Kasrkin
RETIRED MOD
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The following is a transcript of my email to Mr. Shaun Gregory, a respected professor at Bradford University and head of the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU). Professor Gregory is widely consulted by the UK and international media about the security situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
I would like to credit Mian Asad for helping me in this. He was kind enough to take out time and discuss with me in great detail many of the issues raised. Also, S-2 was responsible for providing the link to the article and the email address. Agnostic Muslim, as usual, came up with some brilliant points that I tried incorporate in to the letter too. Enjoy!
I would like to credit Mian Asad for helping me in this. He was kind enough to take out time and discuss with me in great detail many of the issues raised. Also, S-2 was responsible for providing the link to the article and the email address. Agnostic Muslim, as usual, came up with some brilliant points that I tried incorporate in to the letter too. Enjoy!
Dear Mr. Gregory,
My colleagues and I represent an online forum dedicated to matters relating to Pakistani defense. We were interested in piece written by you, published by the CTC Sentinel in July of 2009, regarding the terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Some of our members commented positively, while others were critically inquisitive. We would like to bring to you some of the issues raised and we would be thrilled if you could address them.
The extracts in bold is commentary that was analyzed.
“The vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security arrangements mean that the risks of terrorist groups gaining access to nuclear materials are real. Moreover, militants have recently attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, including an August 20, 2008 incident at the Wah cantonment, widely understood to be one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites…”
And,
“Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up several entry points to one of the armament complexes at the Wah cantonment, considered one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites…”
On both these occasions it is claimed that the Wah cantonment is widely considered or understood to be a nuclear weapons assembly site. We, however, were unable to find references to this claim. The BBC article referred to as part of the second extract only notes that ‘Wah is a strategically important town normally under heavy security as it is home to a large industrial complex producing conventional arms and ammunition’ and ‘it is a sprawling complex manufacturing everything from tanks and small arms to artillery shells.’
The importance of the attack on Wah is stressed repeatedly, implying both the terrorists’ ability and inclination to strike at Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. And yet as per accounts from some of our members familiar with the site, and news reports at the time, the gates attacked were primarily used to access ordnance plants. The casualties too almost entirely consisted of low-clearance industrial workers leaving the premises during a shift change. The BBC article even talks about a local student on tour of the ordinance factories relating the event. Gaining access to the complex is not particularly hard, as can be attested by numerous civilians who’ve toured there, neither is the compound isolated or remote, thus further contrasting with Pakistan Army’s traditionally secluded strategic installations. All this seems to negate the possibility that a high level security breach was involved in regards to Pakistani nuclear assets, or that such was even the intention. Without evidence to the contrary, it is hard to see how the significance of the attack was anything more than a crude but effective attempt to inflict maximum casualties on menial workers under the payroll of the Pakistani government.
The Wah cantonment is extensive, as is the industrial complex that was attacked. The complex contains many factories producing all kinds of munitions, however the gates and the crew that became the target of the attack were still at least 300 feet from the nearest factory, and the bomb in the market obviously more so[1]. What is more, the paramilitary troops from the DSG battalions manning the check points (not to be confused with ASFC or SPD personnel, responsible for guarding Pakistan’s nuclear military and civilian installations respectively) sustained no fatalities. Therefore, while the bombings were undoubtedly expensive in terms of human life, pictures taken on the site reveal that the security parameter around the complex was not breached, despite the bomber’s ability to mingle with the crowd[2]. If the attacks revealed the security measures taken by POF to be inadequate, then the author has not elaborated on the point. As it is, Wah is a heavily protected cantonment surrounded by defenses, including anti-tank barricades, and the roads in and out of the town are permanently manned by the army. This, along with a heavy army presence nearby at Taxila and Rawalpindi, makes the chances of terrorists mustering with significant numbers and weapons inside the cantonment to be able to fight through the defenses around the POF complex and seize a factory inside remote at best.
The facility itself is a sprawling complex with more than a dozen factories. Satellite imagery shows them to be sizable blocky units however we were unable to find indications of nuclear weapons assembly from any of our sources. The closest reference to nuclear activities was that of the Wah Group (not to be confused with the Wah Nobel Group of Companies, which operates in the complex, happens to be a subsidiary of POF and hosts foreigners in its board of directors and deals with civilian contracts) who’ve been previously tasked with manufacturing industrial components used in nuclear warheads, such as the trigger mechanism, high-speed electronics, high-explosive lenses and other ultra-high precision chemical and mechanical parts. This, however, is not the same as claims of the facility, whose present links to the Wah Group are obscure at best, being Pakistan’s main site for assembling entire nuclear weapon systems. While it is conceivable that warhead or missile related components are produced in any of the dozen plus factories, there is no evidence to suggest, or so we feel, that complete warheads and/or delivery systems are produced, stationed, assembled or distributed from there. Close proximity to a sizeable civilian population resident in the cantt is also likely to discourage any critical nuclear weapons presence, not only because of a radiological threat to the populace but also to avoid easy photo-reconnaissance, sabotage or infiltration. If the author has references substantiating Wah’s purported significance as a critical joint in the manufacturing of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, then we’d be pleased to note it for academic purposes. However such intelligence is still unlikely to have been available to the terrorists.
