Rawalpindi | Gentlemen, it’s time

[Elmo]

Our war against Taliban has not even started. Already willing to throw in the towel? This is the first time there is something of the sort of a national consensus. This means that for the first time the GoP, public and the Army are on the same page to face off the threat. To say that our war is a failure has yet to be seen.

Okay, so what exactly have we been chasing out of the tribal areas since 2002… after reading your comment, certainly not the Taliban. As for being the “war a failure”, what S-2 understood is what I had implied.

Our case is even more complicated than the one faced by the ISAF. In our case its brother turned on brother. All typical approached to COIN go by the wayside in a campaign where family and tribal alliances are strained. What matters more? Religion? tribe? country? .

Yes sir agreed and that’s another count I oppose use of force. It’s psychological warfare. And these aren’t issue that have sprouted up overnight, we have known this for the last many years. Law-enforcement agencies’ personnel have been reluctant to fight the Taliban and there have been desertions on these counts.

Here’s a link to David Kilcullen’s piece on the Small wars Journal where he argues that religion is not really a barrier when it comes to counterinsurgency.

Religion and Insurgency (SWJ Blog)

So need your opinion, is religion really a barrier? Can the army somehow circumvent this in the future?

People may not know because most people in the United States do not know what COIN is. The key is that those who have to wage it should know of it and as I have mentioned, its a known science, however its one that is constantly in need of revising and evolution.

Once again, what have WE learned so far from COIN? That remains unanswered. I am not the one with the army background here!

Don’t confuse military knowledge with civilian knowledge.

I had stated this a couple of pages back only: being a civilian I have absolutely no knowledge whatsoever of military operations etc. You clearly missed that.

Secondly if it is part of a standard training concept there is written doctrine outlining what it is and how it is to be executed. Doctrine is in military generic terms so it, as doctrine, has flexibility.

Yes, but what is the Pakistan Army’s doctrine regarding it?

“At this point of time you do not have that luxury. At best you have unsubstantiated pointers from the displaced pers. This is a big problem as you have no idea if it is a fact that the enemy is there or it is a vendetta issue.”
I second nothing actually. I do point out you do have intel. I also point out it may have errors like any intel. Do not twist what I said for your argument.

Twisting what you said I did not. I had highlighted what you had stated because that’s what I had said in my post earlier: we lack credible intelligence and don’t know who the enemy is. Period.

I am trying to point out some military fact that you do not understand.

As for pointing out military facts, well I never claimed that I know everything. National and geo-political may be but certainly not military. I have been asking these questions all along except no one seems interested in answering them.

You make criticism but no concept of how it may be dealt with. One sided flash points do not help with considered discussion.

I make no concept because I have no expertise in that area. So what I know I state, what I don’t know I stay mum on.

The methods I mention are as valid as any, some of these being
1. Interrogation of IDPs.
2. Patrolling.
3. aerial/satellite photos

Now interrogation of IDPs has usually a limited ability as it requires a lot of cross reference of the gained intel. An IDP is not a totally reliable source. But it is a source and useable. For each piece of intel gained it has to be cross referenced with other bits from other IDPs. It is time consuming. In the end yes a picture can be built. This is a method that can not be discounted of hand. As I also said it may unfortunately involve matter of vendettas and that is a difficult point to deal with. There are examples of this in all CI ops. Patrolling is one method that will return reliable intel. This though assumes you have some control of the ground and you use appropriate sized forces to patrol. At present you are not in a position to actually do this fully and the terrain is not conducive to it in many places. The terrain is more conducive to ambush of the patrol so it risk is very high for a patrol. If you loose half a platoon for the sake of a bit of intel on 3 pers then it is over costly in life. Aerial/sat photos are useful in some respects provided you are dealing with static positions. But if you have to deal with caves etc then they may be of little advantage. Here though tracks may show up but that is not specific proof. Now I said you do not have the luxury of doing some of these. You do not in fact have the luxury of mounting patrols into a high risk area. You are at the start of this campaign not into it. So you must rely on a loose form of intel that is from local police, local security pers and also IDPs. Now as for intelligence as a whole, whet you get substantiated or not is only a snap shot of time. It was only valid at the time that intel was observed. Nothing is static. Thus any actions based on that intel will have a probability level of error.

