Russia-Ukraine War - News and Developments

[PakFactor]

I hope everyone here on PDF who lives in the West and supports and cheer for Russia, by now realize that, if there ever is a full scale War between the West and Russia, and even ICBMs starts flying, Russia wont differentiate between YOU, neutrals and those who are against Russia.

Its OK that you are against your own countries foreign policies. But to wish that a foreign country likely to want to harm your own country, wins a war, is just plain stupid and what i call self-defeating mentality.

@Huffal bhai and I, will fly back to Pakistan like the Jews made hijrat out of Europe. Plus, none told the West to antagonize Russia by creeping up on her like Hindus do in India in a weird as hell fetish way.

 

[khansaheeb]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532094953924567041

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532059504732676096

What if China sends arms and sends men to keep Europe on the defensive, it would create a new world order not imaginable decade ago and put the world in turmoil. NATO would collapse with a domino effect causing the 3 nuke powers US, UK and France to be at the cross roads of what to do. Millions of European Refugees could head to Africa for safety.

 

[Brainsucker]

What if China sends arms and men to keep Europe on the defensive, it would create a new world order not imaginable decade ago and put the world in turmoil. NATO would collapse with a domino effect causing the 3 nuke powers US, UK and France to be at the cross roads of what to do. Millions of European Refugees could head to Africa for safety.

No. Currently, China has no reason or WILL to do so. Their only concern is the annoying US. Their priority is to cage US influence in order to free from US harassment. But it will be change if the conflict excalated further.

I hope everyone here on PDF who lives in the West and supports and cheer for Russia, by now realize that, if there ever is a full scale War between the West and Russia, and even ICBMs starts flying, Russia wont differentiate between YOU, neutrals and those who are against Russia.

Its OK that you are against your own countries foreign policies. But to wish that a foreign country likely to want to harm your own country, wins a war, is just plain stupid and what i call self-defeating mentality.

Well then, let's hope that it won't happen.

But I have to argue that you're wrong. Their cheering and support to Russia actually can give another pause to the excalation of the conflict. I can use Indonesia as the example. Our Government condemn the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, but many of our people cheer on them. And look at what happen to us? Russia doesn't force our country to pay the oil with Rubble; unlike Singapore, our neighbor country.

So let your government condemn Russia whatever they want. But when many of your countrymen cheer Russia, Russia will think that your country is actually neutral and forced by American to opposed them. Maybe they will spares your cities when the upcoming nuclear war come to Europe. But if all your people choose to oppose the Russia, and when the Bear is cornered, then ready to take the nuke from them. As they think that you're the enemy that they have to eliminated.

Well, I won't use the term WW3 to a nuclear war between Europe, Russia and United States; as the majority of the world don't involve in it. But I can make sure that it will be the end of the western power in this world.

 

[jhungary]

To be honest, it is pointless. The power of US military is not depend on HIMARS alone, but their complete military system. Without the support of Tomahawk, air to land, etc that the US has, HIMARS is just another artillery system similar to what Russian have. Maybe better, but not much. Russia still has more alternative to destroy HIMARS even if their Artillery system are less capable than it.

There aren't many actually, the only other way Russia can destroy it is to use their air power, which is something they are not willing or not able to engage in this conflict (you be the judge on that) HIMARS being shoot and scoop system, which mean you will need Direct Fire to kill it.

Even so, it's not going to be easy, because the CAS need to loiter in the area to look for the HIMARS, once they fired, you only have a general direction that the system had fired from, you would have no idea where it went after, which mean it would expose the fight to AA element.

Problem is, the present of HIMARS would take away Russian Artillery in the area, because you either leave it in place and get COUNTBAT or got out of range for your own safety. And a Russian Army without Artillery is like a snake without its head.

If HIMARS is introduced in large number (2-300) then this would be enough to push Russia artillery off their range.

What is SBU?

SBU is Ukrainian State Security Service, like the FSB in Russia or KGB during Soviet Time, or the FBI in the US.

 

[Brainsucker]

There aren't many actually, the only other way Russia can destroy it is to use their air power, which is something they are not willing or not able to engage in this conflict (you be the judge on that) HIMARS being shoot and scoop system, which mean you will need Direct Fire to kill it.

Problem is, the present of HIMARS would take away Russian Artillery in the area, because you either leave it in place and get COUNTBAT or got out of range for your own safety. And a Russian Army without Artillery is like a snake without its head.

If HIMARS is introduced in large number (2-300) then this would enough to push Russia artillery off their range.

Thanks, you have the point. But with the current situation in Ukraine, Russia will do their best to target HIMARS first to eliminated the advantage that Ukrainian has. Specially when there are only 4 of them right now.

 

[jhungary]

Thanks, you have the point. But with the current situation in Ukraine, Russia will do their best to target HIMARS first to eliminated the advantage that Ukrainian has. Specially when there are only 4 of them right now.

Again, with what?

First of all, would it be advantageous for Russia to try to hunt the system in limited number is an issue here, you need to go all the way out to perform a seek and destroy mission behind enemy line on those system, that is going to take resource out of your main effort. Not to mention this would draw your force in, which is something you don't do in war, because then your move is being dictated, or losing tempo as we call it. It's really dangerous when you are fighting a war.

On the other hand, what could Russia use to kill HIMARS even if they were located? It's too small to be target by Ballistic Missile. And it is too fast for ground vehicle (It's on average 10mph faster than any tank in this world) and it will have longer range than any Russian Artillery, again, the only way you can go is to send plane and fly CAP. which would require your CAP to stay in position to hunt down the HIMARS. That is a good way to get ambushed.

