen Yusuf’s aircraft go down, was promptly awarded a Vir Chakra for what was believed to be IAF’s first kill. The picture of the damaged Sabre released by the PAF told a different story, though.

Sikand was promptly apprehended by Pak Army troops and had to spend the next five months as a POW. After his repatriation, the IAF somehow took a light view of the incident and, Sikand resumed his career; he eventually rose to the rank of an Air Marshal. His aircraft was flown to Sargodha by Sqn Ldr Sa’ad Hatmi, who carried out several evaluation flights after the war. Hatmi, who had flown the Gnat extensively while on an exchange assignment with the RAF, did not find the IAF version any different. He also maintained that the Gnat was no ‘Sabre Slayer’ when it came to dogfighting. After its brief service with the new air arm, Gnat IE1083 was consigned to the PAF Museum, where it continues to bemuse visitors with one of the bizarre episodes of the 1965 War.

F-104 Starfighter causing a panic amongst the Indian pilots. The painting depicts S/L Brij Pal Singh Sikand re-entering Pakistani airspace in sheer panic.

F-104A 56-877 was the first Starfighter lost in combat. With an enemy Gnat air arrested and a Mystere destroyed, the aircraft served the purpose for which it was inducted. The total strength of No. 9 Squadron, at this stage was reduced to 09 F-104As and 02 F-104Bs.

HIGH SPEED RECONNAISSANCE

1130 HOURS, 9 SEPTEMBER 1965

An F-104B flown by Flight Leiutenant Aftab Alam Khan of No 9 Squadron Sargodha, on a high speed reconnaissance mission over Halwara, on 9 September 1965. In the environment of the India-Pakistan War, the low-speed RT-33 photo reconnaissance fleet of the PAF was rendered obsolete, for missions deep into enemy territory, and over heavily defended targets.
There was an urgent requirement to survey the enemy concentration at the forward airfields and to observer the effectiveness of PAF's B-57 night bombing raids. To fulfil this need, the PAF immediately employed the F-104B. The rear seat observer operated a hand held camera and made visual observations; in this case it was Squadron Leader M. L Middlecoat. En route the aircraft was flown at tree top level, at a speed of 600 knots. Approaching the target the aircraft was accelerated to a speed greater than Mach 1. In this way the high speed capability of Starfighter was fully exploited. This was the first time such a profile was flown by an F-104 pilot. The mission was so successful that it was later repeated several times.

 

[dexter]

Low Level Death:

By: Usman Shabbir & Yawar A Mazhar

An F-104, Star -fighter flown by Flight Lieutenant Amjad Hussain killed an enemy fighter near Sargodha.


The first IAF air strikes on PAF bases took place on the morning of September 7, 1965. It was at 05:30 hrs that the first IAF strike on PAF’s Sargodha airbase was detected when the formation of 6 IAF Mysteres was already pulling-up to attack the airfield. An F-104A flown by Flt Lt Amjad Hussain Khan was vectored by ground control to intercept the raid. According to Flt Lt Amjad he got behind two Mysteres which were exiting on a heading of 120 degrees at about 100 ft AGL. He fired an AIM-9B at one of the Mysteres which hit the ground after leaving the launcher. Closing in he fired at the Mystere with his gun and saw hits on the aircraft. The second Mystere meanwhile broke into the Starfighter forcing Amjad to make a high speed yo-yo and attack again. The Mystere turned into him again forcing another yo-yo with afterburners engaged. The Starfighter climbed to 13-15,000 feet and then dived to make another attack on the Mystere. This time the Mystere pilot did not see the F-104, with the Starfighter diving and closing in at 540 knots and opening canon fire at a range of 3000 ft. The Mystere exploded when the range was 1000-1500 ft and before the Starfighter could pull up to clear the explosion, it flew through the resulting debris. The F-104’s controls froze and aircraft stopped responding, going into a left bank. At this point about 75-100 ft AGL (Above Ground Level) Flt Lt Amjad Hussain ejected from the aircraft and landed near a village receiving a hero’s welcome from the villagers and made back to Sargodha airbase by a bicycle, a horse and a helicopter!!!

The British writer John Fricker in his book “The Battle for Pakistan: The 1965 air war” assigned this loss to Devayya actually shooting down the F-104. However no evidence was offered to substantiate this claim and Fricker also failed to explain how Sqn Ldr Devayya himself was shot down and killed. Later research showed that the site of both aircraft crashing was nearby which supports the likelihood of a mid-air collision or debris of the Mystere striking the F-104 (see Kaiser Tufail’s Great Air Battles of the Pakistan Air Force).

Flt. Lt. Amjad Hussain Khan.

AMBUSH:

By: Usman Shabbir & Yawar A Mazhar

An Indian MiG-21 tries to get behind the Starfighter. Being heavily outnumbered and short on fuel, the Starfighter disengaged at will.

On September 11, Flt Lt Hakimullah was orbiting over Indian territory, low on fuel he was about to turn for Pakistan when PAF radar at Sakesar, monitoring IAF transmissions, reported two sections of IAF fighters reporting visual contact with the Starfighter. Flt Lt Hakimullah spotted two Gnats below him and as he was placing his sights on one of the Gnat he noticed that he was outside the firing parameters of AIM-9B missile. This necessitated bit more repositioning, as he heard the missile tone PAF radar warned him of two more contacts diving at him. He looked up and saw two MiG-21s diving at him, Flt Lt Hakimullah broke into them which took him further inside India. Given his fuel state he broke in the opposite direction and engaged afterburner. Egressing he saw two more MiG-21s approaching him head-on. Diving down with afterburners engaged he broke the sound barrier, although the MiGs tried to pursue, the Starfighter was able to outrun the MiGs. Crossing over to Pakistan, Flt Lt Hakimullah zoomed upto 25,000 ft and reduced power. It was obvious that the Starfighter would not make it back to Sargodha with the remaining fuel, and the pilot elected to make a power-off approach to the dis-used airstrip at Risalwala. The Starfighter made a touch down at Risalewala with the engine flaming-out as the aircraft turned off the runway.

Flt. Lt. Hakimullah applies full power to disengage after being surrounded by four MiG-21FLs.

STARFIGHTER VS FISHBED

By: John Fricker

On 11th September 1965, a single Starfighter flown by Flt. Lt. Hakimullah,scrambled from Sargodha to patrol Lahore at 15,000 ft. Main object of the flight was to induce the IAF to come up and fight, and the F-104A was flying 'clean', - without its usual 200-gallon drop tanks - except for its usual winf-tip Sidewinders. From Lahore, Flt. Lt. Hakimullah headed south towards Ferozepur, where he orbited for seven to eight minutes before cimbing to 25,000 ft.

Sakesar than reported that two sections of IAF fighters were airborne from Halwara and requested another orbit from the F-104, although by this time Flt. Lt. Hakimullah was beginning to become concerned over his fuel margin. Soon his fuel state necessitated an immediate return to base, but at that point Sakesar informed him that IAF fighters were reporting visual contact with the Starfighter. Flt. Lt. Hakimullah then spotted a single Gnat several thousand feet below him as he placed himself for a possible missile attack. As he dived he saw another Gnat almost immediately below.

He placed his sight on the first Gnat in preparation for a Sidewinder attack, and heard the missile tone indicating target acquisition. As he was about to press the trigger, he realised that he was pulling more than 2g a turn, which is outside the limits of the GAR-8. He therefore eased the turn and was continuing a gentle descent when Sakesar warned him of aircraft diving towards him from 26,000 ft. Flt. Lt. Hakimullah looked up and made visual contact with two IAF fighters above him and to the right and quickly realised that they were MiG-21s.

He therefore forgot about the Gnats and broke into these Mach 2 interceptors, only to realise that he was heading further into India. In view of his perilous fuel state, he broke immediately in the opposite direction, went into full afterburner power and saw the MiG leader pull up and rock his wings to look for the F-104. While diving away however, the Starfighter was suddenly confronted with two more MiG-21s approaching him head-on, and he was forced to break into them in turn. By diving with full afterburner power to tree-top height, Flt. Lt. Hakimullah was able to accelerate to supersonic speed - about Mach 1.1 - and although Sakesar reported that the MiGs were continuing their pursuit, the PAF pilot knew that their performance remained subsonic at low altitude.

His predicament was unenviable, however, even though he throttled back to maximum dry thrust after about a minute. Sixty seconds of full afterburner consumes fuel at a prodigious rate - somewhere around 5,000 gallons per hour - and he was deep in enemy territory about 100 miles from base with the gauges indicating only 500 lbs of JP-4 remaining. Normal F-104 operations require a minimum fuel margin for landing of about 1,200 lb although additional reserved are usually specified in case a diversion becomes necessary.

It was obvious that the F-104 would never make it to Sargodha, but even to reach Pakistani territory Flt. Lt. Hakimullah decided that it was necessary to regain height for optimum fuel consumption. After zooming to 25,000ft and throttling back to economical cruise rpm, the PAF pilot asked Sakesar radar for a course to steer and the distance to reach Risalewala. Within sight of the town of that name, he began his descent, and when passing through 14,000ft some 10 miles out, the fuel booster pump warning light came on, indicating that not enough JP-4 was left in the tanks to maintain the required pressure.

From then on, a power-off was approach was necessary with the throttle pulled back to idle, but even with the speed reduced to a minimum of 240-250 knots, the F-104 has the gliding angle of a streamlined brick. There was no question of a second chance at the landing, but at the key position, Flt. Lt. Hakimullah lowered half-flap and the undercarriage and made a beautifully judged touchdown at Risalewala. He coasted to a stop with the aid of tail parachute and wheel brakes, and his engine flamed out through lack of fuel, as he turned off the strip. His brilliant airmanship had saved the PAF one of its most valuable and literally irreplaceable aircraft.

Under more favourable circumstances the F-104 would have attempted to engage the MiGs, although the PAF had decided that it would have been unwise to have attempted to dogfight these high-speed Russian aircraft. With their delta wings, they could probably out-turn the highly loaded Starfighter, but the F-104 had advantage in speed. No further contact with the MiG-21 was made by the F-104s, which found it virtually impossible to achieve any further engagement with the IAF.

Mission Debriefing at Sargodha.