Yup that pretty much answers my questions. Thank you for enlightening!

 

[Elmo]

Some food for thought....


Why Antiwar (and a Plan to End Militancy) Action for a Progressive Pakistan

The writer [Adaner Usmani] is a Harvard University graduate.



After the recent scrapping of the “peace deal” in Malakand, the Pakistani military launched a massive offensive in order to clear Swat, Dir, and Buner of the Taliban. As a direct result, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been forced to flee the war zones (with independent reports also indicating that many thousands are still trapped in the areas under bombardment).

All this has triggered serious, protracted debate over the legitimacy of the war. Below is an email written by an APP member to the People’s Resistance listserv, a Karachi-based group that led civil society efforts during the lawyers’ movement. It comes in response to emails sent by the war’s reluctant advocates, who argue that the antiwar argument is “impractical,” as the State must today choose between (1) peace deals that embolden the forces of reaction, and (2) a war that might well claim the lives of thousands of civilians.

Dear ---- different people have been having this back-and-forth for months and months now, so i don’t want to simply repeat what’s already been said enough. but i understand that you two, in particular, are asking for direct, constructive answers, so let me do my best.

i apologize for the length. as you will see if you reach the end, i got a bit carried away.

————–

but first, a comment.

a-- you summarize the anti-war argument as primarily an “ethical” one–that the offensive “is bad because it causes civilian casualties.” this is certainly part of the narrative, and it is an important part. however if you re-read what many have said in the course of previous discussions, you’ll find that there is also a “practical” component to the contentions: people have also been arguing that these operations do not work, they have exacerbated the scale of the insurgency and anti-state sentiment pakistan confronts, exacerbated the plight of men, women, children in pakhtunkhwa. with over a million pakistanis festering in underfunded refugee camps and inadequate, temporary homes, devoid of gainful employment and divested of all assets, i really fail to see how the advocates of war propose to convince us that this time it will be different–that these refugees will emerge to flash smiles and fly our flag.

in a recent article, to make the pro-war argument, mosharraf zaidi reads the history of the last few years as a history of “failed peace deals”. but i think the past few years could just as easily be read as a history of “failed military operations.” again, if even a fraction of these IDPs turn their backs on the state in the course of the years to come, as is all-too-likely, we are simply furnishing recruits to the patchwork of enraged insurgent groups that have roots in the area. (this leaves aside the thousands of people still trapped in the “war zones”; after all, lest we forget, the idea that you can evacuate only civilians in order to bomb only terrorists is straight out of the samuel huntington fantasy playbook (and, of course, Vietnam didn’t exactly bear him out)).

so, really, i’d like to, first, turn the question around–to my mind, the notion that the military operation is a “practical” alternative beggars belief. how do you justify this claim–our PM sahib can make it in a television address dripping of choreographed patriotism, but surely you see the holes in this hollywood narrative (drop our bombs and “whaddyaknow”, the bad guys are no more!)?

what evidence do you offer that will lead me to believe that bombs, artillery, and khakis will lead to a decline in “terror”? note that i am making this argument assuming that i ought to accept unreservedly the State’s definition of who these terrorists are. if i begin to dispute that definition, and start to argue that, really, our State has long allied itself with select tribal warlords in these areas that are hardly less mad or misogynistic than the “Taliban,” i think the burden of proof on the pro-war side becomes greater still, as it indicates that our State/Military has an interest in fighting certain forms of misogyny and extremism while patronizing others. (and then, on top of this, of course, there is the small matter of direct State terror).

in sum, what i am arguing is that neither of the two options you are asking civil society to choose between are solutions. in other words, both option (1) peace deal/ceasefire with non-representative mullahs, and option (2) military operation, promise to make the problem worse, not better. they may both deliver short-term benefits (unlikely), but the medium-to-long-term effects on the region and the country will be frightening.

if they represent the only two, “practicable” options that exist, today, this is simply because the problem of militancy in the north-west is not a problem that invites any in-the-box, within-the-system solutions. particularly with the US committing to a long-term presence in southern afghanistan (obama is contemplating sending 10,000 more troops, on top of the 20,000 he has already ordered there), I think, realistically, we will have to come to terms with the fact that the problem of militancy in the NW will plague us for years, if not decades to come.

