Pakistanis will always hate May 9 mayhem, love May 28 nuclear tests: Nawaz Sharif
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program
1998: The Year of Testing
Deposed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, from his jail cell, 1978 |
Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, 18 May 1998 |
Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, 28 May 1998 |
By Carey Sublette
Background
The re-election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in India in 1998 was a turning point in world affairs due to its decision to carry out India's first nuclear tests in 24 years. India had been poised on the brink of doing so for some years, with successive governments making active preparation to hold tests, going so far as to actually emplace nuclear devices in test shafts, and - under the first short-lived BJP government - to actually order that tests be conducted. Support for an open declaration of nuclear weapons status had become popular with the Indian public by 1995, and it was an official part of the BJP political platform. The successful execution of nuclear tests under the second BJP government was thus all but a foregone conclusion.
Like India, Pakistan had made many preparations for testing over the years, and could thus organize a test effort on short notice.
On 6 April 1998 Pakistan conducted its first test of the Ghauri. Pakistani media reports credited the missile with a 1100 km test flight and an apogee of 350 km, but information on the impact point shows that the flight distance was no more than 800 km. The system had a claimed range of 1500 km. While Pakistan has stated publicly that the missile was designed and produced indigenously it was, in fact, a North Korea produced No-dong. This was the second test of a No-dong, and it is believed that DPRK observers were present [Bermudez 1998a]. Although this test did not actually influence India's preparations for the tests held 5 weeks later, it did help create the atmosphere of tension in which the tests were conducted.
In the afternoon of Monday, 11 May 1998 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee stunned the world by announcing at a hurriedly convened press conference that earlier that day India had conducted three nuclear tests. International observers were, if anything, even more astonished by the announcement two days later that two additional tests had been conducted.
The Decision to Test
India's test created an untenable situation for Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. In the wake of India's tests, Pakistan felt an urgent need to demonstrate its own prowess in a similar manner for many reasons - to deny India unilateral technical advantage it might have gained from conducting tests; to restore a sense of a balance-of-power with India in the eyes of itself, India, and the world; et cetera. Pressure for test spanned the political spectrum from liberals like opposition leader Benazir Bhutto to the religious right. Bhutto reportedly went so far as to declare that "if there is military capability to eliminate India's nuclear capacity, it should be used." Conservatives within the Sharif administration, particularly Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan pressed very hard for tests. And the Pakistani military, the true seat of power in Pakistan and the actual authority over its nuclear weapons, had been eager to conduct tests for years. Sharif thus faced unbearable pressure to authorize its own nuclear test series. It is very likely that had he refused to go along with tests, Sharif's government would have fallen to a military takeover then and there (rather than 17 months later).
| Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan on 30 May 1998 |
The day after the first tests Ayub Khan said the Asian subcontinent has been thrust into a nuclear arms race and indicated that Pakistan was ready to conduct a nuclear test of its own. "We are prepared to match India, we have the capability ... We in Pakistan will maintain a balance with India in all fields," he said n an interview. "We are in a headlong arms race on the subcontinent."
Prime Minister Sharif was much more subdued, refusing to say whether a test would be conducted in response: "We are watching the situation and we will take appropriate action with regard to our security," he said.
After returning to the country from a trip to Central Asia on 13 May Sharif met for several hours with senior military officials and senior members of his government to discuss India's action, which appeared to have taken Pakistan's security establishment by surprise. "We didn't have any advance information on these explosions," said a member of Sharif's cabinet.
Another cabinet member said, "Not surprisingly, many ministers thought it was the ideal moment for Pakistan to test its nuclear device," and Pakistan's army informed Sharif that it will be ready "within a week" to conduct an underground nuclear test on 24 hours' notice. But officials familiar the deliberations spoke of a division within the cabinet over an appropriate Pakistani response.
According to an aide, Sharif appeared to favor "a balanced and moderate response" and ordered a report on the cost the country would have to bear if a Pakistani nuclear test brought international sanctions.
The same day President Clinton telephone Sharif and urged him not to go ahead with a test, asking him "not to respond to an irresponsible act in kind."
[Azam 2000] provides an account of the initial cabinet meeting at which Pakistan's response to the Indian tests was considered:
Dr. Mubarakmand gave a technical assessment on behalf of the PAEC of India's tests. Unsurprisingly, given the outside skepticism about India's test claims and India and Pakistan's mutual habit of denigrating each other's ability, his assessment was that there had been only one successful test on 11 May, and if a thermonuclear device had been fired then it had been a failure. Mubarakmand added that if it is decided that Pakistan should go ahead with nuclear tests of its own, then the PAEC is fully prepared to carry out the nuclear tests within 10 days.
