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Post-Osama Pakistans nuclear safeguards
Posted on May 12, 2011
By Feyyaz M Pasha
Exclusive Article
The dramatic raid by US Special Forces into hinterland Pakistan on 2 May continues to be an enigma. Surprise achieved by the raiders was total and humiliating, calling into question the oft-boasted impregnability of national defence. How the US was enabled to strike deep into Pakistan, and during 40 minutes faceoff why they were neither intervened nor chased thereafter, begs serious introspection. The disquiet is compounded by the fact that Abbotabad is one of the densest military garrisons of the country. Given the paralytic impulse generated by the episode, a natural spinoff is conjecturing among some quarters whether an identical can happen vis-à-vis Pakistans nuclear assets?
Historically, if a side is determined to secure surprise against the adversary and prepares hard to operationalise it, the feat is doable. German invasion of Poland, France; Egyptian Suez crossing and Israeli strikes against Iraqi nuclear facilities are few examples. None however was struck against a nuclear armed country and where it was (Pearl Harbor), retribution by even a nascent nuclear power was massive. Strategic weapons were later consequential in holding off the antagonists during cold war era from hot confrontation. There were instances of red alerts; these remained short of actualization owing to deterrence radiated by fear of retaliation.
Possibility of a strategic surprise in contemporary environment against Pakistan is real and greatly accentuated especially if there is vulnerability in defence systems exposed by an event under review. Stealth strike airborne package, missile rain from sea based platforms, land centric ballistic or terrain huggers cruise can undertake such an adventure. Hypothetically, if a hostile power emboldened by the surprise raid, attempts to take out Pakistans nuclear sting, can it strategically neutralize the country or the former have the potential to respond to the confronted challenge. Pending the judgment, few considerations need attention first.
Any military power including nuclear weapon states (NWS) can be subjected to a surprise attack during period of relative calm. Yet, different protective structures and mechanisms perennially remain in place to withstand unconventional strikes. Media reports suggest that at present Pakistan has the nuclear arsenal of upto 90-100 warheads of varying yields deliverable by a variety of indigenous developed mechanical frameworks coupled with round the clock commitment to churn out fissile material to add on to the existing stocks. Generally, while this infrastructure is secured against ground threat, it is believed to be held, following international practices, under hardened shelters of the magnitude to absorb tactical nuclear strikes, in addition to built-in SOPs for transiting chain of succession to initiate and execute fire orders under crisis situations.
Stretching imagination further, if that be the case, a hostile power consequently might contemplate an attack of megaton category to vaporize the target area. This is a rare probability which would warrant dozens of such launchings to completely destroy Pakistans widely dispersed nuclear potential albeit not with certainty. A dire implication of the attack will be envelopment of entire South, West and South East Asia as well as the Middle East into radioactive swamp, making life nearly extinct in these regions, drying up all energy sources for the world and rendering sea trade and communications redundant. Obviously, under such a scenario there will be no one to respond to the attacker which in this particular case has to be a superpower distantly located from point of delivery of nuclear ordnance. Practically therefore, the superpower might attempt to replicate OBL like raids to secure warheads and disable delivery means. If well rehearsed and ready, physical defence of strategic locations should repel such an assault.
In the event, a regional power like India decides to venture into a strike of the sort employing low yield weapons; this is brightly possible. Here, after absorbing the initial brunt, the responder possessing credible second strike capability has a wide spectrum of choices. It may not necessarily initiate a launch on warning of an attack or even immediately afterwards but shall deliberate in terms of cost and benefit to decide on response pattern and its intensity just like the attacker must have done prior to the strike. The target country may have been surprised but in the event of a nuclear episode, the response scenario will be altogether different from what has been witnessed recently. Pakistan possesses the capability and the resolve to respond along entire ladder of escalation. Precisely, it is guessed it was for that reason that the entire US civilian and military hierarchy engaged Pakistan leadership soon after their crew exited own air space to obviate any miscalculation or speculation by Pakistan especially against India.
Above debate apart, national security of Pakistan ought to be predicated on a maximalist model rooted in public discourse. Survival of a state manifests only when its citizenry associate their own survival with the existence of the state. Politico-military leadership has consistently failed the nation to this end. The Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani should have issued his policy statement on US raid not days past the event. Intelligence and operational failure has to be conceded and defaulters publicized in a transparent manner through a judicial commission as demanded by PML (N) leadership to restore public trust in national institutions. Rhetoric alone may not work this time.
