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Saudi donors most signifcant source of terrorism funding in Pakistan

There are now news reports of Saudi funded training camps in Waziristan recruiting and preparing militants for Syria.
that is halal terrorism just like the halal 1.5 Billion dollars Nawaz got to sell our men to kill people of an other sovereign country
 
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Formation of a Terror Alliance
The Lashkar e Jhangvi by 2004 had became a powerful terrorist organization with increasing support from Al Qaeda. The new, never-before-known expertise of LeJ cadres proficient in bomb-making and suicide bombings came from the same source. With time, the LeJ had established its contacts with extremists in Pakistan’s tribal areas (FATA). The new ‘friends’ were mainly Uzbek, belonging to the notorious Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) who had taken refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas as US operations in Afghanistan continued.With the formation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007, many of the LeJ’s factions started operating in urban areas under its umbrella. The rise of an insurgency in FATA and a sudden increase in terrorist attacks all over Pakistan proved to be very beneficial for the LeJ as the main concentration of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) was diverted towards fighting the more powerful rebellion of the TTP. The LeJ’s undeclared alliance with the TTP came to limelight when the responsibility for 2008 Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad was claimed by the TTP.

The investigation however, unearthed some startling facts.
The logistics support for this attack was provided by local militants in Punjab, who were also associated with the LeJ. It was now the LeJ helping the TTP to execute attacks in urban areas of Punjab, while the latter in return provided safe havens for LeJ terrorists in FATA.

Attack on SL team
On 3 March 2009, a convoy of the Sri Lankan cricket team was ambushed in Lahore, 6 policemen and 2 civilians were killed, while two Sri Lankan players also sustained injuries. This attack was carried out by at least 12 highly-trained gunmen. Key suspects of this attack were mostly the LeJ and TTP operatives in Punjab. The primary suspect, Muhammad Aqeel alias Dr. Usman, evaded arrest. The attack is believed to have been masterminded by Malik Ishaq himself.

When TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud was killed in 2009, Hakimullah Mehsud took over. He is credited with forming a proper alliance with the LeJ. Under his command, the TTP began targeting minority sects in tribal areas and claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on Shias. But the major joint terror strike by the TTP and LeJ was witnessed in 2009 which was a first-of-its-kind and took the entire nation by surprise.

It was the siege of Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters or the GHQ in the garrison city of Rawalpindi. 5 out of 10 terrorists who stormed the GHQ belonged to Punjab-based extremist organisations, mainly the LeJ; the other 5 belonged to the TTP. A successful special forces hostage rescue operation ended the siege, but resulted in the martyrdom of two
SSG commandos and two civilians.

THE SAUDI CONNECTION

In the Punjab town of Jhang, LeJ’s birthplace, SSP leader Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi describes what he says are Tehran’s grand designs. Iranian consular offices and cultural centers, he alleges, are actually a front for its intelligence agencies.

“If Iranian interference continues it will destroy this country,” said Ludhianvi in an interview in his home. The state provides him with armed guards, fearful any harm done to him could trigger sectarian bloodletting.

Ludhianvi insisted he was just a politician. “I would like to tell you that I am not a murderer, I am not a killer, I am not a terrorist. We are a political party.”

After a meal of chicken, curry and spinach, Ludhianvi and his aides stood up to warmly welcome a visitor: Saudi Arabia-based cleric Malik Abdul Haq al-Meqqi.

A Pakistani cleric knowledgeable about Sunni groups described Meqqi as a middleman between Saudi donors and intelligence agencies and the LeJ, the SSP and other groups.

“Of course, Saudi Arabia supports these groups. They want to keep Iranian influence in check in Pakistan, so they pay,” the Pakistani cleric said. His account squared with that of a Pakistani intelligence agent, who said jailed militants had confessed that LeJ received Saudi funding.


that is halal terrorism just like the halal 1.5 Billion dollars Nawaz got to sell our men to kill people of an other sovereign country

Saudi funded LeJ thugs are at it again.


DAWN

LAHORE: Police claimed on Friday to have busted a network of terrorists-cum-target killers associated with the outlawed Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and another outfit.

It arrested eight terrorists including a traffic warden and seized a huge quantity of explosives, suicide jackets, laptops and illegal weapons.

Police identified the arrested suspects as Shafique Shah of Fazal Colony, Bund Road, warden Muhammad Azam of Ravi Road, Saqib Anjum, Obaidullah, Muhammad Aftab, Qari Mushtaq, Hafiz Azeem and Qari Asif Mahmood.

Most of the arrested are said to be associated with those six members of banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi who were captured last month and were produced before the media. They were also taken into ‘custody’ by the Crimes Investigation Agency last month but their arrests were not made public for further investigation, Dawn learnt on Friday.