HIMARS at this stage is not a threat to Russian Military in operation, as I said, not until they have enough unit to turn the ties. You would need around 200 of those to make it happen. It's not going to be anywhere near this number at least until mid-summer.

 

[The SC]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532104635909038080

 

[The SC]

The most powerful missile attack was launched on the Beskidy Tunnel, which passes through the Carpathian Mountains in the Lviv region.

The tunnel is more than 2 km long. More than 60% of goods in transit pass through it to Western and Central Europe. The aim of the attack is to disrupt the logistics of weapons supplies from the West

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532117109672755200

Video of a missile attack on the Beskydy tunnel in the Lviv region was filmed 50 km from the tunnel in the Stryi region

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532120101310406658

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532081311741104130

https://twitter.com/x/status/1531903364711211010

 

[F-22Raptor]

Thanks, you have the point. But with the current situation in Ukraine, Russia will do their best to target HIMARS first to eliminated the advantage that Ukrainian has. Specially when there are only 4 of them right now.

4 are the initial batch for training. Just like they started small for M777s and Switchblades and then went much larger.

There’s still a lot of money left in drawdown authority, so I expect HIMARS and M270 to arrive in decent numbers.

 

[jhungary]

4 are the initial batch for training. Just like they started small for M777s and Switchblades and then went much larger.

There’s still a lot of money left in drawdown authority, so I expect HIMARS and M270 to arrive in decent numbers.

Well, considering the draw down is 4 billions and another 9 billions for stock replacement. The US can send around 1000 HIMARS just for the drawdown alone (it's 4 millions per system) If I have to guess, and educated guess would be somewhere around 300 with tens of thousands of rocket.

 

[TruthSeeker]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 31​

May 31, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 31, 5:45pm ET
Moscow’s concentration on seizing Severodonetsk and Donbas generally continues to create vulnerabilities for Russia in Ukraine’s vital Kherson Oblast, where Ukrainian counter-offensives continue. Kherson is critical terrain because it is the only area of Ukraine in which Russian forces hold ground on the west bank of the Dnipro River. If Russia is able to retain a strong lodgment in Kherson when fighting stops it will be in a very strong position from which to launch a future invasion. If Ukraine regains Kherson, on the other hand, Ukraine will be in a much stronger position to defend itself against future Russian attack. This strategic calculus should in principle lead Russia to allocate sufficient combat power to hold Kherson. But Russian President Vladimir Putin has chosen instead to concentrate all the forces and resources that can be scraped together in a desperate and bloody push to seize areas of eastern Ukraine that will give him largely symbolic gains. Continuing successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson indicate that Ukraine’s commanders recognize these realities and are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities that Putin’s decisions have created.
The Ukrainian leadership has apparently wisely avoided matching Putin’s mistaken prioritization. Kyiv could have committed more reserves and resources to the defense of Severodonetsk, and its failure to do so has drawn criticism.[1] Ukrainian forces are now apparently withdrawing from Severodonetsk rather than fighting to the end—a factor that has allowed the Russians to move into the city relatively rapidly after beginning their full-scale assault.[2] Both the decision to avoid committing more resources to saving Severodonetsk and the decision to withdraw from it were strategically sound, however painful. Ukraine must husband its more limited resources and focus on regaining critical terrain rather than on defending ground whose control will not determine the outcome of the war or the conditions for the renewal of war.
Sound Ukrainian prioritization of counter-offensive and defensive operations pushed the Russians almost out of artillery range of Kharkiv City and have stopped the Russian advances from Izyum—both of which are more important accomplishments than the defense of Severodonetsk. Ukraine’s leadership has had to make incredibly difficult choices in this war and has generally made the right ones, at least at the level of strategic prioritization and in the pace, scale, and ambitiousness of its counter-offensives. That is why Ukraine still has a good chance to stop and then reverse the gains Russia is currently making.
Russian forces are likely attempting to exploit Belarusian equipment reserves to compensate for heavy material losses in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 31 that Belarusian forces are moving tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from storage facilities in Belarus to Russia to replenish combat losses.[3] This report corroborates previous reporting that Russian forces have largely exhausted their own reserves and indicates that the Kremlin is still leveraging its influence over Belarus in order to use Belarusian equipment.
Some pro-Russian milbloggers began to capture the frustrating realities of limited warfare, which may further intensify societal tensions in Russia. Pro-Russian political figure and self-proclaimed “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev said that the limited mobilization of Russians for war has divided Russian society into two groups: a small proportion that is involved in the war and the “peacetime Russians” who distance themselves from the war effort and are inconvenienced by foreign sanctions.[4] Gubarev blamed the “peacetime Russians” for failing to start collecting donations for Russian equipment, while criticizing the Kremlin for increasing propaganda about Russian successes during the “special military operation” in Ukraine. Gubarev also blamed the “peacetime Russians” for slowing down rotation rates due to fear of conscription. Guberev noted that mass mobilization could resolve the divide in society but opined that Russian commanders will not order such a mobilization to avoid mass casualties of unprepared conscripts as occurred, he notes, in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).
Gubarev is accurately capturing a phenomenon that is normal in a limited war that nevertheless generates high casualties. Resentment by those fighting such a war and their families against those who are untouched by the horrors of combat can grow even in an all-volunteer professional military, as Western countries experienced during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It is likely to be even more pronounced in Russia, whose military relies so heavily on conscripts and involuntarily-recalled reservists. This resentment can erode morale and will to fight as well as the propensity to volunteer for military service.
Russian citizens continued to conduct a series of attacks on Russian military recruitment centers in late May, likely in protest of covert mobilization. Russian Telegram channel Baza reported that the Russian Federal Security Service arrested a former Moscow artist and opposition figure, Ilya Farber, for Molotov Cocktail attacks on military recruitment centers in Udmurtia in the Urals on May 21.[5] A Russian court had previously sentenced Farber to an eight-year prison sentence for a bribery case. The case gained Farber significant support from Russian opposition leaders.[6] Farber admitted to committing arson in court on May 30. Baza also reported two more attacks on recruitment centers in Simferopol and Tula Oblast on May 28 and May 31, respectively.[7]
Key Takeaways