[Azam 2000] continues:
By week's end American spy satellites had detected an influx of equipment at a previously prepared test site in the Chagai Hills in the desert of southwestern Baluchistan province, barely 50 km from the border with Iran, and the CIA was predicting that a test could occur as early as Sunday 17 May.
Over the weekend Sharif consulted with various parties and factions, and remained under enormous pressure to test. Meanwhile public reaction continued to favor an immediate response. Former PM Benazir Bhutto advocated not only an immediate nuclear test by Pakistan, but also asserted that India should be disarmed by a preemptive attack, and called on Sharif to resign.
The tension was ratcheted up on Saturday by Ayub Khan, known to be a hard-liner with close ties to the military, when he remarked to reporters that a nuclear test by Pakistan "is just a matter of timing and the government of Pakistan will choose as to when to conduct the test." "A nuclear test by Pakistan is certain," he added.
Ayub Khan repeated the remarks the next day, telling The Associated Press that Pakistan has decided to go ahead with a test of a nuclear device. "It's a matter of when, not if, Pakistan will test," he said. "The decision has already been taken by Cabinet," he said in a telephone interview from his rural home in northwestern Pakistan.
The frenzy of speculation reached a peak on Sunday, 17 May, when the nuclear device was believed to be in place for a test. There was even a brief flurry of excitement caused by a false alarm on Sunday when German President Helmut Kohl said he had "reliable information" saying Pakistan had exploded a bomb, a report that was quickly denied and discredited.
The Chairman of the PAEC, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, cut short a foreign trip and returned to Pakistan on 16 May 1998. On the morning of 17 May 1998, he received a call from the Pakistan Army GHQ, Rawalpindi informing him to remain on stand-by for a meeting with the Prime Minister. He was thereafter summoned and, accompanied by Dr. Mubarakmand, met with Sharif at his official residence. Sharif asked the PAEC Chairman for his opinion on the two points which were discussed in the DCC meeting the day before. Ahmed assured the Prime Minister that the PAEC was ready to test when ordered to do so, but declined to take a position on whether the order should be given. At conclusion of the meeting he was told to prepare for the tests but remain on stand-by for the final decision [Azam 2000].
According to [Azam 2000]:
Meanwhile the US worked on putting together an incentive package to Pakistan to persuade it not to test. The repeal of the Pressler amendment that cut off military aid was offered, as was delivery of $600 million dollars worth of F-16 fighter-bombers that Pakistan had ordered and paid for but never received. Discussions also began on how much aid to offer Pakistan on top of these concessions. The automatic imposition of a nearly complete embargo like that imposed on India, but which much smaller Pakistan could hardly afford, provided the penalty side of the equation.
But PM Sharif did not confirm the comments by Ayub, and by the beginning of the next week, Pakistan appeared to have backed off any immediate decision to test, and was content to see how much in aid the US might offer in return.
But out of the public eye things were moving rapidly in a different direction.
[Azam 2000]
Test Preparations
True to form, when news reached A.Q. Khan that the task of testing a nuclear device had been assigned to PAEC, not KRL, he lodged a strong protest with the Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat. The Army Chief, in turn, called the Prime Minister. To mollify Khan, it was decided that KRL personnel would be involved in the final preparation of the nuclear test site alongside those of PAEC as well as being present at the time of the test [Azam 2000].
PAEC held a planning meeting chaired by Dr. Ahmed with Mubarakmand and other scientists and engineers of the PAEC in attendance. According to Azam, which devices to test were discussed, and:
There are some plausibility problems with this account. The first issue is that successfully collecting data from an actual nuclear test (an area in which Pakistan had no experience despite years of cold tests) is far from straightforward (see [Teller et al 1968; pp. 150, 167]), and increases in difficulty with multiple tests in a single shaft. Unexpected device behavior or problems anywhere along the tunnel could result in the loss of data on any or all shots. If internal telemetry failed, wholly or in part, it would be very difficult to recover useful results from external seismic measurements with so many devices simultaneously exploded so close together. Six devices constituted a large part of the then available highly enriched uranium, perhaps 90 kg consumed out of 210 kg on hand (although once it had spent a couple of years processing its stockpile of low enriched uranium, this would rise to 800 kg or so). A great deal of Pakistan's immediate nuclear resources would be consumed for quite a gamble on useful results.
