Pakistan the ‘most bullied US ally

[unicorn]

In Pakistan, Drones Won't Be Enough

War On Terror: Three troubling developments in Pakistan call into question the effectiveness of the administration's drone-centered strategy there. It may be time to rethink it.

To be sure, the graveyard of "No. 3" al-Qaida figures eliminated by drones is deep. But many of these "kills" have turned out to be midlevel operatives outside al-Qaida's inner circle.

The fact remains that no top-tier al-Qaida leader has been successfully targeted. Those still at large include: Osama bin Laden; his son, Saad bin Laden; Ayman al-Zawahiri; Adnan El Shukrijumah; Adam Gadahn; Suleiman al-Gaith; Mahfouz al-Walid; and Saif al-Adel.

The FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list today is almost identical to its pre-9/11 list. The only difference is these monsters are in Pakistan instead of Afghanistan.

It bears repeating: Almost a decade after ordering the 9/11 attacks on America, al-Qaida's core leadership has not been decapitated from its body of followers. It's still intact and still calling the shots.

Take al-Adel, recently appointed by bin Laden to command al-Qaida's war against the West. He's believed to be behind the terror group's new "death by a thousand cuts" strategy of launching smaller, more frequent attacks — including Mumbai-style terror across Europe and cargo bombings of planes over U.S. cities.

As they continue to plot against us, we're going after these al-Qaida leaders in virtually the same way we did before 9/11 — lobbing missiles at them, only this time from drones instead of ships.

Over the past two years alone, the U.S. has carried out an astounding 154 drone missile strikes in Pakistan. Yet not a single one hit a truly high-value al-Qaida target.

Now the administration, according to the Washington Post, has asked the Pakistani government to let the CIA expand its target range from Pakistan's tribal region to areas around the city of Quetta, where intelligence suggests al-Qaida and Taliban leaders are holed up.

Islamabad reportedly has turned down the request, citing growing anger over civilian casualties from other drone strikes.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's military has further delayed its long-promised offensive against terrorists in North Waziristan, despite $2 billion in U.S. military aid for the campaign.

Washington has pushed for several years for Islamabad to launch a major military operation in the region, in lieu of our own boots on the ground there.

But Pakistan wouldn't budge, blaming a lack of resources. Now that the army has its money, it still won't march into the region.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Strange coming from COAS of PA ..... he is more powerful than the whole Pakistani civil establishment and is the singular unifying authority presently existing in Pakistan.

The real fact may still remain of geopolitical expediency rather than high moralistic approach in favor of democracy. If there is a will to act against the said elements ...... then a trivial matter like lack of political consensus/spine is of no import.

Why is that strange? The resource constraints, lack of overt political consensus and uncertain public opinion are all real constraints. The Military draws its power and influence by virtue of its popularity amongst the masses, and no matter how powerful the COAS is, taking a course of action that would have severe repercussions (increased terrorist attacks in the cities etc.) cannot be seen as a unilateral military decision, but one that has broad political ownership with the political leadership being honest with the masses about what sacrifices might have to be made.

Without broad public support the COAS is only as popular and strong as Musharraf was in his last days in office.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Oh, please. I have great respect for you but I have to say it's shameless to now give the Parliament all the blame for delaying Swat operation. Firstly, I think I should assume that the Taliban were born one midnight under a fullmoon and had not begun to overtake the region and fulfill the governance vacuum much, much before even the year 2008. Secondly, I think I must now forget that the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation which handed over the area to the Taliban didn't happen because the military didn't want to get involved in a large manner in Swat and the media went on a tirade of nizam-e-adl-only-solution, which mind you is not possible unless the establishment puts forward this view (and the associated peace accords being signed earlier - what do they remind of me of? Oh, late Baitullah). And finally, when has parliamentary legitimacy for an operation been sought before?

Objectivity is sacred and while attempting to agree with the military in what it terms are long terms goals in the region, don't spin history.

As Asim alluded, the Military had its own public image in mind, given the beating it had taken during Musharraf's last few month's in office, in not taking what was at the time a highly unpopular course of action. I accept that - but it is also true that several political parties ran on the platform of opposing Musharraf's decision to deploy troops in FATA, the Lal Masjid Operation and the use of military force against the Taliban in any form.

