South China Sea Forum

[bobsm]

Taipei to hasten frigate patrol for Taiping Island in wake of South China Sea ruling
Ruling, especially regarding Taiwan-occupied island, will never be accepted, says presidential office
PUBLISHED : Tuesday, 12 July, 2016, 11:57pm
UPDATED : Wednesday, 13 July, 2016, 12:17am

Taipei will bring forward plans to send a frigate to patrol waters near the biggest land feature in the Spratlys after a Hague tribunal ruled on Tuesday that Taipei-controlled Taiping Island was a “rock” that conferred no exclusive maritime rights.

Taiwanese Foreign Minister David Lee said President Tsai Ing-wen was expected to take “action” on Wednesday after top-level national security meeting on Tuesday on the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling. Lee refused to specify the action but local news media said Tsai was likely to board a La Fayette-class frigate to boost the crew’s morale before the vessel set off for Taiping.

An emergency response centre has also been set up at the defence ministry.

"The ruling ... has seriously hurt our rights over the islands in the South China Sea, and we can never accept it", the Presidential Office said.

Although the ruling was a result of a dispute between Beijing and Manila over claims to disputed land formations and waters, Taipei found the tribunal’s reference of Taiping unacceptable, saying Taiwan has long considered the 46 hectare feature an island.

“The ruling, especially the part involving Taiping Island, has seriously hurt our rights over the islands in the South China Sea, and we can never accept it,” the Presidential Office said.

It added that the ruling was not legally binding, and it would do all it could to uphold Taiwan’s sovereignty claims to “various islets” and their surrounding territorial waters.

“The Republic of China [in Taiwan] enjoys every right in line with the international law and the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding the islands in the South China Sea.”

The ROC regime took control of Taiping after Japan’s surrender in the second world war and stationed military personnel there even after the regime retreated to Taiwan. The mainland inherited the ROC’s claim to the South China Sea, including the U-shape “nine-dash” line first promoted by the ROC regime in 1947. Tuesday’s ruling also said the line contravened Unclos.

In Beijing, the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office said both the mainland and Taiwan should safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea.

Xinhua quoted TAO spokesman Ma Xiaoguang as saying the two sides shared responsibility for the overall and fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.

Relations between the mainland and Taiwan have been strained since the Tsai took office in May and official communication has stalled.

Taiwan has physically controlled Taiping, making it a must for the Tsai government to stand firm on Taipei’s claims EDWARD CHEN I-HSIN, TAMKANG UNIVERSITY

Analysts said the Tsai government had adopted a strategy of maintaining outright claims to Taiping, but keeping an ambiguous position towards the nine-dash line.

“This is because Taiwan has physically controlled Taiping, making it a must for the Tsai government to stand firm on Taipei’s claims,” said Edward Chen I-hsin, professor of international studies at Tamkang University in Taiwan.


http://www.scmp.com/news/china/poli...8/taipei-hasten-frigate-patrol-taiping-island

 

[cochine]

Vietnam welcomes tribunal’s ruling issuance: spokesman

VNA TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2016 - 18:59:52 PRINT

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Le Hai Binh (Photo: VNA)

Hanoi (VNA) – “Vietnam welcomes the arbitration tribunal’s issuance of the final ruling on July 12 and will issue a statement on the ruling’s content,” Foreign Ministry Spokesman Le Hai Binh said on July 12.

He fielded reporters’ question about Vietnam’s response to the arbitration tribunal’s issuance of the final ruling on the Philippines’s lawsuit against China’s claims in the East Sea. The tribunal was set up pursuant to Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at the request of the Philippines.

“Vietnam once again reiterates its consistent stance on this lawsuit as it was fully shown in the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry’s Declaration on December 5, 2014, sent to the arbitration tribunal,” he noted.

“In that spirit, Vietnam strongly supports settling disputes in the East Sea through peaceful measures, including diplomatic and legal processes without the use or threat to use force, as in line with regulations of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, maintaining peace and stability in the region, security, safety and freedom of navigation in and overflight over the East Sea, and respecting the law-abiding principle in seas and oceans,” Binh said.

