An article of his from his blog
The Roots of Pakistan’s Rage
Walter Russell Mead
It’s been one disaster after another this week in Pakistan. The WikiLeaks documents opened raw wounds in Pakistan’s agonizing relationship with the United States. A plane crash on the outskirts of the capital of Islamabad killed 152 people. UK Prime Minister David Cameron ostentatiously attacked Pakistan for exporting terror and ‘looking both ways’ in the fight against religious extremism as he visited New Delhi to promote British trade with India. And now the worst monsoon floods in a century are ripping through the country, with more than 1,100 known dead already, and possible casualties in isolated and cut off communities several times as high. More rains are on the way as I write; rainclouds are sweeping in toward Islamabad across the Margalla Hills as the people downstream in Sind brace for swollen rivers to burst their banks.
Unusually, the United States has been a bit player in this latest deluge of disaster. While some Pakistanis suspect official involvement in the WikiLeaks, nobody much blames the US for the plane crash, or for David Cameron, or for the monsoon. But the longer I stay here, and the more people I meet, the more I understand that the gulf between Pakistani and American perceptions and priorities is deep. For both sides, the alliance is vital, but for both sides the alliance right now isn’t working particularly well. While American pundits and politicians express doubts over Pakistan’s loyalty and its longtime links to radical extremists, Pakistan is on the boil with conspiracy theories about sinister American plots and feelings about the US run the gamut from bewildered disappointment to burning rage.
I came to Pakistan already well versed in some of the standard American complaints about the alliance; being here has been one long crash course in Pakistan’s complaints about the US. They aren’t, in my opinion, all well founded, but they are important and they deserve to be heard. Over my next few posts, I’ll first lay out some of Pakistan’s concerns as I’ve come to understand them, then lay out American concerns about Pakistan — and then make some suggestions about what, given the tension between these two dissatisfied allies, we can do.
For better or for worse, this is a basic part of my method in trying to understand what is going on in the world. In countries like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Cuba in the 1990s, across the Arab and Islamic worlds in the last ten years and here in Pakistan now, I do my best to try to understand what it is that people object to in American foreign policy and, at times, American culture and life. Before I arrive, especially on a first visit, I’ll read up on the history and on contemporary issues and try to get a sense of the economic situation. On the basis of that reading I’ll come up with some working hypotheses about what is going on, or going wrong, in the relationship. Once on the ground, I spend as much time as possible absorbing the local news media, interacting with journalists, officials, students, intellectuals and diplomats to test and refine my hypotheses. I keep at this until I find that more and more of the local people I meet with think that I ‘get it’, and it’s at that point that the conversations get really interesting.
In Islamabad, Pakistan’s purpose-built capital picturesquely sited at the foot of heavily wooded hills, I’ve been meeting with students and academics at Pakistan’s premier national university Quaid-i-Azam, journalists, analysts, and senior military officials — some with links to the ISI, the shadowy Pakistani intelligence agency cited in the WikiLeaks documents and other sources as the contact point between the Pakistani government and various extremist and violent groups. I’ve visited think tanks like the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), had tea with retired cabinet officers, argued with Pakistani journalists and quizzed US diplomats to get their views on the most troubled international partnership in America’s alliance system.
I’ve still got more people to meet and more to learn, but at this point — about halfway through the trip — four big issues stand out among the problems that Pakistanis describe in the relationship. It would take a whole book, and a lot more experience and knowledge than I have, to give a comprehensive picture of what Pakistanis think about the United States, and people have different ideas about how and why the US has done Pakistan wrong, but these four concerns come up over and over again.
India
First, the Pakistanis by and large do not trust American intentions toward India and this issue looms much, much larger here than in the United States. Americans often do not realize just what a huge place India occupies in the Pakistani mind. The two countries have fought five wars since Partition; in 1947, 1965, 1971, 1984 and 1999. They have been to brink of war more often than that, and even today both countries have their forces on hair-trigger alert.
But that’s just the tip of the iceberg. The struggle between Hindus and Muslims across India is a thousand years old. Muslim conquerors stormed down from today’s Iran and Afghanistan to build some of the world’s richest and most powerful empires. Merchants, mystics and saints spread the faith across the subcontinent and across the sea routes into what are now Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. A tolerant and complex civilization grew up across the subcontinent; Hindus and Muslims sometimes fought but often they lived together reasonably well and, as Muslims remember it, this was a happy and prosperous time.