That opposition continued after the election, and the media continued to harp on the line of 'negotiations' and public opinion reflected that. In such an atmosphere, neither the politicians nor the military were interested in acting against public opinion. It was in fact because of the Nizam-e-Adl agreement, and its subsequent open violation by the Taliban, the flogging of the girl in Swat and Sufi Mohammed's medieval vision about Pakistan, democracy and the judiciary, that public opinion shifted, and the PML-N came on board.

And that is when the military, after obtaining that broad public and political consensus, acted.

Now the question is not just about a politico-public consensus, but also of resources and the ineptitude of the GoP to step into areas already cleared by the military in order to provide governance and security so that the military can be re-deployed elsewhere.

 

[TechLahore]

As Asim alluded, the Military had its own public image in mind, given the beating it had taken during Musharraf's last few month's in office, in not taking what was at the time a highly unpopular course of action. I accept that - but it is also true that several political parties ran on the platform of opposing Musharraf's decision to deploy troops in FATA, the Lal Masjid Operation and the use of military force against the Taliban in any form.

That opposition continued after the election, and the media continued to harp on the line of 'negotiations' and public opinion reflected that. In such an atmosphere, neither the politicians nor the military were interested in acting against public opinion.

I'll go further. The ghairat brigade has been harping on issues which they either know nothing about, or pursue solely in their self interest and short term political popularity. The ghairat brigade includes not just Imran Khan etc. but also Nawaz Sharif and company, JI and many more. Have we forgotten the statement made by SS on the Taliban just a few months ago?

Combine this with the fact that many politicians - including NS (not SS to the same degree) - have had a very negative recent relationship with the Army. It would have been easy for them to use any Army action against militants and twist it into the "America is paying the Army to kill our own people" nonsense that you've heard from JI and other mentally challenged individuals.

Without politicians coming out in full support - via a resolution in Parliament and public statements - these operations would have been absolutely impossible. We've already seen how easy it is to get mobs on the streets burning shops and pelting rocks, egged on by an idiot mullah raising a random Aafia Siddiqi or Drone hamla naaras. The last thing we needed was for the Army to go out on a limb at a time when it was already in the lawyers' crosshairs, in the ghairat brigade's crosshairs, in the "civil society"'s crosshairs, the CJ's crosshairs and so on.

If the Pakistan Army is destablized, Pakistan is destablized. Make no mistake about this. The Army's actions are not just to be interpreted as if they were played out by a coterie of selfish heathen protecting their own backsides. Some degree of selfishness will manifest itself in any institution, or among any collection of individuals. But by protecting its reputation and preserving acceptance for its operations the Army saves not just itself, but the Pakistani nation. It is the only force which is capable of restoring order, contending with TTP/Al-Qaeda, handling our interests in Afghanistan, protecting us on the eastern flank and preserving core strategic interests. It cannot compromise its capability to do all the above due to naaray baazi or someone else's sense of timing.

 

[Muhammad-Bin-Qasim]

I'll go further. The ghairat brigade has been harping on issues which they either know nothing about, or pursue solely in their self interest and short term political popularity. The ghairat brigade includes not just Imran Khan etc. but also Nawaz Sharif and company, JI and many more. Have we forgotten the statement made by SS on the Taliban just a few months ago?

Combine this with the fact that many politicians - including NS (not SS to the same degree) - have had a very negative recent relationship with the Army. It would have been easy for them to use any Army action against militants and twist it into the "America is paying the Army to kill our own people" nonsense that you've heard from JI and other mentally challenged individuals.

Without politicians coming out in full support - via a resolution in Parliament and public statements - these operations would have been absolutely impossible. We've already seen how easy it is to get mobs on the streets burning shops and pelting rocks, egged on by an idiot mullah raising a random Aafia Siddiqi or Drone hamla naaras. The last thing we needed was for the Army to go out on a limb at a time when it was already in the lawyers' crosshairs, in the ghairat brigade's crosshairs, in the "civil society"'s crosshairs, the CJ's crosshairs and so on.