Two important members of the alleged terrorist network --Haroon Bhatti and Saeed of Kot Pindi Das, Sheikhupura -- are still absconders, police sources say and claim the recent arrests were made possible only after the arrested suspects disclosed their plans to target some senior policemen and known figures from different segments of society.

Capital City Police Officer Chauhdry Shafique told a news conference that a ‘terror plot’ had been averted as eight arrested suspects had planned to kill religious and important personalities, senior journalists, doctors, lawyers and senior police officers, and that they had completed surveillance of around 39 targets besides some important buildings and international companies’ offices.

The suspects used to contact each other through emails and had been using several internet cafes of the city for communication. They also used to contact their accomplices in Afghanistan through the net.

The CCPO said the network had also planned to carry out a pressure-cooker blast and suicide attacks during a national anthem ceremony in the Punjab University in winter, but cancellation of the programme failed their mission.

He said two suicide bombers, who had to hit the ceremony, stayed at the Rehmanpura (Ichhra) residence of Qari Asif Mahmood who is a tutor at Jamia Qasmia, Rehmanpura.

He said Shafique Shah joined a banned militant outfit in 1992, operated along terrorists wanted in several cases and was currently playing a central role in planning terrorist activities after joining the TTP.

Similarly, warden Azam of Ravi Road, who joined a banned outfit before his selection as warden, also acted as an informer to target senior police officers and important government buildings. Azam’s father was a police inspector.

The CCPO said the suspects, who brought a huge quantity of explosives and arms from Waziristan, had planned to kidnap or kill foreigners to damage the country’s image and abduct members of elite class for fund raising.

A senior police investigator told Dawn that the CIA police with the help of an intelligence agency first picked warden Azam and later Qari Asif Mahmood around 50 days ago and came to know about other members of the network involved in a series of target killings in the provincial capital since May 2012.He said police then captured Shafique Shah and his two accomplices from Waziristan and later took others into custody, bringing the total arrests to 14.

The officer said the CIA police earlier captured Lashkar e Jhangvi sharp shooter Abdur Rauf Gujjar, who was directly involved in the assassination of Maulana Shamsur Rehman Moawia, Allama Nasir Abbas, Advocate Shakir Ali Rizvi and others.

He said Rauf and his five accomplices were directly linked with recently arrested terrorists Shafique Shah and Qari Asif.

The officer said one Saeed, who provided weapons to Rauf to kill renowned personalities in Lahore, and Haroon, who introduced Rauf to Malik Ishaq and the TTP, were still on the run and were a potential threat to law-enforcement agencies.
 
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@TalibanSwatter many terrorists are not on the run and actually roam openly in public and boast their murders like Malik Ishaq for example who himself boasts personally killing 70 shia members.
these terror groups seem untouchable and the only way they can be stopped is if they get killed in an army operation or when they attack an military installation. Khalid Khawaja was abducted and tortured by LeJ and also Colonnel Imam who was forced to read a confession speech saying he was under the custody of Lashker Jhangvi al Aami (LeJ represents Al Qaeda in Pakistan).

blaming Suadis only doesnt solve the issue. problem is with the society as well that secretly praises the word of TTP and LeJ specially when its against certain communities .. the tragedy is that these beasts are so fearless and used to human blood that they even dont hesitate from killing Muslims of the "correct" faith.
 
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Fair point. However, cutting off Saudi funding to the TTP/AQ/LeJ combine is essential. Simply killing TTP/AQ/LeJ militants alone won't address the root of the problem. The funding is what gives the militant network its strength. TTP thugs will keep recruiting and procuring arms so long as the funding is intact. A military officer recently explained that the average annual salary/cash allowance of a TTP militant is three times that of a Pakistani soldier! Cut the funding off and the Salafi-inspired TTP will die a quick death.
 
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Khaled Ahmad

The Afghan province is emerging as the future capital of the Taliban’s envisioned ‘emirate’.

On February 23, the Afghan Taliban attacked an Afghan National Army (ANA) military outpost in the northeastern province of Kunar, killed 21 soldiers in their sleep and captured a half dozen who were awake. An Afghan spokesman said the Taliban included “foreigners” and hinted at the participation of warriors from “across the border”, meaning Pakistan. Kunar is not controlled by Afghanistan. The abutting North Waziristan is not controlled by Pakistan. But Kunar lies next to other semi-controlled Pakistani “agencies” like Bajaur and Mohmand, while another “uncontrolled” Afghan province, Nuristan, is contiguous to Pakistani Chitral and Swat semi-tribal areas.

