Pakistan Nuclear Forces

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Pakistani nuclear forces


Hans M. Kristensen,
Robert S. Norris &
Julia Diamond

Pages 348-358 | Published online: 31 Aug 2018

Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal with more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing fissile materials production industry. Analysis of a large number of commercial satellite images of Pakistani army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be mobile launchers and underground facilities that might be related to nuclear forces.

Table 1. Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018.



We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 140 to 150 warheads.

With several delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and its uranium enrichment facilities expanding, however, Pakistan has a stockpile that will likely increase further over the next 10 years. The size of the increase will depend on many factors. Two key factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. Speculation that Pakistan may become the world’s third-largest nuclear weapon state – with a stockpile of some 350 warheads a decade from now – are, we believe, exaggerated, not least because that would require a buildup two to three times faster than the growth rate over the past two decades. We estimate that the country’s stockpile could more realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if the current trend continues. If that happens, it would make Pakistan the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapon state. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed.


Nuclear policy developments

Pakistan is modifying its nuclear posture with new short-range nuclear-capable weapon systems to counter military threats below the strategic level. The efforts seek to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed not only to respond to nuclear attacks, but also to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory.1 This development has created considerable concern in other countries, including the United States, which fears that it lowers the threshold for nuclear use in a military conflict with India.

In the Worldwide Threat Assessment for 2018, US Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats said, “Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles. These new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for escalation dynamics and security in the region” (Coats 2018).

Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which includes all government agencies involved in the nuclear mission, held its 23rd meeting on 21 December 2017, under the chairmanship of then-Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi. The group reviewed a study of “certain destabilizing actions” occurring in the region around Pakistan, including “the massive arms build-up in the conventional domain, nuclearization of the Indian Ocean Region and plans for development/deployment of [ballistic missile defense].” The National Command Authority had paid similar attention to conventional weapons development at its meeting in 2016.

At the 2017 meeting, according to a Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations press release, the command authority “reiterated Pakistan’s policy of developing and maintaining Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and avoidance of arms race,” while expressing confidence in the country’s “capability to address any form of aggression” (ISPR 2017d). The National Command Authority also reviewed the “Nuclear Security Regime” of the nuclear arsenal and expressed “full confidence” in both Pakistan’s command and control systems and existing security measures meant to “ensure comprehensive stewardship and security of strategic assets and materials.” It lauded the nuclear arsenal’s “high standards of training and operational readiness.”

The December 2017 meeting emphasized that Pakistan strives for “peaceful coexistence in [South Asia] and will endeavor to work with its neighbors to ensure strategic stability” there (ISPR 2017d). As in 2016, the National Command Authority’s latest statement on security and safety was, in part, a response to international concern that Pakistan’s evolving arsenal – particularly its growing inventory of short-range nuclear weapon systems – could lead to problems with warhead management and command and control during a crisis. Satellite images show that security perimeters around many bases and military facilities have been upgraded over the past seven years in response to terrorist attacks.

Over the past decade, the US assessment of nuclear weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed considerably from confidence to concern, particularly as a result of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2007, a US State Department official told Congress that, “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise” (Boucher 2007). In stark contrast, the Trump administration assessment in 2018 was: “We are particularly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use in battlefield. We believe that these systems are more susceptible to terrorist theft and increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange in the region” (Economic Times 2017). Upon unveiling his South Asia strategy on 21 August 2017, Trump urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists” (The White House 2017). US concern over the security of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons precedes the Trump administration. In 2016, US Undersecretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told members of the US Congress, “Reinstate full original statement: “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you're taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure” (Economic Times 2016).

Pakistani officials reject such concerns and insist that nuclear weapons security is adequate. Samar Mubarik Mund, the former director of the country’s National Defense Complex, explained in 2013 that a Pakistani nuclear warhead is “assembled only at the eleventh hour if [it] needs to be launched. It is stored in three to four different parts at three to four different locations. If a nuclear weapon doesn’t need to be launched, then it is never available in assembled form” (World Bulletin 2013).

As for the unique effect of tactical nuclear weapons, other Pakistani officials insist that the weapons are neither destabilizing nor lower the nuclear threshold. In 2015, General Khalid Kidwai, a member of Pakistan’s National Command Authority, explained: “Pakistan opted to develop a variety of short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons, also dubbed tactical nuclear weapons,” as a “defensive, deterrence response to an offensive doctrine” by India (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 4).

Kidwai said the NASR short-range weapon specifically “was born out of a compulsion of this thing that I mentioned about some people on the other side toying with the idea of finding space for conventional war, despite Pakistan nuclear weapons.” Pakistan’s understanding of India’s Cold Start strategy was, he said, that Delhi envisioned launching quick strikes into Pakistan within two to four days with eight to nine brigades simultaneously (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 8, 9). Such an attack force might involve roughly 32,000–36,000 troops.

“I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s inventory, and in the strategic stability debate, we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side,” Kidwai explained (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 4–5).

After Kidwai’s statement, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry publicly acknowledged the existence of Pakistan’s “low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons,” apparently the first time a top government official has done so (India Today 2015). But the New York Times reported that although an unknown number of the tactical weapons had been built, they had not yet been deployed with warheads in the field (Sanger 2015).

In September 2016, in an interview on Geo News, Pakistani defense minister Khawaja M. Asif said, “We are always pressurised [sic] time and again that our tactical (nuclear) weapons, in which we have a superiority, that we have more tactical weapons than we need. It is internationally recognized that we have a superiority and if there is a threat to our security or if anyone steps on our soil and if someone’s designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those weapons for our defense” (Scroll 2016).



Nuclear weapons production complex

Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding. It includes the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant east of Islamabad, which appears to be growing with the addition of what could be another enrichment plant, as well as the enrichment plant at Gadwal to the north of Islamabad (Albright, Burkhard, and Pabian 2018). Four heavy-water plutonium production reactors appear to have been completed at what is normally referred to as the Khushab Complex some 33 kilometers (20 miles) south of Khushab in Punjab province. Three of the reactors at the complex have been added in the past 10 years. The addition of a publicly confirmed thermal power plant at Khushab provides new information for estimating the power of the four reactors (Albright et al. 2018a). The New Labs Reprocessing Plant at Nilore, east of Islamabad, which reprocesses spent fuel and extracts plutonium, has been expanded. Meanwhile, a second reprocessing plant located at Chashma in the northwestern part of Punjab province may have been completed (Albright and Kelleher-Vergantini 2015).

Nuclear-capable missiles and their mobile launchers are developed and produced at the National Defence Complex (sometimes called the National Development Complex) in the Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range west of Islamabad. The complex is divided into two sections. The western section south of Attock appears to be involved in development, production, and test-launching of missiles and rocket engines. The eastern section north of Fateh Jang is involved in production and assembly of road-mobile Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs), which are designed to transport and fire missiles. Satellite images show the presence of launchers for Shaheen I and Shaheen II ballistic missiles and Babur cruise missiles. The Fateh Jang section has been expanded significantly over the past 10 years, with several large launcher assembly buildings. Other launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.

Little is publicly known about warhead production, but experts have suspected for many years that the Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, northwest of Islamabad, serve a role. One of the Wah factories is located near a unique facility with six earth-covered bunkers (igloos) inside a multi-layered safety perimeter with armed guards. The security perimeter was expanded significantly between 2005 and 2010, possibly in response to terrorist attacks against other military facilities.

Estimating the size of the Pakistani nuclear warhead stockpile is fraught with uncertainty. A frequent mistake is to derive the estimate directly from the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced. As of the end of 2016, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 3,400 kilograms (kg) of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 280 kg of weapon-grade plutonium. This material is theoretically enough to produce between 236 and 283 warheads, assuming that each first-generation implosion-type warhead’s solid core uses either 15 to 18 kg of weapon-grade HEU or 5 to 6 kg of plutonium.2

However, calculating stockpile size based solely on fissile material inventory is an incomplete methodology that tends to produce inflated numbers. Instead, warhead estimates must take several factors into account, including the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced, warhead design choice and proficiency, warhead production rates, numbers of operational nuclear-capable launchers, how many of those launchers are dual-capable, nuclear strategy, and statements by government officials.

Estimates must assume that not all of a country’s fissile material ends up in warheads. Like other nuclear weapon states, Pakistan probably maintains a reserve. Moreover, Pakistan simply lacks enough nuclear-capable launchers to accommodate 200 to 300 warheads; furthermore, all of Pakistan’s launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means that some of them, especially the shorter-range systems, presumably are assigned to non-nuclear missions as well. Finally, official statements often refer to “warheads” and “weapons” interchangeably, without making it clear whether it is the number of launchers or the warheads assigned to them that are being discussed.

The amount of fissile material in warheads can be reduced, and their yield increased, by using tritium to “boost” the fission process. But Pakistan’s tritium production capability is poorly understood. A German company allegedly provided Pakistan with a small amount of tritium and some tritium-processing technology in the late 1980s (Kalinowski and Colschen 1995),3 and China allegedly shipped some tritium directly to Pakistan (Kalinowski and Colschen 1995, 147, 181).

The Khushab complex for years has been rumored to produce tritium,4 and the PINSTECH complex near Nilore may do so as well (FAS 2000a). However, one rumored tritium extraction plant at Khushab turned out to be a coal-fired power plant (Burkhard, Lach, and Pabian 2017). Pakistan claimed that all its nuclear tests in 1998 were tritium-boosted HEU designs, but the yields detected by seismic signals were not sufficient to substantiate such a capability. Nonetheless, Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman conclude in The Nuclear Express that the tests included two designs, the first of which was an HEU device that used boosting. The second test involved a plutonium device (Reed and Stillman 2009, 257–258).

If Pakistan has produced tritium and uses it in second-generation single-stage boosted warhead designs, then the 3,400 kg HEU and 280 kg weapon-grade plutonium would potentially allow it to build between 339 and 353 warheads, assuming that each weapon used either 12 kg of HEU or 4 to 5 kg of plutonium.

