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Russia-Ukraine War - News and Developments

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You obviously dont consider Turkey a NATO member.
Turkish drones were purchased by Ukraine prior, not provided as weapons aid currently

My question was from context of weapons being provided as of now
 
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This should've been all over the news, but it didn't. Not sure why though.
:sarcastic: Ofcourse the western media won't show it, it breaks with the narrative!

Mariupol has held out longer than expected, this entire operation seems slow. They will now move their forces to encircle what is left of the Ukrainian forces in the East and destroy them.

As for Bucha, it seeme that Nato and Britain in particular aren't keen on an impartial investigation. I wonder why not? :sarcastic:
 
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Is there anything that suggest Russia really tried to take full control of Ukraine airspace? I mean like going all inn and taking out every Ukrainian air wing and SAM systems.

There is something really fishy about Russian intentions and actions in this war. To me it looks like Russia simply is afraid to go in with full force. I think the main goal maybe actually to teach Ukraine (and others) a lesson. Demilitarize and make it less anti-Russian.

edit: Although Russia has not enforced a de jure NO Fly Zone still Ukraine airspace is more or less de facto in Russian control. Also Russia might have drawn its conclusions from full blown US invasions in Afg and Iraq, that a full scale take over is very risky.
My comments about the VKS are here...



If my suspicion is true that the VKS essentially used the old Soviet concept of airpower and employment of the same in Ukraine, then the VKS cannot achieve air superiority over a country as large as Ukraine, and that it is only the smaller size of the Ukrainian Air Force that the VKS have that de facto control of Ukrainian airspace.


Boyd and Warden represent a major transition in the evolution of air power theory. Early air power theorists argued that one could defeat the enemy by paralyzing his war-making and war-sustaining capabilities—a form of economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. In contrast, Boyd and Warden contend that one should target enemy command and control—that is, control warfare based upon command targeting.​
Boyd and Warden represent a shift from this economic warfare to what some term control warfare. Boyd’s version of control warfare is more process-oriented in terms of operating inside enemy OODA loops. On the other hand, Warden’s version is more form-oriented in terms of parallel, inside-out attack against the enemy’s Five Rings. That said, both espouse control warfare based upon command targeting.

We can see the progression of early airpower up to where John Boyd and John Warden advocated. Back in WW II, the US Army Air Corps bombed Germany's war-making and war-sustaining capabilities such as the Ploesti oil refineries and the Schweinfurt ball bearing factories. In Desert Storm, we attacked Iraq's command and control and associated information gathering capabilities such as early warning radars. Radars are intelligence.

Under the Soviet concept and employment of airpower as 'airborne artillery', ground commanders dictate the direction and intensity of LOCAL airpower, and by 'local', it mean targeting enemy forces 24-48 hrs ahead. Oil refineries and ball bearing factories are weeks ahead, meaning it takes weeks to turn oil into fuel and ball bearings to install into vehicles. But if you target enemy forces that are 24-28 hrs ahead, you will be shooting at enemy ground forces that are either on the way to you or entrenched waiting for you. In this, airpower is limited to local combat, not regional or national economic and/or command and control capabilities. We never met during the Cold War and now in Ukraine we finally found out that seemingly the current VKS have not made any philosophical and conceptual progress since WW II. If you look at Figure 3 on page 25 of the above doc, the VKS pretty stopped at ring 3 'infrastructure' but concentrated at rings 4 (population) and 5 (fielded forces). The employment of the VKS in Ukraine correlates too much to the old Soviet 'airborne artillery' concept of airpower.

There is a parallel cause on why the VKS performed so poorly over Ukraine: economics. Poutine may have given the Russian military some budgetary boost from improved economy overall, but it was not enough. In Desert Storm, we hit all of the Warden Five Rings in one day. We did it because we could. The US had enough air assets to do it alone but we ended up with allies to help. The VKS did not because it could not. So the VKS had no choice but subordinate itself to ground commanders. In the end, since the VKS could not perform like Desert Storm, might as well do the most good by working for the Russian Army. Many will not like this but US/NATO air forces would have erased the VKS from the air.