A DETERMINED ENEMY PILOT:

By: John Fricker

The war of September was almost two weeks old. Two F-104s were scrambed from Sargodha on a CAP over Lahore, where they were vectored by Sakesar towards a couple of unidentified aircraft at about 25,000ft. Visual contact was made with the bogies by the Starfighter leader at a range of about seven miles, and they were quickly identified as IAF Hunters. The PAF leader then lost contact, but by this time his No. 2, Flt. Lt. Arif Manzoor, had picked up the Hunters on his radar and took over the lead. As he began overtaking the Hunters at about Mach 0.85, both IAF aircraft broke left, probably warned of the F-104's presence by Amritsar Radar.

One Hunter roled over on its back and pulled through in a split-S manoeuvre while the other turned so tightly during its break that Flt. Lt. Manzoor saw it stall and pitch up no fewer than three times. By then, the F-104s had been separated, but Flt. Lt. Manzoor stayed with the second Hunter, hoping to release a Sidewinder as soon as it became possible to relax the amount of g being pulled in the turn. In the meantime, he also endeavored to close range of the Hunter, but he found the target sliding up his windscreen as the IAF aircraft tightened its turn still further.

As he racked the Starfighter round as tightly as possible, Flt. Lt. Manzoor opened up power to keep his speed above Mach 0.9. He was therefore unworried about being intercepted in turn despite warnings from his wingman of other enemy aircraft in the vicinity.

In all, the F-104 made four attempts to nail his determined adversary, but each time the Hunter was able to out-turn the Starfighter, although it stalled out twice in the process. Eventually, Flt. Lt. Manzoor realised that the situation was a stalemate, and as his fuel was down to 2,100 lb, and he was within sight of Adampur, he disengaged by zooming up in afterburner power to 36,000ft. This degree of flying skill was not often demonstrated by the IAF, although it obviously had a large number of experienced fighter and bomber pilots to draw upon as several other engagements showed.These, however, all involved the PAF F-86 Sabre, which the IAF was less reluctant to engage than the Starfighter, since its Hunters and Gnats were both considerably faster than the Sabre.

INDIAN VERSION OF THE SAME INCIDENT

By: Group Captain Bharat Singh

Indian Air Force, after gaining Air Superiority over Pakistan in the Punjab area, the top Indian Air Force planners decided to lure the PAF fighters out of their airfields and engage them using Gnats. The decision was made on the realization that PAF Fighters were conspicuously absent in the Punjab area in the last few days.

I was ordered to select three other pilots and in coordination with the Air Defence staff, plan a "leisurely" Fighter sweep over Pakistan territory. The Patrol height and area was carefully selected where the Pakistan radar and our own radar would have definite pick up on our Fighters. Our Fighters were to maintain radio contact with our Air Defense unit who would maintain a continuous surveillance on our Fighter by tracking us on their Radar scope. I was specifically warned by our Air Defense Fighter Controller that there was a "window" at a point on our flight path were there would be a loss of radar pick up for about a minute or a minute and a half. We were briefed that when this occurred I would be warned. It was understood that the Indian Radar Fighter controller would warn us of any approaching enemy Fighter and give us a running commentary of their position in relation to our Fighters. The discretion to engage the enemy fighters was left to my decision.

After a detailed aircrew briefing along with the ATC (Air Traffic Controller) the Air Defence controller and other sections involved in this operation, we took off in to the clear blue skies and steered a course for our run in point in Pakistan territory. We climbed rapidly to 10,000 feet as we entered Pak air space

It was a nice September morning typical to Punjab. There was no visible sign of deadly war on the ground, it looked so peaceful and quite and the only noise was the lazy drone from my Gnats engine, the sight of the other three Gnats was the only evidence that we were out there to invite Pakistan Fighters to mortal combat.

I ordered the formation in to Battle formation followed by an order"clear your guns" This is a a very short burst to double check that our two 30mm cannons were working.

Reaching our run in point I turned North East parallel to the Indo/Pak border. We started scanning the Western Sky, maintaining a strict look out to our port, the side we expected the enemy threat. We continued a straight and level flight at 10,000 feet, monitoring our fighter controllers commentary for air activity. We were aware that Pak radar and our own radar must have a good pick up on us. Nothing happened; our radar had no pick up of any enemy air activity in that area. At that moment we reached the "null" zone where our Radar would lose pick up on us and also any fighter activity by Pak aircraft. We were warned as we entered the null zone that our radar had lost contact with us. I kept checking the time, one minute then one and a half minute went by yet there was no pick up. I accelerated our planes to combat speed around 450 kts. I warned our Fighter controller that I would turn around if the pick up did not occur very soon. Prolonged loss of radar coverage leaves a formation blind and vulnerable to enemy air attack. The controller insisted that I continue for another one minute, I agreed. Suddenly I started feeling a chill going up and down my spine and an unexplainable sense of danger with an overpowering urge to take evasive action. With the sixth sense of a fox I abruptly ordered my formation "Hard Port, Hard port Go".This is an emergency maneuver to turn round at the maximum rate of turn on ones own axis, maintaining Battle formation. I over rode the Fighter controllers instructions, which is a prerogative of the leader of a Fighter formation.

This maneuver was so fast that we faced the other way with in 30 seconds. The object of this max rate turn is to very quickly turn around because during the turn we have minimum visual scanning ability and a time most vulnerable to an enemy attack.

It seemed that we had, in the nick of time, caught a pair of F-104 Starfighters napping, they were closing in fast, drooling for a kill, It was obvious that the Starfighters were trying to sneak in to a firing position close behind us. As we straightened out facing the way we had come, I received a warning call from my sub section leader who was on my starboard side, "enemy below you crossing from starboard to port". I quickly scanned to my starboard and then to my port! Lo and behold, I saw a dark and a large cigar shaped plane with swept back wings passing under the belly of my Fighter. I was positioned for a perfect kill. He was a dead duck, I was probably 500 to 1000 feet above and three hundred yards behind him positioned just right for a perfect attack from above. I knew I could easily blow him to bits with my gun sight centered on the cockpit. I commenced to roll over to get my 30 mms cannons to bear on to him. I was ready to pump every thing I had in one single continuous burst in to the Starfighter from my two 30 mm cannons, knowing that I would not get a second chance once he cut in his afterburner.

Suddenly my sub section leader sent a chill up my spine, he called urgently, "Negative, it is a Hunter ". I froze in horror I was just about ready to kill one of our own Fighters! Not believing my eyes I again looked carefully at the cigar shaped plane. It certainly was a Pakistani Starfighter. That hesitation for a couple of seconds was enough to save the PAF Starfighter. Realizing the fatal error I quickly rolled in to the attack. It was too late, the Starfighter was observed by me emitting a large trail of flame from its jet exhaust, he had cut in his after burner and accelerated to a very high speed, leaving me standing, so to speak. It was no use, I had him for a while in my sights, the amber light was glowing on my gun sight, meaning that my gun radar was locked on but his range was around 1500 yard, well out of firing range now. In hind sight I should have given him a good long burst from my canons, if for no other reason, just in retaliation for sending that horrible chill up and down my spine. It seems that this F 104 had a "number 2" with him who escaped breaking west, straight to mama's lap.

The horror of this incident slowly downed on me. Far from being the aggressor we nearly became the victims. I could have very easily lost two Gnats and two good pilots. Thank you my Guardian angel for that "chilly" warning. A couple of seconds delay on my part would have been disastrous and a disgrace on me, the leader of the formation and the Squadron Commander to boot. For no obvious reason the over powering compulsion to turn around fast was so compelling, a feeling I had never experienced in my life.

It seemed that the Starfighters were closing in ready to use their deadly "Vulcan guns" which would have pulverized a Gnat in a second. I was numb and humbled by this uncanny urge which saved two lives and two Gnats. In a few more seconds at least two of us would have been dead.

A detailed discussion during the debriefing clarified the scenario. Just before our Fighters went off our Air Defense radar screen, two Pak Starfighters were scrambled by Pakistani Air Defense to intercept us, thereby falling straight in to our preplanned trap as anticipated. Since our radar had no pick up on us at that very moment it was obvious that our Fighter controller also had no pick up on the scrambled Pak Fighters either. We concluded that once the Starfighters were vectored on to us by Pak radar, on sighting us, the Pak fighters approached us stealthily from behind for the "kill". Fighters are vulnerable at the back, which is their blind spot.

It was surprising that they did not use their Sidewinder missiles, as a matter of fact I was close enough to notice that they were not carrying missiles, which can be fired from a much greater distance. Sidewinders are heat seeking weapons and lock on to a heat source like the Jet wake heat emission from an aircraft. These missiles had a history of failing to lock on and hit the target. This we understood was due to internal malfunctions and confusion caused by their inbuilt sensors sensing multiple heat sources. This was true in our case; we had four heat sources emitted by four different aircraft in battle formation, spread far apart.

What ever the reason, the Pak fighters decided to attack us using their deadly six barreled rotating 20 mm Vulcan gun. The volume of fire from these guns is so intense they could cut an aeroplane in to two or pulverize it in seconds. If my guardian angel had not warned me to turn around at the exact moment, at least two Gnats along with their pilots would have been blown to pieces. To use their deadly guns, it was necessary for them to close in, to firing range of 700 to 800 yards. The standard procedure in the front gun attack mode requires a good over taking speed which is required for breaking away after the attack. Because of our very timely and unexpected emergency turn around maneuver, the Starfighters were caught napping and could not decelerate in time and telescoped in to us, passing directly below us in confusion and disarray. I believe they carried out a defensive split and broke off the engagement. They wisely abandoned their attack and escaped home at very high speed.. They did the right thing, because if they had been foolish enough to take us on in combat, on our terms, there were good chances of them being shot down to the guns of four Gnats. The Gnat is superior to the F-104, in a dog fight except in speed and fire power; missiles are unusable in close air combat involving high "G" maneuvers.

The Indian Gnats from this squadron were engaged by the Starfighters. In the heat of combat, the Gnats were identified as Hunters by Flt. Lt. Arif Manzoor.

F-104 AS A NIGHT FIGHTER
By: John Fricker

For its main night-fighting role, however, the PAF was forced to rely on its small force of F-104A Starfighters at Sargodha in No.9 Squadron, commanded by Squadron Leader Arif Iqbal. The F-104A was the only PAF fighter with night capability, resulting from its AN/ASG-14TI fire control system, which incorporates a radar scanner in the nose cone. As a single seater, however, the F-104A is far from ideal for night-fighting, despite itsvery high performance and heavy armament of a six barrelled 20mm Vulcan cannon and two wing-tip Sidewinders. It is somehat critical to fly by day, let alone at night, and its approach speed for landing of no less than 195 mph leaves little room for errors of judgement.