Despite these uncertainties, Pakistan is clearly engaged in a significant build-up of its nuclear forces and has been for some time. In 2008, Peter Lavoy, then a US intelligence officer for South Asia, told NATO that Pakistan was producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world (US NATO Mission 2008). Six years later, in 2014, Lavoy described the purpose of the “expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program to include efforts to significantly increase fissile material production to design and fabricate multiple nuclear warheads with varying sizes and yields, [and] to develop, test and ultimately deploy a wide variety of delivery systems with a wide range to include battlefield range ballistic delivery systems for tactical nuclear weapons”

Kidwai acknowledged in March 2015 that Pakistan “possesses a variety of nuclear weapons, in different categories. At the strategic level, at the operational level, and the tactical level” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 6). In December 2017 he provided more details, saying Pakistan’s nuclear strategy required the “full spectrum of nuclear weapons in all three categories – strategic, operational and tactical, with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass and its outlying territories.” He further explained that the stockpile should have “appropriate weapons yield coverage and the numbers to deter the adversary’s pronounced policy of massive retaliation.” The weapons would give the Pakistani leadership the “liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets, notwithstanding the [Indian] Ballistic Missile Defence, to include counter-value, counter-force, and battlefield” targets. He added this implied that “counter-massive retaliation punishment will be as severe if not more” .

How far Pakistan plans to go in terms of developing a full-spectrum deterrent posture is unclear. It has provided no public statements about its intent. In 2015, however, Kadwai said that “the program is not open ended. It started with a concept of credible minimum deterrence, and certain numbers [of weapons] were identified, and those numbers, of course, were achieved not too far away in time. Then we translated it, like I said, to the concept of full spectrum deterrence” in response to India’s Cold Start doctrine. As a result, he went on, “the numbers were modified. Now those numbers, as of today, and if I can look ahead for at least 10 to 15 more years, I think they are going to be more or less okay.” He further noted, “we’re almost 90, 95 percent there in terms of the goals that we had set out to achieve” 15 years ago (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 6, 12).

We estimate that Pakistan currently is producing sufficient fissile material to build 14 to 27 new warheads per year,6 although we estimate that the actual warhead increase in the stockpile is probably around 10 warheads per year.

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Nuclear-capable aircraft

Pakistan probably assigns a nuclear strike mission to select F-16A/B and Mirage III/V fighter squadrons. The F-16 was probably the first aircraft in the nuclear role, but the Mirage quickly joined the mission.

The F-16A/Bs were supplied by the United States between 1983 and 1987. After 40 aircraft had been delivered, the US State Department told Congress in 1989: “None of the F‐16s Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery” and Pakistan “will be obligated by contract not to modify” additional F-16s “without the approval of the United States” (Schaffer 1989). Yet there were multiple credible reports at the time that Pakistan was already modifying US-supplied F-16s for nuclear weapons, including West German intelligence officials reportedly telling Der Spiegel that Pakistan had already developed sophisticated computer and electronic technology to outfit the US F‐16s with nuclear weapons” (Associated Press 1989). Delivery of additional F-16s, including the more modern F-16C/D version, was delayed by concern over Pakistan’s emerging nuclear weapons program. The United States withheld delivery in the 1990s. But the policy was changed by the George W. Bush administration, which supplied Pakistan with the more modern F-16s.

The F-16A/Bs are based with the 38th Wing at Mushaf (formerly Sargodha) Air Base, 160 kilometers (100 miles) northwest of Lahore. Organized into the 9th and 11th Squadrons (“Griffins” and “Arrows” respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1,600 km (extendable when equipped with drop tanks) and most likely are equipped to each carry a single nuclear bomb on the centerline pylon. Security perimeters at the base have been upgraded since 2014. Nuclear bombs are probably not stored at the base itself but could potentially be kept at the Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex 10 km to the south. In a crisis, the bombs could quickly be transferred to the base, or the F-16s could disperse to bases near underground storage facilities and receive the weapons there.

The newest F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing at Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad. The wing upgraded to F-16C/Ds from Mirages in 2011, and so far has one squadron: the 5th Squadron (known as the “Falcons”). The base has been under significant expansion, with numerous weapons bunkers added since 2004. If the base has a nuclear mission, we suspect the weapons are stored elsewhere in special storage facilities. There are also F-16s visible at Minhas (Kamra) Air Base northwest of Islamabad, although that might be related to aircraft industry at the base.

Some of the Mirage III and/or Mirage V aircraft apparently have been equipped for nuclear weapons and have been used in test-launches of the nuclear-capable Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile. The Pakistani Air Force is adding aerial refueling capability to the Mirage, a capability that would greatly enhance a nuclear strike mission.

The Mirage fighter-bombers are focused at two bases. Masroor Air Base outside Karachi houses the 32nd Wing with three Mirage squadrons: 7th Squadron (“Bandits”), 8th Squadron (“Haiders”), and 22nd Squadron (“Ghazis”). A possible nuclear weapons storage site is located five km (three miles) northwest of the base (Kristensen 2009), and since 2004, unique underground facilities have been constructed at Masroor that could potentially be designed to support a nuclear strike mission. This includes a possible alert hangar with underground weapons-handling capability.7

The other Mirage base is Rafiqui Air base near Shorkot, which is home to the 34th Wing with two Mirage squadrons: the 15th Squadron (“Cobras”) and the 27th Squadron (“Zarras”).

There are also rumors that Pakistan intends to make the Chinese-supplied JF-17 fighter nuclear-capable. According to the Pakistani Senate Defense Committee on National Defence, the pursuit of the JF-17 program was partially triggered by US military export sanctions in response to Pakistan’s nuclear program, including the withholding of F-16 aircraft. “With spares for its top-of-the-line F16s in question, and additional F-16s removed as an option, Pakistan sought help from its Chinese ally” for the JC-17/FC-1 jet (Senate Committee on National Defense 2016). A nuclear role could potentially involve the dual-capable Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), although plans are uncertain.8


Land-based ballistic missiles

Pakistan appears to have six currently operational nuclear-capable land-based ballistic missiles: the short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4), and NASR (Hatf-9), and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6). Three other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles are under development: the medium-range Shaheen-1A, Shaheen-3, and the MIRVed Ababeel.

The Pakistani road-mobile ballistic missile force has undergone significant development and expansion over the past decade-and-a-half. This includes possibly eight or nine missile garrisons, including four or five along the Indian border for short-range systems (Babur, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-1, NASR) and three or four other garrisons further inland for medium-range systems (Shaheen-2 and Ghauri).9

The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Abdali (Hatf-2) has been in development for a long time. The Pentagon reported in 1997 that the Abdali appeared to have been discontinued, but flight-testing resumed in 2002 and it was last reported test launched in 2013. The 200-km (124-mile) missile has been displayed at parades several times on a four-axel road-mobile Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). The three-year gap in flight-testing indicates the Abdali program may have encountered technical difficulties. After the 2013 test, Inter Services Public Relations stated that Abdali “carries nuclear as well as conventional warheads” and “provides an operational-level capability to Pakistan’s Strategic Forces.” It said the test launch “consolidates Pakistan’s deterrence capability both at the operational and strategic levels” (ISPR 2013a).

The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) was last reported test launched in 2014, after which Inter Services Public Relations said the missile was capable of delivering nuclear and conventional warheads, and that the test was “the culminating point of the Field Training Exercise of Army Strategic Forces Command which was aimed at testing the operational readiness of a Strategic Missile Group besides up gradation [sic] of various capabilities of Weapon Systems” (ISPR 2014a). Its short range of approximately 300 km (186 miles) means that the Ghaznavi cannot strike Delhi from Pakistani territory, and Army units equipped with the missile are probably based relatively near the Indian border (Kristensen 2016).

The Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fuel, dual-capable, short-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of 750 km (466 miles) that has been in service since 2003.

The Shaheen-1 is carried on a four-axle, road-mobile TEL similar to the one used for the Ghaznavi. Since 2012, Shaheen-1 test-launches have involved an extended-range version widely referred to as Shaheen-1A. The Pakistani government, which has declared the range to be 900 km (560 miles), has used both designations. The Shaheen-1A was most recently reported test launched in 2015 (ISPR 2015b). Potential Shaheen-1 deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil.10

One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable missiles in the Pakistani arsenal is the NASR (Hatf-9), a short-range, solid-fuel missile originally with a range of only 60 km (37 miles) that has recently been extended to 70 km (43 miles) (ISPR 2017a). With a range too short to attack strategic targets inside India, NASR appears intended solely for battlefield use against invading Indian troops.11 According to the Pakistani government, the NASR “carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes” and was developed as a “quick response system” to “add deterrence value” to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development program “at shorter ranges” in order “to deter evolving threats,” including evidently India’s so-called Cold Start doctrine (ISPR 2011b, 2017a). The four-axle, road-mobile TEL appears to use a snap-on system that can carry two or more launch-tube boxes. The system has been tested in the past using a road-mobile quadruple box launcher. The US intelligence community has listed the NASR as a deployed system since 2013 (National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2013), and with a total of 13 tests reported so far, the weapon system appears to be well-developed. Potential deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil.12

The medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6) apperars to be operational after many years of development. Pakistan’s National Defense Complex has assembled Shaheen-2 launchers since at least 2004 or 2005 (Kristensen 2007), and a 2017 US intelligence community report states that there are “fewer than 50” Shaheen-2 launchers deployed (National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2017). The Pakistani government described the most recent Shaheen-2 test-launch, in November 2014, as a “training launch” marking “the culminating point of the Field Training Exercise of Army Strategic Forces Command which was aimed at ensuring operational readiness of a Strategic Missile Group” (ISPR 2014b). After the November 2014 test the Pakistani government reported the range as only 1,500 km (932 miles), but the US National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) continues to set the Shaheen-2’s range at 2,000 km (1,243 miles). The Shaheen-2 is carried on a six-axle, road-mobile TEL.

Pakistan conducted two test launches of the medium-range Shaheen-3 in 2015. The Pakistani government said the missile was capable of delivering a nuclear or conventional warhead, and NASIC estimates a range of 2,750 km (1,709 miles) (National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2017). The Shaheen-3 is carried on an eight-axle TEL supplied by China and was displayed publicly for the first time at the 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. The Shaheen-3 will still require several more test-launches before it becomes operational.

