Silent Subterfuge – LoC to Border? » Indian Defence Review
By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch
Issue Net Edition | Date : 14 May , 2014
Media reports quote the Special Representative of the Prime Minister on Pakistan saying that India and Pakistan should ensure the LoC is like border. The Special Representative was reportedly speaking at the seminar ‘Discussion between India and Pakistan on J&K- A Historical Perspective’ organized by the Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Kashmir.
Lack of strategic sense has been a casualty in India ever since, coupled with naïve utopia of peace and greed of bagging a ‘peace prize’ of politicians.
Significantly, the quote has come at a time when the present government is in the throes of its last vestiges. To this end, the timing of the statement becomes important. If this is silent subterfuge in perception management to inject an idea, it may certainly succeed under the cover of being just an innocuous statement. But surely the word ‘border’ could not have been injected by default by the Special Representative with years of diplomatic experience, when small innocuous words make a whale of difference in diplomatic parlance.
In this context, the difference between ‘border’ and ‘LoC’ surely cannot be glossed over. If the LoC is ‘border’ then why pray the Special Representative’s Prime Minister and his Cabinet have been thumping tables in Parliament hooting that J&K is integral part of India? On the other hand, if this statement was made because of a missive from the PMO, which is very much possible, the nation needs an explanation.
Lack of strategic sense has been a casualty in India ever since, coupled with naïve utopia of peace and greed of bagging a ‘peace prize’ of politicians. Nehru suffered from it and so does the present dispensation. Otherwise how could anyone ignore the strategic significance of Siachen and recommend withdrawal.
The disturbing reports that emerged from the episode was that three of the members of the Indian delegation of Track II (including the leader) had been personally briefed by the NSA, obviously in tandem with the PMO. The fact that the PM himself visualized this would be a ‘hallmark’ achievement in normalizing relations with Pakistan, facilitating his desire to travel to Pakistan to electrify his native village and earn him global acclaim is even more disturbing. Still more disturbing is the fact mentioned in a recent book by a former media adviser and chief spokesperson of the PM that an Army Chief too was amenable to withdrawal in private though he made official noises otherwise, plus that the president of the ruling party too was in favour but at a later date to give credit to her son. But the cold hard reality is that increasingly former diplomats, military veterans and active journalists are prepared to forsake good of the nation for personal benefits.
How can the public trust in the government in terms of national security with incidents like the Siachen withdrawal especially at a time when Pakistan has been upping the proxy war all along?
The way the recommendations of withdrawal from Siachen were worked out is akin to what in army parlance is termed as ‘situating an appreciation’; decide on the end result first and then just go about working to achieve that end. This appears to be a speciality of the present government as was reportedly done in case of the Naresh Chandra Committee also. Latter is indicative by the remark of former ambassador G Pathasarthy (also member of the same Committee) stating that the conduct of the Naresh Chandra Committee left much to be desired.
So, it is quite apparent that strategic issues of national importance are being sacrificed for ulterior motives. In the case of the Track II that recommended withdrawal from Siachen, the smart act done was that in all the discussions, veteran diplomats took the back seat, letting the nine military veterans do all the talking in order to portray that necessary military considerations had been taken into account. The Indian coordinator who selected these members remains a mystery as none of the members selected had ever served in Siachen and neither did the Indian delegation ever make an effort to visit the Siachen area nor ask for briefing at HQ Northern Command, the Corps at Leh or the Siachen Brigade itself.
The truth of the Indian delegation agreeing to withdrawal from Siachen came out when the Atlantic Council of Ottawa put out the report on the internet. Even then, members of the Indian delegation remained defiant that Siachen had no strategic significance. A former diplomat known for his closeness to the PM chaired a talk at the India International Centre to ‘justify’ withdrawal from Siachen but received a mouthful from the audience including from a former army chief. Later, the members and the delegation tried to palm of the episode by saying that these were only Track II level delibrations, whereas, the Pakistani side had already made it clear that their Track II indeed is also Track I. Interestingly, numerous meetings of this Track II were held in various locations abroad and the final one at Lahore where the agreement to withdraw was signed.