Even then, this very high landing speed is achieved only with the use of boundary layer control or flap blowing, to augment the lift of the Starfighter's razor-thin wings.

Fortunately the pilots of No.9 Squadron were extremely proficient with their aircraft, having nursed their 12 F-104As and 2 F-104Bs from the time they recieved them. By 1965, most of the pilots had 800-1000 hours on the Starfighter, which is a lot of experience on a high performance fighter.

Soon after midnight on 13th September, and again at 0330 hours, IAF Canberras struck at Sargodha and Lahore area, with no evident results. This occasion, however, appears to have been the first on which positive contact was made by the PAF night-fighters with the elusive enemy. Flt. Lt. Amjad was positioned in an F-104 by Sakesar behind an IAF Canberra and heard the growl of his missile tone as the Sidewinder infrared unit locked on. He squeezed the trigger, but instead of the usual meteoric streak of a missile launch a fraction of second later, there was no reaction whatsoever. He hurriedly pressed the red button on the control column to unleash the mighty punch of the 725 rounds of 20mm shells from his Vulcan cannon, but again there was no reaction. Complete electrical failure in his armament system saved the IAF Canberra from virtually certain destruction. It was poor consolation for Flt. Lt. Amjad to hear after landing back at Sargodha, that according to All-India Radio, his base had been blasted off the map by the IAF, which had relegated it to 'past history'.

F-104's Successfull Night Interception
By: Wg Cdr Aftab Alam Khan, Pakistan Air Force (Retd)

The F-104 was the only night fighter with the PAF. Its radar was good for high altitude, line astern missile attack, but was unusable below 5000 ft, because of ground clutter. Also, if the target started to turn, it was not possible to deliver a missile attack. These were the limitations of the system. The IAF Canberra bombers would operate at night, usually below 500 feet. One aircraft would drop flares while others bombed the targets. After delivering their ordinance they would exit at low altitude, but as they approached the border, the Canberra's would start climbing. At this time the F-104's would be vectored for the intercept. The IAF had also installed tail warning radars on their Canberras. As the F-104 started to get into a firing position, the bombers would start a defensive turn and radar contact would be lost. Twice, I had made radar contact but as I closed into missile range, the aircraft executed a defensive maneuver. Only Sqn Ldr Jamal A Khan was lucky enough to shoot down a Canberra. He executed a perfect 'text book ' attack, with a missile launch. The Canberra Pilot was captured. He stated that the tail warning radar made very annoying beeping sounds at low level, therefore, he had switched it off, and he had forgotten to switch it on again as he had climbed out. Although the F-104 made only one night kill, it did achieve an ancillary objective, i.e. it did prevent the enemy from doing damage. The threat or fear of the F-104, forced the Canberras to operate at low altitude levels, once over Pakistani airspace. This prevented the attacking pilots from making determined attacks. They did not, or could not properly identify their targets, and thus dropped their bombs at random, doing little or no damage.

As the war progressed, a radar controller assigned to the army gun radar unit told me that the army radar could spot the IAF Canberras very clearly at night, but the track length was limited to approximately 20 NM. I realized that this was good enough for the F- 104 to make an interception. With its high speed it could position itself behind the target very quickly, and once this was done, the F-104 could be aligned with the help of its InfraRed (IR) gunsight for a missile or a gun attack. The Canberra tail warning radar was ineffective at low altitude. To get the system functioning, only a radio had to be installed in the army radar unit. The war ended before the system was made effective and put into practice.

Flying the high speed F-104 at night in war time conditions was hazardous. The environment was as hostile and dangerous as the enemy. When there was no moon visible, the nights were pitch dark, as the blackout was complete. Haze and poor visibility was common. The runway lights were switched on once the aircraft was about to pitch out for a landing, we were lucky if we could see the airfield lights on downwind, and turning base. The landing conditions were severe. The TACANs were not aligned with the runways, there were no approach lights, ILS or VASI. It was under these conditions that Flt Lt Abbasi, while making an approach, crashed short of the runway. The F-104 was completely destroyed but he miraculously escaped and survived to fly again.

One F-104 was lost on September 17 when Flg Off GO Abbasi landed short of the runway when Peshawar airbase was under a dust storm; miraculously the pilot still strapped in his seat was thrown clear of the crash and survived without any major injuries

Group photo of No. 9 Composite Squadron taken in 1966 with F-104 and F-6 in the background.
L to R, Sitting: Flt Lt Ghulam Omar Abbasi, Flt Lt Farooq Umar, Wg Cdr M L Middlecoat (Sqn Cdr), Sqn Ldr Hakimullah Hussain, Flt Lt Ishaq, Flt Lt Aftab Alam
L to R, Standing: Flt Lt Amanullah, Flg Off Salim Sandal, Flg Off Arif Manzoor, Flt Lt Rashid Bhatti, Flg Off Mushtaq, Flt Lt Abbas Mirza.

 

[dexter]

1971 Pakistan-India War:

Air operations in 1971 Pakistan-India War commenced with a preemptive strike by PAF. In the 1971 War the F-104 was also used for deep penetration strikes against enemy airfields and radars. Two F-104s each attacked Amritsar and Faridkot Indian Air Force Radars. The attack on Faridkot Radar was led by Wing Commander Arif Iqbal, who not only damaged the Radar but also shot down an IAF Krishak aircraft.

PAF Starfighter Operations during the 1971 War

By: Usman Shabbir and Yawar Mazhar

Squadron Leader Amanulah Khan

As India-Pakistan tensions mounted around mid-1971, a number of pilots with previous F-104 experience were sent to Jordan for regaining currency on the aircraft, while pilots returning recently from Jordan were reposted to PAF’s No. 9 squadron. In Jordan PAF pilots could also undertake Dissimilar Air Combat Training with Jordanian Hunters (given the significant presence of the type with IAF). When war broke out on 3rd December some of the pilots were still in Jordan and had to rush home. The following F-104 pilots were attached to No. 9 Squadron during the 1971 war:

Wing Commander M Arif Iqbal (Officer Commanding)
Wing Commander Mervyn L Middlecoat
Squadron Leader Amjad Hussain
Squadron Leader Rashid A Bhatti
Squadron Leader M Akbar
Squadron Leader Tariq Habib
Squadron Leader Manzoor Bokhari
Squadron Leader Waris Mujtaba
Squadron Leader Amanullah
Squadron Leader Abbas Mirza
Flight Lieutenant Samad Ali Changezi

As war broke out on Western front on 3rd December, PAF carried out pre-emptive strikes on forward Indian Air Force bases and radar units. As part of the pre-emptive strikes, No. 9 Squadron was tasked to attack Amritsar, Faridkot and Bernala radar stations.

The First Strikes

For the initial pre-emptive strikes the Starfighter pilots were tasked to attack IAF radar stations. The aim was to degrade their performance by damaging or destroying the antennas using the Starfighter’s Vulcan cannon, affecting IAF capability to interdict PAF raids on the forward airfields. The initial strikes were planned to be carried on 3rd December close to dusk on Amritsar and Faridkot Radar Stations, using guns only. Further strikes were to be carried on these and other radar installations such as the one operating from Bernala from 4th December onwards.

Wg Cdr Arif Iqbal and Sqn Ldr. Amanullah were to strike the Faridkot and Sqn Ldr. Amjad along with Sqn Ldr. Bhatti the Amritsar radar station.

Arif along with his wingman Amanullah got airborne from Sargodha just before dusk on 3rd December and set course at low level. During ingress to the target Amanullah maintained tactical formation on the starboard side of Arif, keeping 20 degrees behind the line abreast position. Few miles from the target Arif pulled up but could not spot the airfield due to limited visibility conditions as it was getting dark. Amanullah instead of pulling up kept low and went down to 100 feet and spotted the runway. Amanullah recalls:

“I went further down, and on the side of the runway (small abandoned airfield of British time) I saw radar vehicles and one temporary camouflaged shelter with a light aircraft. While Arif was orbiting on top still unable to spot anything, I made a 360 turn to line up with side of the runway where all vehicles were parked and made strafing attack with long burst firing 66 rounds per second with the 104’s Gatling gun. I managed to hit the target, made another 90-270 degrees turn and made a second pass. After the second pass I exited. Arif had left before I did therefore I was independent and alone. When I was exiting it was dark and I did not see Ravi and continued west 270 and passed south of Sargodha and when I pulled up it was over Indus River closed to Mianwali. I realised then and set course back for Sargodha. When I came to land, as it was the initial moments of war, the Ack Ack of Sargodha opened on me. I went round shouted at Sargodha ATCO and came back and landed. Base Commander was waiting for me and hugged me since I had come back late. He told me that I have hit an Indian light aircraft at Faridkot (announced by Indian radio). They did not say anything about radar, but the radar was silent after the attack throughout the war. Arif came back without firing while I had expended closed to 400 rounds.”

Raids on Amritsar Radar using RALOR / SLARD Starfighter

By: Usman Shabbir and Yawar Mazhar

4th December 1971: While on their way to attack the Amritsar radar station, Sqr Ldr’s R A Bhatti, and Amjad Hussain ran into two Su-7s, possibly returning from a CAS mission. After some manoeuvring Bhatti was able to position behind one and shot it down with a Sidewinder.

The first raid on Amritsar radar was carried out at 1710 hours by two F-104A aircraft lead by Sqn Ldr Amjad Khan, with Sqn Ldr Rashid A Bhatti as his wingman. Amjad was flying the specially equipped radar locator F-104A (56-804). Both the aircraft took off from Sargodha Air Base configured with two fuel tanks on pylon stations and two Sidewinder missiles on wing tips. The radar was located and engaged successfully and it went off the air.