The range of the Shaheen-3 is sufficient to target all of mainland India from launch positions in most of Pakistan south of Islamabad. But apparently the missile was developed to do more than that. According to Gen. Kidwai, the range of 2,750 km was determined by a need to be able to target the Nicobar and Andaman islands in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean that are “developed as strategic bases” where “India might think of putting its weapons” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 10). But for a 2,750-km range Shaheen-3 to reach the Andaman and Nicobar islands, it would need to be launched from positions in the very Eastern parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian border. If deployed in the Western parts of Balochistan province, however, the range of the Shaheen-3 would for the first time bring Israel within range of Pakistani nuclear missiles.

Pakistan’s oldest nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuel Ghauri (Hatf-5), was test-launched on 15 April 2015. The government said the “launch was conducted by a Strategic Missile Group of the Army Strategic Forces Command” for the purpose of “testing the operational and technical readiness of Army Strategic Forces Command” (ISPR 2015a). The Pakistani government announced a range of 1,300 km (807 miles), while NASIC has stated it to be 1,250 km (776 miles) (National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2017). The extra time needed to fuel the missile before launch makes the Ghauri more vulnerable to attack than solid-fuel missiles, so it is possible that the longer-range versions of the Shaheen may eventually replace the Ghauri.13 Potential deployment areas include the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot area.14

On 24 January 2017, Pakistan test launched a new medium-range ballistic missile – Ababeel – that the government says is “capable of carrying multiple warheads, using Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology” (ISPR 2017b).15 The three-stage, solid-fuel, nuclear-capable missile, which is currently under development at the National Defense Complex, appears to be derived from the Shaheen-3 airframe and solid-fuel motor and has a range of 2,200 km (1,367 miles). (ISPR 2017b; National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2017). After the test-launch, the Pakistani government declared that the test was intended to validate the missile’s “various design and technical parameters,” and that Ababeel is “aimed at ensuring survivability of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment,” thus “further reinforce[ing] deterrence” (ISPR 2017b). Development of multiple-warhead capability appears to be intended as a countermeasure against India’s planned ballistic missile defense system (Tasleem 2017).

Ground- and air-launched cruise missiles

Pakistan continues to develop versions of both the ground-launched Babur (Hatf-7) and the air-launched Ra’ad (Hatf-8) nuclear-capable cruise missiles. The country tested the Babur-2/Babur-1(B) GLCM, each stated to be an enhanced version of the original Babur, and the Ra’ad-2 ALCM, an extended-range version of the Ra’ad. The Pakistani government says the Babur and Ra’ad systems both have “stealth capabilities” and “pinpoint accuracy,” and “a low-altitude, terrain-hugging missile with high maneuverability” (ISPR 2011a, 2011c, 2016b, 2018a). The Babur and Ra’ad are both much slimmer than Pakistan’s ballistic missiles, suggesting some success with warhead miniaturization based on plutonium instead of uranium.

The Babur is a ground-launched, subsonic, dual-capable cruise missile that looks similar to the US Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, the Chinese DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile, and the Russian air-launched AS-15. The original Babur has been test-launched 11 times (last in 2014) and is probably operational with the armed forces. Its road-mobile launcher appears to be a unique five-axle TEL with a three-tube box launcher that is different than the quadruple box launcher used for static display. At different times, the Pakistani government has reported the range to be 600 km (372 miles) and 700 km (435 miles) (ISPR 2011a, 2012a, 2012b), but the US intelligence community sets the range much lower, at 350 km (217 miles) (National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2017).

Pakistan is developing an enhanced version of the Babur known as the Babur-2 or Babur-1(B) GLCM.16 The weapon has been test-launched twice: on 14 December 2016, and 14 April 2018 (ISPR 2016b, 2018a). With a physical appearance and capabilities similar to those of the Babur, the Babur-2/Babur-1(B) apparently has an extended range of 700 km (435 miles), and “is capable of carrying various types of warheads” (ISPR 2016b, 2018a). The fact that both the Babur and the “enhanced” Babur-2/Babur-1(B) have been noted as possessing a range of 700 km indicates that the range of the initial system was likely shorter. NASIC has not released information on an enhanced system. After the first test, the Pakistani government noted that the system is “an important force multiplier for Pakistan’s strategic defence” (ISPR 2016b).

Babur TELs have been fitting out at the National Defense Complex for several years and have recently been seen at the Akro garrison northeast of Karachi. The garrison includes a large enclosure with six garages that have room for 12 TELs and a unique underground facility that is probably used to store the missiles.17

The air-launched, dual-capable Ra’ad (Hatf-8) has been test-launched six times, most recently in February 2016, and might be entering service soon. The test-launches have been conducted from a Mirage III fighter-bomber. The Pakistani government states that the Ra’ad “can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with great accuracy” (ISPR 2011c) to a range of 350 km,


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The air-launched, dual-capable Ra’ad (Hatf-8) has been test-launched six times, most recently in February 2016, and might be entering service soon. The test-launches have been conducted from a Mirage III fighter-bomber. The Pakistani government states that the Ra’ad “can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with great accuracy” (ISPR 2011c) to a range of 350 km, and “complement Pakistan’s deterrence capability” by achieving “strategic standoff capability on land and at sea” (ISPR 2016a). During a military parade in 2017, Pakistan displayed what was said to be Ra’ad-2 ALCM, apparently an enhanced version of the original Ra’ad. The Ra’ad-2 can reportedly reach targets at a distance of 550 km (341 miles) (Khan 2017).

A potential deployment site for the Ra’ad is Masroor Air Base outside Karachi, which is home to several Mirage squadrons and includes unique underground facilities that might be associated with nuclear weapons storage and handling.18


Sea-launched cruise missiles

Pakistan is also developing a sea-launched version of the Babur known as Babur-3. The weapon is still in development and has been test-launched twice: On 9 January 2017, from “an underwater, mobile platform” in the Indian Ocean (ISPR 2017c); and on 29 March 2018 from “an underwater dynamic platform” (ISPR 2018b). The Babur-3 is said to be a sea-based variant of the Babur-2 GLCM, and to have a range of 450 km (279 miles) (ISPR 2017c).

The Pakistani government says the Babur-3 is “capable of delivering various types of payloads … [that] … will provide Pakistan with a Credible Second Strike Capability, augmenting deterrence,” and described it as “a step towards reinforcing [the] policy of credible minimum deterrence” (ISPR 2017c). The Babur-3 will most likely be deployed on the diesel-electric Agosta class submarines (Khan 2015).

Once it becomes operational, the Babur-3 will provide Pakistan with a triad of nuclear strike platforms from ground, air, and sea. The Pakistani government said the Babur-3 was motivated by a need to match India’s nuclear triad and the “nuclearization of [the] Indian Ocean Region” (ISPR 2018b). The Pakistani government also noted that Babur-3’s stealth technologies would be useful in the “emerging regional Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) environment” (ISPR 2017c).

The future submarine-based nuclear capability is managed by Headquarters Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC), which the government said in 2012 would be the “custodian of the nation’s 2nd strike capability” to “strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional stability” (ISPR 2012c).

Kidwai in 2015 publicly acknowledged the need for a sea-based second-strike capability and said it “will come into play in the next few years” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 16). The Pakistani Ministry of Defence Production in 2015 announced a contract for “the indigenous development of 1 [one] ship-borne system with 1 [one] Land Attack Missile” to be completed by October 2018 (Government of Pakistan 2014–2015).

 

[litman]

Nuclear forces ?
How Pakistan humiliated nuclear scientist? A plot they promised for their service and whole life in Lab?

Pakistan govt moved plots allotted for Nuclear scientist from Sector F5 Islamabad to Rawalpindi (initially) then rawat (25 km away from islamabad ) ,.. where per Kanal is around 4 lac Rs only , also no roads , no water , no electricity ... ,so they cant live anywhere after getting retired.

nothing .. A lot of scientist including my father wasted his life working for a nation that doesn't deserve anything .... ( message from all Pakistani nuclear scientists )

dont mean any disrespect but if your father and other scientists were expecting reward from people or the leaders for their services then surely they wasted their efforts but if they expect reward for their efforts of making a muslim nation strong from Allah on the day of judgment then they will get the reward 700 times their efforts. those who work hard in their professions do need appreciation for morale boosting and encouragment but we are in pakistan and generally hardworking people are sidelined and not given the respect and appreciation they deserve but such people should keep their aims high. it is just because of these good people who are still doing their jobs with honesty that this country is existing otherwise vultures and hyenas would have eaten it away by now and Allah is watching all this. each one of us will be rewarded as per our deeds and intentions. there are thousands who are spending their wealth on the poor in this time of corona crisis at the same time their are many others in the same country who are doing hoarding and selling life saving drugs and plasma 10 times their original costs. some are making their dunya while others are making their next world.

 

[ghazi52]

Pakistan’s Nuclear Force Structure in 2025

NAEEM SALIK


Summary: Pakistan’s nuclear posture and the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have been subjects of considerable speculation and debate since Pakistan first tested nuclear weapons, and increasingly so in recent years.

BACKGROUND

Pakistan’s nuclear posture and the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have been subjects of considerable speculation and debate since Pakistan first tested nuclear weapons, and increasingly so in recent years. Within the vast debate, however, many outside Pakistan seem to have agreed that Pakistan has the fastest growing arsenal in the world.

Alarmists estimate that by 2025, Pakistan will become the third-largest nuclear weapon power, leapfrogging ahead of France, China, and the United Kingdom, behind only the United States and Russia. Others conjecture that its growth will make it only the fifth-largest arsenal. Even the best of these estimates are still highly speculative, based on assumptions about Pakistan’s goals, the capacity and efficiency of Pakistan’s nuclear materials production facilities, its ability to convert these materials into weapons components, and its ability to build an inventory of adequate numbers of delivery systems.
Estimates also assume that 100 percent of available fissile material is being converted into weapons, and that Pakistan’s reprocessing and weapons core fabrication can keep pace with the production of plutonium at the Khushab nuclear complex. These estimates draw criticism and angry responses from Pakistani officials, but a vast majority of the people in Pakistan feel elated reading such reports. The people of Pakistan might be disappointed to learn that, contrary to the prevailing perceptions, the size of Pakistan’s arsenal is, and will remain, substantially smaller than recent reports published in the United States suggest.