Unless very particular information is available to the contrary, we’ll have no reason to believe that the 20th August attacks were intended to be anything but an attack on Pakistan’s much lauded, and internationally recognized, munitions producing installations at Wah. Facilities that are undoubtedly supplying conventional weapons and ammunition to Pakistani forces engaged in battle with the militants in Swat and FATA. Furthermore the terrorists did not display any particular motivation, resourcefulness, capacity or intelligence that implies a vulnerability or inadequacy of Pakistan’s nuclear security arrangements. Therefore, is it possible that the author’s references and their implied significance can be misleading in this context?
“With respect to personnel reliability, the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from which groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support…”
This claim was vigorously disputed, particularly by some of our Pashtun members with links to the armed forces. While there is no doubt that Pakistan’s PRP screens out potential militant-Islamist sympathizers, as has been officially acknowledged, the assertion of a bias in the PRP with regards to Pashtun officers is more questionable. This logic itself is dubious since it is widely acknowledged that the phenomenon of Islamist fundamentalism tends to transcend ethnic divisions. As it is the Punjabis and Pashtun share strong cultural and demographical links and Punjab hosts its significant share of Islamist militant activity and organizations. Punjabi political opinion too has been relatively empathetic to those Pashtuns opposed to military operations in their NWFP territories, as compared to the more insulated Pakistani ethnic groups down south who’ve been supportive in the WoT. The popular PML-N party that draws its support exclusively from Punjab, and has deep links in the Army, was vociferously opposed to Pakistan joining the war against terror.
If this logic is applied with regards to the present political and demographical realities then Punjabi officers are more likely to sympathize with the Pashtun tribal-taliban rebellion in the west than say Muhajir or Sindhi officers who hail from communities that tend to host strong anti-Pashtun and anti-Islamist tendencies. Thus the notion of Pakistan’s nuclear assets being the domain of an ‘almost exclusively Punjabi’ club of officers cannot be credited without appropriately sourced statistics or accounts, particularly since the army has worked hard over the last decade to reduce the number of Punjabi members and increase Pashtun recruitment. A Punjabi majority in the army and the country in itself cannot be used to imply an institutional prejudice with regards to the Pashtuns.
“Pakistan, with a few exceptions, chose to locate much of its nuclear weapons infrastructure to the north and west of the country and to the region around Islamabad and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, and Taxila. The concern, however, is that most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are close to or even within areas dominated by Pakistani Taliban militants and home to al-Qa`ida…”
Our members were all too aware of the international concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program. However from a rational viewpoint it was pointed out that none of the mentioned installations are particularly close to areas hosting a significant Taliban presence; and certainly none are dominated or controlled by any of the insurrectionist elements presently confronting the Pakistani state.
“A series of attacks on nuclear weapons facilities has also occurred. These have included an attack on the nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha on November 1, 2007…”
The attack in Sargodha on November 1st was actually a suicide attack on a bus carrying Air Force personnel from the Mushaf airbase to the Kirana Central Depot. These special strategic facilities are guarded by the ASFC and they were not attacked.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Suicide bomb hits Pakistani bus
“An attack on Pakistan’s nuclear airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber on December 10, 2007…”
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Children survive Pakistan attack
Again, the target was a military school bus near the Kamra air base. The Bill Roggio source states ‘The Air Weapon Complex at Kamra is devoted to air-to-surface munitions, among other activities, and would probably have at least some connection with the development of air-delivered nuclear weapons…’ But is it reasonable to imply that an attack on a student bus in the proximity of an airbase should be considered an attack on or a threat to the hazy nuclear aspect of the weapons developmental complex in said airbase?
The school bus was carrying the children of PAC employees. The PAC deals with producing and refurnishing aircraft and is not to be confused with the AWC which makes strategic air to ground weapons. We were told by a source that the AWC is not based in Kamra. And even if nuclear-capable weapon systems are transferred to an active combat squadron for testing or active operations, then they’d most likely be kept in the hardened bunkers of the base, designed to withstand enemy air and artillery attacks, along with the rest of the air force’s conventional arsenal.
“The final risk, and one that is usually overlooked, is that the Pakistan Army could itself decide to transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group. One argument for this, described in Philip Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent, is that states can become pressurized or incentivized to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups because they are responding to threats from an external power but fear the consequences of being identified as the origin of a nuclear strike…”
Identification cannot be avoided since nuclear weapons origins can be traced by the plutonium and uranium fuel used even after the thermonuclear detonation. The consequences for Pakistan’s national security would not be very different if Pakistan was to go for a direct nuclear strike and claim the terrorists did it. It is highly questionable if Pakistan would want to take the risk of nuking a foreign country, directly or indirectly, unless its territorial integrity was being threatened, in which case a direct and overwhelming nuclear strike would be the preferable option to negate the enemy’s nuclear retaliatory capacity.
I hope my (no doubt amateurish) deliberations were worth your time. I await your reply with excitement and will be posting it on the forum.
[1] Google Earth Image
[2] Site of attack - Barriers intact
Kasrkin
Moderation team defence.pk
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