“On this occasion, Vietnam once again affirms its sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes, the sovereignty over internal waters and territorial waters, the sovereign right and jurisdiction over Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf as defined in line with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Vietnam upholds all of its legitimate rights and interests regarding the geographical structures belonging to Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes,” stated the spokesperson.-VNA

 

[TaiShang]

Eco-protection in South China Sea: Sansha City gets creative for eco-friendly islands
CCTV News
Published on 10 Jul 2016
China established Sansha City four years ago to strengthen its foothold in the South China Sea. The city is getting creative to make the islands greener. CCTV’s reporter Han Bin went to one of the islands in the Xisha Islands, known as the Paracels. He looked at the marine environment and the fishermen who relied on the coral reefs to make a living.

Impressive display of regional public goods and development social responsibility.

 

[cochine]

Japan: Parties are required to comply with Arbitral Tribunal’s award

July 13, 2016 Gracel Ortega World 0



“Japan has consistently advocated the importance of the rule of law and the use of peaceful means, not the use of force or coercion, in seeking settlement of maritime disputes,” Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said after the Arbitral Tribunal instituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rendered it award regarding the West Philippine Sea dispute.

He added that as the Tribunal’s award is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute under the provisions of UNCLOS, the parties to this case are required to comply with the award.

“Japan strongly expects that the parties’ compliance with this award will eventually lead to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea,” the Japanese Minister added.

http://www.update.ph/2016/07/japan-parties-are-required-to-comply-with-arbitral-tribunals-award/7479

 

[Han Patriot]

I think you guys are taking all these international courts too seriously. Trust me the real deal is the gangstar nego behind the scenes between US and China. After this, China will re-assert their claim, build more bases, America will keep on flying and sailing to enforce the freedom of navigation, China will protest and then nothing will change.

China will show that she is angry, frustrated and humiliated by foreign powers, it's just for the domestic audience, the population will support the government even more. You still don't get it?

In the end, China would have completed the bases and it will just remain as status quo. It's just theatrical, in the end it's all a game between powers.

 

[cochine]

Making political hay after the arbitration ruling on South China Sea
Evelyn Goh For The Straits Times
Published
Jul 12, 2016, 5:00 am SGT
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South-east Asian states should understand the region's strategic realities. They should focus on building relations, and respond with resolve and restraint, after the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea.
Today, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) will issue its ruling on the Philippines' case against China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. Many worry about China's possible response to what is widely expected to be a ruling against its favour, and the implications for the region's already-choppy strategic waters.

This international legal confrontation comes amid the region's descent into a maritime insecurity spiral since the April-June 2012 stand-off at Scarborough Shoal between Chinese maritime security forces and the Philippine Navy. That incident ended with Chinese control of the disputed feature and Manila initiating legal arbitration proceedings in The Hague.

The following year, tensions escalated between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands, and China declared an air defence identification zone over parts of the East China Sea in November 2013, triggering fears of a similar move in the South China Sea. In mid-2014, the state-owned China Offshore Oil Corporation placed a giant oil rig close to the Paracel Islands disputed by Vietnam.


In January last year, the US-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative publicised satellite images of China's island construction in the area, fuelling Washington's concerns about the unprecedented speed, scale and strategic implications of Chinese land reclamation - fears intensified by reports that China stationed anti-ship missiles on the disputed Woody Island in March this year.

Since mid-2015, the US military has conducted overflights and three publicised freedom-of- navigation operations in the South China Sea, to challenge China's maritime territorial claims.


Meanwhile, Indonesia and Malaysia have responded more strongly to incursions by Chinese fishermen and security agencies in their maritime territories, and Asean has again demonstrated apparent disarray on the South China Sea issue in recent months.

Today's legal ruling, regardless of the result, will be difficult to enforce. To forestall an even more intense security dilemma in the South China Sea, regional policymakers should not lose sight of four vital underlying strategic trends.

STRATEGIC TRENDS

First, the power asymmetry and economic interdependence between China and South-east Asia will continue to grow. While this does not mean that China's smaller neighbours should give up their territorial and resource claims, out of national interest they do necessarily have to sustain relationships with China that are wider than just the South China Sea disputes alone.