So much agreement exists around incorrect estimates of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal because of a paucity of primary source data. Most estimates rely on a few common sources, such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, periodic reports by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbooks, assessments by the Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), and occasional reports by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). These reports in turn rely on each other to corroborate their evaluations, which means that the same data are recycled repeatedly.

The appearance of broad consensus comes from circular corroboration, not repeated independent verification. The resulting consensus picture shows Pakistan as a state obsessed with building as many nuclear weapons as it can in as short a time as possible, totally oblivious to the deleterious effects of such an undertaking on its economic health and the regional security environment. This picture, though inaccurate, affirms the suspicion with which Western observers have viewed Pakistan’s nuclear program since its inception.

The Pakistani military’s predominant role in the management of the Pakistani nuclear program leads these same observers to perceive the Pakistani nuclear program as overly militaristic and aggressive in nature, while at the same time trusting that India’s program is moving at a leisurely pace, and that its growth is justifiable in light of the twin threat from China and Pakistan. Most observers tend to discount the weaponization potential of India’s enriched uranium stockpiles, which are simply put aside as fuel for India’s nuclear-powered submarines. They even fail to take into account reports emerging since 2012 about the construction of a large enrichment facility in Karnataka that would considerably increase India’s enriched uranium production capability and, in turn, its weapons fabrication capacity. The reality of Pakistan’s nuclear posture is quite different from this consensus perception.

Another factor that prevents statistical analyses from reflecting the true state of Pakistan’s nuclear program is the artful picking and choosing of data to support the conclusions at which one intends to arrive. Some very obvious facts are simply ignored because they are apparently not in conformity with the desired inferences. Although Pakistan, like India, has not made its inventory of fissile materials or warheads public, officials in Pakistan often comment on various studies and reports on the issue to call them inaccurate, exaggerated, or propagandistic. This publication will attempt to challenge some of the assumptions made by observers outside of Pakistan, and will try to provide an alternative and more realistic assessment of Pakistan’s current and future nuclear force structure within the constraints imposed by a lack of information in the public domain.



BEGINNINGS OF THE NUCLEAR DOCTRINAL DEBATE

Pakistan’s nuclear force structure is a consequence of the country’s nuclear doctrine. Tracing Pakistan’s doctrine over the last twenty years will, therefore, provide the context necessary to evaluate the veracity of Western estimates about the growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and will lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive understanding of Pakistan’s current and future force postures.

Prior to the overt demonstration of its nuclear capability in response to Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan pursued a policy of ambiguity, denying the existence of a nuclear weapons program. This policy helped mitigate some of the international pressures, but by doing so it foreclosed the possibility of public discourse on Pakistan’s future nuclear doctrine. Even once the doctrine was outlined after the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan remained silent about the goals of its weapons program. Only after India announced its Draft Nuclear Doctrine in August 1999 did Pakistan’s government feel any serious pressure to publish its own doctrine.

Three former government officials—foreign secretary Agha Shahi, air chief Zulfiqar Ali Khan, and foreign minister Abdul Sattar—jointly authored a newspaper article in October 1999 making the case for a minimum deterrence posture. They cautioned against squandering Pakistan’s limited economic resources to build an arsenal that exceeded Pakistan’s security needs, all in the name of winning a pointless competition against India.

They advocated a posture that ruled out the possibility of nuclear warfighting on account of the large size and resource disparity between India and Pakistan, and argued that, since deterrence was the sole aim of the nuclear program, a small arsenal would suffice.

Though the article was the first public statement on the nuclear program’s goals, the phrase most associated with Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, “credible minimum deterrence,” never appears. Instead, the article recommended a minimalist approach in line with the common conception of “minimum deterrence,” while perhaps contradicting itself by insisting on the dynamic nature of the concept and opening up the possibility of an ever-expanding arsenal:

“Minimum deterrence has been and should continue to be the guiding principle of Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit. Of course minimum cannot be defined in static numbers. In the absence of mutual restraints, the size of Pakistan’s arsenal and its deployment pattern have to be adjusted, to ward off dangers of pre-emption and interception. Only then can deterrence remain efficacious.”

The argument in support of minimum deterrence and a flexible force structure was reiterated by Abdul Sattar once he became foreign minister in the government of Pervez Musharaf. Indian decisionmakers adopted a similar approach, evident from former minister of external affairs Jaswant Singh’s argument that, as the security situation changes, the number of weapons required for minimum deterrence will also change.'

Eventually, both India and Pakistan added the word credible to their minimum deterrence postures, indicating their discomfort with the minimal size of their respective arsenals. According to nuclear policy expert Rodney Jones, “the term credible is a much more demanding criterion than ‘minimum’ deterrence might imply by itself.” The flexibility that “credible” provides effectively means that the nuclear doctrines of both India and Pakistan have allowed for reasonably large nuclear arsenals since the beginning of their respective nuclear programs.



PAKISTAN’S EVOLVING NUCLEAR POSTURE

Pakistan seeks to use its nuclear capability not only to counter the nuclear threat that India poses but its conventional advantage as well—Pakistan seeks a full spectrum minimum deterrence rather than merely nuclear deterrence. In the decade following the 1998 tests, Pakistan was able to achieve these objectives by maintaining a credible minimum deterrence posture through three major crises in 1999, 2001–2002, and 2008. Singh, India’s former external affairs minister, acknowledged the role of nuclear weapons in creating parity between India and Pakistan, stating at a forum that “the 1998 nuclear tests by India conferred a kind of parity to Pakistan that it had always sought.”

While Pakistan’s nuclear capability buys a level of parity that Pakistan could not afford to create with conventional forces, the imperative to deter a broad spectrum of threats imposes more exacting demands on Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent posture and makes it sensitive to the changes in India’s conventional force structures and doctrines. This sensitivity explains Pakistan’s strong reaction to India’s Cold Start, or proactive operations, doctrine. As pointed out by Maleeha Lodhi, “Western analysts have often depicted this [Pakistan’s enhancement of its nuclear capability] as a mindless, irrational drive motivated by the unbridled ambitions of the nuclear scientific-military lobby.”

Lodhi further argues that the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal cannot be divorced from its context, specifically “the chain of rapid developments that have undermined the region’s strategic equilibrium and affected Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.” Among these developments, she has listed the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver obtained by India, the continuing growth of India’s conventional and strategic capabilities, India’s espousal of offensive warfighting doctrines such as the proactive operations doctrine, and concerted efforts to acquire a missile defense capability.

In the aftermath of its overt nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan set rather modest force goals in line with its policy of credible minimum deterrence, aiming for an arsenal of fewer than 100 weapons. In an often-quoted interview from January 2002, the director general of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, added constraints to the doctrine, stating that Pakistan had no plans “for now” to develop battlefield nuclear weapons such as nuclear artillery.

Pakistan circa 2002 may not have felt any compelling operational need to develop tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), but abstaining from TNWs could also have been a consequence of technological deficiencies, such as a dearth of fissile material or the inability to create suitably miniaturized warhead designs. Given the well-considered choice of a credible minimum deterrence posture, though, TNWs simply would not have made sense as part of Pakistan’s nuclear posture in the years immediately after 1998.



DICHOTOMY IN DECLARATORY AND OPERATIONAL POSTURES—RATIONALE AND RAMIFICATIONS


In 2011, tests of a short-range missile called the Nasr (Hatf-IX) came as a surprise to many, especially because an official press release announced that the 60-kilometer-range missile was capable of carrying “nuclear warheads of appropriate yield.” Introduction of the short-range, battlefield-usable weapons by Pakistan triggered an animated debate, both in Pakistan and abroad. Those with a sympathetic view of Pakistan’s position have argued that the Nasr is a logical response to India’s provocative Cold Start war doctrine.

Senior Pakistani officials have been quoted as saying that the Nasris meant to pour cold water over Cold Start.16 Critics, on the other hand, view the Nasr as a destabilizing development that increases the probability of a nuclear war in South Asia.

Debate aside, there is no doubt that Pakistan has embarked upon the development of battlefield nuclear weapons capability. Pakistani government spokespersons, though, continue to tout Pakistan’s policy of credible minimum deterrence, which is a form of the so-called simple punishment model of deterrence, unlike the deterrence by denial—or warfighting model of deterrence—enabled by the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. These models have very different demands in terms of the size of arsenals, command and control, and battlefield management. However, this apparent dichotomy in the declared doctrine and actual force posture has yet to be clarified by Pakistani strategic planners.


The pandemonium created by the short range of the Nasr weapon system and perception of problems related to maintaining effective centralized command and control, not to mention the physical security of the missile launchers once operationally deployed in the field, diverted public attention away from some very important implications.

More important than the much-discussed range of the missile is the accompanying development of a sleek and miniaturized warhead to be mounted on it. This technological achievement has far-reaching implications, since it will enable Pakistan to arm its Babur (surface-launched) and Raad (air-launched) cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. It will also make it possible for Pakistan to equip naval platforms with nuclear weapon systems. The debate around Pakistan’s introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons has also remained narrowly focused on the Nasr’s technical attributes, ignoring the operational characteristics of the other short-range systems, such as the 180-kilometer Abdali missile. Pakistan believes that the Nasr demonstrates a capability that will strengthen deterrence through option enhancement and threat manipulation. Lieutenant General (retired) Khalid Kidwai, speaking at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in 2015, strongly criticized the narrow focus of the debate, stating that:

I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s inventory, and in the strategic stability debate, we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side. That the debate has been hi-jacked towards the lesser issues of command and control, and the possibility of their falling into wrong hands is unfortunate, because it has distracted and diverted attention from the real purpose of the TNWs, that of reinforcing deterrence, preventing war in South Asia, ensuring peace, thereby creating an enabling environment for politics and politicians to reassert and lead the way towards conflict resolution, and give South Asia and its people a chance.18

Without denigrating the arguments of the Nasr’scritics, one needs to look into the factors that compelled Pakistan to go down this treacherous path. India has been persistently challenging the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent doctrinally, technologically, and practically. It has been insisting since February 2000 that there is a space below the nuclear threshold for a limited conventional war with Pakistan. Kidwai alluded to this, arguing that:

For 15 years I, and my colleagues, at the Strategic Plans Division in Pakistan, and worked for deterrence to be strengthened. . . . to create roadblocks in the path of those who thought that there was space for conventional war, despite the nuclear weapons of Pakistan. . . . what was probably encouraging them to find the space for conventional war, below this gap, was the absence of a complete spectrum of deterrence. . . . That there was some kind of a gap in their realization at the tactical level, and therefore it was leading to this encouragement . . . on the other side [in India] that there was space for conventional war. . . . Because war was being brought down under the Cold Start Doctrine to the tactical level. . . . Therefore, the idea of Nasr was born [out of the] need to plug this particular gap.

