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Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist

India has actually signed it. Did you remember the Nuclear Deal with USA. You are not going to test any nuclear device. If you did you will not get any uranium from nuclear supplier club.


I have already posted something regarding this " USA will stop the supply of uranium" in this thread. Read it and you will be clear that in next 10-15 years, india will be sanctions proof.
 
US nuclear gurus see signs of more Indian nuclear tests - India - NEWS - The Times of India

US nuclear gurus see signs of more Indian nuclear tests::

WASHINGTON: US nuclear pundits feel the Indian establishment -- political, scientific, or both in concert – may be lining up to conduct more

nuclear tests to validate and improve the country’s arsenal before the Obama administration shuts the door on nuclear explosions.

''You bet he wants to test again,'' said Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Washington DC-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, when asked about the remarks from a key Indian nuclear scientist suggesting India’s thermonuclear test was not up to mark. ''Imagine you are a nuclear weapons designer who has corrected the mistakes and ironed out the wrinkles. You would be crazy not to want to test again.''

''You have to look at the DNA of a weapons designer. They always want to make the weapons smaller, lighter, more powerful,'' Sokolski added. ''If you blindfold them, tie their hands and leave them in the middle of a forest, they will still make their way to a test site.''

While Sokolski addressed the Indian motivations largely from the technology validation standpoint, Washington has long believed that geo-political objectives rather than scientific or technical metrics drives New Delhi’s nuclear weapons quest. The argument has gotten another boost following the remarks by a key Indian scientist, K.Santhanam, questioning the potency of India’s thermonuclear bomb.

While ''We told you so,'' was pretty much the reaction in the US scientific and strategic community on the renewed controversy over the yield of the thermo-nuclear device in Shakti series of nuclear test arising from remarks by Santhanam, there is lingering suspicion here that the disclosure in politically driven. It’s rare for Indian scientists to break ranks on a sensitive national security issue.

Why would Santhanam go public, with such deliberation, on something that was commonly discussed and widely acknowledged in scientific circles, a decade after the questions first surfaced?

The answer, according to some nuclear pundits mulling on the issue on blogs: To ward off growing American pressure on India to sign various nuclear containment treaties and perhaps enable India to conduct one last series of tests to validate and improve its nuclear arsenal.

In scores of research papers and studies in the immediate weeks and months of the 1998 nuclear tests in Pokhran, US scientists repeatedly questioned the reported yield of the thermo-nuclear device, saying it was well below India’s claim of 43-45 kilotons. In fact, some scientists, notably Terry Wallace, then with the University of Arizona and now attached to the Los Alamos National Laboratory, put the combined yield of the three May 11 tests at as low as 10 to 15 kilotons.

Two other tests on May 13 involved sub-kiloton devices for tactical weapons, which US scientists doubted even took place. Even the six nuclear tests claimed by Pakistan were treated with derision, with US scientists saying only two of them involved nuclear devices.

''This is quite clearly a case where governments tested for a political reason rather than scientific reasons, so we have to be suspicious of what they say,'' Wallace, the country’s top nuclear seismology expert, had said about the reported yields.

On Thursday, suspicion lingered in strategic circles that even Santhanam’s ''admission'' was cloaked in politics, aimed primarily at warding off US pressure on New Delhi to sign CTBT, the long-sought treaty to ban nuclear tests, and making ground for a further series of tests. There is renewed energy in Washington under the Democratic dispensation to push forward with such nuclear containment treaties after the previous Bush administration put them on the backburner.

Some US nuclear gurus also believe any break-out test at this point will be detrimental to India, even if it is aimed at validating its thermo-nuclear device, or the so-called Hydrogen Bomb.

"An Indian test would be very toxic to cooperation it has just gained under the nuclear deal. It’s hard to see what India would gain," said Gary Milholin Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

Ensuring a reliable thermonuclear bomb? Milholin scoffed at the idea. "There are people who say American nuclear bombs won’t work because we have not tested for so long," he laughed. "I don’t think anyone would want to test that assumption."