If the Pakistan Army is destablized, Pakistan is destablized. Make no mistake about this. The Army's actions are not just to be interpreted as if they were played out by a coterie of selfish heathen protecting their own backsides. Some degree of selfishness will manifest itself in any institution, or among any collection of individuals. But by protecting its reputation and preserving acceptance for its operations the Army saves not just itself, but the Pakistani nation. It is the only force which is capable of restoring order, contending with TTP/Al-Qaeda, handling our interests in Afghanistan, protecting us on the eastern flank and preserving core strategic interests. It cannot compromise its capability to do all the above due to naaray baazi or someone else's sense of timing.

Agreed to all this but we need to move on... Pak Army should consider long term goals and set them straight out into the public domain so that people could support it in its goals...

The way things were going (even before the current crisis) of corruption within both the Civil Government and Pak Army should not be allowed to continued as a stalemate...

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Agreed to all this but we need to move on... Pak Army should consider long term goals and set them straight out into the public domain so that people could support it in its goals...

The way things were going (even before the current crisis) of corruption within both the Civil Government and Pak Army should not be allowed to continued as a stalemate...

If the PA takes the lead and things go wrong (massive increase in terrorist attacks, IDP's etc.) the politicians will lay the entire blame at the PA's door and rant about 'military undermining the elected representatives' - and this is not speculation, we saw exactly that when Musharraf 'acted in Pakistan's interests in using force against terrorists'. Even now, as TL pointed out, there are several political figures that continue to oppose even the existing military operations, and are arguing for an accommodation with the Taliban.

In order to achieve long term success, military operations must have ownership from elected public representatives, who are accountable to their constituents.

 

[unicorn]

In order to achieve long term success, military operations must have ownership from elected public representatives, who are accountable to their constituents.

You are suggesting that military operation is viable if it has a political ownership.But question is how you get this kind of support as all the major parties regret it strongly.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Pakistan stares into a valley of death​

By Syed Saleem Shahzad

ISLAMABAD - Pakistan's military headquarters has decided in principle to mount a military operation in the North Waziristan tribal area before the start of the Taliban's summer offensive in Afghanistan next year.

The decision has been taken at a point that Washington has dropped any idea of dialogue with the Taliban, preferring to rely solely on brute force - a sudden shift in policy that Pakistan refers to as changing horses in midstream.

At the same time, Pakistan's political leadership refuses to take ownership of the North Waziristan operation, leaving the armed forces alone to decide on its strategy.

The United States has been pressing Pakistan for many months to move against al-Qaeda and related militants based in the tribal area, which also serves as a crucial staging post for the Taliban-led insurgency across the porous border in Afghanistan. The US wants to see its successful drone missile attacks against militants followed up with ground action.

Although the Pakistan military has taken on militants in other tribal areas, Islamabad has been reluctant to send troops into the highly volatile North Waziristan, both for fear of a bitter fight and for a militant backlash across the country.

This would still be the case, and something that the army would have to consider very carefully.

"Given the environment [in North Waziristan] in which the Pakistan army is being forced to decide on an operation, it would definitely be counter-productive. It would be like playing with a beehive. The reaction would be disastrous, not only in Pakistani cities, but in Western capitals as well," a senior counter-terrorism official told Asia Times Online.

Pakistani army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani has repeatedly urged his American counterpart to be pragmatic and seriously take into account the likelihood of a fierce reaction.

Nevertheless, the US and its Western allies are insistent that Pakistan should take action against al-Qaeda, given the exposure in recent months of al-Qaeda-linked terror networks in various countries with roots in Pakistan.

These include Pakistan-born Faisal Shahzad, who pleaded guilty in the United States to receiving funds and training from the Taliban in Pakistan to detonate a bomb in Times Square in New York in May, and the subsequent arrest of nine of his associates in Pakistan.

Similarly, the arrest of Ahmad Siddiqui in Afghanistan and the seizure of a German citizen and others in Pakistan showed that al-Qaeda was far from the spent force that many had believed.

