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RAWALPINDI: On the day WikiLeaks released a slew of American diplomatic cables revealing, among other things, tensions between the US and Pakistan over nuclear matters, a top Pakistani military official claimed the country “has transited from the ‘most sanctioned ally’ to the ‘most bullied ally’” of the US.

The comments were part of a wide-ranging briefing given to editors, anchors and columnists on Sunday. The timing of the briefing appeared to be a coincidence, having been scheduled before the WikiLeaks information became public. All comments were made strictly on the condition of anonymity being maintained.

Detailing frank exchanges between the uppermost echelons of the Pakistan military and the Obama administration, the senior military official listed a catalogue of complaints the ‘people of Pakistan’ have against the US.

These include: the US still has a ‘transactional’ relationship with Pakistan; the US is interested in perpetuating a state of ‘controlled chaos’ in Pakistan; and, perhaps most explosively given the WikiLeaks’ revelations, the “real aim of US strategy is to de-nuclearise Pakistan”.

The official also repeatedly stressed that the ‘frames of reference’ of the US and Pakistan with regard to regional security matters “can never be the same and this must be acknowledged”. Furthermore, the official claimed, the dichotomy between short-term US interests and long-term Pakistani security interests needs to be kept in mind at all times.

When asked about the outlook for relations between the US and Pakistan in the year ahead, the military commander gave a downbeat assessment: “I see difficulties and pitfalls. Things are so complex (in the region).”

On Afghanistan, the official suggested the Americans need to “clearly identify and state the end conditions in Afghanistan”. The commander also claimed the lack of clarity on the Americans’ part was because “either they aren’t willing to state them (the desired ‘end conditions’) or they don’t know themselves”.

Giving a personal assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, the senior official suggested what is needed in the neighbouring country is a “minimum agenda with broad public support”.

Elaborating on that minimum agenda, the official said there “are indicators that the parties to the conflict in Afghanistan can renounce Al Qaeda and ask it to leave Afghanistan”.

Stressing that in Afghanistan the “peace may never be complete, there may be no permanent stability and uncontested power may never establish itself”, the official suggested a minimalist, three-step sequential process towards a “peaceful and stable” Afghanistan.

First, violence in Afghanistan will need to be brought down, and for this “some concessions may have to be made”. Next, all parties would have to renounce Al Qaeda. And finally, some kind of consensus on a future Afghan constitution would have to be negotiated keeping in mind the “history, culture and geography” of the country.

The official rejected the possibility of Pakistan intensifying efforts to interdict militants crossing into Afghanistan: “If we have to look after the border as well as settled areas, the valleys (in the tribal areas), well, that’s mutually exclusive…. Helmand and Kandahar are hundreds of kilometres from the (Pak-Afghan) border. Kabul is far away from North Waziristan. If they (troops in Afghanistan) want to catch them, why don’t they?”

The senior army official had harsh comments for the Afghan government. Recounting the frequent Afghan accusations against this country — Pakistan is keeping the Taliban as ‘an option’; Pakistan is ‘shielding the Quetta Shura’; Pakistan is ‘harbouring and supporting the Haqqanis’, etc — the senior officer responded with a list of Pakistani grievances.

“Pakistan is deliberately being kept in the dark regarding peace efforts…. Pakistan has suffered because of Afghanistan the most…. Many Afghans in leadership role continue to hold malice against Pakistan,” the official claimed.

However, the official added “the bottom line is, destinies of Pakistan and Afghanistan are intertwined and must be seen as one…. An early end to conflict in Afghanistan is key to Pakistan.”

Inevitably, India featured in the comments on both Afghanistan and the US.

Regarding Afghan-India relations, the official said, “Pakistan has no right or desire to dictate Afghanistan’s relations with any country, including India. But Pakistan expects Afghanistan will be mindful of legitimate security concerns (of Pakistan).”

On the triangle of US-Pak-India relations, the commander had this to offer: “The people of Pakistan measure the strength of US-Pak relations on the scale of US-India partnership.”

The commander went on to argue that while Pakistan could not afford to be in a “state of perpetual conflict with India” and has to “strike a balance between defence and development”, “we cannot afford to ignore our basic defence needs.”In sum, the comments on Afghanistan, India and the US suggest the Pakistan Army’s ‘India-centric’ approach to strategic issues is still very much in place, with only minor adjustments made to accommodate the changed regional security environment in the 21st century.

In detailed comments on the military’s approach to North Waziristan Agency, the senior official said, “(The US) has an increased focus on North Waziristan for understandable reasons.”