Pakistan’s development and field testing of the Abdali (Hatf-II) and the Nasr (Hatf-IX) seem to be in keeping with the counsel given by Michael Quinlan, a highly respected British nuclear expert, who has argued that “The range of options available must, therefore, be an unmistakable continuum without huge gaps. That in turn meant that there had to be nuclear forces, backed by will and doctrine for their possible use, intermediate between conventional forces . . . and the ultimate strategic nuclear capability.”

During the Cold War, NATO’s political and geographical compulsions along the central front in Germany, which constrained its ability to give up any space in a conflict even for sound operational reasons, forced it to adopt a forward defense posture. In contemporary South Asia, Pakistan faces a similar dilemma. Pakistan can justifiably draw a comparison between NATO’s compulsions and its own situation. It, therefore, feels compelled to promise a high probability of nuclear use in the event of a military conflict with India. Pakistan, thus, has all the basic building blocks of what it describes as full spectrum deterrence, and it is only a matter of time before missile systems, both at the shortest- and longest-range ends of the spectrum, will be available in sufficient numbers to put full spectrum deterrence into practice. However, not unlike the fluctuations in the U.S. nuclear posture between simple punishment and warfighting, Pakistan’s doctrinal evolution will not be linear.

The transformation in Pakistan’s strategic posture has not been brought about merely by India’s continued quest to find a space for a limited conventional war. The prolonged commitment of almost one-third of Pakistan’s military forces in counterterror or counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas along its borders with Afghanistan has thinned Pakistan’s deployments along the eastern border, creating a feeling of vulnerability that India can easily exploit. India has also adopted a belligerent posture along the Line of Control in Kashmir, especially across the working boundary in the Jammu-Sialkot sector. By perpetually keeping these borders hot and increasing the psychological pressure on Pakistan, India forces Pakistan toward greater reliance on its nuclear capability and lowering of its nuclear threshold.

Conceptually, credible minimum deterrence and full spectrum deterrence are different from each other in terms of both their goals and the force requirements necessary to achieve those goals. Whereas credible minimum deterrence is essentially a variety of simple punishment deterrence (with weapons mainly aimed at countervalue targets, and relatively limited force requirements), full spectrum deterrence is a kind of deterrence by denial, more akin to the flexible response or graduated response doctrines. Full spectrum deterrence targeting would include battlefield (counterforce) targets and would, therefore, require a larger arsenal size and a greater variety of both warheads and delivery systems. It would also require comparatively higher operational preparedness levels than the minimum credible deterrence posture.

Pakistan’s resource constraints and the continued insistence by official spokespersons on credible minimum deterrence as the existing policy, though, likely mean that Pakistan may not go all the way to a fully operational nuclear warfighting posture or deterrence by denial, and may instead settle for something intermediate between the two postures in the next ten years.

Though Pakistan has the advantage of learning from other states, it is still too early for it to have found definitive answers to its nuclear dilemmas. The current situation should, therefore, be considered a transient phase in Pakistan’s evolving doctrinal thinking. It is also important to recognize that India and Pakistan are in a very close dyadic nuclear relationship and, given their historic rivalry dominated by the action-reaction syndrome it is obvious that one country cannot remain oblivious to the developments in the other.

The logic of dynamic and flexible deterrence that constantly adjusts to any expansion in the adversary’s arsenal seems contradictory to the common conception of minimum deterrence, and could lead India and Pakistan toward an unintended arms race. It also opens up the possibilities of an open-ended increase in the number of nuclear weapons held by both countries.

Lieutenant General Kidwai, responding to a question during his 2015 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference appearance, said that Pakistan had identified appropriate numbers to meet its minimum deterrence needs and these numbers were achieved in the recent past. However, the adoption of full spectrum deterrence, in response to the Cold Start doctrine, introduced a new dynamism in the program and led Pakistan to revise its estimates for the necessary numbers of weapons. Kidwai, however, reiterated that these revised numbers should suffice for the next ten to fifteen years, adding that “beyond a certain number you lose the logic, it’s not an open ended race.” This statement clearly indicates that Pakistan’s nuclear build-up has finite limits and is not likely to reach the level of the third-largest or even the fifth-largest nuclear power, as suggested by some analysts.

......................................................


Brigadier Naeem Salik (retired) is a senior fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies. Before his retirement from the Pakistani military, he served as director of arms control and disarmament affairs in the Strategic Plans Division, the secretariat of Pakistan’s National Command Authority.

 

[ghazi52]

MYTH OF THE FASTEST GROWING NUCLEAR ARSENAL


Pakistan’s nuclear program has been stereotyped since its inception. It was first characterized as the so-called Islamic bomb. Then, after 9/11, it was dubbed the most insecure and vulnerable arsenal, just waiting to fall into the wrong hands. In the past few years, it has been commonly described as the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. Given the scope of this publication, it is necessary to analyze only the last of these myths about the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. The five recognized nuclear weapon states (under the Non-Proliferation Treaty) ceased any further production of weapons-grade plutonium by 1995 and highly enriched uranium (HEU) by 1996.

Consequent to the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement, the United States and Russia are maintaining slightly less than 1,600 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads each. The United Kingdom has reduced its arsenal to around 225 warheads and plans further cuts, while the number of Chinese and French weapons is stable at 250 and 300 weapons respectively. The Israeli nuclear weapons program remains shrouded in mystery—estimates of the size of its nuclear arsenal range from 80 to 200 warheads—and North Korea holds a small number of weapons. India and Pakistan are the only countries in the world still building up their nuclear arsenals and fissile material stockpiles. They are the only two countries currently engaged in a nuclear arms race—or, to be fair, in a nuclear arms competition.

Neither India nor Pakistan has ever declared how many warheads they maintain, or how much fissile material they have. All the estimates found in various publications are speculative. Even the most professionally calculated quantities of fissile material make estimates based mainly on the capacities of the production facilities in the two countries, and are forced to make assumptions about many functional parameters. For instance, a 50-megawatt plutonium production reactor working at 100 percent capacity can produce 18.25 kilograms of plutonium per year.

However, these plants normally run at a much lower capacity, and most calculations use a baseline of between 60 percent and 70 percent capacity. Running at this capacity, a 50-megawatt plant will produce around 11 to 13 kilograms per year, assuming that it can maintain the same efficiency through the entire 365 days. In practice, however, the plants may run as low as 40 percent to 50 percent capacity, producing up to 7 to 9 kilograms per year. Moreover, the reactors cannot run 365 days per year. Reactors shut down for refueling and routinely face technical snags, which are not accounted for in existing calculations. Calculating HEU production is even more complicated because analysts must guess the actual number of centrifuges in a particular plant, the enrichment capacity of each centrifuge (which is dependent on the diameter and height of each machine), the quality of the feed material, and whether the rotor is made of aluminum, maraging steel, or carbon fiber. None of these factors can be accurately estimated without intrusive inspections. Finally, it is hard to estimate what proportion of each country’s fissile material has been fabricated into warheads and what proportion is still being processed, or is being kept as reserve for future eventualities, including conversion into more weapon cores.

The amount of fissile material needed for a warhead is also a variable, dependent on the sophistication of weapon designs. The amount of fissile material per warhead that a given study assumes has a direct bearing on the bottom-line result for the estimated arsenal size that that study will find. For instance, the Global Fissile Material Report (GFMR) estimates that Pakistan currently possesses 170 kilograms of plutonium. If the GFMR assumed that Pakistan needed 6 kilograms of plutonium per weapon instead of 4 kilograms, it would make a significant difference in their final estimate; with 4 kilograms per warhead, the estimate would be 42 warheads, but with 6 kilograms per warhead, the estimate would drop to 28. The same clearly holds for HEU warheads; whether a Pakistani HEU-based warhead requires 15, 20, or 25 kilograms of HEU drastically changes the potential size of Pakistan’s arsenal. Compared to the thousands of nuclear tests conducted by great powers during the Cold War, India and Pakistan have only conducted six tests each. Neither has enough data to develop highly sophisticated weapon designs requiring lesser amounts of fissile material. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the estimated size of Indian or Pakistani arsenals comport with reality. Another problem is that these studies, while categorizing India’s entire substantial stockpile of HEU as potential fuel for India’s nuclear-powered submarines, do not address Pakistan’s future HEU needs for naval propulsion. Pakistan is striving to develop the naval leg of its nuclear triad, which would ultimately include naval vessels propelled by nuclear fuel.

Leaving aside all the above-mentioned problems with methods for estimating nuclear arsenal sizes, data available from some of the more credible and widely quoted sources suggest that characterizing Pakistan’s nuclear force as the fastest growing arsenal in the world is totally unjustified.25 Data from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, SIPRI, and the GFMR clearly show that between 2007 and 2015, India and Pakistan’s arsenals grew at exactly the same number of warheads per year (see Tables 1–3). This alone should suffice to debunk the myth of the fastest growing arsenal in the world.


Table 1

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists – Estimates of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Warheads

Year ...............India............... Pakistan
2007................ 50...................... 60
2008................ 60...................... 70
2009................ 70...................... 80
2010................ 80...................... 90
2011................. 90..................... 100
2012................. 100.................... 110
2013................. 110..................... 120
2014..................120..................... 130
2015 ...............110–120............. 110–130


“Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 6 (November 2015): 59–66.
Table 2


SIPRI Estimates of Indian & Pakistani Nuclear Warheads

Year............ India............ Pakistan

2010...... 60–80 ............70–90
2011...... 70–90............ 80–100
2012...... 80–100........... 90–110
2013....... 90–110......... 100–120
2014....... 90–110......... 100–120
2015..... 90–110.......... 100–120


Data from SIPRI Yearbooks 2010–2015. See, for example, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

Table 3

Global Fissile Materials Report (GFMR) Estimates of Indian & Pakistani Nuclear Warheads

Year.............. India................ Pakistan
2007......... 50.................... 60
2009........ 60-70............ 70-90
2011........ 80-10..........0 90-110
2013....... 90-110............. 100-120


International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Materials Report 2007 (Princeton, NJ: International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2007).