Kunar and Nuristan are two provinces abandoned by the ISAF forces in 2011. The order came earlier, in October 2009: “In line with the counter-insurgency guidance of Army General Stanley A. McChrystal, ISAF commander, ISAF leaders decided last month to reposition forces to population centres within the region.” The reason given to the ANA for leaving the area was that it was sparse, strategically unimportant (sic!), subject to local rebellion that couldn’t be countered (sic!), and must therefore be left to the ANA to prove its battle-worthiness. McChrystal didn’t think of Pakistan then, just as Pakistan didn’t think of America when allowing the Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban to operate out of North Waziristan. Kunar is now where the Pakistani Taliban have converged.

Kunar was historically dominated by Arabic-speaking Afghan-Pashtun clerics educated in Saudi Arabia, and its sparse population had to follow the Wahhabi/Salafi faith. Before al-Qaeda fled the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan under UN Security Council Resolution 1373, its leaders used to be located here. Ayman al-Zawahiri was here but had his R&R in adjoining Pakistani agency Bajaur. There is a strong suspicion that he may still be staying in Kunar.

Maulana Fazlullah fled Swat in 2010 and joined a like-minded al-Zawahiri in Kunar. The chemistry must have been immediate and deep because, after Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Hakimullah Mehsud died in a drone attack in 2013, Fazlullah was chosen as the next non-Mehsud leader with al-Qaeda blessing. His method of persuasion is derived from the demonstrative effect of spectacular killing. If the North Waziristan-based leadership was unhappy with his elevation, it was soon chastened through violence, the latest victim being Asmatullah Shaheen Bhittani, who had actually held the top post temporarily after Mehsud’s death. He was killed in North Waziristan on February 24. The message was: you will be ruled from Kunar by your leader, Fazlullah. Some put the bland label of Taliban infighting on it.

An important shift of loyalty to Fazlullah happened when another Taliban warlord of Pakistan’s Mohmand agency, Umar Khalid Khorasani, decided to reject the Pakistan-Taliban “talks” by beheading 23 Pakistani troops captured by him two years ago. To emphasise his message, he did it in Kunar rather than Mohmand. The withdrawal of ISAF forces from the Kunar-Waziristan area has made Pakistan’s efforts to effectively go after the terrorists in its tribal areas virtually impossible. If Khorasani is in Kunar, which he is, then you can bet Fazlullah too is opposed to the Taliban council favouring talks with Islamabad.

Why did the Americans, who had asked Pakistan’s army chief in vain to oust the Afghan Taliban from its territory of North Waziristan, decide to leave Kunar? Many American commentators criticised the decision taken in 2009 and couldn’t make sense of the reason given: Kunar’s 70,000 population was too small to fight for when more densely populated provinces required ISAF presence; in any case the ANA was there to take care of the Taliban. The more plausible reason for leaving Kunar is a tit-for-tat response to Pakistan’s stubbornness to keep the Afghan Haqqani terrorist network on its soil.

Before the latest massacre of “sleeping” ANA soldiers, the Taliban had, in April 2013, killed 13 of the ANA’s “highly regarded” combat unit from the 201st Military Corps, compelling Pakistan’s then army chief General Ashfaq Kayani to predict that the ANA would evaporate in the face of the Taliban onslaught after the ISAF withdrawal. But this onslaught would be facilitated from Pakistani territory and the ANA would not be able to hot-pursue the infiltrators. Drones would continue to occupy centrestage.

The backlash has started before the onslaught, however, and it is coming from the Pakistani Taliban, which has relocated to the “ungoverned spaces” of Kunar, threatening the peaceful idyll of Chitral, in addition to the tribal agencies Pakistan thinks it has tamed through military operations. Kunar is where al-Qaeda and Pakistani Wahhabi-Salafi terrorists have formed their symbiotic alliance. The most dreaded terrorist organisation, Lashkar-e-Toiba, was formed here by a Saudi-trained Pakistani scholar who now heads a renamed jihadi non-state-actor organisation, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, in Lahore. America has used drones to target the leaders in Kunar and has met with patchy success. In June 2012, an ISAF airstrike killed Khatab Shafiq, a Pakistani citizen who served as the LeT’s leader for Kunar, indicating that once the Americans leave Afghanistan, Kunar will serve as the headquarters where Arabs and the Taliban will plan and lead operations inside Pakistan. It will also be the training centre for warriors culled from the “emirate” of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

According to a well-known website watching al-Qaeda, Pakistani Qari Ziaur Rehman, killed in 2013 by a drone, was an al-Qaeda and Taliban leader, operating in Kunar as well as across the border in Mohmand and Bajaur. Kunar is the future capital of the “emirate” that will straddle two borders, and neighbouring Nuristan will be its hinterland. In 2012, the strength of al-Qaeda was measured by its dominance in nine out of the 15 districts of Kunar. The Pakistani army is attacking North Waziristan and likely using its “observer” drones to pinpoint Taliban militants and their Uzbek, Turkmen and Arab affiliates. But to achieve lasting success, it will have to attack the Kunar-Nuristan area in Afghanistan. When this happens, it will reveal the past mistakes made by Islamabad in comprehending what Pakistan is up against. It will be doing to Afghanistan’s sovereignty what it accused America of doing to Pakistan’s when it attacked the terrorists inside Pakistan.