Significantly, not a single meeting was held in India so that the public should not get a whiff of what was cooking. Had the report not been put on the internet, no one would have been wiser. Eventually the members grudgingly agreed that Siachen indeed has great strategic significance. The diplomat who was trying to justify withdrawal from Siachen at India International Centre has joined a newly formed think tank with two Track II buddies, one doing executive director and the other treasurer. What strategic initiatives this think tank is planning, their activities and funding should be of interest to intelligence agencies.
There can be no question of withdrawal with the PLA already dug in Gilgit-Baltistan and simultaneously encroaching in Depsang Plains in Eastern Ladakh.
The funding for all the Track II meetings abroad (all expenses including stay in five star hotels) was ostensibly done by the Atlantic Council of Ottawa, which is closely associated with the Washington based Atlantic Council of the US which is primarily a Pakistani think tank meant for perception management and is funded by the Pakistani Military and ISI. The implications are clear even if one were to forget the unforgettable machinations of Ghulam Mohammed Fai.
To this end, what is contained in the report by the Interlocutors on J&K appointed by the present dispensation should be of interest to the new government. Significantly, when some of these interlocutors were approached by journalists about their foreign trips during the deliberations, the response given was that these foreign trips were funded by the MEA, which the MEA denies.
Therefore, the big question mark remains if the funds came from across the border, which in all probability has happened. The report, therefore, needs to be scrutinized in this backdrop including why it has not been made public after that many months of submission, plus was there a plan to release it at a future date to gain political mileage or once the perception management exercise was complete, one example being the LoC being acknowledged as ‘border’. After all why has the nation or the Parliament not taken into confidence about the so called progress made by the interlocutors?
A second Track II with Pakistan titled ‘Stabilization of LoC’ has been on for past few months. It is not known whether this too is under the aegis of the Atlantic Council of Ottawa and who is funding it as it is under tight wraps after the Siachen experience but this much is known that few meetings have taken place abroad including in Bangkok and Colombo, that some members are same as in the Siachen Track II and that barring perhaps one, none has served at the LoC.
Whatever be the case, the public needs to be kept informed of what is happening not just an odd innocuous statement that the LoC should be considered as ‘border’ by both countries. How can the public trust in the government in terms of national security with incidents like the Siachen withdrawal especially at a time when Pakistan has been upping the proxy war all along?
Again, is it appropriate for the Special Representative of the PM to make such statement like considering the LoC as the border, on practically the last day of the PM in office? No wonder Pakistani High Commissioner at New Delhi has the gumption of talking of resolving Siachen when not a Pakistani soul is anywhere close to Siachen. There is no doubt that it is good to keep talking including at Track II level but the million dollar question is what exactly has changed on ground that we are indulging in the largesse like withdrawing from Siachen and turning the LoC to ‘border’. Are we prepared to do this just to get the MFN status in return? Why are we talking of Siachen and Sir Creek in isolation. Have we ever asked Pakistan to abrogate their treaty with China under which they gave away the Shaksgam valley to the Chinese or is that a closed chapter? Has Pakistan taken up dialogue at official diplomatic level for whole of J&K? Has Pakistan shut down the terrorist camps against us, stopped recruitment and funding for anti-India jihad, stopped open anti-India rallies, stopped pumping drugs and fake currency into India? If not then what is this talk of making LoC a ‘border’ especially when Pakistan can do little to us military or economically. And, how do you think China will view this LoC to ‘border’ development when we have larger boundary disputes with China including along parts of J&K?
The new government certainly needs to take a fresh look at the strategic level. The Siachen chapter needs to be closed once for all. There can be no question of withdrawal with the PLA already dug in Gilgit-Baltistan and simultaneously encroaching in Depsang Plains in Eastern Ladakh. Effective measures also need to be put in place to stop the silent subterfuge of the above type, putting India at strategic disadvantage, to unravel why this happened in the first place and who are responsible for such treachery.