Commander Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani who cut his teeth in the Kashmir struggle against India and then moved to North Waziristan to side with al-Qaeda, is the mastermind behind recruiting, training and then launching operatives. Kashmiri is widely viewed in the Western media as the most dangerous person in the world.

North Waziristan is also the base of the powerful Haqqani network of Jalaluddin and his son Sirajuddin; it is a major driver of the insurgency in Afghanistan and is becoming increasingly more powerful and violent. It poses a serious threat to coalition forces and to the planned transition of responsibilities to Afghan forces to coincide with the planned beginning of a drawdown of foreign forces in the middle of next year.

For these reasons, Washington has applied relentless pressure on Pakistan - including both carrots and sticks - to force it to launch a full ground operation supported by the Pakistani Air Force and US drones.

Army chief Kiani, who is accredited with successes against militants in Swat-Malakand and South Waziristan and who essentially rescued Pakistani cities from falling to the Taliban, is concerned.

These earlier successes were a cunning blend of brute force and ceasefire agreements in which militants were pushed into a corner and then through smart backroom peace overtures brought into line. Kiani wants continuity of this policy and even to expand it across the region.

The Americans would prefer the army to go in guns blazing, firing at al-Qaeda and the Taliban as if at a partridge shoot.

Kiani, with politicians having washed their hands of any decision-making, while committed to action, prefers limited surgical strikes. He believes that the Americans simply do not appreciate the difficulties involved, nor that the country is economically reeling from devastating floods this year and that a full-out assault would rupture the peace process with militants in other areas. A vicious cycle of terror attacks would be the inevitable result.

US steps up the pressure
The real American pressure on Pakistan to mount a military operation in North Waziristan began in October 2009, but Pakistan stalled.

In the meantime, the US tried to initiate talks with the Taliban, which gave Pakistan further reason to delay taking action. By October this year, the US had come to realize that the wish to talk to the Taliban was a mirage, and in a strategic dialogue in Washington the US made a clear demand for Kiani to let loose his men.

In November, Richard Holbrooke, the US's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, announced the US would reallocate US$500 million in aid funds to benefit flood victims - a clear encouragement for Pakistan.

Kiani could not be that easily swayed - the reality remained that even firing a single shot in North Waziristan would mean opening up a battle front. He advocated that such a momentous decision should be taken by parliament.

Kiani put out feelers for this. First, he contacted the president of the second-largest political party, the Pakistan Muslim League, and the chief minister of Punjab, the largest province, Shebaz Sharif, the younger brother of former premier Nawaz Sharif. He is a progressive politician and committed against militancy, especially since the recent attacks on shrines in Punjab. However, Shebaz said it would not be wise for Pakistan to exhibit such a political will. He, however, assured the army chief of his support.

Minister of Interior Rahman Malik, a close aid of President Asif Ali Zardari, expressed the same sentiment. Similarly, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, when asked about an operation in North Waziristan, threw the ball into the army's court. "The military chief is fully empowered to take any decision regarding military operations."

A Pakistani counter-terrorism official involved in the recent unsuccessful peace overtures with the Taliban commented, "The Pakistan army was trying to make ground with the Taliban for negotiations, but now the Americans have abandoned everything and are pushing for an operation.

"They had said they wanted to speak to the 'good' Taliban, but the Haqqani network is no longer defined as good. If an operation is begun in North Waziristan, no matter how low-intensity, any chance for an end game through peace negotiations is gone. They cannot be switched on again and off again at will," the official said.
Kiani is in an unenviable position - damned if he mobilizes his troops, damned if he does not, and abandoned by his political masters.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief and author of upcoming book Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 9/11 and Beyond published by Pluto Press, UK. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com

Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan

 

[Nothing]

At the same time, Pakistan's political leadership refuses to take ownership of the North Waziristan operation, leaving the armed forces alone to decide on its strategy.

It is kind of internal affair matter.. this will lead to huge IDP issue as well as other social issue where PA needs help of GOP. PA is not equipped with and need to get equipped with resources which can manage IDP and other issues

 

[unicorn]

If operation started then it will be a mistake we regret in our coming years.