As Taliban leaders go, Baitullah Mehsud was “flexible” enough to oblige the deep state in Islamabad by striking at proposed targets. Later, Hakimullah was a prickly customer and prefered a less-murky relationship with his victims. Now, the shift of Taliban headquarters to Kunar has moved the “emirship” from the Mehsud tribe to a man from Swat. But he appears more pathologically focused on killing than even Hakimullah.

America has helped Pakistan’s latest change of policy towards North Waziristan by holding off drone attacks, but once the Americans are gone, Islamabad will have to pick up the broken shards of its Afghan policy and realign with new forces in the region. It is already disenchanted with its old proxy, Mullah Omar, the future “emir”, and has not talked to the non-Pashtuns of northern Afghanistan in years. Kunar will be its nemesis.
 
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Cutting off Saudi funding to the TTP/AQ/LeJ combine is essential. Simply killing TTP/AQ/LeJ militants alone won't address the root of the problem. The funding is what gives the militant network its strength. TTP thugs will keep recruiting and procuring arms so long as the funding is intact. A military officer recently explained that the average annual salary/cash allowance of a TTP militant is three times that of a Pakistani soldier! Cut the funding off and the Salafi-inspired TTP will die a quick death.

Time to bluntly tell the Saudis to stop funding their TTP/AQ puppets or else....
 
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ISIL(Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) making inroads in Iraq and Syria today while the TTP/Al Qaeda/LeJ combine fights for a "Islamic State of Waziristan and Kunar" tomorrow??

All are foot soldiers of the global salafi jihadist movement bankrolled by their masters in Saudi- a movement that is perhaps the singular biggest threat of the 21st century to the Muslim world and the rest of the world.

AFP

Saudi Arabia should be held responsible for militant financing and crimes committed by insurgent groups in Iraq, the Baghdad government charged on Tuesday.

Comments from Riyadh indicates it is "siding with terrorism", the cabinet said in a statement issued by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's office.

"We strongly condemn this stance," the statement read.

"We hold it (Saudi Arabia) responsible for what these groups are receiving in terms of financial and moral support."

It continued: "The Saudi government should be held responsible for the dangerous crimes committed by these terrorist groups."

The statement came just days after Saudi Arabia and Qatar blamed "sectarian" policies by Iraq's Shiite-led government against the Sunni Arab minority for the unrest that has swept the country.

In March, Maliki accused both Saudi Arabia and Qatar of supporting terrorism in Iraq.

Reuters

The Pakistani Taliban have set up camps and sent hundreds of men to Syria to fight alongside rebels opposed to President Bashar al-Assad, militants said on Sunday, in a strategy aimed at cementing ties with al Qaeda's central leadership.
More than two years since the start of the anti-Assad rebellion, Syria has become a magnet for foreign fighters who have flocked to the Middle Eastern nation to join what they see as a holy war against Shi'ite oppressors.

Operating alongside militant groups such as the ISIL and al Nusra Front, described by the United States as a branch of al Qaeda, they mainly come from nearby countries such as Libya and Tunisia riven by similar conflict as a result of the Arab Spring.

On Sunday, Taliban commanders in Pakistan said they had also decided to join the cause, saying hundreds of fighters had gone to Syria to fight alongside their "Mujahedeen friends".

"When our brothers needed our help, we sent hundreds of fighters along with our Arab friends," one senior commander told Reuters, adding that the group would soon issue videos of what he described as their victories in Syria.

The announcement further complicates the picture on the ground in Syria, where rivalries have already been on the boil between the Free Syrian Army and the Islamists.

Islamists operate a smaller, more effective force which now controls most of the rebel-held parts of northern Syria. Tensions erupted again on Thursday when an al-Qaeda linked militant group assassinated one of Free Syrian Army's top commanders after a dispute in the port city of Latakia.

Another Taliban commander in Pakistan, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, said the decision to send fighters to Syria came at the request of "Arab friends".

"Since our Arab brothers have come here for our support, we are bound to help them in their respective countries and that is what we did in Syria," he told Reuters.

"We have established our own camps in Syria. Some of our people go and then return after spending some time fighting there."

AL QAEDA LOYALTIES

Known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban operate mainly from Pakistan's insurgency-plagued ethnic Pashtun areas along the Afghan border - a long-standing stronghold for militants including the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies.