Next morning, 4th December, pilots were informed that the radar is back on air. Another mission was planned for 0500 hours with Bhatti as lead (in F-104A 56-804) and Amanullah as his wingman. As the formation arrived over the radar, heavy ack-ack opened up. The pilots decided to stay low and make a 180 degree turn to re-attack. While turning and pulling up, the Amanullah spotted a Gnat trying to level behind the Bhatti (lead) with all guns blazing. Amanuallah gave out a warning “Gnat behind you, exit” with the lead punching his tanks and going full afterburner. While trying to position himself behind the leading F-104A, the Gnat pilot[xiv] had not noticed the wingman. With Bhatti’s F-104A now pulling out of range at supersonic speed, Amanullah positioned himself behind the Gnat and after getting a locked-on tone fired the AIM9B Sidewinder missile. While the missile was homing on, the Gnat broke right and the missile exploded under its belly. Amanullah saw some parts of the Gnat flying off but did not see it crash. After the attack, the wingman also broke-off and headed home.

While flying back Bhatti looked at his wingtip tanks which were stuck and had not jettisoned. Since he was going supersonic the aileron got stuck, which happens because of tortional effect of the tanks on the aileron. Bhatti popped up his speed breaks and the aircraft came out of turn and he was able to safely exit.

Since the mission was interrupted, another strike was planned on Amritsar Radar Station in noon time on the same day (4th December). This was Bhatti’s third mission and he flew as No. 2 to Sqn Ldr Amjad Hussain, who once again was flying the specially equipped F-104 with SLARD. While crossing at low level, Bhatti spotted two Su-7 aircraft crossing above them at approximately 3000ft. Bhatti warned Amjad about the Su-7s, who by this time had also visually picked them up. Amjad manoeuvred to settle behind the lead Su-7 with the second Su-7 trying to come behind Amjad. Bhatti warned Amjad over R/T of the other Su-7 closing behind him, but being focused on trying to track the lead Su-7, he did not respond immediately. All this time Bhatti was also manoeuvring to get behind the second Su-7 to shoot it down before it could shoot down Amjad. With the second Su-7 now even closer to the Amjad, Bhatti gave a tactical call to “break right”, and this time Amjad immediately responded. With Amjad now out of danger, Bhatti closed in on the second Su-7 and after getting a Sidewinder lock-on tone, fired the first missile from a distance of 4000 ft. Bhatti saw the missile hit the Su-7 and the aircraft crashing to the ground. Bhatti then tried to close in on the lead Su-7 and after getting a locked-on tone fired his second Sidewinder. Bhatti failed to notice if his second Sidewinder also hit its mark, as in the process of closing in on the lead Su-7, he was also fumbling with switches in the cockpit, trying to jettison his external fuel tanks. The fuel tanks failed to jettison and with emergency selection, only the right pylon fuel tank got released. Now with the left pylon fuel tank almost full the aircraft was uncontrollable due to asymmetric conditions at very high speed (550-600 knots). Bhatti however managed to control the aircraft and informed his leader. After crossing the border, Lahore Radar was also informed and Bhatti was cleared to climb to safe altitude and reduce aircraft speed as per procedural requirements. The aircraft recovered safely at Sargodha Air Base.

Once again, the mission remained unaccomplished. Now the fourth mission was planned for 5th December 1971, at 13:30 hrs with Sqn Ldr Amjad as leader and young Flt Lt Samad A Changezi as his No. 2. Intel had reported the position of this radar at a road going towards Amritsar Airfield. The pilots approached the target from the south and Amjad made a strafing pass. In the first pass Amjad hit an antenna and realized it was a wooden decoy when he saw it splinter. Right at that moment he saw the actual antenna rotating on the right. Wingman Changezi also confirmed the contact on the right. Formation did a turnaround and attacked again, hitting the antenna. This time the radar station was struck successfully and it went off the air for the second time. During exit, Amjad’s aircraft (56-804) was hit by anti-aircraft guns deployed around the radar station. He turned towards Pakistan, hoping to recover when his wingman gave an ejection call, confirming that fire is spreading. Amjad successfully ejected and was taken POW.

Wreckage of Squadron Leader Amjad's Starfighter.

Star Fighters from Jordan:

On 6th of December the squadron was ordered to move to PAF Base Masroor, Karachi. For the rest of the war the squadron performed day and night Air Defence and Counter Air Operations from this base. It was at PAF Base Masroor that the squadron received nine F-104s provided by the Kingdom of Jordan in support of Pakistan during the 1971 war. These Starfighters were ferried by RJAF pilots (along with some PAF pilots) to Masroor on 13th December from where they operated for the remaining period of the war. The serial numbers of these RJAF Starfighters were as follows: 56-774. 56-775, 56-767, 56-777, 56-799, 56-839, 56-843, 56-845, 56-1789.

When the Jordanian No. 9 Squadron pilots were about 200 miles out from Karachi, a PAF Starfighter formation lead by Amanullah got airborne to escort them to Masroor as they were not armed. Amanullah was in formation with Major Ihsan Shurdom and Awni Bilal to guide them for landing while orbiting over head to give them top cover.

An Indian Navy Alize aircraft is shot down

On 10th December Wg Cdr Arif Iqbal along with Sq Ldr Manzoor Bokhari took off from Masroor Air Base in search for Indian Navy OSA Boats towards OKHA Base along the southern coast. As they were searching for the OSA boats Arif spotted an Indian Navy Alize aircraft at low level. Settling behind it in gun range, Arif shot it down with a gun burst. The Alize with its crew of three crashed into the sea. The formation safely recovered at Masroor.

The only mistake in this painting is that F-104A 56-798 was the aircraft flown by Wg Cdr Arif Iqbal.

HF-24 Marut is Destroyed

On the morning of 11 December, Wg Cdr Arif Iqbal along with Sqn Ldr Amanullah as his wingman took off from PAF Masroor for a Fighter Sweep mission. The aim was to catch any fighters taking off from IAF Base Utterlai. Navigating at low level the Starfighter formation pulled over the Utterlai air base completely undetected and noticed two HF-24 Marut lined up on the runway for takeoff. Amanullah aimed for one of the HF-24 and fired 170 rounds in one single burst, destroying the aircraft. As Amanullah pulled up and positioned for another attack, he saw Wg Cdr Arif, who was below him, firing at the other aircraft. Amanullah shifted his aim into an aircraft pen and fired another burst. The formation exited the area at low level and safely recovered at Masroor.

Two F-104 Starfighters flown by Wing Commander Arif lqbal and Squadron Leader Amanullah are seen carrying out a surprise attack on an IAF desert base at Utterlai. An IAF HF-24 fighter is seen destroyed on the taxi track, after a gun attack by Squadron Leader Amanullah. The second of the two HF-24s, scrambled to intercept the starfighters, was shot up by Wing Commander Arif Iqbal, also by gun attack.

INDIAN VERSION OF THIS ENCOUNTER AS WELL AS A PREVIOUS VISIT TO UTTERLAI BY PAF STARFIGHTERS

Two F-104 Starfighters flown by Wing Commander Arif lqbal and Squadron Leader Amanullah are seen carrying out a surprise attack on an IAF desert base at Utterlai. An IAF HF-24 fighter is seen destroyed on the taxi track, after a gun attack by Squadron Leader Amanullah. The second of the two HF-24s, scrambled to intercept the starfighters, was shot up by Wing Commander Arif Iqbal, also by gun attack.
While the Marut aircrew had it good, the four Gnat aircraft and aircrew of 21 Sqn were confined to the ORP pens and rest rooms. Bobby recalls an encounter between the Gnats and the PAF Starfighters during a strike. “A two aircraft Gnat CAP, Sqn Ldr Cackles Kale and Fg Offr P Ajith, was airborne at the time with Fg Offr Doc Moori as the CAP controller. As the 104s pulled up for the second pass, Ajith was positioned behind one of them above and about a km behind, diving down and closing in on his quarry. Suddenly, while still in the dive, the Starfighter engaged re-heat. For a few seconds the Gnat appeared to be hanging stationary in the air while the 104 was seen pulling away rapidly. Obviously his partner must have warned him of the Gnat closing in on him.

In this attack the raiders did not spot any aircraft on the ground and directed their attack to the cluster of blast pens. Unfortunately, a ricochet from one of the side blast walls hit LAC Sharma of 220 Sqn. I happened to be in the pen strapping up for a sortie and immediately rushed him to the MI Room in a 3-wheeler tempo. Tragically he died even before reaching the MI Room. I understand LAC Sharma was the only Air Warrior who lost his life to direct enemy action in the 1971 conflict. May his soul rest in peace.

The inability of the Gnat to cope with the F-104 threat and also lack of night interception capability resulted in lobbying for a Mig-21 ORP. AOC, Rajasthan Air Force (RAF), Air Cmde Kanwar Singh responded to that request with his standard ‘Good idea!’ Around 10 Dec, a 4 aircraft Mig-21 Detachment from 29 Sqn was positioned there to replace the Gnats.”

There was a strike by two F-104 Starfighters on 11 Dec. Bobby still remembers the “Banshee like wailing of the Vulcan Gatling 20 mm six barrel gun of the Starfighter, firing 6,000 rounds per minute, as something like a shrill factory siren.” Two Maruts, Sqn Ldr Mickey Jatar and Fg Offr Panchi Sidhu were approaching the tyre checker’s point at the entry to the Parallel Taxi Track (PTT) and the Runway. As the runway was still not fully operational, formation aircraft took off simultaneously from the PTT and the single available lane of the main runway. Caught like sitting ducks, both aircraft were hit on the first pass. Boss Jit Dhawan and Bobby were also proceeding in a jeep at the time, to their respective aircraft for a Tac R mission and were witness to the attack. “Pulling up from the dive, the 104s did a quick tear drop turn and came in for a second pass. Meanwhile, we saw Mickey coming out of the cockpit with his G-suit sleeve on fire. Panchi, very officer-like, got out of the cockpit, stepped onto the air intake, then on to the left wing and then on to the drop tank and then, observing the diving 104, hit the ground running and dived full length a short distance away. The second pass missed Mickey’s burning aircraft while making a few holes in the fin and tail of the second aircraft. Panchi, prostrate on the ground, saw the bullets make a furrow in the sand a few feet from his nose.” Mickey Jatar suffered fairly severe burns on his left arm and was hospitalized. Panchi ended up with a dusty G-suit.