Similarly, he said, it would be risky for any country to count on India’s thermonuclear weapon to have a low yield.

"There are now ways other than testing to increase confidence," Milholin added. "And I think India has enough computing power to do that."
 
^^^ Could you translate that? Not everyone here can read Urdu.
 
Indian armed forces confident about nuclear arsenal

NEW DELHI: Indian armed forces seem quite confident about the country's nuclear arsenal despite the controversy over the "yields'' of the 1998
Pokhran-II nuclear tests, which included a 15 kiloton fission device, a 45 kiloton thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb) and three sub-kiloton devices.

Outgoing Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta, also the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, on Thursday said India had "a credible minimum nuclear deterrent'' in line with its no-first use (NFU) policy.

"We are a nation which maintains a credible deterrent...more than enough to deter anybody,'' said Admiral Mehta. And should someone do the unthinkable by launching a first-strike, then the "consequences will be more than what they can bear''.

Asked about former DRDO scientist K Santhanam's statement that the hydrogen bomb tested during Pokhran-II was actually "a fizzle'', Admiral Mehta said, "As far as we are concerned, scientists have given us a certain capability which is enough to provide requisite deterrence...the deterrent is tried and tested.''

That may well be so but there are still some lingering doubts over whether India has a swift and assured second-strike capability, crucial for a country like India whose nuclear doctrine is centred around the NFU policy.

The doctrine, on its part, declares that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be "massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage''. This connotes a robust stockpile of nuclear warheads, safe and ready for use if needed. Estimates indicate India's weapons-grade plutonium stockpile is enough for 80-90 warheads at present.

Pakistan, on its part, has deliberately kept its nuclear policy ambiguous in the belief it deters India from undertaking any conventional military action against it.

Moreover, recent reports indicate Pakistan has pressed the throttle to enhance its arsenal much beyond 60 nuclear warheads as well as supplement its ongoing enriched uranium-based nuke programme with a weapons-grade plutonium one.

But more than the actual number of nuclear warheads, the worry of the Indian armed forces has been the gap in their delivery systems. Pakistan, for instance, is well ahead in the missile arena, borrowing as it has heavily from China and North Korea.

China, with its long-range ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), is in a different league altogether. Its road-mobile DF-31A missile, for instance, can hit targets 11,200 km away, while JL-2 SLBM has a reach beyond 7,200 km.

India, of course, has no ICBM or SLBM. While it's developing the 3,500-km Agni-III and 5,000-km Agni-V ballistic missiles, the only missiles available to armed forces as of now are Prithvi (150 to 350-km range), Agni-I (700-km) and Agni-II (2,500-km). But they, too, have not undergone the rigorous testing nuclear-capable missiles should undergo.

IAF has some fighters like Mirage-2000s jury-rigged to deliver nuclear weapons but the Strategic Forces Command has no dedicated bombers. Similarly, Navy has only two "dual-tasked'' warships armed with Dhanush (variant of Prithvi with a 330-km range) missiles, INS Subhadra and INS Suvarna.

Moreover, the nuclear-powered submarine INS Arihant, which was launched on July 26, will take at another two to three years to become fully operational. And it will be equipped only with 700-km range missiles to begin with.

Link Indian armed forces confident about nuclear arsenal - India - NEWS - The Times of India

I would not take the word of army here. They are to be heard only if they complain that DRDO's stuff does not meet their requirements.
IMO they can't even make difference between fission and fusion device, let alone assess their yield.


Anyone can post the clauses of NSG and 123 agreements, relating to tests?
 
The Hindu : Front Page : ‘Fizzle’ claim for thermonuclear test refuted

Siddharth Varadarajan

Back up charge with scientific evidence, says government’s top scientist

New Delhi: The government on Thursday strongly refuted claims that the 1998 test of a thermonuclear device had been a failure, with Principal Scientific Adviser R. Chidambaram telling The Hindu that those questioning the tests yield had an obligation to back up their charge with scientific evidence.

