I am sorry if I used the wrong terminology, I certainly didn't mean to cast a blanket on the entire entity of Islam or all of its followers in Pakistan. But what I am referring to is the consensus among Zia and some of his top military aids (particularly Hamid Gul and Mirza Aslam beg) to assemble and retain a vast irregular force motivated purely by a radicalized version of Islam, and then use it as a tool to attain foreign policy objectives. This was far more pronounced against India (a topic that would require a separate thread) than Afghanistan considering the adversaries in the latter (Masoud, NA) were Muslims themselves. The point however is these people were in fact successful in assembling an irregular army of fighters motivated purely by radicalized Islam who were considered as "assets" and then used against neighboring countries at the state's behest. It is also well known that this idea was conceived at the early stages of the Afghan conflict; hence by default it is a pre-meditated intention of weaponizing radicalized Islam to be used for national gains.
The motivation was to use an irregular forces against India (hopefully you aren't referring to Operation Topac) to force her to the negotiating table on Kashmir, beyond that I am not convinced any credible argument on the use of 'proxies for foreign policy objectives' exists.
As I said above, in Afghanistan the focus was on finding a faction (pro Pakistan of course, especially given Afghan scheming against Pakistan early in our history - with respect to Pashtunistan, the Baloch militancy and the Durand) that would stabilize the country and allow Pakistan to fulfill the long term trade and energy corridor view. The desire for a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan, along with the historical reasons I mentioned, did for a time find some justification through the idea of 'strategic depth', but I would argue that it was always secondary to the larger interest of stability in Afghanistan for trade purposes.
If you're trying to say that a bunch of "foreigners" just forced their way in and held West Pakistan hostage then I'm not buying it, nor does that opinion conform to what most experts on the region do believe (including Rashid, Ruben and Coll). Fighters from Afghanistan came into Pakistan in seek of refuge knowing very well that they have a lot of local ideological support there. Many of them were even born in Western Pakistan, trained there or have families there. Western Pakistan was the breeding and launching ground for the radicalization and militant movement that eventually gave rise to the groups like Taliban. The chickens came home to roost. Again this is a fact that has been elaborated upon by countless experts time and time again.
When I referred to the Tribesmen, I was referring to Pakistani tribesmen. The influx of Afghan Taliban (and the Pakistani ones who had joined them to fight) woudl have caused problems but given the fiercely independent tribes, they would not have caused the problems we see today by virtue of being 'outsiders'.
It was the local Pakistani tribes that became inflamed over the US invasion, and it was out of that dynamic, of local anti-US sentiment and the influx of the Taliban, that the Pakistani Taliban movement was able to grow unopposed locally, through local figures, and not have any one question it as it cast itself in the mold of fighting US oppression in the name of Islam.
Btw, I'm not trying to vilify Pakistan or single it out for the sake of demonization; what I am trying to say is that a disease cannot be cured until there's a definitive diagnosis; and in this case the correct diagnosis happens to be an autoimmune disease and not an infection. By attempting to consider and treat it as the latter to stave embarrassment will only perpetuate the problem; and this is exactly what many in Pakistan are trying to do (your arguments resemble theirs).
Interesting analogy, but I think you misunderstood my argument, which I tried to clarify above.
But on your larger point, it is true that many people in Pakistan, and a few on this forum, consider the US presence to be the problem, and do not consider the fact that the Pakistani Taiban movement has become self sustaining and ingrained locally. Whether the US stays or leaves in Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban are not going to meekly pack their bags and surrender to the State.
If there was ever any doubt over this, the statement of the TTP Spokesman, Maulvi Umar, in which he argued that the TTP would not welcome any organization on its territory that was more interested in fighting in Kashmir or Afghanistan, instead of against the PA, should put it to rest. That directive also threatened to kill the Kashmiri militant leaders, along with any Islamic scholars that refused to endorse the TTP position of fighting the Pak. Mil in Pakistan.
Of course this statement of his has opened the floodgates on speculation over the motives of the TTP's
alleged real sponsors (India) since the directive is at complete odd's with what the perceived Taliban goal was.