AVM KP Sreekant also recollects the events of the day “We were all sitting in the Aircrew restroom on that fateful day at Uttarlai when we heard a loud hum which we later identified as gunfire from the F-104’s Vulcan 6 barrelled cannon. We rushed out and were horrified to see the lead Marut on fire with smoke billowing up to about 500ft at least. We were of course to learn later on, that Sqn Ldr Mickey Jatar miraculously escaped but his whole left hand had severe burn injuries. The no. 2, who was taxing about 3-400yds behind, was unscathed. The F-104 strike, which destroyed Mickey’s aircraft, was the second one. This was the time when one or maybe 2 Type-77’s were scrambled and one of them, Sqn Ldr IS Bindra (who later commanded 220 Sqn), claimed one of the bandits.”

Air Cmde VK Murthy, the Base Cdr, also recalls the same event; “Pete Gaynor and I were at the ORP watching Mickey Jatar lineup on the dumbell. Suddenly we heard a roar and saw the Starfighters pulling up causing a direct hit with their bullets and saw Jatar jumping out of the cockpit with his overall on fire. He was whisked inside the crew room, the fire put off and first aid was given. Once I saw him alive I shook hands with him with great relief and went about busy on other urgent things at that time leaving Jatar in the hands of Kapoor, the Medical Officer.”

Uttarlai 1971: Flt Lt Bobby Kasbekar, Wg Cdr Jit Dhawan, Flt Lt Brian DeMagry, Fg Offr KP Sreekant, Sqn Ldr Joe Bakshi, Flt Lt Sudhir Batra.

The MiG-21 was scrambled too late due to which the Indian pilot had to FAKE OUT an engagement which never took place to boost the morale of IAF Base Utterlai.

 

[dexter]

Insight in the First Supersonic Combat of the Sub Continent

By: Sarmad Hassan Sharif

A formation of two F-104’s was tasked on 13th December to strike IAF’s airfield at Jamnagar. Wg Cdr Mervin L Middlecoat was to lead this mission with Sqn Ldr Tariq Habib as his No.2. The painting depicts M L Middlecoat bidding farewell to his comrades.

As the December war progressed, PAF HQ decided to strengthen the already weak Southern Air Command. As a strategic move PAF shifted 7 F-104s of No.9 Squadron to Mauripur Air Base on 6th December (The Starfighters were slated to operate from Karachi but due to Amritsar Radar Busting Ops they were retained at Sargodha). Added to it a detachment of 9 RJAF F-104 Starfighters also joined them at Karachi on 13th December 1971, thus bolstering the strength of F-104s.

The basis of bringing the Starfighters in this area was to:
1. Day/Night air defence with a primary emphasis on intercepting IAF Canberra Bombers, which till before their arrival, would arrive over Karachi at night and bomb any target of their choice with impunity;

2. Intercept IN Maritime ASW Aircraft and locate IN Vessels;

3. Carry out daylight blitz strikes against IAF and IN installations as they had the range and speed to carry out such missions;

4. Fly CAP over the war zone and intercept any incoming IAF strike element.

Though they were introduced late in this sector, their arrival however boosted the morale of the PAF Southern Air Command. The RJAF fighters were utilized for air defence duties only while PAF aircraft were earmarked for strike missions.

IAF also now behaved in a cautious manner because before 6th December, they wrecked havoc on important installations which included the Keamari Oil Farm as well as PAF Base Mauripur and Faisal. After the arrival of the Starfighters, IAF restrained itself against the raids against Karachi and restricted them to the war zone.

Wg. Cdr. Mervyn Leslie Middlecoat who was on deputation in Jordan, was recalled by the PAF HQ to resume air operations from the south, with immediate effect. As soon as he arrived at Mauripur he joined the session where new missions were planned for the next day. One of them included a harassing strike on Jamnagar Air Base. The mission profile was selected as lo-lo-lo with a provision of single strafing pass on the airfield targeting preferably exposed aircraft on ORP or any other target of opportunity. Intel confirmed the presence of MiG-21FL as the premier air defence fighter of IAF and the Starfighter pilots had practiced such missions by judging the scramble timing of MiG-21 as two minutes (from the ADA siren till take off). A precise low level approach on the main runway, pull up for a gun attack and straff the targets was what was required and PAF pilots were confident that they would get the IAF MiGs on runway when they would be in their take off roll.

The squadron conducted a similar mission against Utterlai, the same day, when Wg. Cdr. Arif Iqbal and Squadron Leader Amanullah struck Utterlai and destroyed/damaged two HF-24 Marut aircraft. Their timing was so perfect that the MiGs never had time to scramble, and when they did, the Starfighters had already left the area after bagging two kills.

Challenging the Indian MiGs was a challenge itself by the Starfighters, as PAF pilots had flown them against the Mirage-IIIE and F-6 (MiG-19) in DACT and knew that in turning dogfights even a brick could do better. Within PAF it was assessed that F-104 was inferior in all flight regimes by the increasingly numerous MiG-21s with the Indian Air Force but superior to the Su-7s, also inducted by IAF. Especially in a close in fight the Starfighter was considered to be out matched by the MiG-21 given its superior manoeuvrability and similar speed and acceleration. PAF’s F-104 tactics made use of aircraft’s high speed to hit targets quickly, ideally using AIM-9B Sidewinder, and quickly egressing. Turning with more nimble fighters was not considered advisable. Under these conditions if PAF F-104 succeeds in destroying a MiG-21 it would be a morale booster for the squadron as well as the Southern Air Command.

The Indians on the other hand were quite annoyed on their MiGs reaction time at Utterlai and Group Captain Pete Wilson, Station Commander of Jamnagar Airbase had issued a warning to the detachment of the MiG-21 at his base that if anyone cannot scramble in less than 2 minutes can leave the base and go back. The IAF pilots at Jamnagar practiced hard to scramble in less than 2 minutes and succeeded. The Indian station commander anticipated a PAF attack after the Utterlai strike. He was sure that PAF will attempt a similar daylight raid on his base and he was keeping his fingers crossed as he knew that he will be facing a major challenge. Coming in a long way to attack a fully alert enemy base is not a simple task and Wilson knew that if his boys falter in the final crucial seconds the PAF pilots would achieve their task.

Following the successful strike against Utterlai, Wg. Cdr. Middlecoat worked on his mission profile along with Sqn. Ldr. Tariq Habib.

1. They had to fly ~ 500 km from their base towards Jamnagar Airfield at low level i.e. below 250 ft AGL.

2. As soon as they neared their target they had to pull up to 2-3000 feet with target offset to their right by 2-3 miles in order to line up for their strafing runs.

3. Once in line they had to attack on the aircraft on the runway/taxiway with a single pass each.

4. Exiting at high speed and low level.

Both pilots had conducted similar mission in training exercises and as demonstrated by Wg. Cdr. Arif Iqbal and Sqn. Ldr. Amanullah earlier against Utterlai, PAF was qualified to conduct such blitz strike operations.

The day was 12th December 1971 when both the F-104As took off and set their course towards Jamnagar Base at low level. Skimming the Arabian Sea, both Starfighters approached undetected till they crossed the Saurashtra sea coast. They were picked by Indian MOUs and Middlecoat knew that he had exactly one minute left to carry out his mission. Close to the target the formation pulled-up to 2-3000 feet with target offset to their right by 2-3 miles in order to line up for their strafing runs. For some reason Middlecoat banked to the left while target was on the right. Habib gave him a call to correct this. Repositioning for the strafing run resulted in formation spending another minute or two near the target area.

This mistake was enough for the Indian MiG-21FLs to get airborne and take their CAP positions. While they were taking off Middlecoat was at that time correcting his course while Tariq Habib had identified an aircraft on the ORP of Runway 24 and dived in. A carefull aim and the enemy aircraft was on fire after receiving a long burst of the Starfighter’s gatling gun. As per the mission profile Habib pulled up after completing his strafing run and set his course back home.

Meanwhile Middlecoat had caught a MiG-21 out in the open. He dropped his speed and dived hard right towards the MiG firing his gun. The enemy aircraft burst up in flames. Suddenly he spotted two MiG-21FLs diving for him and instantly turned right to shake off the attackers, levelling off at 100 ft AGL on the runway. The pursuing MiG also broke inside the Starfighters turn and closed in. Caught in an awkward position, Middlecoat could neither pull up nor conducted a defensive break as that would bring him in the firing range of the MiG. He engaged reheat and dashed towards the south at low level.

Both the MiG-21s were focused on Middlecoat’s F-104 Starfighter. The lead MiG-21FL flown by Sqn. Ldr. Guni Sehgal, closed in to get a positive missile tone. As he got a positive tone and was about to press his missile firing button, his wingman Flt. Lt. Bharat Bhushan Soni overtook him at an amazing speed and was dead set on Middlecoat’s Starfighter. All this was happening in milliseconds at a very high speed and Guni was unable to stop himself in firing the missile. He yelled on his R/T, “Bops, Soni has come right in front of me, I have pressed the missile firing button”. The missile streaked straight at Soni’s MiG but later deflected at the sun’s reflection in the Arabian Sea. As soon as Soni saw a missile going past his aircraft he stammered on his R/T, “Firing Red at me……….. Missile has missed.”

Flt. Lt. I.J.S. Boparai who was acting as a Killer Control knew the fact that if he relayed the true information to Soni that he has survived a near fracticide would un-nerve him and Soni might give up his chase of the Starfighter. He then told Soni that the F-104 have deployed IR Flares and at the same time ordered Guni to hold fire and provide cover to Soni. Determined to bag a kill, Soni got a positive missile tone and fired his K-13 Atoll missile at the F-104. Middlecoat observed a bright flash from the MiG-21 coming straight towards him. Instinctively he broke right in a high G 90° turn, engaging full afterburners for maximum energy. This manoeuvre was enough to evade the early generation IR missile but Soni also broke right and was closing in fast. As the MiG-21 could sustain a tighter turn than the Starfighter he rapidly closed in.

Middlecoat immediately told Tariq that a missile has fired upon him and asked him to provide him cover. Tariq who was above 500 ft AGL quickly responded and repositioned himself to clear Middlecoat’s tail. Soon he spotted Middlecoat’s Starfighter but due to the dilemma of high speed combat was unable to spot any Indian fighter in the vicinity. Meanwhile Middlecoat looked in his mirror and waited to counter the MiG’s next move. As soon as the MiG came in an attacking position, he again broke hard towards his right anticipating another missile launch. But this time anticipating this move, Soni also broke into the turn of Middlecoat’s Starfighter and fired a two second burst of his 23mm gun. With bright flashes all around the Starfighter, the aircraft started to get out of control. Middlecoat tried to pull the aircraft but the controls didn’t responded and his aircraft started its descent spiralling towards the sea. “I’ve been hit” shouted Middlecoat on his R/T, “I’m going to eject’. Tariq inquired if he could make it to overland but he replied in the negative. He then saw the painful scene of Middlecoat ejecting and the Starfighter going into the water while inverted.