Second, the United States is no longer the only great power operating in maritime South-east Asia. As China's military capability and economic interests expand, it wants to secure access to the region's sea lanes, territories and economic zones. This obliges both Washington and Beijing to find mutually acceptable rules for maritime usage, if only because neither wants to go to war over rocks and islands per se.

Third, China is most likely to continue on its path of national development within the existing international order, rather than by forging a new order - because it has benefited enormously from it, and its key economic partners sit within it. Ultimately, because China's successful domestic economic transformation could be undermined by regional instability, we may expect the Chinese leadership to temper the excesses of its territorial claims.

For a rising power like China, the downside of accepting the existing order is having to give less powerful states more regard than their capabilities alone deserve, such as by respecting unfavourable international legal rulings. Yet, the upsides are significant, because many existing international rules also favour the more powerful - for example, as China develops more long-range naval capabilities, its leaders and military too will appreciate the right to "innocent passage" in others' territorial waters and to military activities in their exclusive economic zones, which they currently oppose for the US.

Fourth, the most dangerous element of the South China Sea disputes is not island-building, territorial claims or freedom of navigation, but rather intense competition over rapidly declining fishery resources in the South China Sea. Armed disputes over fishing grounds have long been fairly common in the area, but these are now exacerbated by large-scale commercial fishing.

Moreover, growing involvement of coast guards and other national maritime security agencies threatens to turn such fishing disputes into bigger regional conflicts. Thus, new modes of trans-boundary fisheries resource management are arguably more urgently needed than an elusive agreement on territorial claims.

A THREE-PART RESPONSE

Where does this leave South-east Asia the morning after the PCA ruling? If it delivers, as many anticipate, an authoritative judgment against the legal basis of China's claim on territorial waters within its "nine-dash line", the Philippines (and other claimants) will secure important moral high ground in the disputes.

Related Story
The 2009 claims that changed the dynamics in the South China Sea
Yet, the judgment by itself will also not wipe clean the South China Sea slate; the region will still face the same knotty problem of seemingly irreconcilable territorial and resource claims.

Therefore, all parties should seize the opportunity offered by this legal juncture to regroup and refocus on the wider strategic picture.

The Asia-Pacific region will have to live with the South China Sea disputes for a long time to come. Effective management of these disputes will entail three essential elements:

•Relationship
As South-east Asians well know, China is not going to go away. But this region is adept at creating complex and delicate relationships with powerful states so as to be able to survive and prosper in their shadow. Focusing on the relationship means acknowledging and upholding the PCA ruling, while resisting the temptation to beat China over the head with it. This entails leaving it some room for manoeuvre so that Beijing is able to find a way to step out of the spotlight. More urgently, South-east Asia needs to work with the US and other partners - Japan, India, Australia - to convince Chinese leaders about the value of stabilising China's relationship with the region, which is also more comprehensive than just the South China Sea disputes alone.

•Resolve
Because of the intractable nature of the rival territorial claims, all parties have to live with higher levels of tension in the South China Sea going forward. Credible and intelligent resolve will be required to prevent localised disputes from spilling over into large-scale armed conflict and to deter aggression by rival claimants. In this regard, there is widespread support from South-east Asian states for the US military presence in the South China Sea, and for continued assistance by the US and its allies like Japan to boost maritime surveillance and defensive capabilities of claimants such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Regardless of differing views about the right to "innocent passage" by military craft within other states' territorial waters , the US will act to uphold that principle. But intelligent resolve requires that freedom-of- navigation operations are not deliberately politicised and publicised in order to castigate China. If the PCA rules against China's claims to territorial waters associated with its artificial islands, the legal point would be won, and in principle the question of freedom of military navigation becomes moot. In that context, politicising such routine operations in international waters would paradoxically legitimise China's sovereignty claims, by suggesting that China's sovereignty claims have merit. Moreover, everyone should expect to extend to Chinese forces the same right to innocent passage in regional and international waters. Note also that deterrence policies will elevate tension, because shows of force tend to generate similar responses. For instance, the military elements of the Obama administration's rebalance to maritime East Asia were met by China's militarisation of the South China Sea disputes, and both sides have upgraded maritime military exercises in the region to rival displays of strength. Ultimately, coercing China into halting its island building or resource exploitation will require actions like blockading Chinese forces or destroying Chinese construction - offensive actions that are likely to trigger war. For the South-east Asians whose lives, lands and seas will be the actual theatre for such a conflict, a more attractive bet will be trying to bring about voluntary limits to these claims.