Other problems include that according to post-test statements, all of these devices were of basically the same type - fusion boosted fission bombs. Furthermore four of the devices were all in the same low yield range (fractional kiloton to a few kilotons), far less than the tens of kilotons claimed for the other two. It is questionable that so many different systems of this type could be usefully tested. Due to the extensive cold testing, the non-nuclear behavior of these systems should have been well understood and thus variations purely in the implosion assembly design would not merit nuclear testing. By exploding them all once (and the last test only a few days later) there would be no opportunity to analyze the test results and conduct retests, or tests of redesigns.
It is also difficult to credit the implication that such an extraordinarily complex test operation was planned and conducted in 10 days. Admittedly, the preparations for tests dated back years (decades!) so that the test equipment would already be on hand, and the basic procedures would have already have been worked out. Nonetheless, there is a big difference in complexity between a one device test, and a five device test, and it is hard to believe that such an operation could be successfully assembled and executed in such a short time without any prior test experience.
Part of the explanation is no doubt that the numerous tunnel fired cold tests were, or at least could be made to be, pretty fair simulations of actual nuclear test exercises. (At least up to the point of data collection - no amount of cold testing can verify the proper behavior of instruments intended to collect data from an energy density and energy output regime a million times higher.) Also the mobilization of test activity immediately after the first Indian tests, detected by U.S. intelligence, indicates that Azam may be wrong - that the planning for the test exercise was conducted much earlier, even before the Indian test, and these previously laid plans were simply being put into operation. Even if not, test preparations clearly began immediately, and thus had an additional week to be successfully concluded. It is significant that the observed preparation activity began a week before Prime Minister Sharif authorized tests, and suggests that the testing activity may not have been entirely under his control.
The tunnel under Koh Kambaran was 1 kilometer long and is described as L-shaped (just as the Indian vertical shafts were L-shaped). The reason for this is that the shaft leading to the entrance is thus shielded from the device detonation, and energy cannot propagate straight up the shaft from the device to the entrance. The description of the tunnel has having separate assembly rooms indicates that in addition to the L-tunnel at the end, the main tunnel had a number of other side tunnels branching off it every couple of hundred meters.
[Azam 2000]
According to the Azam the nuclear devices - in sub-assembly form - were flown from Rawalpindi to a designated airfield in Baluchistan (Quetta?) on a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) C-130 Hercules transport aircraft (it is curious that so many would all be entrusted to a single aircraft though). Four PAF F-16s armed with air-to-air missiles provided escort, with secret orders to shoot the C-130 down if it tried to fly out of Pakistani airspace. The F-16s were ordered to keep their radio communications equipment turned off so that no orders, in the interim, could be conveyed to them to act otherwise. They were also ordered to ignore any orders to the contrary that got through to them during the duration of the flight even if such orders originated from Air Headquarters.
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| Dr. Samir Mubarakmand at a post-test conference. |
On 25 May it was reported by the Associated Press and Reuters that U.S. intelligence officials had said that Pakistani preparations had accelerated in recent days at a site called Raskoh in the Chagai Hills (it later transpired that Ras Koh was indeed the test area, but Ras Koh is a separate mountainous area over 40 km from the Chagai Hills area). Tunneling activities and the setup of explosive monitoring equipment had been observed. "At this point, they could conduct a nuclear test at any time," said one official.
At the same time it had become increasingly likely that any U.S. aid package would fall short of Pakistani expectations. The major inducements suggested at this point - the delivery of 28 F-16s that Pakistan has already paid for and was promised by Pres. Clinton two years ago anyway, and the rescheduling of loans - was not very tempting. Pakistan seemed to be after explicit U.S. security guarantees, something that was unlikely to be offered.
The test tunnel was sealed by the Pakistan Army 5 Corp on 25 May with the assistance and supervision of the Pakistan Army Engineering Corps, the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) and the Special Development Works (SDW) - a military unit created 20 years earlier specifically to carry out field engineering for nuclear tests. Mubarakmand is said to have walked a total of 5 kilometers along the stuffy tunnels checking and rechecking the devices and the cables before the cables were finally plugged into the nuclear devices. Sealing the tunnel consumed 6,000 bags of cement and was completed by the afternoon of 26 May 1998. 24 hours later the cement had set in the desert heat, and the engineers certified that the site was ready. The fact the tests were ready was relayed to the Prime Minister via General Headquarters.