Meanwhile the Indian Killer Control ordered Soni to ‘Return to Base’ and asked Guni to orbit overhead. As soon as Soni pulled up, Tariq caught sight of him. As he pulled up to convert behind the MiG-21 his auto-pitch control malfunctioned and the aircraft nose started oscillating. After disengaging the APC Habib safely exited from the area. Meanwhile Guni did’nt noticed Tariq’s Starfighter as he was busy in observing Middlecoat. He noticed that Middlecoat has neither separated from his ejection seat nor he has waved to the orbiting MiG after ejection. An ejection at a speed of more than 950km/hr and at a very low level can prove near fatal at times and it was assumed that Middlecoat has been injured in this process. Guni was replaced by an orbiting Hunter which tried its best to communicate with Middlecoat but never got any response. Since there was no boat in the area, nor IAF could muster any heliborne search, Middlecoat according to the Indian accounts was not rescued and his fate remains unknown till to date. He has been declared missing in action.

Sqn. Ldr. Tariq Habib was safely recovered at Mauripur. After detailed discussion with him it was declared that the status of this mission is ‘incomplete’ as both Starfighters strafed the airfield. While Tariq’s Starfighter strafed at what was later confirmed as a decoy, the result of Middlecoat’s strafing has never been confirmed.

Everyone was shocked at the loss of Middlecoat, but had to digest it as it was part of the war. One small mistake by our pilots allowed the Indians to scramble their jets and take advantage in the first supersonic air combat of this region.

It shall be noted that the Starfighters never had any fuel for an air to air combat, thus the Indians had dual advantage of operating a better fighter against handicapped PAF strike aircraft.

From Air Cdre. ® I.J.S. Boparai’s account, it has been confirmed that Middlecoat’s Starfighter slowed down in its attack as he spotted a MiG-21 on the ORP. There are many myths and untold facts of the 1965 and 1971 war which after a lapse of 30-40 years came in the public domain. In this specific combat there are two questions which are needed to be answered.

1. It is still to be verified by the Indians that did Middlecoat completed his attack on the MiG-21 parked on ORP, before he himself was attacked by the two MiG-21s which were airborne to intercept the Starfighters or did he fled after spotting the MiGs? If Middlecoat has succeeded in destroying the Mig-21 on the ground then this mission can be remembered as a success with both sides loosing an aircraft each.

2. We still do not know the fate of Wg. Cdr. M. L. Middlecoat. Did he perish during the ejection, was he rescued via a Jamnagar based SAR Helicopter and taken POW, or was consumed by shark?

Whatever is the truth, the Indians knows it and it is the request from the people of Pakistan that do answer these two questions on the basis of reality and not on false pride (which forces one to hide the truth).

IAF MiG-21FL scores decisive hits on Middlecoat's Starfighter. Middlecoast was operating at the edge of 104s combat radius and was caught in such a critical stage of flight that it was impossible for him to engage afterburners and disengage.

Another painting depicting Middlecoat's Starfighter about to crash in the Arabian Sea.

Indians celebrate the loss of the F-104 as it happened to be the first ever F-104 to be sot down in combat by the IAF. However it was never an equal fight as the Starfighters never had the fuel nor radar cover to stay and fight their way out.

Wing Commander Mervyn Leslie Middlecoat Shaheed SJ (Bar), SB.

The Loss of Flt Lt Samad Ali Changezi

By: Usman Shabbir and Yawar Mazhar

PAF pilots often challenged their adversaries both in air and both on the ground via corresponding with International media

PAF Base Masroor was a very important target for IAF attacks and used to come under regular night attacks by IAF Canberra Bombers. Due to the difficulty faced in launching missions from the base, while under attack at night, it was decided that two F- 104 aircraft should be positioned at PAF Base Faisal for night Air Defence Missions as an alternate airfield.

On 16th December, 1971, Sqn Ldr Rashid Bhatti, along with Flt Lt Samad Changezi was detailed to move to PAF Base Faisal with two F-104A aircraft. These aircraft were out of those nine F-104 aircraft that came to Masroor from Jordan on 13th of December. The Jordanian Starfighters lacked the special modifications, carried out by PAF on its Starfighters, enabling them to carry two Sidewinders on under wing weapon pylons in addition to two on the wingtips.

Due to lack of this modification, Bhatti and Samad had no choice, but to fly these aircraft for night air defence with guns only and carry fuel on wingtip tanks for extended range. The main idea being that at night PAF wanted the IAF raiding bombers to know that Starfighters are in the air leaving them with a very uncomfortable position to continue their planned attacks.

Both Bhatti and Samad took off from PAF Base Masroor for PAF Base Faisal on 16th December at 1600hrs. After landing at Faisal the pilots completed necessary operational requirement to organize the Air Defence Hut in tents and both aircraft were made ready for the night mission.

On 17th December, both pilots were told to come back to Masroor and while preparing to return they received instructions from Air Defence Command, to fly a CAP around Mirpur Khas and Chor area before landing back at Masroor.

Both pilots started a CAP in the designated area. Samad was flying the RJAF Starfighter with tail number 56-767 and Bhatti 56-839. After an hour, while both pilots were planning to return to Masroor for landing, they heard a call from Badin Radar Station, informing them of two bandits, flying at 10,000 ft and heading in their direction. The radar controller asked if they would like to engage them, Bhatti replied affirmative. Radar controller started passing on the instructions to establish contact with the bandits.

As Starfighter was approaching near the targets in battle formation, Samad who was on Bhatti’s left established contact with one of the IAF MiG-21s coming from opposite direction. Samad broke off from his lead and tried to manoeuvre behind this MiG-21. Meanwhile Bhatti (lead) also picked up both the MiG-21s and tried to position behind them. Now the situation was such that Samad was behind one MiG-21 trying to close in within gun firing range (about 3500 ft) with the second MiG-21 trying to close in on Samad. At this time Bhatti saw the second MiG-21, while still diving and turning, fire one missile at a very high angle-off at Samad. This missile missed Samad’s aircraft. At this moment Bhatti called Samad that one MiG-21 is behind him and has fired a missile which was a miss. Bhatti told Samad to jettison his fuel tanks and go full afterburner (full throttle) and disengage. Since Samad was very excited trying to get within the gun firing range of the MiG-21 he ignored Bhatti or was not very attentive in the heat of the situation.

The second MiG-21 fired another missile which was a direct hit and Samad’s Starfighter exploded in the air. The pilot had no time to eject and was killed instantly. Bhatti by now had closed in behind this second MiG-21, but both the MiG-21s made a hard turn to the right and headed east towards their base. Due to low fuel and lack of any air-to-air missiles, Bhatti also turned towards own base and recovered at Masroor.

This was the third and final Starfighter loss of 1971 war.

F-104A going supersonic in yet another supersonic jet combat. Once again they were at handicap without their Sidewinders. Squadron Leader Rashid warned his wingman about the threat emerging on his tail. Young Samad Changezi ignored his calls as he wanted to bag a MiG-21 following the loss of his mentor, Wing Commander Middecoat. Had his aircraft been equipped with Sidewinders, he would have succeeded in downing the first ever MiG-21 by a Starfighter.

THE STAR FIGHTERS' FAREWELL FLIGHT

1972

After eleven years of eventful service, a pair of No.9 Squadron's F-104As lifts off the Masroor runway to mark the Lockhead Starfighter's last mission in the PAF. The F-104's life in the PAF was cut short by the United States Government's "even-handed" arms embargo on both Pakistan and India after the 1965 and 1971 wars. Washington chose to ignore the fact that India, a long-time ally of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, did not possess any American military equipment and the sanctions thus exclusively penalized the armed force of Pakistan. In the face of increasing difficulty in obtaining spares, the PAF finally decided in mid-1972 to phase out the starfighters. The PAF's F-104s were somewhat unique. While being the lightest among the starfighters in combat configuration, the more powerful J-79-IIA engines gave them additional manoeuvre energy. The 20mm Galling gun, retrofitted to the PAF's F-104s by specific request, also added to the fighter's combat effectiveness. Many heavyhearted airmen and officers of No 9 Squadron witnessed the farewell flight, some of them served in the Squadron for two wars. From among the Squadron's veteran pilots, the two took up the Starfighters for the last time.

 

[TOPGUN]

You did a awesome job thx so much for sharing , as for the indian version of the story well that's all just bs I care less for it cuz its not true at all changing stories around does not change the actual history .

 

[dexter]

similar thread exists. ... huh...

well i have checked it before posting only thread title is same content is different...huh...

You did a awesome job thx so much for sharing , as for the indian version of the story well that's all just bs I care less for it cuz its not true at all changing stories around does not change the actual history .

thanksalot mate

 

[dexter]

we discussed enough about the same topic... anyhow here i am providing a link DAMAGE ASSESMENT - 1971 INDO-PAK NAVAL WAR

above thread is subjected to Navy ... i just included because air wings from both sides also involved..


Mutual feeling.. we feel your version is BS... so you believe what ever you want. doesn't change the fact...BD ( I sincerely believe biggest mistake by Indian establishment... Mighty BD warriors)

well thats related to only 1971 naval war and im only focussing on F-104,
its sorties , combat and overall performance plus upgardes.

 

[dexter]

The Intervening Period 1965-71
By: Usman Shabbir and Yawar Mazhar

PAF lost two Starfighters during the 17 day conflict with India. Unlike the past these two losses were not replaced by the US given the arms embargo imposed on Pakistan. Therefore No. 9 Squadron was left with only 8 F-104s and 2 F-104Bs after the hostilities. In addition PAF faced the problem of dwindling spare parts stocks for the aircraft which were also embargoed and had to be sourced from third party sources and black market.