He was responding to the recent statement by a former defence scientist, K. Santhanam, that “the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed.” Mr. Santhanam, who cited only unspecified “seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over,” went on to say that this was the reason India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The stated success of the second generation nuclear device tested on May 11, 1998, was questioned at the time by a number of Western seismologists who said the seismic signatures detected by them were at variance with the claimed yield of 45 kilotons. Although the controversy subsided somewhat once scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre — which designed the weapon — published their scientific evidence, it is likely to be reignited once again since Mr. Santhanam represented the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team at the Pokhran-II tests and is the first member of that group to echo the arguments of those who say the thermonuclear device failed to work properly.

“If Mr. Santhanam has any scientific data to back up what he has claimed, I am sure BARC scientists would be more than happy to debate it,” said Dr. Chidambaram. “Without that, this kind of statement means nothing.”

In a 2000 article, The May 1998 Pokhran tests: Scientific aspects, republished in 2008 with some updated details, in a French journal, ‘Atoms for Peace,’ Dr. Chidambaram has argued that western seismologists who under-estimated the Pokhran yields did so because they did not take into account the geological structure at the Indian testing range. They also failed to appreciate that India’s weapons designers purposely went for lower yields because the shots had to be fired in existing shafts which could not be dug any deeper for fear of detection. Higher yields, then, would have caused damage to nearby villages and also led to the possible venting of radioactivity.

Dr. Chidambaram wrote that the thermonuclear device tested was “a two-stage device of advanced design, which had a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the first stage and a fusion secondary stage which was compressed by radiation implosion and ignited.” He said the argument that the secondary stage failed to perform is belied by post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site which showed significant activity of sodium-22 and manganese-54, both by-products of a fusion reaction rather than pure fission. “From a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the cavity radius, confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from ground zero, the total yield as well as the break-up of the fission and fusion yields could be calculated.” Based on this, he said, BARC scientists worked out a total yield of 50 +/- 10 kt for the thermonuclear device, which was consistent with both the design yield and seismic estimates.

As for the sub-kiloton tests of 0.3 and 0.2 kt of 13 May 1998, which the International Monitoring System for verifying CTBT compliance failed altogether to detect, he said “the threshold limit for seismic detection is much higher in, say a sand medium than in hard rock; the Pokhran geological medium comes somewhere in between” and so it was not surprising these two tests did not show up on the IMS.

“Let someone refute what we have written, then we can look at it,” said Dr. Chidamabaram, adding that he was yet to see a published critique of BARC’s scientific assessment by any laboratory-based scientist abroad.
Faulty instrumentation

A former senior official of the erstwhile Vajpayee government confirmed to The Hindu that there had been differences of opinion between BARC and DRDO scientists after the May 1998 tests, with the latter asserting that some of the weapons tests had not been successful. The internal debate was complicated by the fact that the DRDO experts, including Mr. Santhanam, were not privy to the actual weapon designs, which are highly classified. But the issue was resolved after a high-level meeting chaired by Brajesh Mishra, who was National Security Advisor at the time, in which the BARC experts established that DRDO had underestimated the true yields due to faulty seismic instrumentation. And the radioactivity analysis provided the clincher.

Since 1998, whatever his private reservations might have been, Mr. Santhanam appears to have stuck closely to the official line in his public pronouncements.

On the fifth anniversary of Pokhran-II, for example, he said in an article in Outlook that “the asymmetry with respect to China stands largely removed” thanks to the 1998 tests. Since China was a proven thermonuclear power at the time and India was not, it is hard to reconcile this optimistic assertion with the scientist’s current claim that the thermonuclear device India tested was “a fizzle.”

Similarly, in June 2007, Mr. Santhanam declared on CNN-IBN on a programme about the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in which this correspondent was also a participant: “After May 1998, there was a clear declaration from India that we don’t have to conduct any more nuclear tests. India should not have any problem legalising this position. But this is subject to the condition that if the international security condition changes, then we should be allowed to test."
 
