In December 1949, Mao Zedong traveled to Moscow, for his first trip abroad. Three months earlier, perched high above a crowd of thousands in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, Mao had announced the founding of the People's Republic of China. The nascent country was yet unformed, and Mao thought it important to ensure that New China would stand on the right side of history: the Communist side. In this, Mao needed Joseph Stalin's blessing and Soviet help.
Back then, China was in ruins after years of war, first with Japan, then with itself: it had little industry and infrastructure, even less science and technology; it had no navy, no air force but unspeakable poverty and rampant disease. Russia, though still recovering from wartime losses, had a modern industry, atomic weapons, and the ambitions of a superpower.
Mao wanted a treaty of alliance that would give China "face" on the international stage but also provide security guarantees against the United States, economic aid to rebuild and modernize the ruined Chinese economy, and military assistance to "liberate" Taiwan. According to Mao's interpreter, present at the meeting, he told Stalin he wanted something that "looked good but also tasted delicious." Stalin was non-committal. He feared that closer relations with Mao could jeopardize Moscow's postwar gains in the Far East and quite possibly lead to a U.S. intervention.
After the opening of the Russian archives in the early 1990s, the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (CWIHP) obtained declassified documents on the meetings between Mao and Stalin, publishing them in translation, with scholarly commentary, in successive issues of the CWIHP Bulletin to shed light, for the first time, on the making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Not all documents were declassified, and key evidence remains locked away in inaccessible archival vaults in Moscow as well as Beijing. This week, CWIHP has published additional documents on the Mao-Stalin cat-and-mouse game, and on the ups and downs of Sino-Soviet relations in the following years. These documents offer an interesting look behind the curtains of foreign policy decision making in China and Russia and provide clues for understanding where the Sino-Russian relationship is headed
When Stalin Met Mao: Digital Archive
Soviet Russia's Contribution to Chinese Nuclear Programme
Based on PRCFMA – PRC Foreign Ministry Archives
Soviet Russia’s contribution to China’s nuclear programme from 1954-1957
Soviets helped China build research reactor and cyclotron in China , co-operatvie uranius mining and processing , eastblishment of Eastern atomic energy institute
Nuclear weapon programme - 1957-1960
Soviets assisted China in establishment of Uranium enrichment , plutonium processing , warhead design and production and missile technology
The Soviets provided the Chinese with a nuclear reactor, a cyclotron and fissionable material. (Lewiss and Xue, 41)
Soviet Russia helped to establish Uranium processing plant , Plutonium Enrichment plant.
Besides Soviets also established East Atomic Energy Institute to help train Chinses scientists , technicians
These accords also included a geological survey for uranium in exchange for the Chinese supplying raw materials to the Soviets.
In the initial stages of the nuclear project Chinese scientists and planners stressed the need for the “vigorous assistance” of the Soviets. (Ibid., 48)
The Soviets, according to Davis and Xue, felt compelled to give the Chinese more than they were comfortable in doing, because their position among socialist countries was deteriorating. (Ibid., 62)
Chinese scientists of the Communist period were much more deliberate at acquiring as much as they could from the Soviets before the 1960 Sino-Soviet split.
The following Sino-soviet split period would be one of counterproductive populist science and general decline that would last until Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978.
Sino-Soviet Scientific Collaboration B Y K E V I N H O China Files .. ( Washington University Press)
So based on Secret , Diplomatic USSR archives and PRC FM archives it’s clear that From 1954 till 1960 over 6 years Soviet Russia extened all assiatnce in form of men ,materials , machines as well as expertise .
Under agreement between USSR and PRC , USSR was also to give prototype nukeT to China .This plan of which didn’t materilaise. China was solely to be blamed for this. Reasons for this was attitude of PRC . USSR was suddenly taken aback by Chinese aggressive posture towards Taiwan ...as a result of which Soviets withdraw all assistance to PRC.
However by that time all vital information such as warhead design and blue prints had already been passed on to China.
Yet it took Chinese scientists almost 4 years just to 'assemble' nuke.
Soviet assistance ended in 1960 , China tested its first nuke in 1964 based of Soviet war head design given to China way back in 1960.
So by all means Soviet Russia played immense role in China's Nuclear programmer .
It was the first and the most and the largest and blatant instance of Nuclear proliferation underwhich Soviet Russia virtually gave all nuclear know how to China