ANOMALIES IN THE AVAILABLE ESTIMATES


Table 4 below provides estimates of the fissile material stockpiles of India and Pakistan. This table provides a confusing picture at best. For instance, India’s military plutonium stocks grew from 0.52 metric tons in 2007 to 0.7 metric tons in 2009, but were back to 0.52 metric tons in 2011. In the same time period, the non-military plutonium stocks declared strategic (rather than civilian) by India rose from 5.4 metric tons in 2007 to 6.8 metric tons in 2009, before declining again in 2011 to 4.2 metric tons. Pakistan’s plutonium stocks show a steady growth between 2007 and 2015. However, Pakistani HEU stocks jumped from 1.3 metric tons in 2007 to 2.1 metric tons in 2009, and then grew more modestly to 2.7 metric tons in 2011 and 3.0 metric tons in 2013. These stocks grew to 3.1 metric tons by 2015. Throughout this period, there was no evidence of new enrichment plants or facilities to produce feed material for these plants. It is hard to imagine that India’s output of HEU could increase so rapidly without new infrastructure. Yet, India’s HEU stocks seem to have grown exponentially from 0.2 metric tons in 2007 to 3.2 metric tons in 2015. The GFMR authors do not explain these substantive fluctuations in estimates.

Another important statistic that receives too little attention is the comparative size of Indian and Pakistani HEU inventories. According to the 2015 International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) report, India has 3.2 metric tons of HEU compared to Pakistan’s 3.1 metric tons. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was based entirely on HEU until 1999, when the first plutonium production reactor at Khushab became operational. India’s program has been plutonium-based since its inception.

There is a common tendency to ignore India’s HEU stocks while estimating India’s nuclear weapons potential, under the assumption that India’s HEU stocks are meant for naval propulsion. A stockpile of 3.2 metric tons, though, is far more than India’s naval nuclear reactors could possibly use. Each submarine, for example, requires a fuel load of only 200 kilograms of 30 percent enriched uranium. Though India has no real need for more HEU, the rare materials plant (RMP) at Rattehali near Mysore is continuing to churn out more. In short, India has a large surplus of HEU available for making nuclear warheads, and, therefore, the ability to grow its arsenal much faster than Pakistan.

It is also worth mentioning how large the margins of error are for estimates of India and Pakistan’s fissile material stockpiles. Pakistan’s HEU inventory, for example, is estimated at 3 metric tons with a probable error of (+ 1.2 metric tons). The actual amount could be anywhere from 1.8 metric tons to 4.2 metric tons. To put the margin of error in terms of weapons, a range of 1.8 metric tons to 4.2 metric tons is a range of 60 20-kilogram warheads. Given that the available data have such serious shortcomings, no one can declare with any degree of certainty that Pakistan will become the third- or fifth-largest nuclear power in the world, or ascribe adjectives like “fastest growing” with any authority. Such unrealistic inferences drawn from suspect data lead to erroneous conclusions and poor predictions of the strategic environment likely to prevail a decade from now.





Table: 426

Global Fissile Material Report – Estimates of Indian & Pakistani Fissile Material Stocks


Year.............................. India............. Pakistan

2007..
India..
Plutonium:........ 0.52 metric tons
(5.4 metric tons, Strategic)
HEU: 0.2 metric tons

Pakistan
Plutonium: 0.064 metric tons
HE : 1.3 metric tons

2009
India.
Plutonium: 0.7 MT
(6.8 metric tons, Strategic)
HEU : 0.6 metric tons

Pakistan
Plutonium: 0.1 metric tons
HE : 2.1 metric tons

2011
India.
Plutonium: 0.52 metric tons
(4.2 metric tons, Strategic)
HEU: 2.0 MT

Pakistan
Plutonium: 0.14 metric tons
HEU: 2.7 metric tons


2013
India.
Plutonium: 0.54 metric tons
(4.7 metric tons, Strategic)
(0.24 metric tons, Civilian)
HEU: 2.4 metric tons

Pakistan
Plutonium: 0.15 metric tons
HEU: 3 MT (+ 1.2)


2015
India.
Plutonium: 0.59 metric tons
(3.4 metric tons, Strategic)
(0.2 metric tons, Civilian)
HEU: 3.2 metric tons

Pakistan
Plutonium: 0.17 metric tons
HEU: 3.1 metric tons

 

[ghazi52]

A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF PAKISTAN’S PROSPECTIVE NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE IN 2025


No official figures for Pakistan’s fissile material stockpiles or weapons inventory have ever been released by the government of Pakistan, and no authentic information is available in the public domain about the size and capacity of Pakistan’s fissile material production plants. Despite the paucity of information, a reasonable estimate can be created from data that exist once important considerations, such as the economic and industrial capacity, availability of requisite raw materials, doctrine, posture, and politico-diplomatic and strategic compulsions, are accounted for.

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, in their latest report for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, estimate the Pakistani nuclear stockpile at between 110 and130 warheads, whereas the Arms Control Association’s fact sheet estimates 110 warheads. The median figure is 120 warheads. Pakistan’s capacity to produce HEU-based warheads is usually estimated to be about four weapons per year and, therefore, it could produce around 40 additional HEU-based warheads over the next decade.

Currently, Pakistan has four operational plutonium production reactors at its Khushab complex. Assuming the reactors run at 60 percent capacity, each would produce slightly less than two weapons’ worth of plutonium per year, toward a total output of around 36 kilograms of plutonium—six warheads at 6 kilograms per warhead—per year. This suggests that Pakistan could produce up to 60 plutonium warheads over the next decade. The gross total of warheads by 2025, both plutonium- and HEU-based, should be 220, based on available unofficial estimates: 120 warheads in the current arsenal, plus 100 additional warheads. Kristensen and Norris have likewise estimated the size of Pakistan’s arsenal in 2025 to be between 220 and 250 warheads.

Arriving at these figures entails making a number of assumptions about the number and capacity of Pakistan’s centrifuges; the efficiency of Pakistani plutonium production reactors; their uninterrupted operation throughout the year; the amount of HEU and plutonium needed for each warhead; Pakistan’s requirements for naval propulsion; whether Pakistan has been and will continue to convert all of the available material into warheads or maintain some reserve of fissile materials outside warheads; whether Pakistan has determined an upper figure for the size of its arsenal; and Pakistan’s capacity to produce and stockpile requisite delivery systems for all these warheads. Finally, these estimates all assume that Pakistan will continue to produce fissile materials until 2025, rather than ceasing production somewhere in the near future, having satisfied its operational needs.

Pakistan’s nuclear forces in 2025 will have a wide variety of delivery systems for full spectrum deterrence but will, in all probability, comprise fewer than 200 warheads made from both HEU and plutonium, with a wide range of yields, all the way from low-yield to (potentially) boosted fission devices. Pakistan’s delivery systems will likely be a mix of solid-fueled surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with short and medium ranges, ground- and air-launched cruise missiles—some of which may be deployed on surface naval vessels and submarines—gravity bombs delivered by appropriate aerial platforms, and maybe indigenously developed nuclear-powered submarines. Pakistan likely will not keep building its nuclear arsenal for an indefinite period, given its economic constraints and comparatively modest nuclear force requirements—its deterrence is focused on India and is not meant to seek regional or global power status. The availability of delivery systems might also be a limiting factor for the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Since 2010, Pakistan has carried out the Azm-i-Nau (New Resolve) series of military exercises to test changes made to meet the challenge posed by India’s Cold Start doctrine. These exercises have proved that Pakistan could effectively counter Cold Start–type operations with conventional forces. However, as the gap between Indian and Pakistani conventional forces continues to widen in India’s favor, and as Pakistan remains engaged in prolonged counterterrorism operations in various parts of the country, the Pakistan Army’s conventional response to Cold Start may not be sufficient in the future. Introducing a short-range battlefield nuclear weapon system like the Nasr provides reassurance in case conventional deterrence fails or India embarks on an adventurist policy, as suggested by some Indian cabinet ministers in the aftermath of an Indian special forces operation in Myanmar.

Weapons like the Nasr have enhanced Pakistan’s options and complicated Indian calculations for conventional military incursions into Pakistan. Indian planners cannot ignore battlefield nuclear weapons, despite the dismissive attitude displayed by former chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board Shyam Saran and other Indian security analysts. Pakistan’s nuclear forces will maintain their present configuration to cover the whole spectrum of threats with a variety of nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the foreseeable future, barring drastic changes in the overall security environment or a major improvement in India-Pakistan relations.



CONCLUSION

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will grow in the short term, but that growth will not be unbridled and will certainly be far less than suggested in some recent studies.27 Pakistan will likely maintain its current inventory of solid fueled missiles: the Ghaznavi (Hatf-III), various versions of the Shaheen-1 (Hatf-V), the Shaheen-2 (Hatf-VI), the cruise missile Babur (Hatf-VII), the air-delivered cruise missile Raad (Hatf-VIII), and the Shaheen-3 (Hatf-X), plus short-range missiles like the Nasr (Hatf-IX) and some improved version of the Abdali (Hatf-II). It is possible that the liquid-fueled Ghauri (Hatf-IV) will be retired from service by 2025.

Contrary to the specter that full spectrum deterrence—an unfamiliar term in nuclear jargon—necessitates a very large arsenal, Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence arsenal will be modest in size, albeit with a wide variety of delivery systems, including short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft delivery systems. One can also not rule out the possibility of a significant improvement in India-Pakistan relations, which would mitigate the incentives and pressures for Pakistan to build and maintain a larger arsenal.



................................
Brigadier Naeem Salik (retired) is a senior fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies. Before his retirement from the Pakistani military, he served as director of arms control and disarmament affairs in the Strategic Plans Division, the secretariat of Pakistan’s National Command Authority.