But the official added there was serious domestic cause for concern, too: “Most terrorist attacks inside Pakistan originate from North Waziristan. So the question is not if but when and how to tackle it militarily.”

Nevertheless, citing three factors, the official downplayed the possibility of an imminent operation in NWA. First, the official said, South Waziristan needs to be resettled. Second, the country had to prepare for the ‘serious blowback’ of an operation in NWA, which would include terrorist attacks in the cities and a fresh wave of Internally Displaced Persons.

Third, the official stressed the need for the “creation of a political consensus”. Referring to a similar consensus developed in the run-up to Operation Rah-i-Rast in Swat, the official suggested politicians, the media and the Pakistani public would have to demonstrate their support for a military operation in NWA before the army would undertake one.

When told of Prime Minister Gilani’s comment that there is no need for a fresh consensus because the support for the operation in South Waziristan also extends to North Waziristan, the official responded sharply: “I will not do it unless there is a political consensus on North Waziristan.”

Pakistan the ?most bullied US ally? | Latest news, Breaking news, Pakistan News, World news, business, sport and multimedia | DAWN.COM
 
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"I will not do it unless there is a political consensus on NW"

That means the official is COAS Kiyani, since no one else in the military could make such a categorical and assertive statement regarding the launching of a military operation.

Very pragmatic view on US-PAK relations and the potential end game in Afghanistan, as well as the threat to Pakistan from NW and the constraints facing the military in launching an op.
 
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BTW, the comments referring to the development of a consensus in favor of an operation akin to the consensus developed in favor of the operation in Swat, validate my arguments related to Swat back then when the Taliban were ascendant, that the military was waiting for such a consensus, and not supporting the Taliban as many commentators were arguing. The military did not want to become a scapegoat as the ANP-PPP-PMLN dithered and refused to confer parliamentary legitemacy on full fledged military ops.

It was only after the media and public outcry over the public flogging of the girl in Swat, and the Taliban reneging on the peace deal, that the politicians chose to show some spine and confer full legitemacy on mil ops and take ownership.

We see the same pattern now as well- people are accusing the PA-ISI of supporting the Haqqanis (without any evidence again) while the real reasons for inaction remain the very real constraints outlined by the COAS in this interview.
 
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We see the same pattern now as well- people are accusing the PA-ISI of supporting the Haqqanis (without any evidence again) while the real reasons for inaction remain the very real constraints outlined by the COAS in this interview.

Strange coming from COAS of PA ..... he is more powerful than the whole Pakistani civil establishment and is the singular unifying authority presently existing in Pakistan.

The real fact may still remain of geopolitical expediency rather than high moralistic approach in favor of democracy. If there is a will to act against the said elements ...... then a trivial matter like lack of political consensus/spine is of no import.
 
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The commander also claimed the lack of clarity on the Americans’ part was because “either they aren’t willing to state them (the desired ‘end conditions’) or they don’t know themselves”.]

Well that is very true, the Americans are floundering in Afghanistan and have no real clarity in the direction to be taken for settlement of the Afghan issue and the immense public pressure for deinduction of US troops from the region is further obfuscating its strategic vision. It shall remain to be seen if the planned deinduction of US forces from Afghanistan does infact take place.

The official rejected the possibility of Pakistan intensifying efforts to interdict militants crossing into Afghanistan: “If we have to look after the border as well as settled areas, the valleys (in the tribal areas), well, that’s mutually exclusive…. Helmand and Kandahar are hundreds of kilometres from the (Pak-Afghan) border. Kabul is far away from North Waziristan. If they (troops in Afghanistan) want to catch them, why don’t they?”]

The induction of PA or PPMFs into the area in CI-CT and BG roles along Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier is not a process of acting on choices but rather a necessity for the maintenance of peace on either side of the borders. The more Pakistan dithers on the same, the longer it shall take to settle the Afghanistan issue and more the Pakistani security is held to ransom by Afghan issue. And at the end of the day, its Pakistan's claim of having genuine security interests linked to Afghanistan which stand rebutted if the same posturing is maintained as clearly Pakistani establishment is not showing any willingness to secure its own frontiers against cross border movement.

Regarding Afghan-India relations, the official said, “Pakistan has no right or desire to dictate Afghanistan’s relations with any country, including India. But Pakistan expects Afghanistan will be mindful of legitimate security concerns (of Pakistan).”]

What legitimate concerns are there? If its a question of insurgent support then even if its so, PA/PPMFs can effectively be deployed on Pak-Afghan border to check cross border movement. The logic holds.