•Restraint
The PCA ruling should not detract from the longstanding conundrum of how to agree on a code of conduct for the South China Sea. Indeed, developments since 2012 make it clear that we need an even more comprehensive code. In order to prevent accidental conflict escalations, some form of agreement such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (Cues) is needed. As the Singapore Government has suggested, for the South China Sea, Cues will have to cover not only naval incidents but also encounters between coast guards. To cultivate restraint by claimant states in pursuing their rival territorial claims, the Asean-China South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC) remains the most promising avenue. But a negotiated moratorium of activities under the CoC will now have to cover an expanded list of activities, including blockading features occupied by others and island construction. Given the trend of building islands that may be significant enough to generate claims to territorial waters, the CoC will also have to grapple with defining such features and delineating disputed and undisputed areas. Furthermore, the urgent problem of managing conflicting resource claims, especially fishing grounds, will need to be tackled either within the CoC process or independently of it. Regulating restraint in the South China Sea is a very tall order, which requires South-east Asian leadership. The most important response South-east Asian states must have to today's ruling is to make constructive political hay from their moral high ground. One assured way to do this would be for Asean to push forward with agreeing among itself the outline for a CoC consistent with international law that all its member states can first commit to upholding. Having demonstrated unity in restraint, regional states can then hope to persuade China and other players to sign up.

•The writer is the Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University.

 

[Tiqiu]

 

[SEAISI]

That's a big middle finger to the viets

 

[cochine]

That's a big middle finger to the viets

PCA ruling, china doesnt has both historic evidences for claiming and also nine dash claiming is ruleless.

Its disclosed that Chinese are aggressive invaders in to sea territory òf Viets.

 

[Tiqiu]

That's a big middle finger to the viets

Here is another one from their dear Uncle

World | Thu Jul 14, 2016 5:57am EDT
Related: World, Indonesia
U.S. launches quiet diplomacy to ease South China Sea tensions

A ship (top) of the Chinese Coast Guard is seen near a ship of the Vietnam Marine Guard in the South China Sea, about 210 km (130 miles) off shore of Vietnam May 14, 2014.


The United States is using quiet diplomacy to persuade the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and other Asian nations not to move aggressively to capitalize on an international court ruling that denied China's claims to the South China Sea, several U.S. administration officials said on Wednesday.

"What we want is to quiet things down so these issues can be addressed rationally instead of emotionally," said one official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe private diplomatic messages.

Some were sent through U.S. embassies abroad and foreign missions in Washington, while others were conveyed directly to top officials by Defense Secretary Ash Carter, Secretary of State John Kerry and other senior officials, the sources said.

"This is a blanket call for quiet, not some attempt to rally the region against China, which would play into a false narrative that the U.S. is leading a coalition to contain China," the official added.

The effort to calm the waters following the court ruling in The Hague on Tuesday suffered a setback when Taiwan dispatched a warship to the area, with President Tsai Ing-wen telling sailors that their mission was to defend Taiwan's maritime territory.

The court ruled that while China has no historic rights to the area within its self-declared nine-dash line, Taiwan has no right to Itu Aba, also called Taiping, the largest island in the Spratlys. Taipei administers Itu Aba but the tribunal called it a "rock", according to the legal definition.

The U.S. officials said they hoped the U.S. diplomatic initiative would be more successful in Indonesia, which wants to send hundreds of fishermen to the Natuna Islands to assert its sovereignty over nearby areas of the South China Sea to which China says it also has claims, and in the Philippines, whose fishermen have been harassed by Chinese coast guard and naval vessels.