The British conquest of India (at its height, British India included modern India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma) destroyed the Islamic empires. Muslims (roughly 25% of the total population) lost the protection of powerful princes; the British sought to divide and rule the two communities, favoring now one and then then other. As British power waned, many Muslims came to feel that the subcontinent sheltered two nations: one Hindu, one Muslim and that the differences between the two were so great that the Muslims needed their own state. Under the leadership of the charismatic and talented Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Muslims insisted on and obtained the partition of British India into Hindu and Muslim states. Pakistan (which originally included Bangladesh as well as what we now know as Pakistan) was the state for the Muslims.
The British often spoke sanctimoniously about their global responsibilities, but they left India in a hurry as the subcontinent descended into chaos. Millions of Hindus and Muslims caught on the wrong side of the dividing line fled or were driven from their homes. Something like 14.5 million refugees were created initially with ultimately about 25 million people moving from one country to the other; somewhere between 200,000 and 1,000,000 people were killed in vicious communal riots whose memory still poisons the region today.
In addition to dividing the country between Hindu and Muslim majority districts, the British also allowed the rulers of the “princely states” to choose whether to join India or Pakistan; Kashmir’s ruler opted for India under controversial circumstances as Pakistani forces sought to bring the Muslim-majority state into Pakistan. India won the subsequent war, and continues to hold most of the old princely state. The conflict in Kashmir remains bitter to this day; in recent weeks civil disturbances have broken out, resulting in shootings and curfews.
In subsequent years, life in both countries, but especially in Pakistan, was dominated by the consequences of Partition. Settling refugees, periodic wars, the running sore of Kashmir: all keep the memories alive. Almost everything in Pakistan’s history revolves around the unequal struggle with India — a struggle that became even more challenging after what is now Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan, with India’s help, in 1971. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is seen here as a triumph against the odds, and the nuclear arsenal is seen as the country’s last-ditch ace in the hole (in much the same way Israelis see their deterrent). Most Pakistanis are completely convinced that India is ceaselessly plotting Pakistan’s destruction and everything in Pakistani foreign policy boils down to a simple calculation about who is winning the zero-sum contest between these two states.
Since 1989 one of the biggest changes in American foreign policy has been the slow shift towards a strategic partnership with India. From an American perspective, the rise of India towards superpower status is one of the best things happening in the world today. The rise of India means that China’s rise is likely to be peaceful; sharing Asia with India and Japan means that China is that much less likely to try to dominate Asia in the way that Japan once did. A peaceful China balanced by powerful neighbors is exactly what the United States hopes to see.
The burgeoning US-India relationship frightens and horrifies Pakistan. Trade is booming; the Indian diaspora in the United States is becoming steadily more visible and influential. The US takes India’s side in major controversies — blaming Pakistan for terrorism in Kashmir and India while doing nothing about India’s actions in Kashmir. Worst of all, the US is helping India gain access to nuclear materials and nuclear technologies while continuing to block Pakistan’s attempts in the field.
The struggle with India is central, many Pakistanis feel, to Pakistan’s security and even to its existence. The United States is systematically and increasingly siding with India. What kind of an ally is this? Pakistan asks. The United States is working to help India become a global power; what does this mean for Pakistan?
India is the first major issue driving the US and Pakistan apart; Americans should not underestimate its importance. India is an all consuming obsession for many people here, and the presence of a larger, rapidly growing and richer neighbor just 18 miles from Lahore is something that many Pakistanis can never forget. The perception that America is betraying its old and faithful Pakistani ally to benefit from India’s rise echoes and re-echoes through Pakistani culture and politics. It unites the military and those in the religious community who hate and fear Hinduism even as it alienates many patriotic Pakistanis who have no religious ax to grind.
Afghanistan
The second major issue shaping negative Pakistani feelings about the United States is almost as important. Pakistanis are on the front lines in the war on terror and Afghanistan is, literally, right on their doorstep. Pakistanis have no confidence in America’s regional strategy and they are convinced that American blunders have created a multifaceted disaster that has already cost Pakistan dear. Many Pakistanis believe that the US invasion of Afghanistan was a mistake in the first place; Mullah Omar offered to send Osama Bin Laden to stand trial in a third country, they say, and the US should have accepted that. More, they argue that American policy from the beginning was a disaster. We invaded in the wrong place at the wrong time; we refused to work with the people who could have helped us; we lost our focus on Afghanistan to turn toward Iraq (a war deeply hated by many Pakistanis). Now, inevitably, the disaster in Afghanistan has spread across the border into Pakistan, with religious radicals and tribes in revolt turning their fury against Pakistani targets even as drone strikes in Pakistan infuriate many people.