• Russian forces are increasingly focused on advancing on Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman.
• Russian forces are making gains within and around Severodonetsk.
• Russian forces are likely hoping to advance on Lysychansk from Toshkivka in order to avoid having to fight across the Severskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk.
• The Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast is likely feeling the pressure of the limited Ukrainian counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast, especially as much of the Russian operational focus is currently on the capture of Severodonetsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to regroup and prepare for renewed offensives southeast of Izyum and made minor, unsuccessful attacks towards Slovyansk on May 31.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to attack Dovhenke, 20 kilometers south of Izyum, but were unsuccessful.[9] Russian forces additionally shelled Ukrainian positions to the southwest and southeast of Izyum and struck Dovhenke, Virnopillya, Husarivka, and Velyka Komyshuvakha in order to prepare for resumed offensives.[10] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Russian forces are fighting in Bohorodychne, Svyatohirsk, and Schurove, settlements between the southeast of Izyum and northwest of Slovyansk.[11]
Russian forces are additionally pushing westward towards Slovyansk from the Lyman area.[12] A Russian Telegram channel indicated that Russian forces now control the road through Raihorodok and are advancing westward from Raihorodok and eastward from Izyum to drive on Slovyansk.[13] Recent renewed offensives towards Slovyansk likely indicate that Russian forces intend to attempt to take full control of Donetsk Oblast by seizing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, although their ability to do so is far from clear.
Russian forces continued ground assaults in and around Severodonetsk on May 31.[14] Russian forces, including Chechen units, now control up to 70% of the city and continue to make gains within the city center.[15] Ukrainian troops are reportedly withdrawing from the center of the city. [16] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces will begin clearing the villages around Severodonetsk in the coming days, likely in order to support the encirclement of the area.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that fighting is on-going in Toshkivka, to the south of Severodonetsk.[18] Russian advances north of Toshkivka are likely intended to support the capture of Lysychansk and would allow Russian forces to advance on Lysychansk from the south as opposed to fighting westward across the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk. Russian forces failed to advance across the Siverskyi Donets River from Bilohorivka and are likely eager to avoid another costly river crossing.
Russian forces continued ground assaults to the east of Bakhmut on May 31.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops are fighting in Zolote, Komyshuvakha, Nyrkove, Berestove, Pokrovske, and Dolomitne, all settlements along the eastern arc of Bakhmut.[20] Russian forces likely intend to keep pushing to gain access to the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the northeast of Bakhmut to support their seizure of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area. Russian forces reportedly made incremental gains near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border and took control of Blahodatne and Neskuchne.[21] Russian troops additionally claimed to have made marginal gains north of Donetsk City in the direction of Niu York and reportedly took control of Novoselivka Druha on May 31.[22]




Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces continued to fire on Kharkiv City and its environs and did not make any confirmed advances on May 31.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian grouping in this area is comprised of elements of the Western Military District, which are focusing on preventing further Ukrainian advances towards the international border.[24] Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration Oleg Synegubov stated that Russian forces conducted artillery strikes against the Osnovyanskyi and Kyivskyi districts of Kharkiv City, Korotych, Udy, Zolochiv, and Chkalovske.[25]


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Ukrainian forces continued a counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast on May 31 and are pushing Russian forces east of the Inhulets River. Ukrainian forces launched several localized counterattacks west of the Inhulets River in the past few days.[26] Ukraine’s Office of Strategic Communications published images of destroyed Russian artillery equipment in Davydiv Brid, an operationally significant settlement that sits astride the Russian-controlled T2207 highway.[27] The T2207 highway loops around the northeastern Kherson Oblast boundary until it connects with the parallel T0403 highway to Krvyyi Rih and Zaporizhia City in the east. Russian forces have struggled to consolidate control over the eastern segment of the T2207 due to Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area. The Ukrainian counteroffensive on Davydiv Brid could hinder Russia’s ability to support units north of the settlement where they face Ukrainian counteroffensives from further north. The Ukrainian General Staff did not confirm that Ukrainian forces liberated Davydiv Brid, but numerous social media videos and reports suggest that Russian forces may have withdrawn from the settlement on May 31.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that Ukrainian forces liberated another settlement on the eastern segment of the T2207 highway.[29] Russian Telegram channels expressed concern for the possible increase of Ukrainian troops in the area, likely seeing the risk of increasing Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih directions.[30] The Russian prioritization of the Battle of Severodonetsk and the Donbas offensive operation continues to create vulnerabilities in the critical terrain of Kherson Oblast.


Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian occupation authorities continued to loot and set conditions for permanent societal control in occupied Ukrainian settlements. Mariupol Mayor’s Adviser Petro Andryushenko reported that Russian forces began to “nationalize” the Port of Mariupol, which included seizing the remaining 34 Ukrainian ships there.[31] Russian forces in Mariupol and Melitopol began accepting documents for Russian citizenship and have aimed a simplified passport procedure specifically at orphans.[32] Russian forces are also continuing mass burials, with geolocated video footage suggesting that they have already buried 22,000 to 45,000 Mariupol residents.[33]
Russian forces continued to face significant challenges in their attempts to consolidate occupation authority on May 31. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Russian-appointed mayor of Melitopol Halyna Danylenko resigned due to partisan activity in the city.[34] The Ukrainian Resistance Center added that Ukrainian entrepreneurs stopped the operation of the Kupyansk Dairy Cannery in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and are refusing to use Russian banks and currency.[35]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 1​

Jun 1, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
June 1, 5:30pm ET​

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast has gotten the attention of Russian forces in the area, and the Russians are scrambling to secure the vital ground line of communication (GLOC) the Ukrainians have threatened. Ukrainian forces carried out a series of organized counterattacks targeting settlements on the eastern bank of the Ihulets River that are very close to a key highway supporting Russian forces further north. The Russians have responded by destroying the bridges the Ukrainians used in one of those counterattacks and other bridges across the river in an effort to hold their line against anticipated continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are likely still close enough to the highway to disrupt its use as a main supply route, potentially undermining the Russians’ ability to hold against Ukrainian counter-offensives from the north.
Russian milbloggers are expressing growing alarm about the threat of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the areas Russian forces have deprioritized while concentrating on Severodonetsk. Russian milbloggers have increasingly focused on tracking the rate of Ukrainian counterattacks in late May.[1] Pro-Russian Telegram channel “Dmitriyev” (over 100,000 followers) reported that Ukrainian forces are fully capable of inflicting ”painful and cutting blows” on Russian GLOCs in Kherson, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia Oblasts by July-August due to lack of adequate Russian defensive forces in the areas.[2] Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces “will grope for weakness” in Russian defenses in Kherson Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers are effectively criticizing the Russian military command for endangering Russian territorial gains across other axes by prioritizing the Donbas offensive operation so heavily.
Russian authorities are likely anticipating Ukrainian partisan pressure in Luhansk Oblast. The Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on June 1 the launch of the “Luhansk partisan” project to galvanize resistance to Russian attempts to consolidate control of Luhansk Oblast.[4] A Russian Telegram channel reported that the Russian Internal Ministry is sending a special detachment of its employees on “leave” to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), which is a likely attempt to reinforce Russian administrative presence in the LNR in the face of growing internal and partisan discontent.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Kupyansk, a Russian-controlled city in eastern Kharkiv Oblast along the P07 highway within 30 kilometers of the Luhansk Oblast administrative border.[6] Kupyansk is far from the front lines and in no apparent danger of imminent Ukrainian conventional attack. Taken together, the reported deployment of Internal Ministry employees and a BTG suggest that Russian forces are anticipating partisan resistance against their attempts to gain control of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continue to undermine the economic viability of areas they are attempting to capture. Russian forces reportedly hit the “Azot” fertilizer production plant in Severodonetsk on May 31 and caused the dissemination of toxic nitric acid smoke.[7] The production plant was an economically-significant resource for Severodonetsk and the Luhansk region and it would have been prudent for Russian forces to maintain and take control of the plant’s production capabilities. Russian forces similarly destroyed the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, which had considerable industrial significance for Ukraine and could have been economically exploited by Russian occupiers if they had not destroyed it. While the Azot plant in Severodonetsk was less productive on whole than Azovstal, its destruction is part of the systemic failure of Russian forces to take effective control of the economic and industrial capabilities of occupied territory. Russian forces will likely continue to destroy productive infrastructure and continually undermine the economic benefits they could have hoped to gain from occupied territories.
Key Takeaways

• Russian forces reportedly made incremental advances north of Slovyansk but likely have not yet been able to take control of the road into Slovyansk.
• Russian forces are attempting to advance towards Lysychansk from the south and west in order to avoid having to fight across the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk but are having limited successes so far.
• Russian troops made incremental gains north of Avdiivka.
• Russian troops reportedly destroyed Ukrainian-built bridges over the Inhulets River near Davydiv Brid in response to Ukrainian counteroffensive pressure.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces attempted to advance south of Izyum but did not make any confirmed advances on June 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks on Dibrovne and Dovhenke, both within 20 kilometers south of Izyum.[8] A Russian Telegram channel reported that Russian forces are engaged in positional battles to the southwest of Izyum in Kurulka and Velyka Komyshuvakha.[9]
Russian forces reportedly made advances to the north of Slovyansk and took control of Yarova and Svyatohirsk and are conducting westward offensives from Lyman towards Slovyansk.[10] In order for Russian forces to gain access to Slovyansk via road, however, they would have to cross a bridge across the Severskyi Donets River outside of Raihorodok, and ISW has not yet seen evidence that they have been able to do so, which suggests Russian forces do not yet control the road into Raihorodok-Slovyansk.
Russian forces continued to advance within Severodonetsk on June 1.[11] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian troops now control upwards of 70% of the city and that Ukrainian troops are retreating from the city center.[12] Russian Telegram channels additionally indicated that Russian forces are fighting in Ustynivka and Myrna Dolyna, which is a likely attempt to advance northwest to Lysychansk without having to cross the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk.[13] Russian forces are reportedly fighting for control of Bilohorivka (where they attempted a costly and failed crossing of the Severskyi Donets River in early May) and Vrubivka, which would allow them to advance on Lysychansk from the west.[14] Ukrainian forces likely are holding onto Toshkivka, south of Severodonetsk, after reports that Russian forces lost their positions in Toshkivka on May 28.[15] Russian forces have continued ground and artillery attacks against Toshkivka to attempt to regain lost positions.[16]
Russian forces continued ground, air, and artillery attacks against Donetsk Oblast on June 1.[17] Russian troops continued fighting to the east of Bakhmut around Komyshuvakha, Berestove, Nyrkove, Pylypchatyne, and Svitlodarsk in order to gain access to highways to the northeast of Bakhmut, which would facilitate attempts to encircle the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian grouping around Avidiivka is holding its positions in the area, and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) claimed that DNR troops encircled Ukrainian troops in Avdiivka.[19] Russian forces reportedly cut the Donetsk City-Avdiivka-Konstantinivka highway. Russian forces have been close enough to the highway for some time that Ukrainian forces have probably not been relying on it as a main supply route. If the Russians could secure it from its base (rather than simply cutting it), however, they could be able to use it advance northward towards Konstantinivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk.[20] Russian forces are fighting north of Avdiivka in the vicinity of Krasnohorivka and on the southern outskirts of Niu York.[21]



Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces conducted air and artillery strikes against Kharkiv City and its environs on June 1. Russian forces shelled the Kyivskyi district of Kharkiv City, Ruski Tyshky, Zolochiv, Derhachi, and Tsyrkuny and conducted airstrikes against Vesele and Ternova.[22]


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Ukrainian forces continued to threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northeastern Kherson Oblast, despite Russian forces restricting further Ukrainian counteroffensives on May 31 and June 1. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces destroyed bridges over the Inhulets River in Davydiv Brid, an operationally significant settlement located on the Russian-controlled T2205 highway.[23] Russian forces likely destroyed bridges in an effort to hinder Ukrainian efforts to reach Davydiv Brid on May 31.[24] Ukrainian forces can likely still disrupt Russian forces' ability to use the highway as a main supply route if they remain just on the other side of the river, which is less than a kilometer from the road and therefore within range of many tactical systems. Disruption of the T2205 as a primary GLOC could undermine Russian defenses against Ukrainian counteroffensives on the northern Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border. Russian forces have also destroyed another bridge just north of Davydiv Brid and intensified artillery fire in northern Kherson, likely in anticipation of continued Ukrainian counterattacks.[25] Russian forces also unsuccessfully attempted to reconnoiter by battle Ukrainian positions on the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast on June 1.[26]
Russian forces continued to fortify positions across southern Ukraine in an effort to establish permanent control over occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast, instead executing engineering work for the second lines of defense.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces transferred likely one T-62 tank battalion and one motorized rifle battalion to Vasylivka, approximately 50km south of Zaporizhia City. ISW has previously reported on an increase in Russian military presence and fortifications east of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[28]
The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command said that Russian forces are transferring anti-aircraft missile systems, electronic warfare equipment, and multiple rocket launchers to Snake Island off Romanian coast.[29]


Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Some Russian milbloggers continue to question Russian policy, this time regarding the status of occupied territories. The Head of Russian State Duma International Committee Leonid Slutskiy claimed that Russia may annex Kherson Oblast and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) as soon as July.[30] A small-scale Russian Telegram Channel MoscowCalling ridiculed Slutskiy’s announcement, noting that Russian forces have not secured the land corridor to Crimea via Zaporizhia Oblast.[31] MoscowCalling also noted that without control over Zaporizhia Oblast, Russian forces will not have the capacity to support commercial and administrative routes via the Kerch Strait bridge. Governor of St. Petersburg Alexander Belov and Russian-appointed Head of Mariupol Konstantin Ivanchenko signed a cooperation agreement between two cities on June 1, but it is unclear whether the Kremlin has decided to fully annex Mariupol.[32]

 

[Hassan Al-Somal]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532137166196903936

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 31​

May 31, 2022 - Press ISW

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 31, 5:45pm ET
Moscow’s concentration on seizing Severodonetsk and Donbas generally continues to create vulnerabilities for Russia in Ukraine’s vital Kherson Oblast, where Ukrainian counter-offensives continue. Kherson is critical terrain because it is the only area of Ukraine in which Russian forces hold ground on the west bank of the Dnipro River. If Russia is able to retain a strong lodgment in Kherson when fighting stops it will be in a very strong position from which to launch a future invasion. If Ukraine regains Kherson, on the other hand, Ukraine will be in a much stronger position to defend itself against future Russian attack. This strategic calculus should in principle lead Russia to allocate sufficient combat power to hold Kherson. But Russian President Vladimir Putin has chosen instead to concentrate all the forces and resources that can be scraped together in a desperate and bloody push to seize areas of eastern Ukraine that will give him largely symbolic gains. Continuing successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson indicate that Ukraine’s commanders recognize these realities and are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities that Putin’s decisions have created.
The Ukrainian leadership has apparently wisely avoided matching Putin’s mistaken prioritization. Kyiv could have committed more reserves and resources to the defense of Severodonetsk, and its failure to do so has drawn criticism.[1] Ukrainian forces are now apparently withdrawing from Severodonetsk rather than fighting to the end—a factor that has allowed the Russians to move into the city relatively rapidly after beginning their full-scale assault.[2] Both the decision to avoid committing more resources to saving Severodonetsk and the decision to withdraw from it were strategically sound, however painful. Ukraine must husband its more limited resources and focus on regaining critical terrain rather than on defending ground whose control will not determine the outcome of the war or the conditions for the renewal of war.
Sound Ukrainian prioritization of counter-offensive and defensive operations pushed the Russians almost out of artillery range of Kharkiv City and have stopped the Russian advances from Izyum—both of which are more important accomplishments than the defense of Severodonetsk. Ukraine’s leadership has had to make incredibly difficult choices in this war and has generally made the right ones, at least at the level of strategic prioritization and in the pace, scale, and ambitiousness of its counter-offensives. That is why Ukraine still has a good chance to stop and then reverse the gains Russia is currently making.
Russian forces are likely attempting to exploit Belarusian equipment reserves to compensate for heavy material losses in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 31 that Belarusian forces are moving tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from storage facilities in Belarus to Russia to replenish combat losses.[3] This report corroborates previous reporting that Russian forces have largely exhausted their own reserves and indicates that the Kremlin is still leveraging its influence over Belarus in order to use Belarusian equipment.
Some pro-Russian milbloggers began to capture the frustrating realities of limited warfare, which may further intensify societal tensions in Russia. Pro-Russian political figure and self-proclaimed “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev said that the limited mobilization of Russians for war has divided Russian society into two groups: a small proportion that is involved in the war and the “peacetime Russians” who distance themselves from the war effort and are inconvenienced by foreign sanctions.[4] Gubarev blamed the “peacetime Russians” for failing to start collecting donations for Russian equipment, while criticizing the Kremlin for increasing propaganda about Russian successes during the “special military operation” in Ukraine. Gubarev also blamed the “peacetime Russians” for slowing down rotation rates due to fear of conscription. Guberev noted that mass mobilization could resolve the divide in society but opined that Russian commanders will not order such a mobilization to avoid mass casualties of unprepared conscripts as occurred, he notes, in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).
Gubarev is accurately capturing a phenomenon that is normal in a limited war that nevertheless generates high casualties. Resentment by those fighting such a war and their families against those who are untouched by the horrors of combat can grow even in an all-volunteer professional military, as Western countries experienced during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It is likely to be even more pronounced in Russia, whose military relies so heavily on conscripts and involuntarily-recalled reservists. This resentment can erode morale and will to fight as well as the propensity to volunteer for military service.
Russian citizens continued to conduct a series of attacks on Russian military recruitment centers in late May, likely in protest of covert mobilization. Russian Telegram channel Baza reported that the Russian Federal Security Service arrested a former Moscow artist and opposition figure, Ilya Farber, for Molotov Cocktail attacks on military recruitment centers in Udmurtia in the Urals on May 21.[5] A Russian court had previously sentenced Farber to an eight-year prison sentence for a bribery case. The case gained Farber significant support from Russian opposition leaders.[6] Farber admitted to committing arson in court on May 30. Baza also reported two more attacks on recruitment centers in Simferopol and Tula Oblast on May 28 and May 31, respectively.[7]
Key Takeaways