 

[litman]

we have been hearing that pak has the fastest growing arsenal in the world since 10 years or so. in 2010 they used to claim that pak has 100- 110 nuclear weapons and is adding about 20 warheads per year. now in 2020 they say that pak has 140-150 nucear weapons. so as per their claims in 2010 pak should have added 200 weapons in 10 years but they managed to add only 40-50 at max. i think this is just a propaganda against pak which says pak has fastest growing nuclear weapons arsenal.

 

[Broccoli]

we have been hearing that pak has the fastest growing arsenal in the world since 10 years or so. in 2010 they used to claim that pak has 100- 110 nuclear weapons and is adding about 20 warheads per year. now in 2020 they say that pak has 140-150 nucear weapons. so as per their claims in 2010 pak should have added 200 weapons in 10 years but they managed to add only 40-50 at max. i think this is just a propaganda against pak which says pak has fastest growing nuclear weapons arsenal.

Well, it's fasted if nobody else has added up that many per capita.

 

[ghazi52]

Pakistan Test-fires 1,500 km "Ghauri" Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)

6 April 1998

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has successfully tested-fired a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), designated the "Ghauri".

The flight test took place at 7:23 a.m. PST (+5 GMT) on Monday morning, 6 April 1998. The missile, launched from an unspecified site, covered a distance of 1,100 kilometres and reached its unspecified target location in 9 minutes and 58 seconds. Later in the morning, the Prime Minister of Pakistan told the National Defence College in Rawalpindi that Pakistan had test-fired a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 1,500 kilometres and a payload of 700 kilograms

"Our scientists and engineers, by their perseverance, high sense of commitment and exemplary skill, have shown that Pakistan had mastered complex technologies," said the Prime Minister. "They know that the entire nation is proud of their achievement," he added.

The Foreign Ministry followed the Prime Minister and issued a brief press statement announcing the successful launch of Hatf-V (Ghauri) missile. It weighed 16 tonnes with 14 tonnes of fuel and covered an impact range of 1,100 kilometres. India already has tested a similar surface-to-surface missile, which is also believed capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. When India tested its missile, Pakistan warned that a missile arms race on the subcontinent could result.

``As part of our integrated missile research and development program, Pakistan today carried out a successful flight test of the surface-to-surface missile, the Hatf-V (Ghauri) with a range of 1,500 kilometers (900 miles) and a payload of 700 kilograms (1,500 pounds),'' the Foreign Ministry statement said.

``This test represents a step forward in Pakistan's indigenous missile and satellite launch program,'' the statement said.

Foreign Ministry spokesman, Tariq Altaf, outlined Pakistan's need for enhancing its defence capability in the wake of India's growing belligerence. The written statement he read before journalists and the subsequent briefing articulated Pakistan's position on the issue. The first point, emphasized both in the written statement and the briefing, was that it was an entirely "indigenous effort."

"The test represents a step forward in Pakistan's indigenous missile and satellite launch programmes," said the statement. In the next paragraph, while talking about 'the dedication and commitment of scientists and engineers,' the statement once again recalled that "Pakistan has achieved its indigenous missile capability".

It was the growing need for strengthening the national defence, more than any past glory, that made Pakistan take "another step forward" in missile technology. "It primarily relates to our security needs which are of fundamental importance to us," said the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry at a press conference called to formally announce the launching of Ghauri.

"Our sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest are sacrosanct," said the spokesman.

The prime minister also stressed this point when he spoke of the country's "credible indigenous missile capability". The need to emphasise the indigenous nature of Pakistan's missile programme aimed to pre-empt the Indian response which predictably alleged Chinese assistance in Pakistan's development of Ghauri.

A reporter raised this issue at the briefing as well when he asked the spokesman if the Ghauri missile was based on the Chinese M-11. "No, the entire work has been done by our scientists and engineers" and the missile has been developed from local material. Most of the questions asked at the briefing sought two clarifications: What was the need to develop the missile and was it directed against India?

The spokesman reminded journalists of India's own missile programme when talking about the need for developing Ghauri. He spoke of "multiple tests of all kinds of missiles by India - Agni, Nag, Prithvi and Surya" - and told reporters that Pakistan had been "constantly drawing world's attention towards developments in the region".

The spokesman also touched on this issue and reminded the world that the new Indian government had openly declared its intention to acquire nuclear weapons. When a reporter asked if Ghauri was capable of carrying nuclear weapons, he said: "My understanding is that anything that flies can carry any payload."

Asked how many missiles Pakistan needed to defend itself, the spokesman said the need was linked to the threat perceptions. Without naming India, he said such perceptions stemmed from empirical evidence (of threats from an adversary) and the assessment of (the enemy's) intentions. He said empirical evidence of Pakistan's threat perceptions were well-known while "the intentions remain unquantifiable".

He said it was a pity that Prithvi had been deployed by "our next door neighbour". Pakistan, he said, was disappointed and expressed concern at the Indian move. Another issue raised repeatedly during the briefing was that of the impact of the test-fire on the regional situation, particularly Pakistan's relations with India. When a reporter asked the spokesman if Pakistan still wanted to continue bilateral talks, he said: "We are ready to go an extra mile for regional peace and security."

When asked about international repercussions of the test, the spokesman said: "It is our right to conduct scientific research and we have scientists to do so. There are no international laws that prevent indigenous development of missiles and scientific research."

Asked to assess the impact of the test-fire on Pakistan-US relations, Altaf said he was sure the United States would "understand our security concerns and compulsions in the region. "We hope that the US would understand the threat we face and is aware and acutely conscious of what has been taking place across the border."

The test apparently was not conducted at the Kahuta nuclear research laboratory, near Islamabad as is widely believed. It is widely thought that the site of detonation was somewhere in the province of Baluchistan whereas the launch-site was somewhere the province of Punjab. The site remains "classified" but the test was carried in Pakistan.

The missile is named after a 12th Century Muslim king Shahabuddin Ghauri who established a Muslim dynasty in India and defeated Prithvi Raj Chauhan, the Hindu king that the Indian Prithvi missile is named after.

Informed sources say that it was a three-stage indigenously-built missile, which Pakistan test-fired for its research and development purposes. "We have no immediate plans to go for its serial production with induction in the military," said a highly-placed source.

The test-firing of this missile of Hatf family was being delayed since November last. The test-firing was rescheduled for last January, but it was postponed for a number of reasons. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif congratulated renowned Pakistani scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan of Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), for producing the missile.

It is learnt that the approval of this test-fire was accorded by the recently-held Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC). Informed circles reveal that the missile was tested overland, and it rose to about 350 kilometers before descending. It hit the impact range of 1,100 kilometers, though the total flight of the missile was 1,500 kilometers. Sources say that Ghauri missile can be fired from a mobile platform, and it can hit several major Indian cities, including its capital, New Delhi, and commercial capital, Mumbai.

Pakistan, said one official, has demonstrated its scientific and technological prowess in response to the growing threat from India: First, the breaking of sound barrier by an Indian aircraft; two, storage of surface-to-surface ballistic Prithvi missile close to Pakistani borders; and three, India's new Hindu nationalist government had recently announced an agenda to develop nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, the US Congressional Research Service says about the Indian missile programme that India began serial production of its Prithvi tactical missiles as early as mid-1995. The same report says that Pakistan may respond with the deployment of its own system.

India tested a Prithvi-II version in late January 1996 with a suitable range and payload for the delivery of nuclear warheads. The report says that both Indian and Pakistani missiles are presumed to have a dual-use capability of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads. "If such missiles are deployed by either country, however, the other is likely to assume the worst and seek a countervailing capability," says the US Congressional report.

Another report by the Asian Studies Centre of the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, says that India was inducting the indigenously developed 150-mile-range Prithvi to reserve army units. This is a liquid-fueled, mobile missile. In October 1995 India had 40 to 50 Prithvi missiles and intended to build up to 80. According to the same report, Pakistan began the development of Hatf missiles in the early 1980s. The first was tested in 1989. The Hatf-1 has a range of 50 miles, Hatf-2 185 miles and Hatf-3 375 miles.

 

[ghazi52]

Ghauri Missile Specifications:

- The missile has a range of 1500 kms with a payload of 700 kg.

- The missile, which was fired at 7.23 am, successfully covered a distance of of 1,100 km (including a 350 km curved trajectory ascent) before turning its direction towards its designated target.

- The travel time of the missile was 9 minutes and 58 seconds.

- The fuel consumption of the missile was 14,000 kg (14 tonnes).

- The total weight of the missile is 16,000 kg (16 tonnes).

 

[ghazi52]

Pakistan can N-tip missiles better: Expert

17 January 2000

NEW YORK: Pakistan is better equipped to put nuclear warheads on missiles and launch them than India, says an American expert on South Asia who recently wrote a book on India's nuclear bomb.

``Pakistan today has a better capacity to put nuclear warheads and launch them,'' George Perkovich says in an interview to be published in the upcoming edition of American magazine.

``Pakistan has two competing missile programmes which wasn't known until recently. The A Q Khan labs have the Ghauri missile assisted by North Korea. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Organisation has missiles too assisted by China. They're racing against each other for money and prestige, for the title of great providers of Pakistan's strategic might,'' he says.

 

[ghazi52]

Hatf-I ballistic missile test-fired successfully

8 February 2000

Missile can carry greater payload, destroy targets up to 100 km using variety of warheads; neighbours informed in advance

By Raja Zulfikar & Shakil Shaikh

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan test-fired on Monday another indigenously built Hatf-I surface-to-surface ballistic missile, which has a short range but which can carry greater payload and has a far-improved accuracy.

A Foreign Ministry statement described the testing as successful and said all parameters were validated. "The test was a sequel to several related tests conducted in previous years," it said.

The unexpected test-firing of Hatf-I was only confirmed in the afternoon by government officials, who said the newly-designed missile could successfully destroy targets at up to 100 kilometres, using a variety of warheads. All countries bordering Pakistan were informed of the Hatf test in advance.