The Hindu : Front Page : ‘Fizzle’ claim for thermonuclear test refuted

Siddharth Varadarajan

Back up charge with scientific evidence, says government’s top scientist


New Delhi: The government on Thursday strongly refuted claims that the 1998 test of a thermonuclear device had been a failure, with Principal Scientific Adviser R. Chidambaram telling The Hindu that those questioning the tests yield had an obligation to back up their charge with scientific evidence.

He was responding to the recent statement by a former defence scientist, K. Santhanam, that “the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed.” Mr. Santhanam, who cited only unspecified “seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over,” went on to say that this was the reason India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The stated success of the second generation nuclear device tested on May 11, 1998, was questioned at the time by a number of Western seismologists who said the seismic signatures detected by them were at variance with the claimed yield of 45 kilotons. Although the controversy subsided somewhat once scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre — which designed the weapon — published their scientific evidence, it is likely to be reignited once again since Mr. Santhanam represented the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team at the Pokhran-II tests and is the first member of that group to echo the arguments of those who say the thermonuclear device failed to work properly.

“If Mr. Santhanam has any scientific data to back up what he has claimed, I am sure BARC scientists would be more than happy to debate it,” said Dr. Chidambaram. “Without that, this kind of statement means nothing.”

In a 2000 article, The May 1998 Pokhran tests: Scientific aspects, republished in 2008 with some updated details, in a French journal, ‘Atoms for Peace,’ Dr. Chidambaram has argued that western seismologists who under-estimated the Pokhran yields did so because they did not take into account the geological structure at the Indian testing range. They also failed to appreciate that India’s weapons designers purposely went for lower yields because the shots had to be fired in existing shafts which could not be dug any deeper for fear of detection. Higher yields, then, would have caused damage to nearby villages and also led to the possible venting of radioactivity.

Dr. Chidambaram wrote that the thermonuclear device tested was “a two-stage device of advanced design, which had a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the first stage and a fusion secondary stage which was compressed by radiation implosion and ignited.” He said the argument that the secondary stage failed to perform is belied by post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site which showed significant activity of sodium-22 and manganese-54, both by-products of a fusion reaction rather than pure fission. “From a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the cavity radius, confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from ground zero, the total yield as well as the break-up of the fission and fusion yields could be calculated.” Based on this, he said, BARC scientists worked out a total yield of 50 +/- 10 kt for the thermonuclear device, which was consistent with both the design yield and seismic estimates.

As for the sub-kiloton tests of 0.3 and 0.2 kt of 13 May 1998, which the International Monitoring System for verifying CTBT compliance failed altogether to detect, he said “the threshold limit for seismic detection is much higher in, say a sand medium than in hard rock; the Pokhran geological medium comes somewhere in between” and so it was not surprising these two tests did not show up on the IMS.

“Let someone refute what we have written, then we can look at it,” said Dr. Chidamabaram, adding that he was yet to see a published critique of BARC’s scientific assessment by any laboratory-based scientist abroad.
Faulty instrumentation

A former senior official of the erstwhile Vajpayee government confirmed to The Hindu that there had been differences of opinion between BARC and DRDO scientists after the May 1998 tests, with the latter asserting that some of the weapons tests had not been successful. The internal debate was complicated by the fact that the DRDO experts, including Mr. Santhanam, were not privy to the actual weapon designs, which are highly classified. But the issue was resolved after a high-level meeting chaired by Brajesh Mishra, who was National Security Advisor at the time, in which the BARC experts established that DRDO had underestimated the true yields due to faulty seismic instrumentation. And the radioactivity analysis provided the clincher.

Since 1998, whatever his private reservations might have been, Mr. Santhanam appears to have stuck closely to the official line in his public pronouncements.

