Correct, they are recommendations and principles that India and Pakistan committed to, pending agreement on the details of both demilitarization and plebiscite. India has reneged on he international commitments made multiple times, and refuses to even engage in negotiations over those principles any longer, whereas Pakistan continues to adhere to her international commitments.
Multiple UNSC Resolutions made clear what the framework of these discussions was to be - primarily, negotiations towards an agreement on the details of a demilitarization plan. The Indian government's participation in such negotiations would only occur if they recognized that the UNSC Resolutions required a UN mediated agreement on demilitirization, acceptable to all sides, prior to any withdrawal. The argument here is over the claim that the UN Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw all 'combatants' unconditionally. If that was the case, the UNSC had no reason to set up UN Commissions and send UN representatives to negotiate the details with India AND Pakistan, and India had no reason to accept or participate in UNSC sanctioned discussions that undermined the claim that 'Pakistan was required to withdraw unconditionally'.
You misunderstood my point completely - as I explained in the paragraph above, I'm arguing that the UNSC resolutions do not place any requirement of an unconditional and unilateral withdrawal upon Pakistan. The UNSC Resolutions and UNCIP Resolutions and Reports make clear that any withdrawal is subject to the details of withdrawal being agreed upon between India, Pakistan and UN Representatives. India's participation in the multiple negotiations established by the UNSC validate Pakistan's position (of not being under any requirement of withdrawing unilaterally and unconditionally) by virtue of explicitly accepting the principle (at the time) of 'agreeing to a framework withing which a final settlement is binding on both', as you said in your first sentence. If India hadn't agreed to the 'framework', it would not have participated in the multiple negotiations established by the framework, and it is the 'framework within which a final settlement is binding on both' that debunks the argument that the UNSC Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally and unconditionally.
In fact, even if India did not agree with the framework, the fact that the UNSC set up multiple rounds of UN Commissions and UN Representative led missions to develop agreement over the general principles of demilitirization and plebiscite, clearly establishes that the intent behind the UNSC Resolutions from the beginning was to 'establish a framework within which agreement over the details of demilitirization and plebiscite could be reached' - again, a vindication of the Pakistani position that no unconditional and unilateral withdrawal is required of her.
This passage of yours is irrelevant to the specific point being discussed, of whether the UNSC Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw unconditionally and unilaterally.
Lie or 'tactical omission', if the misrepresentation by Pakistan was indeed so grievous, the UNSC was free to strengthen the language in her subsequent resolutions against Pakistan, yet the subsequent resolutions only further establish and detail a framework within which agreement on the details of demilitarization and plebiscite need to be reached.
You can tarnish Pakistan's actions as much as you want, but the facts are that the UNSC did not see things the way you do, as is clear from the language of the UNSC Resolutions and UNCIP reports subsequent to the first UNSCR on J&K.
Pakistan did not contest the need for a full withdrawal of irregular forces to be validated prior to an Indian demilitarization, so this argument is a straw man. Pakistan's disagreements with some proposals were over the massive superiority in conventional government controlled forces that India would be allowed to keep deployed in the valley compared to Pakistan's.
I'm not going to trust you - you did an excellent job of restating my arguments, but you've offered nothing in the way of a rebuttal of those arguments other than saying 'this is how a lawyer would quote it' - I see no 'havoc' being created here by my reasoning, certainly none that you've pointed out so far.
There is no 'legal absurdity' here, just a desire on your part to read the text out of context, chopped up into pieces that support the Indian point of view on your part. The statement in 2.A(1) was the acceptance in principle of Pakistan withdrawing her troops - it did not specify when or how that withdrawal were to take place, and the context and conditions applicable to the statement in 2.A(1) was very clearly established in the opening lines of Part II, "both the Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission."
The introduction to Part II set up the framework for negotiations, and provided clear context that everything stated in Part II of the UNCIPR was subject to a final agreement on the details, and therefore my interpretation of Part II.B(1) clearly flows within the context established by the opening lines of Part II. What would be absurd would be to cling solely to the language of 2.A.(1), ignoring what came before and after.
What exactly about the above do you not understand? Pakistan confirms that it has managed (by force, dialog or both) to secure the withdrawal of irregular forces, which the UN Commission would confirm (and was free to introduce proposals on how best to confirm the withdrawal prior to reporting it to India), after which the withdrawal of regular forces, on both sides, begins in accordance with the details of the Truce Agreement settled upon by all sides.
I never questioned that.
Then what exactly are you arguing with me for - you yourself claimed earlier that, "Actually, since the issue is whether there is a unilateral pre-condition on Pakistan to withdraw, what we need to see is whether there are other words around which show otherwise", and now you've essentially accepted my position.