For the long term, it now falls to China, specifically Chinese concept of airpower, to lead the non-West aligned air forces. Would the PLAAF adopt the Boyd-Warden ways of airpower? Maybe, but that would require a re-conceptualization of the entire PLA itself to be an expeditionary military like how the US military is. How expeditionary? Again, back to Desert Storm. Historically, expeditionary armies lived off the land. They took food and make their arms from local sources. But with DS, the US shipped everything we need from one hemisphere to the other. This is how much the PLA must change. Could is one thing, but 'can do' is another. Can the PLA become as expeditionary? China shares borders with 11 countries and not all of them friendlies. That mean a good portion of the PLA must be constantly on the alert on the home front whereas the US do not worry about Canada and Mexico.
 
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Day 40

Well, I never thought I would still be writing this in Day 40. But here we are, at Day 40 (About to go to Day 41) of the War in Ukraine. Fighting continue.

Here are the situation as of Day 40

View attachment 830541

So, what's happening?

Russia is Culminated

We hear this a thousand time, but what does that mean?

In war, a force is culminated means they are at the high tide mark and can no longer progress forward, usually at the end of their logistic capability. Further gain is unlikely at this point unless a serious reshape and re-contribution to the combat operation at hand.

Russia at this point reached the high tide mark for the entire operation, The Northern arm has been beaten back, and Ukrainian is counter attacking North East Ukraine. Russia pull off all the force in North and try to reinsert it somewhere either in the East (Near Kharkiv) or South East (Near Donbas)

Localised Battle

Kyiv - Russian Retrograde

Russian announced a draw back on the North, on the other hand, we have not seen any retrograde operation launched by Russia to preserve its North Force, what we can see is a general withdraw with their force abandoning defensive position around Kyiv and its suburb.

According to Chapter 7 FM 100-15 A retrograde operation defined as the following.

1.) A delay operation to withdraw frontline troop in parts to preserve the frontline, so you don't pull everyone at once and collapse the frontline.
2.) A volunteer withdrawal of rear troop, with defensive position destroyed or sabotaged so to denied the enemy for using the defensive structure you have built.
3.) Redeploy and/or retired the troop that are not engage in combat.

We didn't see any of that.......

Conventional Wisdom suggest for every unit you pull off the front line, you leave 2 unit behind to act as a "Fighting Withdrawal" that way you will always have some troop holding the line and not going to vacate the frontline all at once, this is obviously did not do, because Ukraine took back almost the entire Kyiv Oblast in 2 days, and leave behind carnage suggested that the Russian withdraw is unorganised and sudden.

On the other hand, defensive position around the line were not destroyed. Noted in Hostomel Airport, this Satellite Image suggested the defensive position remain intact

View attachment 830563

From this, we can deduce Russian Operation in Kyiv is not a Retrograde, but a general rout.

Odesa

Odesa is on the far side of the Western Coast, it being the biggest and only port left with Ukraine, this is a big target for the Russian, so what's happening to it?

Apart from a missile strike and an artillery strike, nothing.

Even tho snake island felt on day 1, Odesa was largely untouched. Russian ship is on stand by, however, they cannot launch an amphibious assault until the Russian took Mykolaiv, you need a supply route over land in order to sustain an amphibious operation.

I would have to say Odesa is safe for now, pending on whether or not Ukrainian can take Kherson during the counter offensive.

Kherson

I have no doubt in my mind Kherson is the next Counter Offensive Point for Ukrainian. Taking Kherson would pressure Russian troop back to Crimea as you can made a clear dash toward Crimea thru Kherson, and taking Kherson would have weaken the Russian ability to conduct Military Operation in the South and South East.

During the last few days we have seen limited activities in Kherson area after Ukrainian counter attacked toward Kherson Airfield, this is in my opinion probing work, Ukraine is waiting on heavy equipment (Tanks and Artillery) for a major push, once those equipment is in Ukrainian hand, we would expect to see a General Push toward Kherson and Melitopol Direction.

Mariupol

Anybody who studied warfare would probably tell you Mariupol would have fall in the first few days of the war. The Proximity (10km toward Donbas frontline) would mean this is more or less a sure things to the Russia. Taking Mariupol would free up a bunch of troop from the South and East so they can have the freedom to move North and encircle the Ukrainian Defender in Donbas.