On the fifth anniversary of Pokhran-II, for example, he said in an article in Outlook that “the asymmetry with respect to China stands largely removed” thanks to the 1998 tests. Since China was a proven thermonuclear power at the time and India was not, it is hard to reconcile this optimistic assertion with the scientist’s current claim that the thermonuclear device India tested was “a fizzle.”

Similarly, in June 2007, Mr. Santhanam declared on CNN-IBN on a programme about the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in which this correspondent was also a participant: “After May 1998, there was a clear declaration from India that we don’t have to conduct any more nuclear tests. India should not have any problem legalising this position. But this is subject to the condition that if the international security condition changes, then we should be allowed to test."
 
he he just as I thought! Santhanam’s revelations are making the right noises in the right places at the right time. Way to go Santhanam saab!:tup:


WASHINGTON: US nuclear pundits feel the Indian establishment -- political, scientific, or both in concert – may be lining up to conduct more nuclear tests to validate and improve the country’s arsenal before the Obama administration shuts the door on nuclear explosions.

''You bet he wants to test again,'' said Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Washington DC-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, when asked about the remarks from a key Indian nuclear scientist suggesting India’s thermonuclear test was not up to mark. ''Imagine you are a nuclear weapons designer who has corrected the mistakes and ironed out the wrinkles. You would be crazy not to want to test again.''

''You have to look at the DNA of a weapons designer. They always want to make the weapons smaller, lighter, more powerful,'' Sokolski added. ''If you blindfold them, tie their hands and leave them in the middle of a forest, they will still make their way to a test site.''


While Sokolski addressed the Indian motivations largely from the technology validation standpoint, Washington has long believed that geo-political objectives rather than scientific or technical metrics drives New Delhi’s nuclear weapons quest. The argument has gotten another boost following the remarks by a key Indian scientist, K.Santhanam, questioning the potency of India’s thermonuclear bomb.

While ''We told you so,'' was pretty much the reaction in the US scientific and strategic community on the renewed controversy over the yield of the thermo-nuclear device in Shakti series of nuclear test arising from remarks by Santhanam, there is lingering suspicion here that the disclosure is politically driven. It’s rare for Indian scientists to break ranks on a sensitive national security issue.

Why would Santhanam go public, with such deliberation, on something that was commonly discussed and widely acknowledged in scientific circles, a decade after the questions first surfaced?
{exactly my thoughts!}

The answer, according to some nuclear pundits mulling on the issue on blogs: {m no pundit but have been saying the same thing on def.pk all along!} To ward off growing American pressure on India to sign various nuclear containment treaties and perhaps enable India to conduct one last series of tests to validate and improve its nuclear arsenal.

In scores of research papers and studies in the immediate weeks and months of the 1998 nuclear tests in Pokhran, US scientists repeatedly questioned the reported yield of the thermo-nuclear device, saying it was well below India’s claim of 43-45 kilotons. In fact, some scientists, notably Terry Wallace, then with the University of Arizona and now attached to the Los Alamos National Laboratory, put the combined yield of the three May 11 tests at as low as 10 to 15 kilotons.

Two other tests on May 13 involved sub-kiloton devices for tactical weapons, which US scientists doubted even took place. Even the six nuclear tests claimed by Pakistan were treated with derision, with US scientists saying only two of them involved nuclear devices.

''This is quite clearly a case where governments tested for a political reason rather than scientific reasons, so we have to be suspicious of what they say,'' Wallace, the country’s top nuclear seismology expert, had said about the reported yields.

On Thursday, suspicion lingered in strategic circles that even Santhanam’s ''admission'' was cloaked in politics, aimed primarily at warding off US pressure on New Delhi to sign CTBT, the long-sought treaty to ban nuclear tests, and making ground for a further series of tests. There is renewed energy in Washington under the Democratic dispensation to push forward with such nuclear containment treaties after the previous Bush administration put them on the backburner.

Some US nuclear gurus also believe any break-out test at this point will be detrimental to India, even if it is aimed at validating its thermo-nuclear device, or the so-called Hydrogen Bomb.