Because the framework the UNSC had set up required agreement by both parties - it did not consider the possibility of one party's obstructionism as a means of delaying resolution until such time as the status quo could be argued to be the most feasible option, and it probably didn't have the votes to push through a resolution censuring India.
Pakistan's disagreement over troop levels that gave India more than a significant advantage were based on military rationale, and Indian tactics of illegally sparking communal violence, invasion and occupation of the territory of sovereign States such as the Pakistani territory of Junagadh and the State of Hyderabad. India's demands during negotiations that she be recognized as solely having the legal ability to deploy forces throughout disputed J&K in case of violence and threats of instability.To any rationale individual this was clearly a setup to replicate the events of Junagadh and Hyderabad and have Indian forces step into the Vacuum left by withdrawing Pakistani forces, hence the need to maintain, at least, a defensible posture with limited Indian military troop superiority.
I didn't miss anything - I I clearly stated in my earlier post that without a truce agreement interpretations of 'ongoing withdrawal' could be interpreted to mean anything, and the examples I gave were to further establish the fact that the withdrawal was subject to an agreement on the details. You're attributing arguments to me that I did not make.
I have accepted no ambiguity and you have established no such thing.
The Pakistani government is on record committing to a withdrawal in the UNSC, in accordance with the UNSC framework that calls for an agreement on the details of the withdrawal negotiated under said UNSC framework - it doesn't get any more 'officially on record' than that.
As explained earlier, the UNSC, if it considered Pakistan's 'misrepresentation' regarding the presence of her troops in J&K to be unacceptable, have addressed the issue in subsequent UNSC Resolutions in a manner that outright demanded an unconditional and unilateral withdrawal from Pakistan, period. Instead, it chose to create a framework under which India, Pakistan and the UN were to negotiate a agreement on the details of a verifiable demilitirization leading to a plebiscite, a framework that was accepted by all sides at the time.
It does not, as explained earlier. Again, since a government cannot be expected to have control over all irregulars, it stands to reason that the State may have to resort to both non-violent and violent means to ensure compliance. The use of violence by the State to ensure that irregulars comply with the requirement to withdraw requires the use of government armed forces. Therefore the logical absurdity is to argue that a government 'use its best endeavors to ensure withdrawal of an irregular force', when the government does not have a military that would give it's 'best endeavors' the teeth to ensure said compliance by irregulars. The UNSC and UNCIP knew exactly what it was proposing because a staged withdrawal, with government troops the last to leave, would be the only way to ensure that the GoP had the ability to influence irregulars.
The series of events were negotiations and agreement on the details of demilitirization, that India sabotaged and obstructed by placing unreasonable demands, as detailed earlier.
Actually, Indian rejected the earlier proposal of 5000 fewer troops on her side, even though that would have still left her with a significant numerical advantage over Pakistan. Pakistan compromised on several occasions, with the troop discrepancy continuing to increase in favor of India each time India rejected a proposal and a new one was presented. At some point Pakistan had to draw the line and it justifiable did so. The obstructionism was on the Indian side - why did India reject the earlier proposal with 5000 fewer troops on the Indian side, even though India would have still had a significant numerical advantage?
Irrelevant to the point being argued, on whether Pakistan was required to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw from J&K by the UNSC Resolutions, which I have clearly explained to not be the case, as Pakistan has argued.
I see a bunch of articles and a reference in some books to this alleged 'removal from the list of the UN disputes', but there is absolutely no reference to a UN published list of disputes that Kashmir was allegedly 'removed from'. One can't 'remove a dispute from a list' if said list doesn't even exist to begin with.
Please provide a reference to a UN site/source that provides a list of disputed territories, as recognized by the UN.
You write:
Correct, they are recommendations and principles that India and Pakistan committed to, pending agreement on the details of both demilitarization and plebiscite. India has reneged on he international commitments made multiple times, and refuses to even engage in negotiations over those principles any longer, whereas Pakistan continues to adhere to her international commitments.
The UNSC concluded its mediated talks on troop withdrawal after the collapse of the 12-point proposal. Since then, the UN has only intervened when the issue of ceasefire has arisen, like in ’65 and ’71. India has always cooperated on the issue of ceasefire. If the UN has not initiated another round of talks on withdrawal, then India cannot reject what is yet to be proposed, can it?
And yes, you are right, Pakistan can only adhere to her international commitments where there are none – in this case regarding negotiations that have not even taken place. Apart from that, Pakistan has violated its international commitments towards not being a menace to the world by proliferation of terrorism and WMDs more than any other country in the world. It has also breached its commitments of not being an aggressor on more than one occasion. Apart from that minor issue, you are right.
You write:
Multiple UNSC Resolutions made clear what the framework of these discussions was to be - primarily, negotiations towards an agreement on the details of a demilitarization plan. The Indian government's participation in such negotiations would only occur if they recognized that the UNSC Resolutions required a UN mediated agreement on demilitirization, acceptable to all sides, prior to any withdrawal.