at the same time, i don’t think we need to over-exaggerate the scale of the crisis that we face–perhaps i’m being too optimistic, but i don’t think that these insurgencies are dramatically different from, for example, the problem of the Maoists in India (who have a presence in roughly 1/3 of indian districts, don’t forget), the problem of paramilitaries in Colombia, or even the problem of street gangs in El Salvador, etc. the hard-on-terror approach will not work for any of them in any sustainable, holistic way, nor will it work for us. (do you think, for example, that Sri Lanka is really solving any of its problems, in any sustainable way, with this recent campaign against the LTTE?)

we are not about to fall to the Taliban. the problem of creeping fundamentalism in our cities, is distinct, sociologically, from the terrorism of the TTP and TNSM (this is why i object to WAF’s recent framing of the issue of the dramatic rise in misogyny as “talibanization”–it is unhelpful and analytically very lazy). bombs in Swat will do nothing to free women or minds in karachi.

————–

nonetheless–you both wanted an alternative, so i will offer it to you. again, i don’t think that what i am putting forth is “practical,” simply because i don’t think that there are any “practical” solutions. progressive forces have very little claim on the State and the Army; they are not about to listen to us.

i do understand the argument that i have heard for more clever, committed, ground-troop counter-insurgency. and perhaps there will need to be some dabbling in these dark arts in order to re-establish some semblance of the State’s writ, before any plan can be implemented.

or perhaps the State will simply have to do an honest job in areas within its writ, before people elsewhere start to believe in it (anyway, after all, for 62 years the Pakistani state has not really exercised its writ directly in many of these areas (esp. FATA), but rather by proxy through tribal elites).

what’s very clear, nonetheless, is that all this demands an end to today’s military operation.

my fantasy plan has 12 parts, presented in haphazard order. feel free to add.

1. announce a radical land reform program (no compensation, no exceptions) effective immediately.
2. announce an end to the political and State patronage of maliks, khans, walis, etc. in fact announce a program to confiscate the luxury assets of all elites, including our various royal families. re-distribute these equitably to those militants who agree to lay down arms, as well as to working-class people everywhere (i’m sure we can find more than enough for everyone.).

[Skipped bit...]
4. announce a comprehensive legal reform package that includes the decolonization of FATA (repeal of FCR, for example), protection of minorities and women. promulgate an order requiring all stalled cases to be heard and resolved within 6 months, across the country.
5. propose a holistic anti-corruption policy (including raising of lower-level police salaries and aggressive prosecution of corrupt elites)

[Skipped bit...]

8. nationalize the madrassas, integrate them into a revamped public education system. ban private education; redistribute the assets of private schools to the public system. propose a plan to integrate education across classes, so the sons of bankers go to school with the sons of unemployed polio victims. convene a transparent committee (comprising especially of minorities and women) to draft a comprehensive new curriculum. (if you’re having trouble funding this, demand reparations from Britain for multiple decades of intentional underdevelopment and brutal colonial rule–remember to give a good chunk of this to bangladesh. officially beg forgiveness for 1971).
9. convene an assembly radically more democratic than our parliament (seats reserved for peasants, minorities, and workers) to write a new, minority-friendly, secular constitution.

[Skipped bit...]

12. announce a massive literacy campaign enlisting especially elite youth in a 6-month campaign, modeled on the cuban or nicaraguan experience.

———————-

i cannot go on any longer. it is too much fun, and i simply am setting myself up for disappointment when i wake up in the morning.

sincerely,
adaner

 

[Ratus Ratus]

Nadja:

Yes, but what is the Pakistan Army’s doctrine regarding it?

Counterinsurgency/COIN is a military doctrine. As it is a doctrine it is not accessible/detailed etc to the public in most/nearly all countries. Such documents will carry a security classification of sorts. In the case of US documents I know they carry the following “Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means” or similar depending on the document as part of the distribution restriction statement
Other nations will use similar statements eg “The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person not authorized to receive it”. It will also carry a security classification such as RESTRICTED on each page, including the blank ones.
What ever there is on such, it means not for public viewing/access etc.

So from that you can see you are not going to get Pakistan’s or any other nation’s COIN doctrine spelt out to you here.