Late in the day on 27 May the U.S. government reported that Pakistan had been observed pouring cement in a test shaft in the Chagai Hills. This indicated that nuclear test devices were being sealed in, which is the final necessary step before conducting nuclear tests. Officials then predicted that tests could occur within hours.
Pres. Bill Clinton made a last-minute plea to Sharif, Wednesday night. According to presidential spokesman Mike McCurry it was a "very intense" 25-minute call in which the president implored the prime minister not to conduct a test. It was the fourth presidential call to Sharif since India's first explosion on May 11. But the test time had been set - 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 28 May 1998.
The Test is Fired
In the pre-dawn hours of 28 May Pakistan cut the communication links for all Pakistani seismic stations to the outside world. All military and strategic installations in Pakistan were put on alert, and the Pakistan Air Force F-16A and F-7MP air defense fighters were placed on strip alert - ready to begin their take-off roll at any moment.
Azam provides a detailed account of the events that day:
The Announcement
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| Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif announcing that Pakistan had conducted five nuclear tests. |
In a later address to Pakistani and foreign reporters, Sharif said:
See the complete text of the address.
Seismic readings indicate a detonation time of 10:16:17.6 UCT (+/- 0.31 sec). See the preliminary seismic data, and the official announcement from the Pakistan government web site.
One interesting and significant aspect of this address is the order chosen for Sharif's congratulation of the organizations responsible. The organization chiefly responsible for the development of the nuclear devices, and the tests, was the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) not the better known Khan Research Laboratories (KRL).
Another interest, and possible significant, fact is the that the initial reports issuing from Pakistan between the time of the tests and Sharif's official announcement indicated that Pakistan had conducted two tests, not five. As discussed below, two is a much more plausible number of devices to have been conducted in a single shaft simultaneous test, especially for a nation with no prior test experience and limited amounts of weapon material.
The extreme tension pervading Pakistan at the time of the tests is illustrated by the fact that five hours after Sharif's announcement (as reported by Agence France Presse), Pakistan summoned the Indian high commissioner to the foreign office and informed him that "credible information" had been received that an attack was to be mounted before dawn on Pakistan's nuclear installations by India, and that "swift and massive retaliation" would result. The ambassador, Satish Chandar, was asked to convey to New Delhi that Islamabad "expected the Indian government to desist from any irresponsible act."
Shortly afterward President Rafiq Tarar issued a terse announcement declaring a state of emergency and suspension of fundamental rights in Pakistan citing threats of unspecified "external aggression."
The Tests
The location of the first Pakistani test was measured seismically by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Prototype International Data Center (PIDC) as occurring at 10:16:17.6 UCT (+/- 0.31 sec) in an elliptical region centered at 28.9032N 64.8933E with major and minor axes of 10.4 km and 8.4 km, with an azimuth of 178 deg. This places the test site in the Chagai District of Baluchistan Province in western Pakistan. The US Geological Survey National Earthquake Information Center (USGS NEIC, usually cited as either "USGS" or "NEIC") data (28.950N 64.720E) had a center offset to the northeast by 20 km, and a time of occurrence of 10:16:15.8 UCT. The preliminary seismic body wave magnitude (mb) for the shot was 4.8 from the PIDC and 4.9 for the USGS (4.8 is cited in [Walter et al 1998]).The precise location of the Pakistani tests were initially a matter of some uncertainty. The seismic data published by the PIDC and the US Geological Survey (USGS) defined regions that did not contain terrain of the high relief shown by Pakistan Television coverage of the shot. News coverage initially placed the location in the Chagai Hills area, some 40 km from the general area indicated by the seismic data and also lacking high relief terrain. This problem was solved by Certified Mapping Scientist Frank Pabian by correlating publicly available data. Video footage of the test shot being fired, and analysis of the sun shadows, provided the correct azimuthal orientation of the geologic features and the test shaft entrance relative to them. By searching satellite imagery for features that matched those seen in the videos, Pabian located the likely test area and confirmed it by obtaining post-shot satellite images which revealed the test equipment, and the surface displacements caused by the rock slides set off the shot.