Taliban militants in Pakistan, who are linked to their Afghan counterparts, are mainly fighting to topple Pakistan's government and to impose their radical version of Islam, targeting the military, security forces and civilians.

But they also enjoy close ties with al Qaeda and other salafi jihadist groups who have, in turn, deployed their own fighters to Pakistan's volatile tribal region on the Afghan border known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA.

In the latest sign of this trend, at least two suspected foreign militants were killed in a drone attack in North Waziristan, local security officials said.

Ahmed Rashid, a prominent Pakistani author and expert on the Taliban, said sending Taliban fighters to Syria was likely to be appreciated as an act of loyalty towards their al Qaeda allies.

"The Pakistani Taliban have remained a sort of surrogate of al Qaeda. We've got all these foreigners up there in FATA who are being looked after or trained by the Pakistani Taliban," said Rashid, who is based in the Pakistani city of Lahore.

"They are acting like global salafi jihadists, precisely with the agenda that al Qaeda has got. This is a way, I suppose, to cement relationships with the Syrian militant groups ... and to enlarge their sphere of influence."
 
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The Saudi Shadow

The Nation

Recent diplomacy between Riyadh and Islamabad reminds me of delinquents daring a hornet’s nest. Iran spared no moment to threaten Pakistan with a military raid while Russia was curt to caution Pakistan about meddling in Syria. Deep in trouble itself and grappling to fight insecurities created through non-state actors, how could Pakistan even think of becoming part of a dangerous game that failed three decades ago?

Pakistan has a historical propensity to nibble its space in big power rivalry, while its economic short cuts could make the temptation too lucrative to resist. But Pakistani policy planners need to realise that in the final analysis, the transition from an Afghan Jihad against godless communism to a liberation struggle of enlightened moderates in Syria is the name of the same game. The policy failed in Afghanistan and Indian Occupied Kashmir. It will fail in Syria but not before unleashing a new genre of non-state actors. As Benjamin Franklin said, ‘Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and lose both.’ Pakistan has remained a loser for the past three decades and must resist the forbidden fruit offered by a kingdom fast losing its credibility.

Saudi policy to reshape the Middle East after toppling Morsi in Egypt lost its steam in Syria because Putin intervened. However, the Saudis are convinced that success was just around the corner had President Obama not blinked first.

Disillusioned by the lack of US support and its thaw with Iran, the kingdom began contemplating its own shadow war. It toyed with the idea of enlisting Pakistan to train and arm Syrian rebels on the pattern of Afghan cooperation. However, it was forced to abandon the plan after the USA confronted it with incriminating information over terrorism. Still, old habits die hard. With slight modifications, Saudi Arabia is now advocating a sugar coated alternative laden with the same intentions. Eager, Saudi Arabia donned a soft face by sacking its terrorism czar and issuing an unprecedented royal decree that condemned terrorism. The effect was immediate. It ended reluctance on the part of President Obama to visit Saudi Arabia in March this year when this new idea backed by the French Civil-Military Complex could be endorsed or rejected.

Saudi Arabia does not wish to lose its position as a hegemon in the region where Iran is fast asserting its presence. The house of Saud will spare no effort to sell its win-win proposal with a moderate make-up. The plan seeks to soothe American nerves, appeases Israel and checkmates the Russo-Iranian influence. With triple objectives of containing Islamic extremism (Al Qaeda and its shadows, a paradigm shift but led still, by the Salafis), brining some relief to Palestine and the collapse of the current Syrian regime (read end of Russo-Iranian Influence), Saudi Arabia feels the act can be pulled off with the assistance of Pakistan, Jordon and France. Of course, the dirtiest role has been assigned to Pakistan. We are required to supply weapons and train so called moderate (read Salafi) militants against Syria, wielding a poor man’s stinger Anza. The wish list also includes renting over 30,000 Pakistani troops to address Saudi internal and external insecurities and pose a structural threat to Iran. The plan reflects Saudi callousness and insensitivity to the security of other countries; its the money that makes the mare go.

For over a year, Saudi Arabia had become an irritant for most countries involved in the Syrian conflict. It was officially and privately accused of sponsoring terrorism. Though Pakistan never raised the issue, whispers suggest that many militant groups in Pakistan had Saudi ideological and monetary support. The DNA is more than visible. To impose caution, USA confronted Saudi Arabia with a highly classified dossier of terrorist activities. Somehow the most incriminating and irrefutable contents got leaked showing Saudi terrorist foot prints in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan and Russia. The dossier is now known to Russia, China and Iran who could embarrass USA and France for supporting Saudi Arabia as sponsor of global terrorism at the UN Security Council.

