Scepticism about the ‘war’

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Scepticism about the ‘war’ By Hajrah Mumtaz
Sunday, 14 Jun, 2009 | 10:49 AM PST | There is no evidence that a shift has taken place in the agencies’ notion of the concept of ‘good’ (read ‘our’) and ‘bad’ Taliban. — Reuters Provinces
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Lack of funds threaten aid efforts Even as the Pakistan army claims progress against the militants in the north-western areas of the country, there are reports that people – while being firmly against the Taliban and their ilk – are sceptical of the government’s and the army’s commitment to the long-term battle. That is, of course, to eradicate issues of extremism and militancy for good, invest in the development of the areas first rampaged by the likes of Fazlullah and Mangal Bagh and then ravaged by the military operation against them, and perhaps most importantly, revisit the country’s notion of the strategic depth of Afghanistan, which has proved so very disastrous.

One may well ask why this scepticism exists. The people of Pakistan have always stood firmly behind the army in times of turbulence. Historically, as is evident in our literature, song and academic curricula, we glorify fighting for the sake of the country’s territorial integrity, refer to fallen soldiers as ‘martyrs’, and believe implicitly in the validity of the ideological concept of the nation. The last time Pakistan was involved in a major conflict – 1971 – there was little indication of any such scepticism. This, despite the fact that the ‘war’ was being fought against what was then a part of the country — a fully-paid up member of the idea of Pakistan. Then, the spin doctors managed to convince us that the war was valid and being won – right up to the day the country woke up to headlines that announced the secession of East Pakistan. Now, even as the Taliban and their band are reportedly being driven back, there is general discontent and quiet murmurings about the will, both political and military, to win the battle. And the murmurs have to be quiet, at least for the moment: in the context of this country, doubting the commitment of the army amounts to a form of blasphemy – especially at a point when soldiers are dying.

So what has changed?

For one thing, the amount and nature of information available to the citizenry. Back then, there were only newspapers (for the literate minority) and not very many of those; there was the radio and PTV, but those were in the control of the state. There were no on-the-spot, ‘live from the refugee camp’ reports. So people learned mainly what the state wanted them to learn. Now, television channels aplenty are accessible regardless of literacy rates, most of them independently owned and operated. And there’s also the internet from where one can access a host of information and commentary from local and international sources. True, the news about the army’s successes in X division or Y agency comes mainly from the ISPR. But concurrently, thanks to the access to information, people are learning to connect the dots. And when one starts to extrapolate from the gaps in what the government and the army are telling us, one does indeed find grounds for scepticism.

First, there’s the issue of the IDPs. It had become clear for quite some time that the Swat issue was not going to be solved by cutting deals, and that a military operation was going to become inevitable. That would, quite clearly, lead at the very least to thousands of civilians being forced to flee their areas, if not millions as proved to be the case. It is abundantly evident to the whole country that no effective contingency plan was formulated for either the safe passage of non-combatants from the conflict zones, or for their accommodation while the battles raged, or for their rehabilitation if and when their villages and towns are considered safe. The suffering of these people is in close-up on our television screens; many people are asking themselves what they’d be feeling in the same situation, had they been driven out of their homes and then abandoned.

Then, there’s the failure to either arrest or take out any of the TTP’s top commanders, when just a few weeks ago the government was in the process of negotiating with them. These men were giving interviews on television, gathering for lunch at government-run venues. Now that they are the enemy, why can’t we find them? If the state and its institutions, including the army, do not know where they are, that represents a colossal failure of intelligence and therefore implies incompetence of the intelligence networks. And if their whereabouts are known, the fact that they are still free holds very disturbing implications.

A similarly worrying implication is inherent in the fact that while the head-money on some of the militants’ leaders has recently been increased, such as for Muslim Khan, others are apparently exempt. The glaring example in this regard is Baitullah Mehsud, for whom not even head-money has been announced although he is blamed for a string of attacks in Pakistan – including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

The lack of success so far in taking out key Taliban targets also raises the disturbing possibility that the agencies – that were in no small part responsible for this mess in the first place – continue to view at least some of the militants as potential strategic partners. There has been no evidence that a shift has taken place in either the notion of ‘strategic depth’, or the concept of ‘good’ (read ‘our’) and ‘bad’ Taliban.

Then, there are other bits and bobs of news that are perhaps not directly connected to the battle against the Taliban, but certainly bode ill for the fight against extremism in general. Abdul Aziz of Lal Masjid notoriety and Hafiz Saeed of the Jamaatud-Dawa (the reincarnated form of the banned Lashkar-i-Taiba) were recently declared free by courts that cited the lack of evidence. Certainly, one would wish no court to declare the guilt of anyone without citing proper evidence – the due processes of the law must be followed. But the question is: why was the prosecution’s evidence so deficient? Why were the cases not properly built so that justice could be served to these men, whose links with extremist organisations are virtually undisputable? It seems incredible that such men walk free in a country where others are kept incarcerated for years on the flimsiest of excuses – as long as the government wants it so.

And in a similar manner, it is also evident that no serious attempts have been made to dismantle the jihadi/militant infrastructure in areas outside the NWFP and Fata, notably southern Punjab, from where groups such as the Jaish-i-Mohammadi reportedly continue to operate with impunity.

These are just some of the factors that lead a politically aware person to question the long-term success of the ‘war’ currently under way. And contrary to popular belief, the people of this country are, thanks to the twists of history, very politically aware indeed. It is time for the top brass of the state and the army to realise that they are accountable to the public – and that the public will not be taken in by spin forever.
— hajrahmumtaz@gmail.com