Lt Gen Prakash Katoch
Prakash Katoch is a former Lt Gen Special Forces, Indian Army
By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch
Issue Net Edition | Date : 14 May , 2014
Media reports quote the Special Representative of the Prime Minister on Pakistan saying that India and Pakistan should ensure the LoC is like border. The Special Representative was reportedly speaking at the seminar ‘Discussion between India and Pakistan on J&K- A Historical Perspective’ organized by the Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Kashmir.
Lack of strategic sense has been a casualty in India ever since, coupled with naïve utopia of peace and greed of bagging a ‘peace prize’ of politicians.
Significantly, the quote has come at a time when the present government is in the throes of its last vestiges. To this end, the timing of the statement becomes important. If this is silent subterfuge in perception management to inject an idea, it may certainly succeed under the cover of being just an innocuous statement. But surely the word ‘border’ could not have been injected by default by the Special Representative with years of diplomatic experience, when small innocuous words make a whale of difference in diplomatic parlance.
In this context, the difference between ‘border’ and ‘LoC’ surely cannot be glossed over. If the LoC is ‘border’ then why pray the Special Representative’s Prime Minister and his Cabinet have been thumping tables in Parliament hooting that J&K is integral part of India? On the other hand, if this statement was made because of a missive from the PMO, which is very much possible, the nation needs an explanation.
Lack of strategic sense has been a casualty in India ever since, coupled with naïve utopia of peace and greed of bagging a ‘peace prize’ of politicians. Nehru suffered from it and so does the present dispensation. Otherwise how could anyone ignore the strategic significance of Siachen and recommend withdrawal.
The disturbing reports that emerged from the episode was that three of the members of the Indian delegation of Track II (including the leader) had been personally briefed by the NSA, obviously in tandem with the PMO. The fact that the PM himself visualized this would be a ‘hallmark’ achievement in normalizing relations with Pakistan, facilitating his desire to travel to Pakistan to electrify his native village and earn him global acclaim is even more disturbing. Still more disturbing is the fact mentioned in a recent book by a former media adviser and chief spokesperson of the PM that an Army Chief too was amenable to withdrawal in private though he made official noises otherwise, plus that the president of the ruling party too was in favour but at a later date to give credit to her son. But the cold hard reality is that increasingly former diplomats, military veterans and active journalists are prepared to forsake good of the nation for personal benefits.
How can the public trust in the government in terms of national security with incidents like the Siachen withdrawal especially at a time when Pakistan has been upping the proxy war all along?
The way the recommendations of withdrawal from Siachen were worked out is akin to what in army parlance is termed as ‘situating an appreciation’; decide on the end result first and then just go about working to achieve that end. This appears to be a speciality of the present government as was reportedly done in case of the Naresh Chandra Committee also. Latter is indicative by the remark of former ambassador G Pathasarthy (also member of the same Committee) stating that the conduct of the Naresh Chandra Committee left much to be desired.
So, it is quite apparent that strategic issues of national importance are being sacrificed for ulterior motives. In the case of the Track II that recommended withdrawal from Siachen, the smart act done was that in all the discussions, veteran diplomats took the back seat, letting the nine military veterans do all the talking in order to portray that necessary military considerations had been taken into account. The Indian coordinator who selected these members remains a mystery as none of the members selected had ever served in Siachen and neither did the Indian delegation ever make an effort to visit the Siachen area nor ask for briefing at HQ Northern Command, the Corps at Leh or the Siachen Brigade itself.
The truth of the Indian delegation agreeing to withdrawal from Siachen came out when the Atlantic Council of Ottawa put out the report on the internet. Even then, members of the Indian delegation remained defiant that Siachen had no strategic significance. A former diplomat known for his closeness to the PM chaired a talk at the India International Centre to ‘justify’ withdrawal from Siachen but received a mouthful from the audience including from a former army chief. Later, the members and the delegation tried to palm of the episode by saying that these were only Track II level delibrations, whereas, the Pakistani side had already made it clear that their Track II indeed is also Track I. Interestingly, numerous meetings of this Track II were held in various locations abroad and the final one at Lahore where the agreement to withdraw was signed.