The location of the shot turned out to be located in the Ras Koh Hills about 14 km east-southeast of the location centers given by the PIDC and USGS seismic data (and about 9 km outside of the calculated PIDC uncertainty ellipse). The immediate area of the shot was a mountainous region called the Koh Kambaran massif. It had been conducted in a horizontal tunnel bored into the south eastern flank of the principal mountain in the area that rises to 2700 m. The precise geographic location was shown to be location 28 deg 47 min 31 sec N, 64 deg 56 min 51 sec E (+/- 10 sec) or 28.7919N 64.9475E (+/- 0.003) in decimal degrees; the uncertainty corresponds to a distance of 300 m. According to Pakistani reports (confirmed by imagery analysis), the principal explosion was conducted 1 km from the tunnel portal under the mountain [Pabian 1999].
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| Images of the Chagai Region |
The PIDC originally assigned the event the ID number EVENT 1440477, but changed it to "EVENT 1440562" when subjected to manual analysis. The seismic data from the 1998 tests can be accessed from the IDC web site, the tests are summarized with a map here. Also see the BGR Hannover Seismic Data Analysis Center for a nice summary of the seismic data with a map. The preliminary seismic data form the International Data Centre, which was generated automatically is in this file, while the expert evaluated data prepared five days later is here.
The second test was fired two days later, on 30 May 1998. The PIDC has assigned it an event ID of 1442998. Official Pakistani sources give the time of the shot as 06:55:00.0 UCT, estimated times are 06:54:57.1 UCT (PIDC) and 06:54:56.1 (USGS). The estimated locations are 28.494N 63.781E (PIDC) and 28.720N 64.020E (USGS). Both the PIDC and USGS location determinations are known to be imprecise because they are computed directly from the seismic signals using a globally averaged seismic velocity model (the PIDC uses the IASPEI-91 model) which does not include small regional velocity variations. A more accurate estimate can be obtained using historical seismic data as reference, and calculating an offset (called a Joint Epicentral Determination or JED). A JED calculation for the 30 May event gives a location of 28.433N 63.860E and reduces the error ellipse from 336 km2 to 80 (in addition to correcting for systematic biases) [Barker et al 1998]. Wallace performed a similar Joint Hypocenter Determination (JHD) and obtained a shot time 06:54:57.1 UCT and a location of 28.499N 63.741E ([Wallace 1998] or go to his on-line reprint). See also the BGR Hannover Seismic Data Analysis Center map. Seismic magnitude reported by the USGS for the 30 May event was mb 4.6 [Walter et al 1998]. The JED and JHD locations put the event in a region of low relief topography, especially compared to the May 28 event. This is consistent with remarks by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Gohar Khan about the May 30 test: "The previous ones were in hard rock, but these were conducted in a shaft like a well."
According to Wallace [Wallace 1998] an appropriate formula for the magnitude-to-yield relation in the Chagai district of Pakistan is:
Eq. 1 mb = 4.10 + 0.75 log YThis formula gives yield estimates of 8-12 kt for the 28 May shot and 4-6 kt for the 30 May shot. Barker et al [Barker et al 1998; p. 1968] also assigned yields of 9 kt (95% c.i. 6-13 kt) for the 28 May and 4 kt (95% c.i. 2-8 kt) for the 30 May shots. Walter suggests a tentative estimate range of 5-20 kt for 28 May, and 3-11 kt for the 30 May shot [Walter et al 1998].
| Test: | Chagai-I |
|---|---|
| Time: | 10:16:15.8 28 May 1998 (UCT) USGS; 10:16:17.6 UCT (PIDC) |
| Location: | Ras Koh mountains, Chagai District, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan 28.7919 deg N, 64.9475 deg E |
| Test Height and Type: | Multiple device (5?, 2?) in underground horizontal tunnel, 1000 m long |
| Yield: | approx. 9 kt (5-20 kt possible range; claimed yields range from 18 kt to 40 kt) |
|  |
| Dust raised on Koh Kambaran in the Ras Koh mountains by the Pakistan-I test, 28 May 1998 |
On 31 May, the day after the second test, the test team flew into the capital of Islamabad from Baluchistan Province in a special C-130 aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Chairman Ishfaq Ahmed Khan, PAF officials and staff from NDC and KRL received the team. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand (aka Mubarak, Mubarik, Mobarak, Mubarik Mand, Mobarak Mand, Mubarik Mund, Mobarakmand, Mubarrakmand, etc., etc.) Director General of the PAEC National Development Complex (NDC) who led the test team was the chief recipient of the congratulations. Along with Mubarakmand, senior scientists Dr. Tariq Salija and Dr. Irfan Burney were the key members of the team - responsible for both developing and testing the devices.