The primary (immediate) motive of the Indian government was to secure a ceasefire. The ceasefire line itself was agreed upon in the Karachi agreement. So the India side were to do what exactly according to you – walk out on the negotiations in which the first step was the ceasefire that they were equally concerned about? And how does Indian involvement in the negotiations show that the Pakistani/your position is correct? How did you make that jump? Your reasoning goes like this “So the Indians were involved in the discussions all along
and since everyone knows our position is correct so by being involved in the discussions the Indians endorsed the correctness of our position”. But where did you prove your position to be correct in the first place?
And I mentioned the words immediate because you shouldn’t use that as an excuse to conclude that the Indians were not serious about the entire plan as laid out in the two resolutions we have been discussing. Do you have any proof of anything said by an Indian representative that they didn’t want a solution? Not wanting the solution that Pakistan wants is not the same as not wanting an solution at all.
The argument here is over the claim that the UN Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw all 'combatants' unconditionally. If that was the case, the UNSC had no reason to set up UN Commissions and send UN representatives to negotiate the details with India AND Pakistan, and India had no reason to accept or participate in UNSC sanctioned discussions that undermined the claim that 'Pakistan was required to withdraw unconditionally'.
You are shifting goalposts here. The argument was not on withdrawal of “all combatants unconditionally”. The argument was on whether or not the language in Resolution dated Aug 13, 1948 a) clubbed together the withdrawal of Pakistani troops with that of irregulars; b) whether the words “being withdrawn” in themselves meant that the entire process could chug along without actual withdrawal of Pakistani troops.
Yes, Indian involvement in the negotiation showed that they agreed to the framework. So what is the framework that we are talking about? You claim that the framework is that a) there is no unilateral unconditional requirement on Pakistan to withdraw, b) that the issue of withdrawal, which was the pre-condition for plebiscite, had to be mutually agreed upon under the aegis of the UNSC. As for the first point, saying that the words in Part II B (1) do not put an onus of withdrawal on Pakistan is a fool’s errand. You have solely focused on it in the manner you wish. You have deliberately ignored Part II A (1), that I have mentioned earlier, which specifically calls for withdrawal of Pakistani troops as it is a
change in the material situation, as if it is of no consequence.
Where is the corresponding obligation in the resolution upon India to do the same? Even in Part II B (1), the Commission is supposed to notify India that Pakistani irregulars and troops have withdrawn.
Why does it not mention that Pakistan needs to be informed as well about the corresponding Indian withdrawal?
Now, I had already agreed with your reasoning that despite the onus of withdrawal being upon Pakistan, the language of Part II B (1) seems to suggest that “complete” withdrawal of Pakistani troops is not required under the provision. That is self-evident. Yet, the same provision clearly states that the government of India is to be notified of the complete withdrawal of irregulars and the ongoing withdrawal of troops,
at which point it was to begin its own withdrawal in agreed stages. What you have done here is actually quite neat, I must admit. In order to get out of the self-evident nature of the provision, you have conflated an obvious point, about the Pakistani withdrawal being ongoing, with a very tenuous one, that this showed that there is no unconditional requirement of Pakistani troop withdrawal at all.
The issue here is the stages of action as per the language of Part II, the stages are as follows:
Stage 1 - Full withdrawal of Irregulars - along with Partial withdrawal of Pakistani troops
along with - Simultaneous negotiation and demarcation of ceasefire line
along with - Negotiation on levels of troops to be maintained by both countries
Stage 2 - Verification by Commission
Stage 3 - Notification to India about withdrawal of all Pakistani irregulars and ongoing withdrawal of Pakistani troops to agreed levels
Stage 4 - Indian withdrawal to agreed numbers
Stage 5 - Plebiscite
What you have done is emphasized the points of “all” and “unconditional”, instead of focusing on the stages set out. India engaged in discussions as per the stages set out. Now what had transpired, was that we had not even reached the end of Stage 1 of the roadmap. Talks collapsed at the stage of what troop levels were to be maintained by both countries. Keeping that in mind, stages 2-5 were not possible.
Unless both sides could agree on the troop numbers. Now why are you making it an issue of did India agree with the framework, etc. etc.? When the simple issue is, where did the negotiations collapse? They collapsed because the parties could not agree on numbers. Without that agreement, Pakistan could not have withdrawn down to the requisite number.
You are treating the words about the commission notifying about the Pakistani withdrawal to India as if they don’t exist, but they do exist. So post-notification, India would have reduced its number as per agreement. But how would India have done all that if there was no agreement? You talk as if the plebiscite was right across the corner. We had not even reached the end of stage 1. Even if I was to concede to you the point that the requirement of withdrawal on India and Pakistan was simultaneous, without any agreement on the number, how could things have gone forward?