The US, Pakistanis say, has given only derisory military aid — $1.5 billion versus the estimated $40 billion the war has cost Pakistan. More, we are blaming the victim. The spread of radical violence in Pakistan is the direct result, they say, of the American war and American blunders in Afghanistan, but all we do is blame Pakistan for the problem and, endlessly, repeat the cruel and unfeeling refrain: “Pakistan must do more.” We even want them to dismantle their defenses against India (an enemy strengthened by America’s nuclear bias) to move forces to the Afghan frontier.
US attacks on Pakistan for ties to the Taliban and radical groups are, Pakistanis say, cynically hypocritical. After all, the US and Pakistan worked together with many of these groups to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Is it perfectly OK to work with radical religious groups for American goals but a moral crime to use the same groups to protect Pakistan’s interests?
More, US threats against Iran threaten Pakistan’s economic interests and political stability — just as our failure to solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute outrage Pakistani sensibilities and make our overall position in the region less stable. Pakistanis darkly suspect that Indian money and Indian agents are responsible for violence in troubled parts of Pakistan and many believe that the US supports what Pakistanis believe are India’s efforts to build up its influence in northern Afghanistan.
Many Pakistanis believe that on top of everything else, the US is now getting ready either to cut and run in Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan with the thankless task of sweeping up, or, worse, handing northern Afghanistan to India, forcing Pakistan into a two front confrontation with its larger and richer rival. Pakistan has no greater strategic nightmare than to see India entrenched in Afghanistan; many Pakistanis are completely convinced that this is what the end result of America’s Afghan policies will be.
America and Islam
The third problem is that many Pakistanis fear — and some are convinced — that Americans are anti-Muslim. These fears are even more pointed here than in some countries because Pakistanis have an extra reason for suspicion: America’s reconciliation with Hindu India. The relative silence in the US about the situation in Kashmir compared to American hyperventilation about other problems strikes many Pakistanis as further proof that Americans don’t care as much about human rights problems that Muslims experience. More than 60,000 people have been killed in clashes between Indian security forces and Kashmiris in recent years; this is much worse than anything that has happened in Tibet. Why, Pakistanis darkly wonder, do Hollywood stars fall all over themselves about poor Tibet, but Americans seem to glide right past the problems of Kashmir? Is this part of a global struggle against Islam? Many Pakistanis think so, and you will see newspaper cartoons that show Uncle Sam wearing a top hat with the Star of David and the flag of India on it.
Islam stands at the core of Pakistan’s identity. Without Islam, there is no rationale for partition. Unlike many Muslim countries that have an ethnic as well as a religious identity (Arab, Turkish, Malay and so on), Pakistan’s ethnic groups have only Islam to hold them together. Take Islam away and there is no point to Pakistan. American policies, like the reconciliation with India, that threaten Pakistan’s national interests feel and look anti-Islamic as well. By the same token, American policies seen as hostile to Islam (support for Israel, the war in Iraq) are frequently felt in Pakistan as attacks on the nation as well.
Nationalism and religion are the two strongest forces in world politics today; in Pakistan they are uniquely woven together and American policies are seen as deeply hostile to both.
Unwelcome Influence
Fourth, Pakistanis think Americans make all the big decisions here and that Pakistan’s institutions, including the military, have to knuckle under to American pressure. They sometimes talk about the “three As” that run Pakistan: Allah, the Army and America. Pakistanis believe that America makes and unmakes governments here; if there is a military coup, it is because the Americans willed it. If an elected government makes an unpopular decision, it is because of American pressure. Unpopular economic policies reflect our neo-liberal economic agenda; unpopular security policies represent our relentless pressure on Pakistan. Most Pakistanis seem convinced that the US prefers military to democratic governments in Pakistan, and that America’s alliance with Pakistan’s own corrupt civilian elites and unpopular military rulers is the main reason that these undesirable people have controlled the country for so long.
This is how many Pakistanis see the relationship and how the relationship is often described in the Pakistani press; for Americans, the first step in developing a better relationship with Pakistan is to see this picture whole and clear and realize that, accurate or not, this is the impression our policies create on a great many people in Pakistan.