 

[kuge]

Here is another one from their dear Uncle

World | Thu Jul 14, 2016 5:57am EDT
Related: World, Indonesia
U.S. launches quiet diplomacy to ease South China Sea tensions

View attachment 317755
A ship (top) of the Chinese Coast Guard is seen near a ship of the Vietnam Marine Guard in the South China Sea, about 210 km (130 miles) off shore of Vietnam May 14, 2014.


The United States is using quiet diplomacy to persuade the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and other Asian nations not to move aggressively to capitalize on an international court ruling that denied China's claims to the South China Sea, several U.S. administration officials said on Wednesday.

"What we want is to quiet things down so these issues can be addressed rationally instead of emotionally," said one official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe private diplomatic messages.

Some were sent through U.S. embassies abroad and foreign missions in Washington, while others were conveyed directly to top officials by Defense Secretary Ash Carter, Secretary of State John Kerry and other senior officials, the sources said.

"This is a blanket call for quiet, not some attempt to rally the region against China, which would play into a false narrative that the U.S. is leading a coalition to contain China," the official added.

The effort to calm the waters following the court ruling in The Hague on Tuesday suffered a setback when Taiwan dispatched a warship to the area, with President Tsai Ing-wen telling sailors that their mission was to defend Taiwan's maritime territory.

The court ruled that while China has no historic rights to the area within its self-declared nine-dash line, Taiwan has no right to Itu Aba, also called Taiping, the largest island in the Spratlys. Taipei administers Itu Aba but the tribunal called it a "rock", according to the legal definition.

The U.S. officials said they hoped the U.S. diplomatic initiative would be more successful in Indonesia, which wants to send hundreds of fishermen to the Natuna Islands to assert its sovereignty over nearby areas of the South China Sea to which China says it also has claims, and in the Philippines, whose fishermen have been harassed by Chinese coast guard and naval vessels.

so is that US acknowledging she is the stirring trouble-maker?

 

[Hamza913]

I don't know much about the South China sea dispute, other than who is at odds with each other. Could some members from each respective side please offer me their view on things and explain what it's about? Thanks.

 

[Taimoor Khan]

It reminds me of old cat and mouse story. Plenty of rats running around south China sea, clueless as to who will bell the cat.

 

[cochine]

How does the East Sea ruling affect Vietnam?

VietNamNet Bridge - Major General Le Van Cuong, former director of the Institute of Strategy Studies, the Ministry of Public Security, told Dan Tri online newspaper that the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, the Netherlands on the Philippines’ lawsuit against China’s nine-dash line claims in the East Sea (internationally known as the South China Sea) is a break-through for Vietnam’s struggle to defend its legitimate rights and interests and sovereignty in the East Sea.

Major General Le Van Cuong, former director of the Institute of Strategy Studies, the Ministry of Public Security.


Q: The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on July 12 ruled that there is no legal foundation for China’s U-shaped line claims in the East Sea. What do you think of the ruling?

Le Van Cuong: I think this is a very honest judgment, in accordance with objective and historical reality. I fully believe in international justice and the verdict of the Tribunal. China does not have any legal basis for the 9-dotted line claims.

The Tribunal's ruling again rejected the absurd claims of China with the so-called "sovereignty in the East Sea." This also means that Beijing's claims over Vietnam’s Truong Sa (Spratly) and Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands is entirely illegal, regardless of international law.

Before the PCA made the ruling, China had made a series of aggressive actions in the East Sea, such as invading Vietnam’s Hoang Sa on January 19th 1974 and Vietnam’s seven reefs on March 14 1988. China's actions violated point 3, item 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 2625 of the UN General Assembly and generally international law.

Therefore, the PCA’s ruling on July 12 is extremely important. It reflects the voice of conscience, of progressive human kind and indirectly urges the international community to be alert and take tough measures against China's actions to deliberately cause tension in the East Sea.

Q: The East Sea case between the Philippines and China is considered the case of the century because this was the first time a country used legal measures to resolve conflicts in the East Sea. What is the meaning of the ruling in the present context and whether it can change the face of the East Sea?