"I congratulate the entire nation - We owe our success to their prayers and support," said a heavily garlanded Mubarakmand said in his brief talk to the enthusiastic crowd.
"It is the outcome of team work, who worked dedicatedly day and night to come up to the expectations of the nation."
The achievement, he said, "reflects the professional competence of the Pakistani engineers who in a short time accomplished the task."
Later talking to the newsmen, Mubarakmand said, "we accomplished the given task in a matter of about eight days only."
He was appreciative of his team of scientists, engineers and technicians who made the mission a success. He said, a team of around 150 scientists worked at Chagai.
According to the Associated Press of Pakistan, a senior scientist, who arrived with Mubarakmand said "we got the expected results." He said, "the team stayed at the test site for 8-10 days and worked in excruciating temperatures, ranging up to 53 degrees Celsius.
Another scientist requesting anonymity said that Pakistan had undertaken cold tests, but now it had access to more data to serve as a reference in going ahead with computer simulations for newer designs and types of nuclear devices. He attributed the success to the "stringent quality control" and said it was one of the basic reasons that no test failed.
Describing the differences between the test of a nuclear device and its weaponized version, the head of another section said, "the weaponized versions are more rugged and can withstand, high velocity, extreme temperatures and vibration, whereas the nuclear devices comprise the same material, but which remains in a static state."
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| The Pakistani scientists posing with a nice view of Koh Kambaran in the background. The 28 May shot was fired in a tunnel bored underneath this mountain. The principal scientists responsible for developing the devices and conducting the tests were the team leader Dr. Samar Mubarakmand (right of the man in the blue beret) and Dr. Tariq Salija and Dr. Irfan Burney, all of the PAEC. The better known A.Q. Khan of KRL is left of the man in the beret (who may be General Zulfikar Ali, the ranking military officer present). It is interesting to note that [Azam 2000] cites an incorrect height for Koh Kambaran of 185 m. Comparing the prominent white band on the mountain, which satellite photography shows is 520 m long, to this photograph shows that is over 500 m high. |
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| Pakistani scientists. A.Q. Khan is present, but not Samar Mubarakmand. Perhaps this is the representation from KRL. |
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| A. Q. Khan posing in the test tunnel. The test director, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, was probably too busy to pose. |
Initial reports coming out of Pakistan during the four hour and forty five minute gap between the test and Sharif's official announcement indicated that two test devices had been fired in this shot. Sharif however claimed that five had been fired. There are several reasons to find this claim improbable. Every fission device requires a certain minimum amount of material, no matter how small the yield. Testing five devices at once expended quite a lot of the fissile material available at the time. Furthermore testing multiple devices in a single shaft, and successfully collecting test data, is a technical challenge, a challenge that increases with the number of devices. Even after years of testing experience, and enormous resources, the US has not infrequently experienced failures in test data collection. Placing so many devices in one shaft would run a serious risk that the data from all of the tests would be lost, and thus the fissile material expended with negligible result. India in contrast tested all five of the devices they fired in 1998 in separate shafts. Given the relatively low total yield, most of the devices must have had quite a low yield. It is questionable that Pakistan would have a need to test so many different devices all in the same low yield range.
It can be conjectured that the initial statements of two devices were correct and made by parties knowledgeable about the tests, but not about official policy perhaps even then being formulated by Sharif and his advisers. In this scenario the reason that Pakistan officially claimed five devices in this first shot was for status and image reasons, to establish equality in testing with India.
| Test: | Chagai-II |
|---|---|
| Time: | 06:55:00.0 30 May 1998 UCT (Pakistani Government); 06:54:57.1 UCT (calculated JHD estimate) |
| Location: | Chagai District, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan 28.433 deg N 63.860 deg E (Barker), 28.499 deg N 63.741 deg E (Wallace) |
| Test Height and Type: | Underground vertical shaft, 1 device (2?) |
| Yield: | 4-6 kt est. (3-11 kt max range; 18 kt claimed) |
According to Azam: "Pakistan conducted its sixth nuclear test at Kharan, a flat desert valley 150 km to the south of the Ras Koh Hills. This was a miniaturized device giving a yield which was 60% of the first tests. A small hillock now rises in what used to be flat desert, marking the ground zero of the nuclear test there."
Read Khan's interview
with The News given after
the tests.