During this period one F-104A aircraft (tail number 56-805) was written-off in 1967 in a ground accident. During aircraft start-up the starter unit did not disengage automatically due to an electrical failure and became overheated due to high RPM and caught fire. This fire spread to the engine and the aircraft was switched off. Despite efforts by fire tenders the aircraft was completely burnt. Yet another F-104A was lost in 1968 when Flt Lt GO Abbasi had a fatal crash while practicing low level aerobatics near Mianwali (tail number 56-807). It is believed that during this practice mission he faced multiple technical problems which Board of Inquiry could not exactly pinpoint.

PAF was now left with 06 F-104As and 02 F-104Bs. The bigger challenge was yet to come.

Flying, Comparisons and Feather Duster

By: Usman Shabbir and Yawar Mazhar

PAF's Supersonic Arsenal comprised of 80 F-6s, 24 Mirage-IIIs and 10 F-104 Starfighters in the late 60s.

Flight training during this period added more emphasis on low level night interceptions, which was not routinely practiced before the 1965 war. This was made possible by PAF’s acquisition of some low level radars which were deployed to cover important areas and valuable points. To test the effectiveness of this radar system extensive night training was carried out for F-104 pilots and radar operators. In addition air combat training missions were flown against other PAF aircraft. With the induction of Chinese F-6 (Mig-19) in PAF and PAF’s increasing experience of flying Soviet built aircraft in the Middle East, comparison between the types was increasingly common.

The F-104 was ill-suited to the type of air combat likely in South Asia was well illustrated in the ‘Feather Duster’ report which the United States Air Force (USAF) completed in 1965. The study evaluated various USAF aircraft including F-104Cs against Mig15/17 type aircraft (simulated by F-86H Sabres). The study included defensive and offensive setups of various US fighters against F-86Hs. In case of USAF Starfighters the study concluded several lessons which unsurprisingly pointed to the type’s very limited capability to engage in a manoeuvring fight. Out of 29 sorties where an F-86H acted as an offensive aircraft (positioned line astern and higher speed) a kill was scored on 21 occasions with the F-104’s defensive manoeuvres like the break, turns or hard pull-ups being unsuccessful. The only manoeuvre which allowed F-104s to dis-engage on some of the occasions was an accelerating diving spiral. In an offensive set-up, F-104s key advantage turned out to be its small size which from certain positions made visual detection of the attack very difficult. In cases where the F-104 tried to follow the F-86H’s defensive manoeuvre, it ended up overshooting the target. The report summarized by saying,

“As with the F-105, if a rear hemisphere missile/gun attack by Mig15/17 type aircraft is observed by defending F-104 aircraft, max acceleration 0-1 G diving separation is recommended. If the attack is observed too close for this type of separation, a diving accelerating spiral employing rapid roll rates is effective. The F-104 has an excellent chance to subsequently re-engage undetected visually by the enemy. If attacking threat is carrying missiles, the accelerating dive, if delayed until missile launch range, must rapidly generate angle-off prior to attempting escape.

The F-104 has little success in forcing overshoots through the use of breaks, hard turns, high G rolls or scissors manoeuvres.

In attacking with the F-104, an outstanding advantage is its small frontal silhouette. The F-104 attack should be pressed at supersonic speed, 1.1-1.3 mach, to ensure closure before the defender’s turn forces an overshoot.

Both in attacking and defending with the F-104, once supersonic separation has been effected, initiation of climb must be delayed at least 1-2 miles to prevent Mig15/17 type aircraft from cutting off in vertical plane.”

Informally air races between F-6 and F-104s were also organized with both aircraft lined next to each other on the runway and starting take-off roll together. F-6’s shorter take-off distance allowed it to gain altitude and speed sooner with F-104s catching up and surpassing F-6 at higher altitude (around 30,000 ft) and higher speeds. It was considered that the MiG-21 had the same acceleration and rate of climb at low Mach numbers as the F-104s although the F-104 maybe slightly better at higher Mach numbers.

Compared to both the F-6 and MiG-21, the Starfighter had a more spacious cockpit with better visibility compared to the other two aircraft. In the F-104, the layout of cockpit instruments and all controls and switches was good. It was very easy to reach any switch/control and read all instruments clearly, without any confusion. On the other hand the lay out of F-6 & MiG-21 cockpit instruments and positioning of various switches and controls was not very good increasing the chances of wrong switch or button selection.

In terms of general handling, F-104 flight controls were slightly heavier than F-6 controls and controls response also slightly slower than F-6. However the J79 engine responded much better to throttle inputs than the F-6. The Starfighter within its operating limitations had little vices while the F-6 exhibited adverse yaw at high angles of attack during low speed or high-G maneuvering which could lead to the aircraft entering into a spin.

Within PAF it was assessed that F-104 was inferior in all flight regimes by the increasingly numerous MiG-21s with the Indian Air Force but superior to the Su-7s, also inducted by IAF. Especially in a close in fight the Starfighter was considered to be out matched by the MiG-21 given its superior manoeuvrability and similar speed and acceleration. Not unlike the conclusions of the Feather Duster report, PAF’s F-104 tactics made use of aircraft’s high speed to hit targets quickly, ideally using AIM-9B Sidewinder, and quickly egressing. Turning with more nimble fighters was not considered advisable.

Slowly but surely, the arms embargo on Pakistan started effecting F-104 flying, with the result that the aircraft were practically cocooned starting December 1969. While some flying was managed on a regular basis, squadron pilots did the bulk of their day flying on F-6 aircraft with other squadrons. The Starfighter were pulled out of the storage in July 1971 as hostilities with India built-up.

Starfighter pilots preparing to go on a High Altitude Storm Climb sortie.

Upgrades and Modifications
By: Usman Shabbir and Yawar Mazhar

Given its ageing RT-33 aircraft based reconnaissance capability PAF attempted to use F-104s high speed performance for such missions. During 1968-69, at least one of the two F-104Bs was modified to carry Swedish made reconnaissance cameras (TA7M) in the rear seat. There were three cameras in one set of equipment, two oblique cameras and one vertical, with the vertical camera installed in the centre and oblique cameras installed on either side of vertical camera. This setting provided a total photo coverage angle of 170 degrees. This gave the F-104B the capability to look deep inside the enemy territory from a safe distance with coverage area depended on the height at which the aircraft would be flying. This modification flew quite a few trial missions before the war and the results were very encouraging. Although during the later 1971 war, the three available Mirage-IIIRPs were considered sufficient and the recce modified F-104Bs did not fly a recce mission.

Another important modification was installation of radar homing device on a single F-104A aircraft. This device called SLARD (Short range Low Altitude Radar Detection) and alternately Radar Locator (RALOR) was sourced through an American source and initial trials were carried on a twin engine communication plane. Based on results of such trials it was decided to fit an F-104A aircraft with this equipment. Aircraft tail number 56-875 was modified with this equipment (near the war perhaps due to maintenance related issues the equipment was removed from 56-875 and installed on 56-804). Initial trial fitting on the aircraft made the cockpit very uncomfortable for the pilot and was also considered a safety hazard in case of an ejection. Such issues were resolved during the testing phase which included extensive missions against various PAF radars. The SLARD had two sensors on the right and left of the nose cone. The device had a pick up range of about 7-10 miles at low level. The display in the cockpit would indicate the location of radar about 30 degrees either side from the nose of the aircraft. A vertical line/mark would appear after every 2 to 3 seconds to guide the pilot about exact location of the target radar with reference to the aircraft.

The F-104s also had an infrared (IR) sight however its pick up range was too short to be of any operational use. After the 1965 war, a serious effort was made by PAF engineers to improve its performance. These efforts did succeed in increasing the pick up range from less than half a mile to seven-eight miles against a single jet engine source by cooling the IR cell with liquid Nitrogen. The modified system did give the pilots good pick up ranges but because of ice formation, the system would clog and shut down. It required good 15 minutes for the ice to clear and the system to start functioning again. Unable to find a satisfactory solution to the problem, the effort was finally abandoned.

Yet another major modification was to make the under wing fuel tank station a weapon station capable of carrying Sidewinder missiles. Both the F-104 A and B versions that Pakistan had acquired had four external stores positions, one on each wingtip capable of carrying either an external jettisonable fuel tank or a Sidewinder missile, and one under each wing capable of carrying a jettisonable fuel tank only. Of these external store stations, the wingtip station was much cleaner and far less drag producing than the under wing station. For all operational missions, when Sidewinder missiles were carried, the pilots had either to fly with no external fuel tanks at all or carry them on the under wing station.

Operationally the ability to carry both wingtip tanks and Sidewinder missiles was considered very desirable. It was thought that the underwing stations could be modified to carry Sidewinder missiles. After the 1965 war, efforts were made locally for this modification. PAF’s technical staff was able to fabricate a set of Sidewinder launcher racks for the under wing station and also completed other necessary modifications like wiring, sighting and emergency jettisoning etc.

After thorough ground and flight testing, a number of live firing tests were carried out and the modification was declared successful. The entire fleet of F-104s was then modified at PAF’s main engineering depot at PAF Base Faisal.

Aircraft tail number 56-875 was modified to carry the SLARD / RALOR (near the war perhaps due to maintenance related issues the equipment was removed from 56-875 and installed on 56-804).

Assistance to Royal Jordanian Air Force

In 1968 Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) had inducted F-104 A&B Starfighter Aircraft and a request was made to Pakistan Air Force to convert RJAF pilots on the aircraft along with leading some pilots to Instructor Pilot status. This started PAF’s association with Jordanian F-104s. As the RJAF Starfighters started arriving at Prince Hassan Air Base (H-5) in USAF cargo airplanes and were being assembled and test flown by test pilots fromLockheed Martin, the PAF pilots deputed to RJAF started the pilot conversion program. Standard Operating Procedures, Flight Orders, Check Lists, Flying Syllabus, Boards and Charts, and all other operational aspects that were required for the establishment of fighter squadron were created and initially 15 pilots were converted, including Major Ihsan Shurdom who later rose to command the RJAF.

King Hussain of Jordan, himself a keen aviator was a regular visitor to the F-104 squadron. This association with RJAF turned out to be very useful in later more testing times for PAF.

 

[Pakistani shaheens]

Very informative thread, Brother! thanks for sharing

 

[waz]

Nice thread.

I wish we still had one or two flying for airshows and other events. Such a great piece of history.

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

Excellent thread @dexter

 

[Windjammer]

Found this interesting article on the mystery surrounding the shooting down of Wg. Cdr. Mervyn Leslie Middlecoat.