Who has it:
Active members of the Pakistan military above a certain rank will have access to the Pakistan doctrine. Members of other militaries will have access to their countries doctrine. Some have access to several nations’ doctrine due to their specific roles. They are all controlled by the restrictions of security on such.

 

[Elmo]

Nadja:

Yes, but what is the Pakistan Army’s doctrine regarding it?

Counterinsurgency/COIN is a military doctrine. As it is a doctrine it is not accessible/detailed etc to the public in most/nearly all countries. Such documents will carry a security classification of sorts. In the case of US documents I know they carry the following “Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means” or similar depending on the document as part of the distribution restriction statement
Other nations will use similar statements eg “The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person not authorized to receive it”. It will also carry a security classification such as RESTRICTED on each page, including the blank ones.
What ever there is on such, it means not for public viewing/access etc.

So from that you can see you are not going to get Pakistan’s or any other nation’s COIN doctrine spelt out to you here.

Who has it:
Active members of the Pakistan military above a certain rank will have access to the Pakistan doctrine. Members of other militaries will have access to their countries doctrine. Some have access to several nations’ doctrine due to their specific roles. They are all controlled by the restrictions of security on such.

Ummm... I had started to expect something will be available on it since everyone just kept talking about COIN and how the cycle needs to be repeated ad infinitum to get it right. Thanks for not beating about the bush and letting me know that no one makes it available. I guess, better late than never.


(After the edit: Oops, forgot to add this earlier, if one has time do check out the Small Wars Journal for an idea of the COIN doctrine of some western nations and the discussion thereby. It was quite educating.)

 

[Ratus Ratus]

Ummm... I had started to expect something will be available on it since everyone just kept talking about COIN and how the cycle needs to be repeated ad infinitum to get it right. Thanks for not beating about the bush and letting me know that no one makes it available. I guess, better late than never.

Ok lest get something quite clear. Doctrine as such seldom make cycles for ever in the short term which I suspect is what you feel has been expressed. Doctrine is written so it has changes but these will normally only occur at worse every 6 – 12 months depending on theatre of Ops. Normally doctrine will change seldom

What does change and must buy virtue of the theatre of ops is how that doctrine is implemented. This is a totally different ball game.
As a simple example and lest assume doctrine made little change between Vietnam and now. For Australia the same doctrine used in Vietnam is used in Timor and Afghanistan and a couple of other places between. But each theatre of ops has different issues. So though the doctrine is constant the way it is implemented must alter to suit the local conditions. You may take lessons learned form one theatre to the next but only if they apply directly or are useable somehow.
SO the comment about it being cyclic is that each area is different to some extent. What happened in FATA before is one theatre, what happens now is actually a different theatre though the same tactical piece of dirt. Many aspects have altered from the original FATA conflict.
Yes sounds confusing but it actually isn’t.

 

[Elmo]

Ok lest get something quite clear. Doctrine as such seldom make cycles for ever in the short term which I suspect is what you feel has been expressed. Doctrine is written so it has changes but these will normally only occur at worse every 6 – 12 months depending on theatre of Ops. Normally doctrine will change seldom

What does change and must buy virtue of the theatre of ops is how that doctrine is implemented. This is a totally different ball game.
As a simple example and lest assume doctrine made little change between Vietnam and now. For Australia the same doctrine used in Vietnam is used in Timor and Afghanistan and a couple of other places between. But each theatre of ops has different issues. So though the doctrine is constant the way it is implemented must alter to suit the local conditions. You may take lessons learned form one theatre to the next but only if they apply directly or are useable somehow.
SO the comment about it being cyclic is that each area is different to some extent. What happened in FATA before is one theatre, what happens now is actually a different theatre though the same tactical piece of dirt. Many aspects have altered from the original FATA conflict.
Yes sounds confusing but it actually isn’t.

Thank you Ratus Ratus.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

if one has time do check out the Small Wars Journal for an idea of the COIN doctrine of some western nations and the discussion thereby. It was quite educating.)

I have read their comments and discussion not to mention COIN manuals from various nations.
End of comment

 

[Ratus Ratus]

I said this earlier in this thread.

Firstly and too many peoples’ horror I don’t personally believe that the campaign against the Taliban, (TTP etc) will last long. I would give it at best 3 weeks.
At that point peace deals will be struck and at the point of a gun, held by the wrong people again.

Few screamed so I gather there is a consensus.

