FalconsForPeace
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A NUMBER of high-profile Saudi visitors have been in Islamabad recently. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal visited the capital on Jan 7; this was said to be the most high-level Saudi visit to Pakistan in six years. On Monday, another prince from the desert kingdom, Salman bin Sultan, who is also his country’s deputy defence minister, was in Islamabad to meet the prime minister and army chief heading a 17-member defence delegation.
There has been much speculation about the ‘real’ nature of the visits, ranging from the Saudis wanting to seek Pakistani help to train the Syrian rebels, to talk of Riyadh bailing out Pervez Musharraf, saving the former president-general from the ignominy of a messy public trial.
What is clear is that Nawaz Sharif enjoys the confidence of the Saudis and the visits mark renewed warmth in ties between Riyadh and Islamabad. Interestingly, the Saudis largely gave a cold shoulder to the Asif Zardari-led PPP government during its tenure.
To gauge the Saudis’ confidence in Mr Sharif, we should consider this quote from Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, the Saudi financier and a member of the House of Saud, given to the Wall Street Journal: “Nawaz Sharif, specifically, is very much Saudi Arabia’s man in Pakistan.”
Former foreign secretary Najmuddin Shaikh concurred that the visits by senior Saudi figures marked a new direction in relations between the two countries. “There is a lot of significance to these visits. They have come after a long time. The Saudis have always said they have a special relationship with Pakistan. They consider Pakistan a second line of defence, to be called up in times of difficulty.”
However, considering Pakistan’s current predicament regarding the unchecked growth of sectarian militancy, it is significant that the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Foreign Affairs and National Security Sartaj Aziz told the press that Pakistan had asked for Saudi help to “deal” with sectarianism during Prince Saud’s visit.
One senior former diplomat told this writer that he believed at least 50pc of the madressahs in Pakistan were either directly funded by the Saudi government, or by Saudi philanthropists. If even a fraction of this estimate is correct, the Saudis could significantly help by cutting off funding to those madressahs that spread extremist or sectarian views. “They have extensive control,” remarked Mr Shaikh when asked about Saudi influence.
Yet senior journalist Khaled Ahmed, who has authored a book on sectarianism in Pakistan, was sceptical about the extent of Saudi influence.
“The Saudis can’t help because the funding is private and Arab, not entirely Saudi. Iran is reactive and will stop if the Arab funding stops.”
While the level of Saudi involvement and ability to cut off funds to extremist madressahs may be up for debate, it is largely true that both Saudi and Iranian ulema wield considerable influence over the Sunni and Shia communities in Pakistan, respectively, and what they say can change the discourse.
For example, Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, in his role as marja-i-taqleed (object of emulation, one of the highest positions in the Shia clerical hierarchy), has forbidden the use of impolitic language directed against figures from Islamic history held in high esteem by Sunnis.
On the other hand, Saudi Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz Aal As Shaykh, in his last Haj sermon, also called for shunning sectarianism and condemned terrorism. While the Saudi religious leader is an adherent of the Salafi creed, whereas most Pakistani Sunnis — both Barelvi and Deobandi — are Hanafi, the cleric’s pronouncements nonetheless have influence, largely due to Islam’s two holiest sites being located in Saudi Arabia.
Such constructive remarks from Iranian and Saudi clergymen are welcome; however, they will only have an impact if they are actively propagated at the mosque and madressah level in Pakistan.
Ultimately, Pakistan will have to walk a fine line balancing its relations with the Saudis and Iranians, keeping both regional players in confidence.
As Dr Farhan Siddiqi, an academic at the University of Karachi’s Department of International Relations says, “We cannot ignore Iran. We share borders. [The government] will have to balance the relationship. Pakistan has to work out a strategy to convince both the Saudis and the US to work with Iran.”
PAKISTAN’S SAUDI-IRAN BALANCING ACT - DAWN.COM
There has been much speculation about the ‘real’ nature of the visits, ranging from the Saudis wanting to seek Pakistani help to train the Syrian rebels, to talk of Riyadh bailing out Pervez Musharraf, saving the former president-general from the ignominy of a messy public trial.
What is clear is that Nawaz Sharif enjoys the confidence of the Saudis and the visits mark renewed warmth in ties between Riyadh and Islamabad. Interestingly, the Saudis largely gave a cold shoulder to the Asif Zardari-led PPP government during its tenure.
To gauge the Saudis’ confidence in Mr Sharif, we should consider this quote from Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, the Saudi financier and a member of the House of Saud, given to the Wall Street Journal: “Nawaz Sharif, specifically, is very much Saudi Arabia’s man in Pakistan.”
Former foreign secretary Najmuddin Shaikh concurred that the visits by senior Saudi figures marked a new direction in relations between the two countries. “There is a lot of significance to these visits. They have come after a long time. The Saudis have always said they have a special relationship with Pakistan. They consider Pakistan a second line of defence, to be called up in times of difficulty.”
However, considering Pakistan’s current predicament regarding the unchecked growth of sectarian militancy, it is significant that the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Foreign Affairs and National Security Sartaj Aziz told the press that Pakistan had asked for Saudi help to “deal” with sectarianism during Prince Saud’s visit.
One senior former diplomat told this writer that he believed at least 50pc of the madressahs in Pakistan were either directly funded by the Saudi government, or by Saudi philanthropists. If even a fraction of this estimate is correct, the Saudis could significantly help by cutting off funding to those madressahs that spread extremist or sectarian views. “They have extensive control,” remarked Mr Shaikh when asked about Saudi influence.
Yet senior journalist Khaled Ahmed, who has authored a book on sectarianism in Pakistan, was sceptical about the extent of Saudi influence.
“The Saudis can’t help because the funding is private and Arab, not entirely Saudi. Iran is reactive and will stop if the Arab funding stops.”
While the level of Saudi involvement and ability to cut off funds to extremist madressahs may be up for debate, it is largely true that both Saudi and Iranian ulema wield considerable influence over the Sunni and Shia communities in Pakistan, respectively, and what they say can change the discourse.
For example, Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, in his role as marja-i-taqleed (object of emulation, one of the highest positions in the Shia clerical hierarchy), has forbidden the use of impolitic language directed against figures from Islamic history held in high esteem by Sunnis.
On the other hand, Saudi Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz Aal As Shaykh, in his last Haj sermon, also called for shunning sectarianism and condemned terrorism. While the Saudi religious leader is an adherent of the Salafi creed, whereas most Pakistani Sunnis — both Barelvi and Deobandi — are Hanafi, the cleric’s pronouncements nonetheless have influence, largely due to Islam’s two holiest sites being located in Saudi Arabia.
Such constructive remarks from Iranian and Saudi clergymen are welcome; however, they will only have an impact if they are actively propagated at the mosque and madressah level in Pakistan.
Ultimately, Pakistan will have to walk a fine line balancing its relations with the Saudis and Iranians, keeping both regional players in confidence.
As Dr Farhan Siddiqi, an academic at the University of Karachi’s Department of International Relations says, “We cannot ignore Iran. We share borders. [The government] will have to balance the relationship. Pakistan has to work out a strategy to convince both the Saudis and the US to work with Iran.”
PAKISTAN’S SAUDI-IRAN BALANCING ACT - DAWN.COM