"An Indian test would be very toxic to cooperation it has just gained under the nuclear deal. It’s hard to see what India would gain," said Gary Milholin Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

Ensuring a reliable thermonuclear bomb? Milholin scoffed at the idea. "There are people who say American nuclear bombs won’t work because we have not tested for so long," he laughed. "I don’t think anyone would want to test that assumption."

Similarly, he said, it would be risky for any country to count on India’s thermonuclear weapon to have a low yield.

"There are now ways other than testing to increase confidence," Milholin added. "And I think India has enough computing power to do that." {not if some super power is trying to shove a discriminatory shitty-bitty down our throats forcefully}

US nuclear gurus see signs of more Indian nuclear tests - India - NEWS - The Times of India
 
A DRDO scientist involved in 1998 atomic tests ignited a controversy when he suggested Pokhran- II was not a full success but was contradicted by his then boss and former President A P J Abdul Kalam who said today the explosions had yielded the desired results.

Kalam, who mentored India's nuclear programme, said the only thermonuclear device tested in 1998 produced the "design yield".

K. Santhanam, who coordinated the Pokhran II tests, was on Thursday quoted as saying that the only thermonuclear device tested was a "fizzle". A test is described as a fizzle when it fails to meet the desired yield.

The claim by Santhanam, the Defence Research and Development Organisation(DRDO) representative for the tests conducted when Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister, also had few takers in the Government and the nuclear establishment who dismissed it as absurd and puzzling.

After he dropped the bombshell, Santhanam said there was no question about backing away from his assertion that the 1998 atomic tests did not achieve the desired results.

But Kalam, who was the Director General of the Defence Research and Development Organisation(DRDO) during Pokhran-II, told PTI that from the data obtained by seismic and radioactive measurements it had been established by the project team that the "design yield of the thermo-nuclear test has been obtained."

"After the test, there was a detailed review, based on the two experimental results: (i) seismic measurement close to the site and around and (ii) radioactive measurement of the material after post shot drill in the test site," Kalam told news agencies here.

"From these data, it has been established by the project team that the design yield of the thermo-nuclear test has been obtained," said Kalam, who as Director General of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, spearheaded the nuclear tests in 1998.

Kalam had last year come out in support of the landmark India-US nuclear deal, saying New Delhi did not need to test again as its deterrence capability was strong enough.

According to Santhanam, "We can't get into a stampede to sign CTBT. We should conduct more nuclear tests which are necessary from the point of view of security". Santhanam made these remarks to IANS Thursday.

This runs contrary to assertions by other scientists and top officials involved with India's nuclear programme. Home Minister P Chidambaram said he was puzzled by the Santhanam's statement. "If you are not puzzled, you are a genius," he told reporters when asked to comment on the claim.
 
Guyz there is no need of testing one, simulation runs can easily find out the exact number of Kilotons or Megatons.

Doesn't India has the worlds fourth fastest supercomputer???
Why build it and not use??:undecided:

I say :toast_sign: to simulated analysis rather than actual testing.
 
let me try.

it says: 3, 2, 1, ignition!!!
phussssssss....

:rofl::rofl::rofl:


You do realize that the controversy is only over the hydrogen bomb?...the fission devices(or the normal nuclear bombs dropped over Japan) work just fine and have worked fine from the 70's.
 
Conspiracy against India on Nuclear’s Potency – Dr. Raj Baldev
MIL/Mohan Balaja, Aug 28, 2009


New Delhi, India: August 29, 2009 – Mohan Balaji –

Dr. Raj Baldev, you are a famous Cosmo Theorist, lead head of the Scientific Advance Research of Universe & Life (SAROUL) & Head of God Believer, World Peace Mission - you were kind enough to give me an interview yesterday in the larger international interest, I am obliged, would you again oblige the world to give your counter comments whether India would go for fresh tests to improve its technology as the US Scientists presume?