Posted on May 12, 2011
By Feyyaz M Pasha
Exclusive Article
The dramatic raid by US Special Forces into hinterland Pakistan on 2 May continues to be an enigma. Surprise achieved by the raiders was total and humiliating, calling into question the oft-boasted impregnability of national defence. How the US was enabled to strike deep into Pakistan, and during 40 minutes faceoff why they were neither intervened nor chased thereafter, begs serious introspection. The disquiet is compounded by the fact that Abbotabad is one of the densest military garrisons of the country. Given the paralytic impulse generated by the episode, a natural spinoff is conjecturing among some quarters whether an identical can happen vis-à-vis Pakistans nuclear assets?
Historically, if a side is determined to secure surprise against the adversary and prepares hard to operationalise it, the feat is doable. German invasion of Poland, France; Egyptian Suez crossing and Israeli strikes against Iraqi nuclear facilities are few examples. None however was struck against a nuclear armed country and where it was (Pearl Harbor), retribution by even a nascent nuclear power was massive. Strategic weapons were later consequential in holding off the antagonists during cold war era from hot confrontation. There were instances of red alerts; these remained short of actualization owing to deterrence radiated by fear of retaliation.
Possibility of a strategic surprise in contemporary environment against Pakistan is real and greatly accentuated especially if there is vulnerability in defence systems exposed by an event under review. Stealth strike airborne package, missile rain from sea based platforms, land centric ballistic or terrain huggers cruise can undertake such an adventure. Hypothetically, if a hostile power emboldened by the surprise raid, attempts to take out Pakistans nuclear sting, can it strategically neutralize the country or the former have the potential to respond to the confronted challenge. Pending the judgment, few considerations need attention first.
Any military power including nuclear weapon states (NWS) can be subjected to a surprise attack during period of relative calm. Yet, different protective structures and mechanisms perennially remain in place to withstand unconventional strikes. Media reports suggest that at present Pakistan has the nuclear arsenal of upto 90-100 warheads of varying yields deliverable by a variety of indigenous developed mechanical frameworks coupled with round the clock commitment to churn out fissile material to add on to the existing stocks. Generally, while this infrastructure is secured against ground threat, it is believed to be held, following international practices, under hardened shelters of the magnitude to absorb tactical nuclear strikes, in addition to built-in SOPs for transiting chain of succession to initiate and execute fire orders under crisis situations.
Stretching imagination further, if that be the case, a hostile power consequently might contemplate an attack of megaton category to vaporize the target area. This is a rare probability which would warrant dozens of such launchings to completely destroy Pakistans widely dispersed nuclear potential albeit not with certainty. A dire implication of the attack will be envelopment of entire South, West and South East Asia as well as the Middle East into radioactive swamp, making life nearly extinct in these regions, drying up all energy sources for the world and rendering sea trade and communications redundant. Obviously, under such a scenario there will be no one to respond to the attacker which in this particular case has to be a superpower distantly located from point of delivery of nuclear ordnance. Practically therefore, the superpower might attempt to replicate OBL like raids to secure warheads and disable delivery means. If well rehearsed and ready, physical defence of strategic locations should repel such an assault.
In the event, a regional power like India decides to venture into a strike of the sort employing low yield weapons; this is brightly possible. Here, after absorbing the initial brunt, the responder possessing credible second strike capability has a wide spectrum of choices. It may not necessarily initiate a launch on warning of an attack or even immediately afterwards but shall deliberate in terms of cost and benefit to decide on response pattern and its intensity just like the attacker must have done prior to the strike. The target country may have been surprised but in the event of a nuclear episode, the response scenario will be altogether different from what has been witnessed recently. Pakistan possesses the capability and the resolve to respond along entire ladder of escalation. Precisely, it is guessed it was for that reason that the entire US civilian and military hierarchy engaged Pakistan leadership soon after their crew exited own air space to obviate any miscalculation or speculation by Pakistan especially against India.
Above debate apart, national security of Pakistan ought to be predicated on a maximalist model rooted in public discourse. Survival of a state manifests only when its citizenry associate their own survival with the existence of the state. Politico-military leadership has consistently failed the nation to this end. The Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani should have issued his policy statement on US raid not days past the event. Intelligence and operational failure has to be conceded and defaulters publicized in a transparent manner through a judicial commission as demanded by PML (N) leadership to restore public trust in national institutions. Rhetoric alone may not work this time.
And you are from South-India for sure . . .