Saudi Arabia plans to replace extremist jihadists with a so called moderate force of Salafi rebels who incrementally bring President Bashar Assad to his knees. In contrition for fermenting terrorism, a royal decree condemned Islamic Jihadist with known linkages to Al Qaeda (similar to US objectives of eliminating Al Qaeda). In addition, Saud Arabia disowned thousands of Saudi foot soldiers it pumped into Syria and Iraq. They have been told that to avoid execution back home, they are better off continuing their mission till death or to disperse to other fighting areas (Pakistan and Afghanistan). Pakistan’s geographical position will be used to checkmate Iran (Shia) and Russian influence in Afghanistan. To affirm that old habits are dead, Saudi Arabia has sent its terrorism guru Prince Bandar Bin Sultan on forced leave to the USA. The new chief Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, perfectly fits the American eye.

Fouad al-Ibrahim a reputed Middle East commentator for Al Akhbar presents a chilling assessment shared by many other analysts. “Saudi Arabia had mastered a double game. In public, it expressed a contrived strictness about the participation of Saudis in fighting abroad or collecting donations for al-Qaeda and its old and new subsidiaries. But in secret, money, men, and weapons were flooding the battlefields without any control.” He goes on to write, “Observers have gathered overwhelming evidence about the complicity of Saudi political, media, and religious institutions in the emigration of thousands of Saudis… prohibited from traveling abroad, except by special orders of the military leadership.” Some of them will find their way into Pakistan.
 
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The Independent UK - Excerpt

Saudi sympathy for anti-Shia "militancy" is identified in leaked US official documents. The then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote in December 2009 in a cable released by Wikileaks that "Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, Lashkar e Jhangvi, LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan] and other terrorist groups." She said that, in so far as Saudi Arabia did act against al-Qa'ida, it was as a domestic threat and not because of its activities abroad. This policy may now be changing with the dismissal of Prince Bandar as head of intelligence this year. But the change is very recent, still ambivalent and may be too late: it was only last week that a Saudi prince said he would no longer fund a satellite television station notorious for its anti-Shia bias based in Egypt.
 
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Cutting off Saudi funding to the TTP/Al Qaeda/LeJ combine is essential. Simply killing TTP/Al Qaeda/LeJ militants alone won't address the root of the problem. The funding is what gives the militant network its strength. TTP thugs will keep recruiting and procuring arms so long as the funding is intact. A military officer recently explained that the average annual salary/cash allowance of a TTP militant is three times that of a Pakistani soldier! Cut the funding off and the Salafi-inspired TTP will die a quick death.
 
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Express Tribune

PESHAWAR: In a bid to extend its influence in the South Asian region, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, (ISIS), commonly known as Daish, distributed pamphlets in Peshawar and border provinces of Afghanistan as well.

The booklet titled Fatah (victory) is published in Pashto and Dari languages and was distributed in Peshawar as well as in Afghan refugee camps on the outskirts of the city. The logo of the pamphlet has the Kalma, the historical stamp of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and a Kalashnikov assault rifle. Some copies were also mysteriously sent to Afghan journalists working in Peshawar.
On the last page of the pamphlet, the editor’s name appears to be fake and where the document has been published cannot be ascertained. Since long, Afghan resistance groups, including Haqqani Network, Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan and Tora Bora group have been publishing similar pamphlets, magazines and propaganda literature in Peshawar black markets.

The ISIS, introducing itself as Daulat-e-Islamia (Islamic State) in the pamphlet, has made an appeal to the local population for supporting its struggle for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

A number of hardline groups operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan have already announced support for the group headed by Afghan Taliban. Among them, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost and Maulvi Abdul Qahar, stalwarts of Saudi Arabia-backed Salafi militant groups operating in Nuristan and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan, have already announced support for the self-styled caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Besides distribution of its literature and pamphlets, some of the ISIS supporters have also made wall chalking, asking locals to join and support the group. Some cars and vehicles also have ISIS stickers pasted on them.

Meanwhile, recently established Ahrarul Islam, a faction of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is already working on the lines of ISIS. Similar is the status of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as Hizb-e-Islami Turkistan.
Ahrarul Islam doesn’t believe in boundaries between Islamic countries, therefore, it is working for the establishment of a network throughout South and Central Asian regions. The group doesn’t recognise al-Baghdadi as the caliph, but considers Mullah Omar as ‘commander of the faithful’ chief, like TTP.

A number of local and foreign militant groups recently displaced from North Waziristan also claim that they want to “strive for the enforcement of Islamic Shariah not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan but throughout the world.”
 
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This is a war being waged by Salafi jihadists supported by their Saudi benefactors against the rest of the muslim world, and the western world.