But the official added there was serious domestic cause for concern, too: “Most terrorist attacks inside Pakistan originate from North Waziristan. So the question is not if but when and how to tackle it militarily.”]

You still need to think so long knowing the source? This is what I meant when I said more of expediency here.

When told of Prime Minister Gilani’s comment that there is no need for a fresh consensus because the support for the operation in South Waziristan also extends to North Waziristan, the official responded sharply: “I will not do it unless there is a political consensus on North Waziristan.”]

Again passing the buck in order to avoid launching a military op in North Waziristan. That means the authority of PM is a mere hogwash and it underlines my earlier statement that the COAS can act if he wants but is not choosing to. Because if he is so keen on political backing, this comment should mean as such and the necessary directives from the GoP be sought for launching of Ops.
 
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The US seems to have the notion that they can just stroll onto another country's territory and conduct their operations there all they want. With America being a superpower, this is to be expected. Backed by their International Status and their military, there isn't much Pakistan can do, unless they make a stand and tell them to "GT*O", quite bluntly.
 
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"I will not do it unless there is a political consensus on NW"

That means the official is COAS Kiyani, since no one else in the military could make such a categorical and assertive statement regarding the launching of a military operation.

Very pragmatic view on US-PAK relations and the potential end game in Afghanistan, as well as the threat to Pakistan from NW and the constraints facing the military in launching an op.
I really have a lot of respect with the honesty in which he has spelled out things and the real reason behind not going after NW, as the Parliament hasn't given its mandate to it.

Note: Military man is being more democratic than the PM, btw...

It also pisses me off since the world paints Pakistanis as deceptive on the WoT, whereas it seems like we are the only ones with a clue on how to win it.
 
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You still need to think so long knowing the source? This is what I meant when I said more of expediency here.
Obviously the economic preparations are not there. More bombings that would follow, and more IDPs resulting from the operation, all need to be planned out.

Again passing the buck in order to avoid launching a military op in North Waziristan. That means the authority of PM is a mere hogwash and it underlines my earlier statement that the COAS can act if he wants but is not choosing to. Because if he is so keen on political backing, this comment should mean as such and the necessary directives from the GoP be sought for launching of Ops.

Actually thats how it should be, the civilian government must take a vote in Parliament whether or not they should go in. That way there would be control over the Army since they'd go in under orders of the nation, not by what is decided in the GHQ.
 
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BTW, the comments referring to the development of a consensus in favor of an operation akin to the consensus developed in favor of the operation in Swat, validate my arguments related to Swat back then when the Taliban were ascendant, that the military was waiting for such a consensus, and not supporting the Taliban as many commentators were arguing. The military did not want to become a scapegoat as the ANP-PPP-PMLN dithered and refused to confer parliamentary legitemacy on full fledged military ops.

It was only after the media and public outcry over the public flogging of the girl in Swat, and the Taliban reneging on the peace deal, that the politicians chose to show some spine and confer full legitemacy on mil ops and take ownership.

We see the same pattern now as well- people are accusing the PA-ISI of supporting the Haqqanis (without any evidence again) while the real reasons for inaction remain the very real constraints outlined by the COAS in this interview.

Oh, please. I have great respect for you but I have to say it's shameless to now give the Parliament all the blame for delaying Swat operation. Firstly, I think I should assume that the Taliban were born one midnight under a fullmoon and had not begun to overtake the region and fulfill the governance vacuum much, much before even the year 2008. Secondly, I think I must now forget that the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation which handed over the area to the Taliban didn't happen because the military didn't want to get involved in a large manner in Swat and the media went on a tirade of nizam-e-adl-only-solution, which mind you is not possible unless the establishment puts forward this view (and the associated peace accords being signed earlier - what do they remind of me of? Oh, late Baitullah). And finally, when has parliamentary legitimacy for an operation been sought before?

Objectivity is sacred and while attempting to agree with the military in what it terms are long terms goals in the region, don't spin history.
 
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In detailed comments on the military’s approach to North Waziristan Agency, the senior official said, “(The US) has an increased focus on North Waziristan for understandable reasons.”

Nevertheless, citing three factors, the official downplayed the possibility of an imminent operation in NWA. First, the official said, South Waziristan needs to be resettled. Second, the country had to prepare for the ‘serious blowback’ of an operation in NWA, which would include terrorist attacks in the cities and a fresh wave of Internally Displaced Persons.