• Russian forces are increasingly focused on advancing on Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman.
• Russian forces are making gains within and around Severodonetsk.
• Russian forces are likely hoping to advance on Lysychansk from Toshkivka in order to avoid having to fight across the Severskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk.
• The Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast is likely feeling the pressure of the limited Ukrainian counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast, especially as much of the Russian operational focus is currently on the capture of Severodonetsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to regroup and prepare for renewed offensives southeast of Izyum and made minor, unsuccessful attacks towards Slovyansk on May 31.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to attack Dovhenke, 20 kilometers south of Izyum, but were unsuccessful.[9] Russian forces additionally shelled Ukrainian positions to the southwest and southeast of Izyum and struck Dovhenke, Virnopillya, Husarivka, and Velyka Komyshuvakha in order to prepare for resumed offensives.[10] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Russian forces are fighting in Bohorodychne, Svyatohirsk, and Schurove, settlements between the southeast of Izyum and northwest of Slovyansk.[11]
Russian forces are additionally pushing westward towards Slovyansk from the Lyman area.[12] A Russian Telegram channel indicated that Russian forces now control the road through Raihorodok and are advancing westward from Raihorodok and eastward from Izyum to drive on Slovyansk.[13] Recent renewed offensives towards Slovyansk likely indicate that Russian forces intend to attempt to take full control of Donetsk Oblast by seizing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, although their ability to do so is far from clear.
Russian forces continued ground assaults in and around Severodonetsk on May 31.[14] Russian forces, including Chechen units, now control up to 70% of the city and continue to make gains within the city center.[15] Ukrainian troops are reportedly withdrawing from the center of the city. [16] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces will begin clearing the villages around Severodonetsk in the coming days, likely in order to support the encirclement of the area.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that fighting is on-going in Toshkivka, to the south of Severodonetsk.[18] Russian advances north of Toshkivka are likely intended to support the capture of Lysychansk and would allow Russian forces to advance on Lysychansk from the south as opposed to fighting westward across the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk. Russian forces failed to advance across the Siverskyi Donets River from Bilohorivka and are likely eager to avoid another costly river crossing.
Russian forces continued ground assaults to the east of Bakhmut on May 31.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops are fighting in Zolote, Komyshuvakha, Nyrkove, Berestove, Pokrovske, and Dolomitne, all settlements along the eastern arc of Bakhmut.[20] Russian forces likely intend to keep pushing to gain access to the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the northeast of Bakhmut to support their seizure of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area. Russian forces reportedly made incremental gains near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border and took control of Blahodatne and Neskuchne.[21] Russian troops additionally claimed to have made marginal gains north of Donetsk City in the direction of Niu York and reportedly took control of Novoselivka Druha on May 31.[22]




Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces continued to fire on Kharkiv City and its environs and did not make any confirmed advances on May 31.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian grouping in this area is comprised of elements of the Western Military District, which are focusing on preventing further Ukrainian advances towards the international border.[24] Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration Oleg Synegubov stated that Russian forces conducted artillery strikes against the Osnovyanskyi and Kyivskyi districts of Kharkiv City, Korotych, Udy, Zolochiv, and Chkalovske.[25]