The goal is to overthrow existing states and set up takfiri states around the world and link them under the umbrella of a salafi caliphate by using foot soldiers such as the TTP and Al Qaeda in Pakistan, Al Nusra in Syria, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Al Shabab in Somalia, Abu Sayyaf in Philipines, Boko Haram in Nigeria...the list goes on and on.

While TTP and other foot soldiers fight on the ground, the Salafi jihadist establishment in Saudi provides the ideology, operational guidance, and funding to all such organizations through proxies.

As many media sources have confirmed, ISIS was a Saudi project. The Saudis created and funded the monster to destroy Asad's regime in Syria and wreak havoc in Shiite run Iraq. However, they are now learning a valuable lesson in blowback as ISIS has turned its guns on Saudi rulers, declaring them unworthy.

As the Atlantic reported, - "ISIS, in fact, may have been a major part of Bandar’s covert-ops strategy in Syria. The Saudi government, for its part, had denied allegations, including claims made by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, that it has directly supported ISIS. But there are also signs that the kingdom only recently shifted its assistance—whether direct or indirect—away from extremist factions in Syria and toward more moderate opposition groups."

Clearly, Saudi's new found fear of ISIS stems from their desire for self preservation, rather than any genuine regard for the communities being ravaged by these militants in Iraq and Syria. The fact that ISIS's ideology largely mirrors the Saudi Wahhabi doctrine cannot be denied. And herein lies the problem.

As Reuters explained in a recent article - "Supporters of the Al Saud argue they have to tread carefully when dealing with conservative clerics. They say the ruling family is more liberal than most Saudi citizens, and is wary of provoking public anger.But liberal Saudis and some foreign analysts say that is not the case, and argue that if the government really wanted to reduce intolerant religious discourse, it could readily do so."When the government wants things to be done, they will be done," said Mohammed al-Zulfa, a former member of the Shoura Council."

Will the ruling family renounce its century old alliance with the Wahhabi clergy? Will it dismantle the intolerant ideology that has served as a wellspring for salafi/wahhabi jihadists around the world? Will it stop funding murderous groups like ISIS in its quest for geo-political dominance?

Is the Saudi ruling hierarchy willing to reform itself and the salafi establishment it has nurtured for more than a 100 years?Time will tell.

It is clear that unless all of the above happens, salafi jihadists will continue to wreak havoc.

Hopefully the Pakistani and US establishments are smart enough to realize that this war cannot be won by simply targeting non-state actors like TTP or ISIS. Whatever the means, until international powers confront and dismantle the ideological and financial hub of the salafi jihadists in Saudi, the threat will remain.
 
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Fouad Ibrahim (Excerpts)

It is necessary to note that ISIS’ ideology is not different from the ideology of any Jihadi Salafi or Awakening organization. A quick return to the doctrinal teachings on ISIS’ websites will reveal the ideological identity of the group. Needless to say, the writings of Mohammed bin Abdel Wahhab such as The Book of the Unity of God, Clarification of the Doubts, Nullifiers of Islam and others are distributed in the areas under ISIS’ control and are taught and explained in private religious classes that the organization’s educational department holds.

In addition, whoever reads the biographies of members of the leadership class in the organization the Islamic State of Iraq and later ISIS or the Islamic State (IS) will easily find that these people absorbed the Wahhabi doctrine and mastered all its details. As a matter of fact, their biographers emphasize the statement “he follows the teachings of the predecessors (Salaf),” in other words, he upholds the Wahhabi-Hanbali doctrine. This is what we read in the biographies of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, his successor Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, former War Minister Abu Hamza al-Muhajir al-Masri, Information Minister and official spokesperson of the Kingdom Abu Mohammed al-Adnani al-Shami and others.

Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the first prince of the faithful in the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, formulated for instance the principles of his prospective state and they were Salafi-Wahhabi in nature. He is the one who devised the document introducing the State’s ideology. Among its goals is establishing the religion and disseminating monotheism “which is the purpose of creating people and calling for Islam...” This is the formulation found in Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abdel Wahhab’s letters and the interpretations of the Book of the Unity of God by Wahhabi clerics.

ISIS’s project therefore is nothing more than reviving the Wahhabism of the founding generation and this worries the House of Saud because, this time, reforming the Wahhabi project comes from outside the Saudi state and undercuts its legitimacy.
Like all Salafi-Wahhabi organizations, declaring the other a disbeliever, whether he is Muslim or a Person of the Book, has become a well-established feature of ISIS’ doctrine. Simply put, that is because the rigid characteristics expected in a Muslim person, according to the vision presented by these organizations, apply only to the adherents of Wahhabism. Interestingly, ISIS’ leadership adhered to Mohammed ibn Abdel Wahhab’s logic when it accused him of being too indulgent in declaring transgressors disbelievers. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi says about the state’s ideology in his speech on March 13, 2007 entitled, “Say I am Aware of the Lord”: “People have thrown many lies at us that have no basis in our faith. They claimed that we declare ordinary Muslims disbelievers and consider their blood and money permissible for us.”