Third, the official stressed the need for the “creation of a political consensus”. Referring to a similar consensus developed in the run-up to Operation Rah-i-Rast in Swat, the official suggested politicians, the media and the Pakistani public would have to demonstrate their support for a military operation in NWA before the army would undertake one.

When told of Prime Minister Gilani’s comment that there is no need for a fresh consensus because the support for the operation in South Waziristan also extends to North Waziristan, the official responded sharply: “I will not do it unless there is a political consensus on North Waziristan.”

This beautifully surmises why the Army is not willing to go on with the NW Ops. Further its not necessary that it reflects the comment made by Kyani.These things have been Researched,Debated to Death throughly in organizations like NDU,Army War Collage and Command and Staff Collage and the overwhelming majority consensus asserts to these findings.
Having said that the Army will never take such a move in which even a single weakness is reflected to India.This is the founding point in negating any sort of Ops in NW Currently.
The whole agenda of US diplomatic engagements aims towards carrying on with Both India and Pakistan despite being put in odds and the foremost problem with this is Pakistan is bearing much more than any of the two...!
 
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Oh, please. I have great respect for you but I have to say it's shameless to now give the Parliament all the blame for delaying Swat operation. Firstly, I think I should assume that the Taliban were born one midnight under a fullmoon and had not begun to overtake the region and fulfill the governance vacuum much, much before even the year 2008. Secondly, I think I must now forget that the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation which handed over the area to the Taliban didn't happen because the military didn't want to get involved in a large manner in Swat and the media went on a tirade of nizam-e-adl-only-solution, which mind you is not possible unless the establishment puts forward this view (and the associated peace accords being signed earlier - what do they remind of me of? Oh, late Baitullah). And finally, when has parliamentary legitimacy for an operation been sought before?

Objectivity is sacred and while attempting to agree with the military in what it terms are long terms goals in the region, don't spin history.
The thing is, Kayani has to (or wants to, or is trying to, whatever fits) to act in accordance to a fresh start from the point where he took control of the army.

One of the things that we know irked Kayani was the poor image of the army when Musharraf departed. He wants to keep his proverbial "ullu seedha" as it is his right to do so, no shame in that IMO.

Your example is right partially that in the Nizam-e-Adal bongi, our army didn't want to either go into Swat. But this decision shouldn't be of the army. If the Army doesn't want to do something it should lay down the facts to the civilian government and then the Government says "ok, don't go, it's my call". If the government wants the army to go, it can order it to go, no matter what.

As an accountable person, like COAS, I would want the Parliament to be shoulder the accountability and responsibility that we went to NWA and thats why there are so many suicide bombings as a result of it.

I admit again, that its all a matter of keeping their ullu seedha, but that too is his right.
 
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It all goes to show the Pak Army is more politically mature than our so called political parties... It is a very appropriate thing to say... Why should the Army start acting like an independent institution... after all it is part of this nation itself and if there is no political will on the ground for military's participation, why should the Army consider such ventures...

Well done the COAS for this... I have also heard that the enemies of Pakistan are trying to get rid of Ashfaq Kiyani... This makes me think that he is acting like a professional and responsibly in the interests of Pakistan... It does upset me though when we keep getting these reports that the Army has allowed Americans base use in Quetta etc... If you take the political will on the streets in Pakistan then such news should not even arise in the first place... We have had enough nonsense where our enemies have managed to create a clash between our army and sections of our people...
 
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As for the original topic... I have been saying this and many of us actually on this forum... We have to move on now... American "friendship" is doing us no good and they are obviously not sincere for the good of Pakistan at all...
 
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Obviously the economic preparations are not there. More bombings that would follow, and more IDPs resulting from the operation, all need to be planned out

Asim. The economic preparations can not be made in a foolproof manner ever, for the nature and scope of the operation to be lauched will be fluid at best. The GoP has to go ahead with contigency based approach rather than a planned approach. Already there is a now a fair bit of expertise in Pakistani establishment over how to deal with the humanitarian fall out of a protracted military campaign in the region. This resource can be tapped in an effective way to deal with the situation as it evolves.

Actually thats how it should be, the civilian government must take a vote in Parliament whether or not they should go in. That way there would be control over the Army since they'd go in under orders of the nation, not by what is decided in the GHQ.

A vote will be just a show. At the end of the day, none can deny that the politicians in South Asia in general have a poor strategic perspective and as such, if a democratic framework is implemented, many will not be able to comprehend and appreciate the requirement of the Op. Additionally, it will and shall always be the military's domain to decide the nature and scope of operation to be launched,.
 
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