Dr. Raj Baldev, Cosmo Theorist: Mr. Bala, you have rightly pointed out, the US think tanks feel that India may go for fresh tests to improve their nuclear ability and this issue has been raised intentionally to validate and improve the country’s arsenal before Obama administration shuts the door on nuclear explosion. But it is a wrong impression; India has no need of going for any fresh tests, since it has already attained the absolute perfection on its Nuke tests and arsenals in all respects.

Dr. Raj Baldev, Cosmo Theorist, elaborating the subject said, “The program of explosion was of a specific design and level, its technical information with them was of a better DNA technology, which was restricted only to scientists of great confidence as thought fit at that time for specific security reasons, and since Mr. K.Santhanam probably did not belong to the inner team of scientists, he, therefore, lacked the correct information of the desired target which the Indian scientists wanted to achieve, and that in fact they got it.

“There is absolutely no doubt about India’s ability and capability of testing the weapon and its potency of thermonuclear bomb was of the level that wanted, there was no discrepancy in the test whatsoever, the remarks by Mr. Santhanam carries no weight, “ Dr. Raj Baldev said.

Dr. Raj Baldev said, “Why Mr.Santhanam has been silent for many years, why he disclosed the level of explosion now? Why he came up in public with an explosion of publicity on such a sensitive national issue which was commonly discussed and widely acknowledged in scientific circles, a decade after the questions first came up?

Dr. Raj Baldev further said, “If we go back to this test, there are dozens of papers with many questions; even US scientists repeatedly questioned the reported yield of the thermo-nuclear device, saying it was well below India’s claim of 43-45 kilotons. In fact, some scientists,like Terry Wallace, once with the University of Arizona and now attached to the Los Alamos National Laboratory, had also put the combined yield of the three May 11 tests at as low as 10 to 15 kilotons.
Dr. Raj Baldev said, “On this subject, two top secret meetings of Indian and US scientists were most probably held in Washington in camera with utmost secrecy to explain to the US Scientists why the yield of the thermo-nuclear device was intentionally kept below, the Indian scientists explained that it could comfortably be as low as 10 to 15 kilotons, still there could be no discrepancy in the device, they proved it to them and the US authorities were convinced. Even the USSR was convinced of the latest technology which India had.”If we go back on the two other tests on May 13 involved sub-kiloton devices for tactical weapons, US scientists doubted whether they took place at all. Even the six nuclear tests claimed by Pakistan were treated with doubt; of which they accepted only two to have nuclear devices.
“In short, it would be unwise for any country to doubt India’s capability and potencies of thermonuclear weapon in terms of low yield, since India has another advanced technology, which perhaps other countries don’t have and that has made India stronger than many other countries in thermonuclear weapons than ever before.

”For security reasons, it shall not be proper to get into the details of the secret program which ran perfectly well with the most sophisticated advanced technology,which India possesses. This is just a drama played to force the Indian scientists and the govt. to commit some mistake or to come out with the top secret information of their advancement in thermonuclear weapons, which they have been so far secretly and successfully maintaining,” Dr. Raj Baldev said. “Most of the earlier models were tested in the lab and new labs were established of which even Mr. Sanathanam was probably not aware of where they were set up to know the real results; their modifications were so complicated which India adopted and those were far better than other countries. This aspect was to be kept top secret and which the Govt. has exemplary maintained in spite of sharp differences of leaders of BJP and Congress,” Dr. Raj Baldev said.

Dr. Raj Baldev further told that it is, in fact, a conspiracy against India to let it down or to inculcate a fabricated doubt in the minds of the present scientists as regards the perfection of their atomic weapons and their future use. Indian scientists can’t be so foolish to keep the defective arsenals with them! It is a great plot hatched against India to get some information in their reaction to Santhanam’s assertion.

