fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
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Relations between the US and Pakistan were summed up by Secretary of State Clinton in July 2009 when she observed that ―if you go back and look at the history between the United States and Pakistan, we were not always as sensitive or understanding of the needs of the Pakistani people. We were not always constant in our support and our friendship for Pakistan . . . So it's been, I would argue, a relationship that hasn't been as constant and as effective as we would want it to be.‖
38 It is apparent since her statement, however, that there has been regression rather than progress. In its May 2011 survey, Pew Research found that ―nearly seven-in-ten [Pakistanis] consider the US to be more of an enemy than a partner to their country . . . a similar number say they are worried that the US could pose a military threat to their country.‖
Inter-government stresses are caused by a combination of bilateral variances and antithetical foreign policy imperatives:
there was high-level toleration of US drone strikes inside the country until the March 2011 strike that killed so many civilians and was described by the General Kayani as being ―carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard to human life.‖39 Pakistan‘s government cannot afford to ignore adverse public opinion indefinitely, and in the event of major demonstrations of disapproval it would have to demand that the strikes be ended. If the US refused to cooperate, it is possible the Pakistan air force would be tasked to deal with drones. This would lead to major confrontation.
Pakistan cannot accept another Abbottabad-style attack. If such were to take place, there would be national reaction that could hazard the lives of all Americans, and indeed other foreigners in the country. It would be a major diplomatic disaster.
The United States is forging deeper political, military and economic ties with India, which, in spite of current positive dialogue, Pakistan continues to regard as presenting a security threat – and the feeling is mutual. Increasing US-India collaboration, especially in nuclear and defence matters, will continue to convince Pakistanis that irrespective of demonstrable US support for Pakistan‘s economy and polity, it is not a reliable ally.
15
India‘s US-endorsed involvement in Afghanistan and the CARs will continue to be strongly resisted by Pakistan and will be a source of growing friction with the US.
Pakistan regards the US attitude to the long-standing Kashmir disagreement as favouring India, but, while adding to trilateral discord, the dispute is of itself unlikely to lead to war.
The US attitude to Iran is not supported by Pakistan which considers the joint Iran-Pakistan fuel pipeline to be vital to its development.
China‘s nuclear, defence and other assistance is greatly valued by Pakistan, which objects to US attempts to limit such cooperation. This will remain an irritant for so long as US opposition continues, but should not result in concrete action by America, which places much value on ties with the PRC.
In the unlikely event of the US attempting an operation to secure Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons‘ facilities there would be determined military resistance.
On 23 August 2011 three US senators, including the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, had separate discussions with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani. It was reported that ―ardari said Islamabad and Washington had invested substantially in building the process of strategic dialogue and must not allow some incidents to roll back the labour of building an enduring and multifaceted equation as it was no option for the two countries at this critical time.‖40 He further stated that cuts in aid would ―end a negative signal to the public about the commitment of the US government towards the people of Pakistan when they are suffering heavily in economic terms due to unparalleled toll of war against terror.‖Senator Levin, on the other hand, ―nsisted that Pakistan‘s failure to act against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, Afghan Taliban around Quetta and other militant extremists was undermining the American effort in Afghanistan.‖41 It appears there is little meeting of minds, and that that US-Pakistan relations will continue to be at best unsteady. Complete collapse is unlikely, unless there is a major miscalculation by Washington, as noted above, but there will never be trust between the nations.
40
38 It is apparent since her statement, however, that there has been regression rather than progress. In its May 2011 survey, Pew Research found that ―nearly seven-in-ten [Pakistanis] consider the US to be more of an enemy than a partner to their country . . . a similar number say they are worried that the US could pose a military threat to their country.‖
Inter-government stresses are caused by a combination of bilateral variances and antithetical foreign policy imperatives:
there was high-level toleration of US drone strikes inside the country until the March 2011 strike that killed so many civilians and was described by the General Kayani as being ―carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard to human life.‖39 Pakistan‘s government cannot afford to ignore adverse public opinion indefinitely, and in the event of major demonstrations of disapproval it would have to demand that the strikes be ended. If the US refused to cooperate, it is possible the Pakistan air force would be tasked to deal with drones. This would lead to major confrontation.
Pakistan cannot accept another Abbottabad-style attack. If such were to take place, there would be national reaction that could hazard the lives of all Americans, and indeed other foreigners in the country. It would be a major diplomatic disaster.
The United States is forging deeper political, military and economic ties with India, which, in spite of current positive dialogue, Pakistan continues to regard as presenting a security threat – and the feeling is mutual. Increasing US-India collaboration, especially in nuclear and defence matters, will continue to convince Pakistanis that irrespective of demonstrable US support for Pakistan‘s economy and polity, it is not a reliable ally.
15
India‘s US-endorsed involvement in Afghanistan and the CARs will continue to be strongly resisted by Pakistan and will be a source of growing friction with the US.
Pakistan regards the US attitude to the long-standing Kashmir disagreement as favouring India, but, while adding to trilateral discord, the dispute is of itself unlikely to lead to war.
The US attitude to Iran is not supported by Pakistan which considers the joint Iran-Pakistan fuel pipeline to be vital to its development.
China‘s nuclear, defence and other assistance is greatly valued by Pakistan, which objects to US attempts to limit such cooperation. This will remain an irritant for so long as US opposition continues, but should not result in concrete action by America, which places much value on ties with the PRC.
In the unlikely event of the US attempting an operation to secure Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons‘ facilities there would be determined military resistance.
On 23 August 2011 three US senators, including the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, had separate discussions with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani. It was reported that ―ardari said Islamabad and Washington had invested substantially in building the process of strategic dialogue and must not allow some incidents to roll back the labour of building an enduring and multifaceted equation as it was no option for the two countries at this critical time.‖40 He further stated that cuts in aid would ―end a negative signal to the public about the commitment of the US government towards the people of Pakistan when they are suffering heavily in economic terms due to unparalleled toll of war against terror.‖Senator Levin, on the other hand, ―nsisted that Pakistan‘s failure to act against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, Afghan Taliban around Quetta and other militant extremists was undermining the American effort in Afghanistan.‖41 It appears there is little meeting of minds, and that that US-Pakistan relations will continue to be at best unsteady. Complete collapse is unlikely, unless there is a major miscalculation by Washington, as noted above, but there will never be trust between the nations.
40