Significantly, not a single meeting was held in India so that the public should not get a whiff of what was cooking. Had the report not been put on the internet, no one would have been wiser. Eventually the members grudgingly agreed that Siachen indeed has great strategic significance. The diplomat who was trying to justify withdrawal from Siachen at India International Centre has joined a newly formed think tank with two Track II buddies, one doing executive director and the other treasurer. What strategic initiatives this think tank is planning, their activities and funding should be of interest to intelligence agencies.
There can be no question of withdrawal with the PLA already dug in Gilgit-Baltistan and simultaneously encroaching in Depsang Plains in Eastern Ladakh.
The funding for all the Track II meetings abroad (all expenses including stay in five star hotels) was ostensibly done by the Atlantic Council of Ottawa, which is closely associated with the Washington based Atlantic Council of the US which is primarily a Pakistani think tank meant for perception management and is funded by the Pakistani Military and ISI. The implications are clear even if one were to forget the unforgettable machinations of Ghulam Mohammed Fai.
To this end, what is contained in the report by the Interlocutors on J&K appointed by the present dispensation should be of interest to the new government. Significantly, when some of these interlocutors were approached by journalists about their foreign trips during the deliberations, the response given was that these foreign trips were funded by the MEA, which the MEA denies.
Therefore, the big question mark remains if the funds came from across the border, which in all probability has happened. The report, therefore, needs to be scrutinized in this backdrop including why it has not been made public after that many months of submission, plus was there a plan to release it at a future date to gain political mileage or once the perception management exercise was complete, one example being the LoC being acknowledged as ‘border’. After all why has the nation or the Parliament not taken into confidence about the so called progress made by the interlocutors?
A second Track II with Pakistan titled ‘Stabilization of LoC’ has been on for past few months. It is not known whether this too is under the aegis of the Atlantic Council of Ottawa and who is funding it as it is under tight wraps after the Siachen experience but this much is known that few meetings have taken place abroad including in Bangkok and Colombo, that some members are same as in the Siachen Track II and that barring perhaps one, none has served at the LoC.
Whatever be the case, the public needs to be kept informed of what is happening not just an odd innocuous statement that the LoC should be considered as ‘border’ by both countries. How can the public trust in the government in terms of national security with incidents like the Siachen withdrawal especially at a time when Pakistan has been upping the proxy war all along?
Again, is it appropriate for the Special Representative of the PM to make such statement like considering the LoC as the border, on practically the last day of the PM in office? No wonder Pakistani High Commissioner at New Delhi has the gumption of talking of resolving Siachen when not a Pakistani soul is anywhere close to Siachen. There is no doubt that it is good to keep talking including at Track II level but the million dollar question is what exactly has changed on ground that we are indulging in the largesse like withdrawing from Siachen and turning the LoC to ‘border’. Are we prepared to do this just to get the MFN status in return? Why are we talking of Siachen and Sir Creek in isolation. Have we ever asked Pakistan to abrogate their treaty with China under which they gave away the Shaksgam valley to the Chinese or is that a closed chapter? Has Pakistan taken up dialogue at official diplomatic level for whole of J&K? Has Pakistan shut down the terrorist camps against us, stopped recruitment and funding for anti-India jihad, stopped open anti-India rallies, stopped pumping drugs and fake currency into India? If not then what is this talk of making LoC a ‘border’ especially when Pakistan can do little to us military or economically. And, how do you think China will view this LoC to ‘border’ development when we have larger boundary disputes with China including along parts of J&K?
The new government certainly needs to take a fresh look at the strategic level. The Siachen chapter needs to be closed once for all. There can be no question of withdrawal with the PLA already dug in Gilgit-Baltistan and simultaneously encroaching in Depsang Plains in Eastern Ladakh. Effective measures also need to be put in place to stop the silent subterfuge of the above type, putting India at strategic disadvantage, to unravel why this happened in the first place and who are responsible for such treachery.
Lt Gen Prakash Katoch
Prakash Katoch is a former Lt Gen Special Forces, Indian Army