“Even if for a moment we presume that observation of Santhanam was correct, the mistake in the design if at all it is there can be rectified, tested in the lab. No question of re-testing the weapon. I agree with Mr.Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Washington DC-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, ''Imagine you are a nuclear weapons designer who has corrected the mistakes and ironed out the wrinkles. You would be crazy not to want to test again,'' Dr. Raj Baldev said


Conspiracy against India on Nuclear’s Potency – Dr. Raj Baldev | World News | World Current Affairs | Current World Affairs | News | Latest News | News Today | International Reporter

'Santhanam was worried about India signing the CTBT'
Last updated on: August 28, 2009 18:47 IST
Tags: CTBT, Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance, India, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, P K Iyengar
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CommentScientist K Santhanam's statement terming the nuclear tests held under the aegis of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance government at Pokhran, Rajasthan, in May 1998, a mere 'fizzle', has divided the country's scientific community.
While some nuclear scientists have supported Santhanam, who was in charge of Pokhran-II, others feel such a statement was uncalled for.

In an interview with rediff.com's Vicky Nanjappa, Dr A N Prasad, former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and a distinguished nuclear scientist, explains the reasons behind Santhanam's statement and its possible implications for India.

What prompted Mr Santhanam to issue such a statement about Pokhran II?

I feel he made such a statement because of his concerns about the latest moves by the United States to pressurise India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I feel his statements are aimed at ensuring that India rethinks its stand on this issue.

India has already accepted the terms and conditions of the India-US civil nuclear agreement. Though the official position is that we can conduct tests, in practice we are not allowed to do so.

Once the process is complete, we will invest billions of dollars and if under any circumstance if we go ahead and conduct a test due to our national interests, the economic consequences will be bad.

In case we go ahead and conduct tests, then the deal will surely be off and all the efforts towards building reactors and infrastructure will be a waste. Probably Santhanam thought this was not the right time to sign the CTBT and hence he came out with such a statement.

Do you think India should sign the CTBT?

For all practical purposes, we are in a situation where the CTBT has become a mere formality, as we have voluntarily announced a moratorium on testing. As I said earlier, in the future, in case India goes ahead and conducts a test, the economic consequences would be terrible.

I think India should carefully study all these factors before going ahead.

Who do you think should shoulder the blame for the 'fizzle', as Mr Santhanam called the 1998 tests?

It is unfair to blame one single political party for this. Blaming the BJP is not right. Every politician who is at the helm of affairs is bound to go by the version of the experts and the BJP too did the same.

If the people who were in charge of conducting the tests say that the tests were good enough, then political parties have no option but to go by their statements.

Do you think Mr Santhanam is right?

I really can't say. It is difficult to detonate a thermo-nuclear device underground. Hence to say that everything is 100 per cent correct where Pokhran II is concerned raises a doubt. We need to look into the issue in a proper perspective and then come to a conclusion.

I personally don't know the exact results of the test. Insiders like Santhanam and P K Iyengar, who were actively involved in Pokhran-II, will know best. I must add that blaming politicians is not the answer here.

But the statement has come after 11 years. It raises doubts about the timing; it seems the issue has been scripted.

I know people are repeatedly asking why this statement was made after 11 years. Try and understand that it is very difficult to make a statement when a person is in the government. The official version is different.

A correct statement can be made only after the person retires and this could have been the case for Santhanam too. Probably he is worried about (India signing) the CTBT.

After the embarrassing revelations, how will India tackle the situation?

Let us not forget that it is a highly credible thing to carry out a nuclear test in the first place. Just because such a statement has been made, let us not take away the contribution of the scientists.

It is not a crime to fail.

Nothing can be 100 per cent perfect. However, covering up something that has not gone entirely correctly is wrong.

What about the CTBT? What does India do now?

Some damage control exercise is needed here. There is a problem on hand and it needs to be set right. There is a lot of chaos and confusion at this moment. At such a time, it would not be sensible to go ahead and sign the CTBT.

We need to wait for things to cool down first. There is no great hurry either since

'Santhanam was worried about India signing CTBT': Rediff.com news

think this clears doubts.
 
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