In light of this:
“Why Antiwar (and a Plan to End Militancy) Action for a Progressive Pakistan” above

I will suggest that the following:
The army is planning to go into Waziristan, possibly in June
Link:
http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistans-war/26577-starting-new-operation-waziristan.html
Will not eventuate.

Also my 3 weeks is now down to 2.

You will make peace at the point of a gun and live with an expanding militancy you have no control of.


ed
Prove me wrong by all means, I will not feel disappointed.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

ed
Prove me wrong by all means, I will not feel disappointed.

I think we all know that the only 'proof' of this lies in how events unfold as we go forward.

As Blain explained - the GoP or Military do not have the financial resources to assist the IDP's and carry on the operation for the duration necessary, and unless the promised international assistance materializes, this may end in some sort of flawed negotiated settlement.

Some will cry 'diplomacy with a gun to ones head' - I think its just the cold hard facts. The country cannot operate without money.

Of course, even if the promised aid (loans) show up, how the government handles the IDP issue to prevent a backlash from Pakistanis elsewhere will also play a significant role in whether the operation is sustained.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

My opinion on the alleged 'Coming Waziristan Operation' that I posted elsewhere:

I will be surprised if the PA opens another front of the Swat scale (and it will have to be of this scale if not bigger) in Waziristan before the Malakand Division operations are over.

The motive behind the release of this information may have been to prevent the TTP-Mehsud from sending significant reinforcements and supplies to Swat - they would likely build up their own defences if they were expecting a military offensive soon.

 

[blain2]

I left my original points in bold for appropriate context to be able to respond to your replies.

"What encroachment in Punjab?"

Sorry. I thought you'd attended THIS party.

S-2,

Hassan Abbas himself states that there is no existential threat to either the Punjab or Punjabis from these folks. You need to see the dynamics on the street to understand where Taliban have support and where they won't last. Trust me on this, Taliban will not survive sticking around in Punjab. The extremist groups remain and we are cognizant of that, however for the Punjabis to evolve into the Taliban is something that is pulled out of nowhere. I have had the chance to read more so than that one paper of Hassan Abbas' writings. The connection is always that of militancy. However unlike in NWFP and FATA where people walk around with guns and use their kinship to push agendas, Punjab and the rest of Pakistan is too diverse to be used in such a manner.

"Just because you read it in the western press..."

Admittedly, CTC SENTINEL is western. West Point western in fact. The writer, Hassan Abbas, is Pakistani, no?

Yes Hassan Abbas is Pakistani, but what exactly is it in is writing that has you all excited about the fall of Punjab? What militancy exists in Punjab is also present in Sind. Can it take over the province either politically or socially (leave out militarily altogether)? No way.

"Beyond NWFP, there is no support base for the Taliban."

Really? If you say so but my instincts are SCREAMING otherwise. What was that support base like for those guys up in Bajaur last fall? That was pretty supportive around Loe Sam wasn't it?

Where is Bajaur and Loi Sam? In Sind? Lets not lose context here.

"The ANA troops could care less about this war. Most of them have no heart in the fight so to claim that they do it to make a point is laughable. If they did then Southern Afghanistan would now be won over by the ANA and their ISAF supporters using their Pashtun cadres to get to the people to turn against the Taliban."

S-2>> And your excuse for not achieving the same in FATA is...equally laughable with far less justification? I see an army barely raised from the ashes with no pedigree at all. What do you see and upon what are your professional expectations?

Funny, for all the chest-beating military pride here, the urge to disparage others seems strong. My army receives such here all the time. I'd think more introspection would be merited on this specific ANA issue.

That's just me, though.

Please don't try to bait me on this military pride thing here just to get a reactionary response because I won't go down that path. What I am saying is very factual. The religious and ethnic linkages are demotivating factors in this war. They are an issue in Afghanistan and they remain an issue to a great extent in Pakistan. Professional or non-professional, they do get in the way of waging war.

"The vast majority of the Iraqi security apparatus is Shia trying to pacify a sunni insurgency"

S-2>> We're not talking about your assessment of our performance. We're talking about a nation of brother versus brother and what I believe remains a civil war. Inter-marriage, tribal marriages, community relations. There's a long and close history here. It's not shias to the right and sunnis to the left and kurds freeze in place.