You have repeatedly used the reasoning that if the UNSC wanted to unilaterally impose an obligation on Pakistan to withdraw, then why did the UNSC not pass a resolution to that effect? The answer is quite simple actually. It was Pakistan which was not happy with the
status quo. The UN, by not passing a resolution requiring India to come back to the negotiating table or accept the twelve-point proposal in
toto, had, in effect, endorsed the Indian position.
If the UN had agreed with your view, they would have passed a resolution saying the above, the fact that they didn’t means that they did think like me. I know, now you will simply discredit the “if UNSC thought so then why didn’t it....”line of argument.
You wrote:
Actually, Indian rejected the earlier proposal of 5000 fewer troops on her side, even though that would have still left her with a significant numerical advantage over Pakistan. Pakistan compromised on several occasions, with the troop discrepancy continuing to increase in favor of India each time India rejected a proposal and a new one was presented. At some point Pakistan had to draw the line and it justifiable did so. The obstructionism was on the Indian side - why did India reject the earlier proposal with 5000 fewer troops on the Indian side, even though India would have still had a significant numerical advantage?
So what are we left with? The question whether India deliberately obstructed by not agreeing to the lowest threshold Pakistan was willing for? There are two ways of looking at it: on facts, Pakistan had invaded first, and sent in irregulars. India had not. So if any country did have concerns on the issue, it was India, not Pakistan. Another way to look at it would be that since the matter was in the UN, both countries should have trusted the UNSC to be able to effectively monitor and control the situation
qua the plebiscite. Even in that situation, why did Pakistan not trust the UNSC? How is India’s responsibility to trust the UNSC any greater than Pakistan’s?
I am not responding to all the points in your post. Most of them are your points of view which have nothing to do with the issue under discussion.
So, to sum up:
1) India was party to the negotiations as it was also keen on a solution to the issue, starting with restoration of peace through a ceasefire. To invade another country, and then to adduce its willingness to talk peace as evidence of authenticating once own position is far-fetched. The presumption that by merely proving that the Indians agreed to the framework, you are proving that they had agreed to the Pakistani position that the plebiscite needed to be held regardless of whether or not the troop numbers were agreeable to them is a convenient and bogus leap of logic.
2) The language of Part II is clear and unambiguous. Pakistan is to withdraw, India is to be notified of the (ongoing) withdrawal, at which point, it is to withdraw its troops down to the level that had been agreed upon during the (ongoing) Pakistani withdrawal, thereby paving the way for the plebiscite. Pointing out that it was merely a framework does nothing except try to obfuscate, and if it means that Pakistan’s obligation to withdraw is not binding, then neither is India’s to ensure a plebiscite, which comes lower down in the order of precedence.
3) If there was no agreement on the troop numbers, and the UNSC had seen it to mean a breach by India, it would have passed the appropriate resolutions to either bring it back to the table, or endorsed Pakistan’s position regarding a plebiscite. The UNSC did not do any such thing, thereby providing the ultimate proof that Pakistan’s withdrawal was a condition precedent to the plebiscite.
4) The failure to agree on the troop numbers was either a case of India’s experience in Kashmir, or a lack of faith by both countries in the UNSC mechanism. In either case, the fault lies altogether with Pakistan or at best upon both countries equally.
I see a bunch of articles and a reference in some books to this alleged 'removal from the list of the UN disputes', but there is absolutely no reference to a UN published list of disputes that Kashmir was allegedly 'removed from'. One can't 'remove a dispute from a list' if said list doesn't even exist to begin with.
Please provide a reference to a UN site/source that provides a list of disputed territories, as recognized by the UN.
Finally, on an unrelated note:
So if there is no written list that means there is no list? There is another way of looking at it, as Pskistan's envoy to the UN looked at it - that if there is no written list, and if the dispute is not being mentioned as an ongoing one, then it is no longer under consideration as an ongoing dispute. Hey, he could have simple called the UK envoy's bluff, right? By pointing out like you cleverly did that there is no such list. But the fact of the matter is, if it hasn't been mentioned, it is not on the agenda. Now two things could have happened, the UK envoy/General Assembly/UNSC could have clarified that oh we are so sorry, genuine mistake, it's still an ongoing dispute. Or it could have gotten mentioned as an ongoing dispute by the General Assembly/UNSC at a later point in time.
Now you are very fond of always asking for proof, aren't you? Now please show me some proof that either of the two things mentioned above actually happened. Mind you, Pakistan's unilateral mention of it at either venue does not count. Nor does any mention by the UN that it is an issue to be resolved bilaterally (without mention of the words "under the UNSC framework"). If you cannot adduce either evidence, then for a change just accept something instead of being a contrarian with no proof.