This test also was plagued by questions of how many devices had actually been fired. Official Pakistani sources broke the news of two tests, and the official Associated Press of Pakistan news agency also carried the news, quoting "authentic" sources. "Yes by the grace of God," Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan told Reuters when asked if reports of two more nuclear tests on Saturday were correct. But the official government announcement by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed announced one test during a press conference, triggering a barrage of queries from surprised journalists. Intrigued by Ahmed's announcement, they asked him whether they should believe him or other officials.
"All I can say is that I am answering here for the government of Pakistan," the foreign secretary told a questioner who said Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan had confirmed two explosions. Special editions of local newspapers, quoting defense officials, also carried news of two blasts.
In an interview on 30 May 1998 A. Q. Khan told the prominent Islamabad daily The News that the five tests were "all boosted fission devices using uranium 235" but said that although "none of these explosions were thermonuclear, we are doing research and can do a fusion test if asked. But it depends on the circumstances, political situation and the decision of the government." Khan said that of Pakistan's five tests, the first was a "big bomb" which had a yield of about 30-35 kilotons. "The other four were small tactical weapons of low yield. Tipped on small missiles, they can be used in the battlefield against concentrations of troops," he told the newspaper. "This has been a successful nuclear explosion by all definitions. It was exactly as we had planned and the results were as good as we were hoping," he said.
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) released a statement saying the five blasts measured 5.0 degrees on the Richter Scale, and produced a yield of up to 40 kilotons of TNT. "These boosted devices are like a half way stage towards a thermonuclear bomb. They use elements of the thermonuclear process, and are effectively stronger Atom bombs," Munir Ahmad Khan, former PAEC director, told Agence France-Presse. Khan said Pakistan has had a nuclear capability since 1984 and all the Pakistani devices were made with enriched uranium.
This was prepared using materials provided by the Indian, Pakistani, and United States governments, by the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, The Times of India News Service, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, the Associated Press of Pakistan, the Press Trust of India, Science News, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Nuclear Weapons Archive.
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Nawaz Shareef has more involvement in May 9 than May 28.
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Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) supremo Nawaz Sharif has said that people of the country will always hate May 9 mayhem and love May 28 — a reference to the events when violent protests broke out following Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Chairman Imran Khan’s arrest and Pakistan became the nuclear-armed country, respectively.
- May 9 and May 28 episodes are two different symbols: Nawaz Sharif.
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- Khan inciting his supporters to violence while sitting in bunker: Maryam.
“The people of Pakistan will continue to hate May 9 and love May 28 as there is a stark distinction between these two events,” the three-time prime minister said in an audio message played at the PML-N’s public gathering organised to celebrate the Youm-e-Takbeer, which marks the historic day when Pakistan conducted successful nuclear tests in the hills of Chaghai 25 years ago.
PML-N Senior Vice President Maryam Nawaz and other party leaders also addressed the gathering.
Nawaz, who has been living in London since November 2019 on medical grounds, said despite the pressure of international powers he went ahead with his decision of conducting nuclear tests in 1998 as prime minister of the country.
“We don’t have any aggressive intentions against anyone but we cannot allow anyone to have ill intentions against Pakistan,” he added
He also slammed his ouster from power in 2017 saying that all those elements who conspired against him had been exposed.
Addressing the gathering, Maryam took a jibe at Imran Khan, saying: “If a coward was leading Pakistan on May 28 1998, he would have hidden with a bucket over his head”.
Calling the PTI chief “jackal”, she said he was begging the US for help during “tough times” after accusing it of toppling his government through conspiracy.
“Brave nations are led by brave leaders,” she added.
Maryam, the scion of the Sharif family's political dynasty, said the PTI chief while “sitting in a bunker in Zaman Park inciting his supporters to violence”. Khan has been using his Lahore's Zaman Park residence since he was injured in an assassination attempt in Wazirabad on November 3 2022.
The PML-N stalwart also hailed her father Nawaz for rejecting a $5 billion offer to compromise on nuclear tests saying: “This is called absolutely not”.
Earlier today, in a Youm-e-Takbeer message, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who is also PML-N president, reaffirmed that the national defence and sovereignty are impregnable.
He said that Youm-e-Takbeer was a clear declaration of "no compromise over country’s sovereignty, and defence", and a reminder that the nation would not budge from any sacrifice to safeguard.