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Ukrainian forces continued a counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast on May 31 and are pushing Russian forces east of the Inhulets River. Ukrainian forces launched several localized counterattacks west of the Inhulets River in the past few days.[26] Ukraine’s Office of Strategic Communications published images of destroyed Russian artillery equipment in Davydiv Brid, an operationally significant settlement that sits astride the Russian-controlled T2207 highway.[27] The T2207 highway loops around the northeastern Kherson Oblast boundary until it connects with the parallel T0403 highway to Krvyyi Rih and Zaporizhia City in the east. Russian forces have struggled to consolidate control over the eastern segment of the T2207 due to Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area. The Ukrainian counteroffensive on Davydiv Brid could hinder Russia’s ability to support units north of the settlement where they face Ukrainian counteroffensives from further north. The Ukrainian General Staff did not confirm that Ukrainian forces liberated Davydiv Brid, but numerous social media videos and reports suggest that Russian forces may have withdrawn from the settlement on May 31.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that Ukrainian forces liberated another settlement on the eastern segment of the T2207 highway.[29] Russian Telegram channels expressed concern for the possible increase of Ukrainian troops in the area, likely seeing the risk of increasing Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih directions.[30] The Russian prioritization of the Battle of Severodonetsk and the Donbas offensive operation continues to create vulnerabilities in the critical terrain of Kherson Oblast.


Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian occupation authorities continued to loot and set conditions for permanent societal control in occupied Ukrainian settlements. Mariupol Mayor’s Adviser Petro Andryushenko reported that Russian forces began to “nationalize” the Port of Mariupol, which included seizing the remaining 34 Ukrainian ships there.[31] Russian forces in Mariupol and Melitopol began accepting documents for Russian citizenship and have aimed a simplified passport procedure specifically at orphans.[32] Russian forces are also continuing mass burials, with geolocated video footage suggesting that they have already buried 22,000 to 45,000 Mariupol residents.[33]
Russian forces continued to face significant challenges in their attempts to consolidate occupation authority on May 31. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Russian-appointed mayor of Melitopol Halyna Danylenko resigned due to partisan activity in the city.[34] The Ukrainian Resistance Center added that Ukrainian entrepreneurs stopped the operation of the Kupyansk Dairy Cannery in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and are refusing to use Russian banks and currency.[35]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 1​

Jun 1, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
June 1, 5:30pm ET​

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast has gotten the attention of Russian forces in the area, and the Russians are scrambling to secure the vital ground line of communication (GLOC) the Ukrainians have threatened. Ukrainian forces carried out a series of organized counterattacks targeting settlements on the eastern bank of the Ihulets River that are very close to a key highway supporting Russian forces further north. The Russians have responded by destroying the bridges the Ukrainians used in one of those counterattacks and other bridges across the river in an effort to hold their line against anticipated continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are likely still close enough to the highway to disrupt its use as a main supply route, potentially undermining the Russians’ ability to hold against Ukrainian counter-offensives from the north.
Russian milbloggers are expressing growing alarm about the threat of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the areas Russian forces have deprioritized while concentrating on Severodonetsk. Russian milbloggers have increasingly focused on tracking the rate of Ukrainian counterattacks in late May.[1] Pro-Russian Telegram channel “Dmitriyev” (over 100,000 followers) reported that Ukrainian forces are fully capable of inflicting ”painful and cutting blows” on Russian GLOCs in Kherson, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia Oblasts by July-August due to lack of adequate Russian defensive forces in the areas.[2] Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces “will grope for weakness” in Russian defenses in Kherson Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers are effectively criticizing the Russian military command for endangering Russian territorial gains across other axes by prioritizing the Donbas offensive operation so heavily.
Russian authorities are likely anticipating Ukrainian partisan pressure in Luhansk Oblast. The Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on June 1 the launch of the “Luhansk partisan” project to galvanize resistance to Russian attempts to consolidate control of Luhansk Oblast.[4] A Russian Telegram channel reported that the Russian Internal Ministry is sending a special detachment of its employees on “leave” to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), which is a likely attempt to reinforce Russian administrative presence in the LNR in the face of growing internal and partisan discontent.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Kupyansk, a Russian-controlled city in eastern Kharkiv Oblast along the P07 highway within 30 kilometers of the Luhansk Oblast administrative border.[6] Kupyansk is far from the front lines and in no apparent danger of imminent Ukrainian conventional attack. Taken together, the reported deployment of Internal Ministry employees and a BTG suggest that Russian forces are anticipating partisan resistance against their attempts to gain control of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continue to undermine the economic viability of areas they are attempting to capture. Russian forces reportedly hit the “Azot” fertilizer production plant in Severodonetsk on May 31 and caused the dissemination of toxic nitric acid smoke.[7] The production plant was an economically-significant resource for Severodonetsk and the Luhansk region and it would have been prudent for Russian forces to maintain and take control of the plant’s production capabilities. Russian forces similarly destroyed the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, which had considerable industrial significance for Ukraine and could have been economically exploited by Russian occupiers if they had not destroyed it. While the Azot plant in Severodonetsk was less productive on whole than Azovstal, its destruction is part of the systemic failure of Russian forces to take effective control of the economic and industrial capabilities of occupied territory. Russian forces will likely continue to destroy productive infrastructure and continually undermine the economic benefits they could have hoped to gain from occupied territories.
Key Takeaways