If so, Iraq will collapse, which is o.k. by me. We'll still have a groovy lil' home up in Kurdistan, or so I'm guessin'.

Your assessment of this brother taking on a brother is also too general. I can tell you that Iraqis are split across sectarian and ethnic lines and there isn't as much of this brother on brother action as you make it out to be. It runs contrary to human nature (specially when it is one of the issues that is foremost on the minds of the people) and this is even more so in the tribal societies. Iraq remained a federation because Saddam tried to keep on lid on it by force. The fault lines were always there and they came to the fore after the fall of his government. This dynamic remains in place in Pakistan and Afghanistan across multiple layers of religious/sectarian and ethnic connections.

"Secondly, religion is a major factor here that was absent in the examples of Vietnam..."

S-2>>No. Buddhists and Catholics played a HUGE role in vietnamese politics and had to be factored into the nat'l political milieu. I was thinking more of the "emergency" than the Malaysian communist insurgency that ran from the late sixties till the late eighties.

I tend to disagree with the comparison but since you see it differently, no problem.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

‘Militarily we will win the war but it will be unfortunate if we loose it publicly,’ Gilani told the National Assembly.

DAWN.COM | Pakistan | We will crush Taliban, must win hearts: PM Gilani

 

[S-2]

"Hassan Abbas himself states that there is no existential threat to either the Punjab or Punjabis from these folks."

Blain2, with all due respect, I didn't suggest the threat was yet "existential". I carefully chose "encroachment". I see a difference. I hope that you do too.

"Encroachment" alone IS cause for concern, though. The political dynamics of Pakistani Punjab are such that great potential for mischief resides, wouldn't you concur?

"...what exactly is it in is writing that has you all excited about the fall of Punjab?"

Excited? Again, you exaggerate for effect.

Fall of Punjab? And again, sir. Never once suggested it's imminence.

Please recall that your comment here was directed at the use of western media sources whom are supposedly solely responsible for shaping my views of matters-

"Just because you read it in the western press..."

I think I seek the best information available western or otherwise. As information generally goes, I've great faith in CTC and deeply appreciate the SENTINEL. You should too. Abbas is a Pakistani source. I never suggested anything about Punjab beyond encroachment.

"What militancy exists in Punjab is also present in Sind. Can it take over the province either politically or socially (leave out militarily altogether)? No way."

Again, if you say it's minimal, so be it. I'd not look with askance, though, if somebody suggested that your afghan pashtu Karachi slums represent no-go terrain to your Sindh security forces and that there is a growing taliban presence in that city.

Just "encroachment", mind you.

"Where is Bajaur and Loi Sam? In Sind? Lets not lose context here."

Certainly not in NWFP unless the borders moved. Let's not lose accuracy here. After all-

"Beyond NWFP, there is no support base for the Taliban."

...that IS what you actually said. The support base beyond NWFP shall likely prove EXTENSIVE. Waziristan is huge and it's the militants FINAL REDOUBT. A redoubt, I conjecture, they've spent an immense amount of time preparing to defend.

"Please don't try to bait me on this military pride thing here just to get a reactionary response because I won't go down that path. What I am saying is very factual."

I disagree.

What you said struck me as a very condescending "slam" of the ANA.

"The ANA troops could care less about this war. Most of them have no heart in the fight so to claim that they do it to make a point is laughable."

You seem to project your desires in this crassly unprofessional observation. No context and you assign the most base instincts to the men of the ANA. No heart? Therefore they die in great numbers without dignity? I see.

On what basis do you judge the heart of these men?

How about their training and experience? Your expectations to suggest they should have swept up southern Afghanistan by now when your vaulted army has shown no similar ability? I found that a perplexing statement.

Actually without factual basis. I'd hope for a more nuanced and balanced assessment rather than a condescendingly dismissive swipe at another army's heart-particularly in light of the questions that have been asked here and the stout defense rendered to such.

I confess that comment by you disturbed me.

"I can tell you that Iraqis are split across sectarian and ethnic lines and there isn't as much of this brother on brother action as you make it out to be."

I can tell you that you face no more nor less of these issues than are faced daily by others in both Afghanistan and Iraq. There's nothing unusual/unique about the stress your society feels relative to others in the midst of their own insurgencies.