Le Van Cuong: First of all, I have to say that the Tribunal's ruling is not mandatory for China. But I think that this judgment is meaningful on the point that it is on behalf of the United Nations, on behalf of the international community and progressive mankind to make a conclusion that is fully consistent with objective reality.

This demonstrates that the PCA worked very seriously, fairly and impartially. The ruling also demonstrates that international law has been respected, international law is paramount, not national strength.

Secondly, after this decision, the international community will surely have a different view on China.

Legally, China has trampled upon international law. China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council but it does not comply with the UN Charter.

In the political and moral aspects, for many times Chinese leaders claimed to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors; committed to join other countries to maintain peace, stability and development.

On September 25th 2015 at the White House’s Rose Garden, in a meeting with US President Barack Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping also declared to the world that China did not militarize the East Sea.

But on February 12th 2016, China installed 8 surface-to-air missile launchers in Phu Lam (Woody) Island and 4 high frequency radar systems for military purposes. Then they continued to build up, sent war planes to its runways on Chu Thap (Fiery Cross Reef) and Gac Ma (Johnson South Reef).

In all aspects, nobody can believe in China because they frequently "say one thing and do another." I think this ruling once again proves that justice must belong to reason, not to the power.

Q: What do you think about China’s response after the ruling?

An artificial island of China in the East Sea. Photo CSIS



Le Van Cuong: First of all, I have to say that Chinese leaders are visionary. They had certainly prepared scenarios for the worst. They may react in two ways.

Firstly, China will launch a great media campaign to continue to lie to the world about the so-called "China’s sovereignty in the East Sea," while enticing the support of others. China will often make claims that they have a legal basis for the Spratly and Paracel islands and the PCA’s ruling is invaluable and unrelated to them.

Secondly, Beijing may take actions on the field. They may continue militarization in the East Sea in a faster, more aggressive way. China has built runways for war planes and in the coming time they may send long-ranger bomber-aircraft to the runway on the Fiery Cross Reef or war planes J10, J11, 30 ... to Johnson South Reef or install HQ 9 rocket launcher rigs in the Spratly and Paracel Islands

It is also possible that they will build many works on Scarborough and turn it into a military base. Of course this is not easy.

Another scenario is that China will set up the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East Sea under 3 levels.

At the lowest level, they will set up the ADIZ over the Paracel Islands. There China has prepared technical and material infrastructure such as airports, war planes, HQ9 surface-to-air missile, and high frequency radar systems. If this happens, China’s ADIZ will overlap the airspace of Vietnam and the Philippines, the flight information regions of Hanoi, HCM City and Hong Kong.

At a more serious level, China will set an ADIZ in the Spratly Islands and this will affect international aviation security because this ADIZ will overlap the flight information zones of a series of Ho Chi Minh City, Singapore, Malaysia, ....

The final step is that China can set up the ADIZ on the area inside the 9-dotted line. This is the most serious and dangerous level. If it happens, the entire East Sea will become a hot spot.

I think China will make moves while watching the response of the United States and the international community. However, today China is unable to do anything it wants. If they make excessive aggression, they will be boycotted by the international community.

Q: What is the ruling’s impacts on Vietnam, in your opinion?

Le Van Cuong: The Philippines formally brought the case to the PCA in January 2013. It is not easy for the Philippines to pursue this case. They had to prepare 4,000 pages of documents. They had an extremely good team of lawyers. So, if there's a similar scenario happening for Vietnam, we can learn from them about the preparation of legal documents.

The ruling on July 12 is also beneficial to Vietnam in the struggle to defend its legitimate rights and interests, and sovereignty in the East Sea. Thus, Vietnam will have more legal power.

http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/ma...does-the-east-sea-ruling-affect-vietnam-.html

 

[Hamza913]

After WW2, China claimed all the islands of the South China Sea and occupied the main island. These were our prize of war for our victory over Japanese imperialism. In the 1970's, Vietnam and Philippines invaded our islands. We defeated Vietnam in naval battles but Pinoy was too far away. Since 2012, they tried to expand their invasion with the help of USA pivot to Asia. As a consequence, China built up our navy to defeat the USA in South China Sea. Meanwhile, we spank the Viets and Pinoys mercilessly.

Thank you.