Wg. Cdr. Mervyn Leslie Middlecoat who was on deputation in Jordan, was recalled by the PAF HQ to resume air operations from the south, with immediate effect. As soon as he arrived at Mauripur he joined the session where new missions were planned for the next day. One of them included a harassing strike on Jamnagar Air Base. The mission profile was selected as lo-hi-lo with a provision of single strafing pass on the airfield targeting preferably exposed aircraft on ORP or any other target of opportunity. Intel confirmed the presence of MiG-21FL as the premier air defence fighter of IAF and the Starfighter pilots had practiced such missions by judging the scramble timing of MiG-21 as two minutes (from the ADA siren till take off). A precise low level approach on the main runway, pull up for a gun attack and strafe the targets was what was required and PAF pilots were confident that they would get the IAF MiGs on runway when they would be in their take off roll.

The squadron conducted a similar mission against Utterlai, the same day, when Wg. Cdr. Arif Iqbal and Squadron Leader Amanullah struck Utterlai and destroyed/damaged two HF-24 Marut aircraft. Their timing was so perfect that the MiGs never had time to scramble, and when they did, the Starfighters had already left the area after bagging two kills.


Challenging the Indian MiGs was a challenge itself by the Starfighters, as PAF pilots had flown them against the Mirage-IIIE and F-6 (MiG-19) in DACT and knew that in turning dogfights even a brick could do better. Within PAF it was assessed that F-104 was inferior in all flight regimes by the increasingly numerous MiG-21s with the Indian Air Force but superior to the Su-7s, also inducted by IAF. Especially in a close in fight the Starfighter was considered to be out matched by the MiG-21 given its superior manoeuvrability and similar speed and acceleration. PAF’s F-104 tactics made use of aircraft’s high speed to hit targets quickly, ideally using AIM-9B Sidewinder, and quickly egressing. Turning with more nimble fighters was not considered advisable. Under these conditions if PAF F-104 succeeds in destroying a MiG-21 it would be a morale booster for the squadron as well as the Southern Air Command.

The Indians on the other hand were quite annoyed on their MiGs reaction time at Utterlai and Group Captain Pete Wilson, Station Commander of Jamnagar Airbase had issued a warning to the detachment of the MiG-21 at his base that if anyone cannot scramble in less than 2 minutes can leave the base and go back. The IAF pilots at Jamnagar practiced hard to scramble in less than 2 minutes and succeeded. The Indian station commander anticipated a PAF attack after the Utterlai strike. He was sure that PAF will attempt a similar daylight raid on his base and he was keeping his fingers crossed as he knew that he will be facing a major challenge. Coming in a long way to attack a fully alert enemy base is not a simple task and Wilson knew that if his boys falter in the final crucial seconds the PAF pilots would achieve their task.

Following the successful strike against Utterlai, Wg. Cdr. Middlecoat worked on his mission profile along with Sqn. Ldr. Tariq Habib.
They had to fly ~ 500 km from their base towards Jamnagar Airfield at low level i.e. below 250 ft AGL.
As soon as they neared their target they had to pull up to 2-3000 feet with target offset to their right by 2-3 miles in order to line up for their strafing runs.
Once in line they had to attack on the aircraft on the runway/taxiway with a single pass each.
Exiting at high speed and low level.


Both pilots had conducted similar mission in training exercises and as demonstrated by Wg. Cdr. Arif Iqbal and Sqn. Ldr. Amanullah earlier against Utterlai, PAF was qualified to conduct such blitz strike operations.

The day was 12th December 1971 when both the F-104As took off and set their course towards Jamnagar Base at low level. Skimming the Arabian Sea, both Starfighters approached undetected till they crossed the Saurashtra sea coast. They were picked by Indian MOUs and Middlecoat knew that he had exactly one minute left to carry out his mission. Close to the target the formation pulled-up to 2-3000 feet with target offset to their right by 2-3 miles in order to line up for their strafing runs. For some reason Middlecoat banked to the left while target was on the right. Habib gave him a call to correct this. Repositioning for the strafing run resulted in formation spending another minute or two near the target area.


This mistake was enough for the Indian MiG-21FLs to get airborne and take their CAP positions. While they were taking off Middlecoat was at that time correcting his course while Tariq Habib had identified an aircraft on the ORP of Runway 24 and dived in. A carefull aim and the enemy aircraft was on fire after receiving a long burst of the Starfighter’s gatling gun. As per the mission profile Habib pulled up after completing his strafing run and set his course back home.


Meanwhile Middlecoat had caught a MiG-21 out in the open. He dropped his speed and dived hard right towards the MiG firing his gun. The enemy aircraft burst up in flames. Suddenly he spotted two MiG-21FLs diving for him and instantly turned right to shake off the attackers, levelling off at 100 ft AGL on the runway. The pursuing MiG also broke inside the Starfighters turn and closed in. Caught in an awkward position, Middlecoat could neither pull up nor conducted a defensive break as that would bring him in the firing range of the MiG. He engaged reheat and dashed towards the south at low level.

Attack profiles of both Starfighters, with explosions indicating the points where both aircraft attacked. The red lines indicates the Indian MiGs intercept pattern.

Both the MiG-21s were focussed on Middlecoat’s F-104 Starfighter. The lead MiG-21FL flown by Sqn. Ldr. Guni Sehgal, closed in to get a positive missile tone. As he got a positive tone and was about to press his missile firing button, his wingman Flt. Lt. Bharat Bhushan Soni overtook him at an amazing speed and was dead set on Middlecoat’s Starfighter. All this was happening in milliseconds at a very high speed and Guni was unable to stop himself in firing the missile. He yelled on his R/T, “Bops, Soni has come right in front of me, I have pressed the missile firing button”. The missile streaked straight at Soni’s MiG but later deflected at the sun’s reflection in the Arabian Sea. As soon as Soni saw a missile going past his aircraft he stammered on his R/T, “Firing Red at me……….. Missile has missed.”


Flt. Lt. I.J.S. Boparai who was acting as a Killer Control knew the fact that if he relayed the true information to Soni that he has survived a near fracticide would un-nerve him and Soni might give up his chase of the Starfighter. He then told Soni that the F-104 have deployed IR Flares and at the same time ordered Guni to hold fire and provide cover to Soni. Determined to bag a kill, Soni got a positive missile tone and fired his K-13 Atoll missile at the F-104. Middlecoat observed a bright flash from the MiG-21 coming straight towards him. Instinctively he broke right in a high G 90° turn, engaging full afterburners for maximum energy. This manoeuvre was enough to evade the early generation IR missile but Soni also broke right and was closing in fast. As the MiG-21 could sustain a tighter turn than the Starfighter he rapidly closed in.


Middlecoat immediately told Tariq that a missile has fired upon him and asked him to provide him cover. Tariq who was above 500 ft AGL quickly responded and repositioned himself to clear Middlecoat’s tail. Soon he spotted Middlecoat’s Starfighter but due to the dilemma of high speed combat was unable to spot any Indian fighter in the vicinity. Meanwhile Middlecoat looked in his mirror and waited to counter the MiG’s next move. As soon as the MiG came in an attacking position, he again broke hard towards his right anticipating another missile launch. But this time anticipating this move, Soni also broke into the turn of Middlecoat’s Starfighter and fired a two second burst of his 23mm gun. With bright flashes all around the Starfighter, the aircraft started to get out of control. Middlecoat tried to pull the aircraft but the controls didn’t responded and his aircraft started its descent spiralling towards the sea. “I’ve been hit” shouted Middlecoat on his R/T, “I’m going to eject’. Tariq inquired if he could make it to overland but he replied in the negative. He then saw the painful scene of Middlecoat ejecting and the Starfighter going into the water while inverted.


Meanwhile the Indian Killer Control ordered Soni to ‘Return to Base’ and asked Guni to orbit overhead. As soon as Soni pulled up, Tariq caught sight of him. As he pulled up to convert behind the MiG-21 his auto-pitch control malfunctioned and the aircraft nose started oscillating. After disengaging the APC Habib safely exited from the area. Meanwhile Guni did’nt noticed Tariq’s Starfighter as he was busy in observing Middlecoat. He noticed that Middlecoat has neither separated from his ejection seat nor he has waved to the orbiting MiG after ejection. An ejection at a speed of more than 950km/hr and at a very low level can prove near fatal at times and it was assumed that Middlecoat has been injured in this process. Guni was replaced by an orbiting Hunter which tried its best to communicate with Middlecoat but never got any response. Since there was no boat in the area, nor IAF could muster any heliborne search, Middlecoat according to the Indian accounts was not rescued and his fate remains unknown till to date. He has been declared missing in action.


Sqn. Ldr. Tariq Habib was safely recovered at Mauripur. After detailed discussion with him it was declared that the status of this mission is ‘incomplete’ as both Starfighters strafed the airfield. While Tariq’s Starfighter strafed at what was later confirmed as a decoy, the result of Middlecoat’s strafing has never been confirmed.


Everyone was shocked at the loss of Middlecoat, but had to digest it as it was part of the war. One small mistake by our pilots allowed the Indians to scramble their jets and take advantage in the first supersonic air combat of this region.

It shall be noted that the Starfighters never had any fuel for an air to air combat, thus the Indians had dual advantage of operating a better fighter against handicapped PAF strike aircraft.


From Air Cdre. ® I.J.S. Boparai’s account, it has been confirmed that Middlecoat’s Starfighter slowed down in its attack as he spotted a MiG-21 on the ORP. There are many myths and untold facts of the 1965 and 1971 war which after a lapse of 30-40 years came in the public domain. In this specific combat there are two questions which are needed to be answered.

1. It is still to be verified by the Indians that did Middlecoat completed his attack on the MiG-21 parked on ORP, before he himself was attacked by the two MiG-21s which were airborne to intercept the Starfighters or did he fled after spotting the MiGs? If Middlecoat has succeeded in destroying the Mig-21 on the ground then this mission can be remembered as a success with both sides loosing an aircraft each.

2. We still do not know the fate of Wg. Cdr. M. L. Middlecoat. Did he perish during the ejection, was he rescued via a Jamnagar based SAR Helicopter and taken POW.

Whatever is the truth, the Indians knows it and it is the request from the people of Pakistan that do answer these two questions on the basis of reality and not on false pride (which forces one to hide the truth).

 

[Indus Falcon]

Excellent thread Dexter. Thank You!! Really appreciate it!!