When he denied the accusation, Baghdadi first resorted to Mohammed ibn Abdel Wahhab’s teachings in declaring the other a disbeliever but in an indirect way. When we go back to the works of Wahhabism on disbelief, we find that Baghdadi is nothing more than an emulator who repeats Wahhabi arguments about the issue.

The principles of the state as defined by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi are almost literally copied from Wahhabi sources such as “the need to demolish and remove all manifestations of polytheism and prohibit its ways...,” “whoever utters the two testimonies, shows us Islam and does not commit one of the nullifiers of Islam, we will treat him as a Muslim...,” “there are two kinds of disbelief, major and minor” and “the need to resort to the law of God through seeking adjudication in the Islamic courts of the Islamic state and to look for them if we do not know of them because resorting to the idolatry of secular laws, tribal adjudication and so on is one of the nullifiers of Islam…”

The last point seems clear in that whoever seeks arbitration in courts other than those of the Islamic state commits one of the nullifiers of Islam and therefore becomes a disbeliever. That means that the overwhelming majority of Muslims are disbelievers because they seek adjudication in spaces other than an Islamic state’s courts.

In conclusion, ISIS, based on the aforementioned information, is one of the most indulgent takfiri groups in issuing declarations of disbelief. So much so, that you barely find a Muslim outside of ISIS. This represents a faithful commitment to the early Wahhabi vision.

Saudi Arabia became part of a group of countries – that includes Jordan, the countries of North Africa, Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen – nominated to fall within the scope of savagery. They have geographical depth and the kind of topography that allows the establishment of areas governed by the management of savagery. In addition to factors like a weak ruling regime, weak military presence in remote areas, a promising Jihadi Islamist presence, the nature of the people in these areas and the ubiquitous presence of weapons among people. (A. Naji, The Way of Empowerment, ibid pp.8-9).

It is important to point out that the stage of managing savagery paves the way for the stage of empowerment. Including Saudi Arabia now within the strategy of change means that ISIS is preparing to fulfill the deferred Wahhabi promise of establishing the caliphate.

A lot of people close to the Saudi regime rejoiced over ISIS’ control of Mosul and its expansion into other Iraqi provinces. Some of them went as far as to describe ISIS’ fighters as “revolutionaries” and to consider what ISIS did as a “liberation movement”. Suddenly, however, the public mood changed dramatically once IS was announced and there was talk of its expansion into the south where the Arabian Peninsula is.

The danger of IS stems from the fact that it embraces the same doctrinal claims and it preaches the same religious teachings formulated by the founder Mohammad ibn Abdel Wahhab. In addition, it carries within its folds a promise delayed for two centuries, namely, establishing an Islamic state and succeeding at a time when the clerics of Wahhabism and the Ikhwan, the Juhayman movement, the Awakening clerics, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and other individual and collective efforts failed.
 
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CTC Westpoint (Excerpts)

More important perhaps are the sophisticated videos and telecommunications used by militants to target fundraising markets abroad. The Taliban and al-Qa`ida are both active fundraisers among the Gulf Arab populations particularly in Saudi Arabia; almost all of their messaging is in Arabic. The IJU targets potential support markets among ethno-linguistic Turk populations in Europe (mainly Germany) and Turkey, where euros and the new lira hold relatively high exchange values. The more interesting facet, perhaps, is the informal trust verification process and the methods used to move the money once raised. There is anecdotal and other reporting information available suggesting that individuals are specifically tasked with distributing messages and collecting or moving funds. One example emerged after Saudi internal security allegedly detected and disrupted an al-Qa`ida financial support network that entered the country during the hajj pilgrimage season in December 2007. The model described by the Saudi government and other reporting follows. A mobile phone SIM card contained a message from an al-Qa`ida fundraising appeal from Ayman al-Zawahiri. The message was physically transferred by a non-Saudi to a Saudi national in-country. Al-Zawahiri endorsed the Saudi funds collector in his recorded message as “a trusted brother in whom we have confidence.” The funds collector used the cover of charity work to approach possible donors [20]. Funds successfully raised are then suspected to be moved formally or informally—by hawala or cash courier—most probably to complicit money exchangers in Peshawar before being moved to aid FATA militants. There have been a number of arrests of Saudi al-Qa`ida members in Pakistan caught carrying substantial sums of foreign currencies while in transit between countries. To further support this claim, there is also a significant amount of Saudi currency evident in TTP strongholds, especially in the NWFP.
 
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Every time this topic comes up, we have retard Pakistanis defending Saudis or Iranians. No self-respect, no dignity for these low life scums.
 
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