Pakistanis will always hate May 9 mayhem, love May 28 nuclear tests: Nawaz Sharif
May 9 and May 28 episodes are two different symbols: Nawaz Sharif. Former premier says all those who conspired against him exposed.Khan inciting his supporters to violence while sitting in bunker: Maryam.Pakistan...www.geo.tv
‘Some people’ pulled my governments’ legs when aim was prosperity, Nawaz laments
"Who knows what fear these people have of me that they want to ruin a smiling and thriving country,” former premier says at rally marking Youm-i-Takbeer.www.dawn.com
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Another terrorist arrested
Maula Jatt
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Imrandooism - is a cancer
But no May 8 wasn't what establishment is desperately trying to make it out to be - infact far from it
But they're a tone deaf people so I am not expecting much from em
But no May 8 wasn't what establishment is desperately trying to make it out to be - infact far from it
But they're a tone deaf people so I am not expecting much from em
Hyde
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Old ladies used to say that when you are aged 100 year old, you have the ability to transform into snake.
Nawaz Sharif was an old, bald politician back in 1998. Later on he started looking younger than before and got his hair back permanently after transplant. I wonder if he is on the reverse cycle of life and that old lady used to say the truth
Nawaz Sharif was an old, bald politician back in 1998. Later on he started looking younger than before and got his hair back permanently after transplant. I wonder if he is on the reverse cycle of life and that old lady used to say the truth
Maula Jatt
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Kashmiris don't crack
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khush kitta hee oyiiii.............hon Pakistan wapa ajjaa jani Nawaza ..
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) supremo Nawaz Sharif has said that people of the country will always hate May 9 mayhem and love May 28 — a reference to the events when violent protests broke out following Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Chairman Imran Khan’s arrest and Pakistan became the nuclear-armed country, respectively.
- May 9 and May 28 episodes are two different symbols: Nawaz Sharif.
- Former premier says all those who conspired against him exposed.
- Khan inciting his supporters to violence while sitting in bunker: Maryam.
“The people of Pakistan will continue to hate May 9 and love May 28 as there is a stark distinction between these two events,” the three-time prime minister said in an audio message played at the PML-N’s public gathering organised to celebrate the Youm-e-Takbeer, which marks the historic day when Pakistan conducted successful nuclear tests in the hills of Chaghai 25 years ago.
PML-N Senior Vice President Maryam Nawaz and other party leaders also addressed the gathering.
Nawaz, who has been living in London since November 2019 on medical grounds, said despite the pressure of international powers he went ahead with his decision of conducting nuclear tests in 1998 as prime minister of the country.
“We don’t have any aggressive intentions against anyone but we cannot allow anyone to have ill intentions against Pakistan,” he added
He also slammed his ouster from power in 2017 saying that all those elements who conspired against him had been exposed.
Addressing the gathering, Maryam took a jibe at Imran Khan, saying: “If a coward was leading Pakistan on May 28 1998, he would have hidden with a bucket over his head”.
Calling the PTI chief “jackal”, she said he was begging the US for help during “tough times” after accusing it of toppling his government through conspiracy.
“Brave nations are led by brave leaders,” she added.
Maryam, the scion of the Sharif family's political dynasty, said the PTI chief while “sitting in a bunker in Zaman Park inciting his supporters to violence”. Khan has been using his Lahore's Zaman Park residence since he was injured in an assassination attempt in Wazirabad on November 3 2022.
The PML-N stalwart also hailed her father Nawaz for rejecting a $5 billion offer to compromise on nuclear tests saying: “This is called absolutely not”.
Earlier today, in a Youm-e-Takbeer message, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who is also PML-N president, reaffirmed that the national defence and sovereignty are impregnable.
He said that Youm-e-Takbeer was a clear declaration of "no compromise over country’s sovereignty, and defence", and a reminder that the nation would not budge from any sacrifice to safeguard.
Pakistanis will always hate May 9 mayhem, love May 28 nuclear tests: Nawaz Sharif
May 9 and May 28 episodes are two different symbols: Nawaz Sharif. Former premier says all those who conspired against him exposed.Khan inciting his supporters to violence while sitting in bunker: Maryam.Pakistan...‘Some people’ pulled my governments’ legs when aim was prosperity, Nawaz laments
"Who knows what fear these people have of me that they want to ruin a smiling and thriving country,” former premier says at rally marking Youm-i-Takbeer.www.dawn.com
Azadkashmir
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he had maryam nawaj stem cells planted in his bald scalp to grow pubic hair.
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