40 days in, Mariupol is still hanging on by a thread. At this stage, I would have to say even if Mariupol felt, the Russian force, with 40 days of hard fighting would have been spent or near spent, which mean the original objective may be already in doubt. On the other hand, if the Ukrainian manage to break thru from Kherson, that will render the advance toward Mariupol pointless, because the Russia would have to pull troop back to defend Crimea. And even if Mariupol did fall, I seriously doubt Russia have enough troop to defend the city from a upcoming counter attack.

Kharkiv

Kharkiv is probably one of the wild card at the early onset of the war, due to it proximity toward Russian border and it's large ethnic Russian resident, we don't know if Kharkiv would have just fold or people in Kharkiv is going to cooperate with the Russian.

Kharkiv turns out to be one of the fiercest place of the entire war. Kharkiv have been back and forth, and latest intelligence suggested that Russia is no longer trying to take Kharkiv, and were unable to encircle it. Russian strategy with Kharkiv is by-passing it and going south toward Izyum and trying to encircle the Donbas defender.

Kharkiv is currently also one of the major point of Ukrainian counter offensive, with supply corridor being pushed back across the border.

Overall Situation

As of April 4. the situation is probably a stauts quo between the Russian force and Ukrainian Force. Russia have been withdrew from the Northern ends, Kyiv is relief as of now.

Depending on how Russian rearm and regroup, they may try to invade thru Belarus and into Ukraine again, however, unlike the first time they have the element of surprise, this time, Ukrainian is fully or nearly fully mobilised with time to make defensive position, any further advance is going to be tougher than it was before, which make another push toward Kyiv unlikely.

On the other hand, Russian is expected to rotate the force and redeploy them toward the south, a logical destination is in Donbas instead of Kharkiv, on the other hand, these force is freshly pull off the field from Kyiv and reinsert them into Donbas for a grinder warfare, I seriously doubt the combat effectiveness of these force without giving them enough time to R&R.

While the Russian is doing that, Ukrainian have been able to raise another 200,000 TDF troop, and is currently opening another round of mobilisation, basically awaiting armament and equipment to fully kit out the first batch of TDF troop. As this war drag on, the more investment coming from EU and US, Ukrainian Force is going to grow in number which mean they can pursuit more objective than they can now. On the other hand, can the Russian keep up with the number game and the equipment game is unknown. Bear in mind, US and EU is underwriting the war in Ukraine for Ukraine. Russia is paying for its own war, with heavy economic sanction, the capability of whether or not they can persecute such a war during these economic circumstance is doubtful at best.

In the next week or 2, as more equipment and formation of new Brigade, Ukrainian is expect to conduct a country-wide counter offensive. I would say the next counter offensive focus is going to be in the Southern Region.

Russian/Ukrainian end game?

I don't think this war would be decided on the field, I still think this war is going to be decided with the peace talk, the position on the ground will dictate the progress peace talk. I don't think Russia can take anything more than Donbas, I do think the southern corridor is in jeapody from Ukrainian counter attack.

So I would suggest the next Ukrainian counter attack would see who have the bigger carrot in the peace talk. If Russian failed to resist the counter attack, then donbas would not have a favourable outcome. On the other hand, if Ukrainian are not able to dislodge the Russian, then outlook of the Ukrainian defence in Donbas will be grim. They will then be more willing to deal, other than keep fighting.

@Wood @RescueRanger @SQ8 @Paul2 @mmr @LeGenD

No one who "studied warfare" will make them claims at start of war for a quick victory at Maripul. Especially thousands of mechanised infantry, Marines and Azov spent years planning to defend it.
 
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Interview of a Ukranian pilot who fought as an infantry man during the attack on Hostomel. 8-)

The Ukrainian Air Force learned yet more valuable lessons during exercises with the U.S. Air Force, particularly the Clear Sky series of drills, the biggest of which in 2018 was the first-ever joint multinational exercise hosted by Ukraine. Here, the regular sparring partners for the Ukrainian were the F-15Cs of the California Air National Guard’s 144th Fighter Wing, while the Polish Air Force participated too.

More details about this exercise in the Interview
 
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