• Russian forces reportedly made incremental advances north of Slovyansk but likely have not yet been able to take control of the road into Slovyansk.
• Russian forces are attempting to advance towards Lysychansk from the south and west in order to avoid having to fight across the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk but are having limited successes so far.
• Russian troops made incremental gains north of Avdiivka.
• Russian troops reportedly destroyed Ukrainian-built bridges over the Inhulets River near Davydiv Brid in response to Ukrainian counteroffensive pressure.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces attempted to advance south of Izyum but did not make any confirmed advances on June 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks on Dibrovne and Dovhenke, both within 20 kilometers south of Izyum.[8] A Russian Telegram channel reported that Russian forces are engaged in positional battles to the southwest of Izyum in Kurulka and Velyka Komyshuvakha.[9]
Russian forces reportedly made advances to the north of Slovyansk and took control of Yarova and Svyatohirsk and are conducting westward offensives from Lyman towards Slovyansk.[10] In order for Russian forces to gain access to Slovyansk via road, however, they would have to cross a bridge across the Severskyi Donets River outside of Raihorodok, and ISW has not yet seen evidence that they have been able to do so, which suggests Russian forces do not yet control the road into Raihorodok-Slovyansk.
Russian forces continued to advance within Severodonetsk on June 1.[11] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian troops now control upwards of 70% of the city and that Ukrainian troops are retreating from the city center.[12] Russian Telegram channels additionally indicated that Russian forces are fighting in Ustynivka and Myrna Dolyna, which is a likely attempt to advance northwest to Lysychansk without having to cross the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk.[13] Russian forces are reportedly fighting for control of Bilohorivka (where they attempted a costly and failed crossing of the Severskyi Donets River in early May) and Vrubivka, which would allow them to advance on Lysychansk from the west.[14] Ukrainian forces likely are holding onto Toshkivka, south of Severodonetsk, after reports that Russian forces lost their positions in Toshkivka on May 28.[15] Russian forces have continued ground and artillery attacks against Toshkivka to attempt to regain lost positions.[16]
Russian forces continued ground, air, and artillery attacks against Donetsk Oblast on June 1.[17] Russian troops continued fighting to the east of Bakhmut around Komyshuvakha, Berestove, Nyrkove, Pylypchatyne, and Svitlodarsk in order to gain access to highways to the northeast of Bakhmut, which would facilitate attempts to encircle the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian grouping around Avidiivka is holding its positions in the area, and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) claimed that DNR troops encircled Ukrainian troops in Avdiivka.[19] Russian forces reportedly cut the Donetsk City-Avdiivka-Konstantinivka highway. Russian forces have been close enough to the highway for some time that Ukrainian forces have probably not been relying on it as a main supply route. If the Russians could secure it from its base (rather than simply cutting it), however, they could be able to use it advance northward towards Konstantinivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk.[20] Russian forces are fighting north of Avdiivka in the vicinity of Krasnohorivka and on the southern outskirts of Niu York.[21]



Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces conducted air and artillery strikes against Kharkiv City and its environs on June 1. Russian forces shelled the Kyivskyi district of Kharkiv City, Ruski Tyshky, Zolochiv, Derhachi, and Tsyrkuny and conducted airstrikes against Vesele and Ternova.[22]


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Ukrainian forces continued to threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northeastern Kherson Oblast, despite Russian forces restricting further Ukrainian counteroffensives on May 31 and June 1. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces destroyed bridges over the Inhulets River in Davydiv Brid, an operationally significant settlement located on the Russian-controlled T2205 highway.[23] Russian forces likely destroyed bridges in an effort to hinder Ukrainian efforts to reach Davydiv Brid on May 31.[24] Ukrainian forces can likely still disrupt Russian forces' ability to use the highway as a main supply route if they remain just on the other side of the river, which is less than a kilometer from the road and therefore within range of many tactical systems. Disruption of the T2205 as a primary GLOC could undermine Russian defenses against Ukrainian counteroffensives on the northern Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border. Russian forces have also destroyed another bridge just north of Davydiv Brid and intensified artillery fire in northern Kherson, likely in anticipation of continued Ukrainian counterattacks.[25] Russian forces also unsuccessfully attempted to reconnoiter by battle Ukrainian positions on the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast on June 1.[26]
Russian forces continued to fortify positions across southern Ukraine in an effort to establish permanent control over occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast, instead executing engineering work for the second lines of defense.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces transferred likely one T-62 tank battalion and one motorized rifle battalion to Vasylivka, approximately 50km south of Zaporizhia City. ISW has previously reported on an increase in Russian military presence and fortifications east of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[28]
The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command said that Russian forces are transferring anti-aircraft missile systems, electronic warfare equipment, and multiple rocket launchers to Snake Island off Romanian coast.[29]


Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Some Russian milbloggers continue to question Russian policy, this time regarding the status of occupied territories. The Head of Russian State Duma International Committee Leonid Slutskiy claimed that Russia may annex Kherson Oblast and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) as soon as July.[30] A small-scale Russian Telegram Channel MoscowCalling ridiculed Slutskiy’s announcement, noting that Russian forces have not secured the land corridor to Crimea via Zaporizhia Oblast.[31] MoscowCalling also noted that without control over Zaporizhia Oblast, Russian forces will not have the capacity to support commercial and administrative routes via the Kerch Strait bridge. Governor of St. Petersburg Alexander Belov and Russian-appointed Head of Mariupol Konstantin Ivanchenko signed a cooperation agreement between two cities on June 1, but it is unclear whether the Kremlin has decided to fully annex Mariupol.[32]

This is all you need to know about ISW

 

[Beny Karachun]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1531082722210418689

Fake info

 

[Gomig-21]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1531913092505952258

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister: Arms shipments to Ukraine increase the risk of "direct confrontation" between Russia and the United States
@AsharqNewsBrk

https://twitter.com/x/status/1531898895651024897

L-O-L! OMG, these right wing nut freaks are beyond delusional on a stratospheric level!

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532086222499233794

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532088054814580738

"Sell them"? Why not just deduct the cost from the $40 BILLION we just sent them lmao! This war has been out of control for a while and only getting worst. This crap needs to end soon so there's a semblance of a chance to return to normalcy.

 

[Hassan Al-Somal]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532051858981797889

https://twitter.com/x/status/1532084080614989824

Fake info

https://twitter.com/x/status/1529041792007655424

https://twitter.com/x/status/1527574668403671041