Monday's test comes less than a year of the test-firing of Shaheen (Hatf-IV) nuclear capable surface-to-surface missile with a medium range of 600 kilometres. Before testing Shaheen, Pakistan had test-fired Ghauri-II. "Hatf-I is an indigenous effort and contributes significantly to Pakistan's national security and deterrence strategy," the Foreign Ministry statement said in the post-test reaction. It, however, gave no further details.

The place, where the test-firing was conducted remained a matter of guessing till late afternoon as government officials chose not to mention the site of the tests. Ghauri-II was fired from Tilla Jogian (Jhelum), while Shaheen's test was made from Sonmiani base some 50 kilometres from Karachi.

"The key aspect of the test of Hatf-I is that it surely has confirmed that it has an enhanced capability of carrying a varying capacity of warheads," a senior official said in his comment. "The main feature of today's test is not the range but its other capabilities," he said.

Monday's test of Hatf-I caught even senior government officials unaware, as they expressed surprise when told that Pakistan had carried out the test. "The decision to do the testing was probably made suddenly," one of them thought.

In recent times, South Asian region echoed with tit-for-tat testing first of nuclear devices and then of missile testing from May 1998 to April 15, 1999 when New Delhi detonated nuclear explosions on May 11, 1998.

To respond, Islamabad went for similar nuclear tests 17 days later when on May 28, 1998 six nuclear devices were detonated from Chaghi, Balochistan.

About a year later, in the middle of April 1999 India chose to test-fire an extended version of its Agni missile (Agni-II), which the Army Chief, General Pervaiz Musharraf, had described as an indirect aggression on Pakistan.

Immediately afterwards, Islamabad chose to test Ghauri-II, the intermediate range ballistic missile, fired from Tilla Jogian, which reached the reduced target of Jeewani town in Balochistan in hardly 12 minutes.

The Ghauri-II test was followed by the maiden testing of Shaheen series, specifically Hatf-IV, with which Pakistan temporarily closed further testing, saying it had concluded, for then, the series of SSM flight tests involving solid and liquid fuel rocket motor technologies.

Shaheen originally had a full range of 750 kilometres but the April 1999 test was officially put at 600 kilometres with a payload of 1,000 kg. Shaheen has a smaller range of that of Ghauri-II.

Ghauri-II with an optimum range of 2,000-2,300 km was test-fired with a reduced target range of 1,165 km because of territorial strains. Ghauri-II can be fired from a mobile launching system from anywhere in Pakistan.

The test-firing of Shaheen was aimed at attaining precision in missile technology. It is a more sophisticated weapon, which uses solid fuel and is terminal-guided. It is capable of being armed with any type of warhead, conventional or nuclear.

Soon after the test of Shaheen, Pakistani scientists predicted that this would contribute to the development of the then on-going Hatf-II and Hatf-III series, as well as Pakistan's satellite and space programmes.

The successful test-firing of Hatf-I is being described as a display of "upper edge" the country has in missile capabilities against its enemy - India.

"We can respond very well to threatening statements from across the border," said a senior official. "Vajpayee's statement is one of the ongoing series of such statements," he added.

In the recent past, India has continuously been conducting missile testing of various ranges and capabilities, including Agni-I and Agni-II (intermediate range ballistic missile - IRBM), Nag, Trishul, Akash, and Prithvi.

In April 1999, further test of the Prithvi's 350km naval version and 250km air-force version were announced, while the 150km-range version has been with Indian army units for several years. These units were initially based at Jullundur, close to the border with Pakistan.

India has almost deployed such missiles on the basis of launch-on-warning strategy and Pakistan has to make minimum arrangements to counter such threats.

Some reports suggest that Prithvi and other Indian missiles are deployed close to Pakistani border, which can be operationalised within 3 to 4 minutes.

India is also planning to conduct a test-fire of "Danish", a naval version, and it is continuing to pursue its missile development programme by ignoring all the international calls to restraint.

On its part, Pakistan has a battery of indigenous missiles for its security: Surface-to-surface Ghauri-II with an announced maximum range of 2,300 km if the payload is reduced from 1,000 to around 700 kilogrammes; Ghauri-I (surface-to-surface) with a range of 1,500 km and a payload of 700 kilogrammes; Shaheen-II (surface-to-surface) with a planned range of 2,300 kilometres and payload of 1,000 kilogrammes, Shaheen-I (surface-to-surface) with a range of 750 km; and Anza-I and Anza-II (surface-to-air) missiles.

 

[ghazi52]

Pak range of missiles give it edge over India

July 2000

By Mahendra Vaid

NEW DELHI: India could easily take on Pakistan in a conventional warfare, but the neighbouring country's acquisition of missiles -- "stolen, borrowed or purchased outright" -- give it an edge, top serving military officials have said.

"Pakistan has a good, calibrated range of missiles in its possession, whatever their source, and it is using them deftly to make up for its lack of strategic depth," a senior military official said at a seminar on the veracity of an NBC report from the United States assessing that Pakistan's missile programme is superior to that of India.

The serving military officials participated in the seminar, organised by the Security and Political Risk Analysis (SAPRA), a non-official think tank here, on condition of staying off the record.

As for the purpose behind the missile programme, a participant said it was a matter of guesswork whether it was war prevention, as claimed officially by successive Pakistani governments, or "war conclusion".

Information about the actual numbers is either published or a matter of conjecture. The generally agreed estimate is that Pakistan has the Chinese M-11, called Hatf III, with a range of 150 KM, which was a response to India's Prithvi. Shahin I is the Chinese M-9 missile and Ghauri is a replica of the Nodong missile of North Korea. Shahin II was aimed at both the country's north and the south, to be upgraded and deployed at will. This allowed for a strong element of surprise.

The participants at the seminar, both experts and laypersons, strongly felt that India must draw positive lessons from the NBC report and move ahead with its plans, irrespective of pressures from the big powers.

The motive behind the report, some felt, was to "prick" both India and Pakistan and keep them engaged in an arms race. The other was scare one against the other and coax both to fall in line with the international missile control regime and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

None among the participants was willing to accept the Chinese and North Korean denials. They felt that while Korea did it for money, it suited China to contain India by helping the missile and nuclear development programmes of neighbours inimical to India. It was and remains a low-cost strategy to "contain" India.

The Ghauri, fired in early 1998, took India by surprise. A few weeks later, it was India's turn to surprise Pakistan and the world with nuclear tests at Pokhran in May. Pakistan responded the same month-end.

This has accelerated the arms race in South Asia. There was no use wishing it away since it was "already there" and had become "inevitable". "It is time to look ahead with determination," the participants felt.

Was it with the connivance of the nuclear powers, especially the U.S., that the two countries went nuclear? A serving military official, in Washington when the tests were conducted, raised this question, leading to an animated debate.

What should India's response be? The consensus was that an economically strong and politically stable India, possessing "comprehensive national strength", should have no problem in countering any threat to its security.

There were cautions about the Indian response being Pakistan-centric when security threats came from Chinese and other directions as well.

Officials and academics felt that India had much more at stake than Pakistan and thus it should work to avoid a war -- but not ignore the adversary as many pacifists advocate.

Among those who participated at the seminar on Saturday were Maj. Gen. (rtd) Ashok Mehta, Air Commodore (rtd) Prashant Dikshit, Prof Ashwini Ray of the JNU, Gp. Capt. (rtd) Praful Bakshi and Indraneel Banerjee, Director of SAPRA.

 

[ghazi52]

Dr I. H. Usmani







Dr. Usmani also played a pivotal role in establishing the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH), now a leading establishment for research, training and capacity building. - File Image

Pakistan’s eminent physicist, Dr I. H Usmani was among the pioneers of nuclear energy and technology in Pakistan. He was an effective administrator, visionary, mentor and a tireless perfectionist.


Ishrat Hussain Usmani was born on April 15, 1917. He graduated in Science from the Muslim University in Aligharh and did his Masters in Physics from Bombay University.

In 1939, young Usmani moved to Imperial College, University of London for a doctorate. He wrote his thesis entitled “A study of the growth of compound crystals by electron diffraction” under the supervision of renowned physicist Niels Bohr – The Nobel laureate and founder of the atomic model.

He was also taught by G P Thomson, the Nobel laureate son of Professor J. J Thomson. Interestingly, he did his PhD in Physics within two years; he was only 23-years-old when he successfully finished his PhD.

In 1942, He also passed the Indian Civil Services (ICS) examination with distinctions and served as District Officers at Madras Presidency from 1942-47.

After the independence, Dr. Usmani moved to Pakistan where he was appointed as chief controller of imports and exports and served in various Governmental designations.


A visionary for nuclear science and technology

In 1959, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto – then a young minister of Ayub Khan’s Cabinet – appointed I. H. Usmani as a member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PEAC) and upon the request of President Ayub Khan, took charge of the chairmanship of the PEAC in 1960.
Almost immediately, Dr. I. Usmani worked towards enhancing the PEAC as a world renowned organization. He used various practical and innovative strategies in a scientific manner to develop high-class manpower, up-to-date instruments and state-of-the-art facilities.

He selected 50 individuals with masters’ degrees in Physics, Chemistry, Engineering and Geology on merit basis for the orientation of the nuclear science and technology program. These scientists were named Officers on Special Training (OSTs) and then sent abroad for doctoral and post-doctoral research in esteemed universities and institutes abroad. For this vision, Usmani put in immense effort and resources; using even his personal contacts all across the world.

He produced at least 400 bright minds in various disciplines of nuclear sciences and technology in a very short span. It was then that the well-educated and dedicated team of experts ushered in a new era of research and development in the country. He was the only person in Pakistan’s history to have created the largest galaxy of experts in nuclear-related fields.

As a strong proponent of peaceful usage of nuclear technology, he launched multi-dimensional programs to produce nuclear energy, research and development to address national needs by using radio isotopes in health, agriculture and industry.

Dr. I. Usmani fully utilized the services of OSTs and established nuclear centers in Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Tando Jam, Dhaka, Chittagong, Memon Singh.

These state-of-the-art centers paved the way for research and development in metallurgy, agriculture and the health industry with the help of nuclear technology. Even today, the country-wide cluster of nuclear diagnostic centers, the new variety of crops and precision engineering are fruits of his vision and efforts.
Dr. Usmani also served as vice-chairman of the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO); setting the foundation of the country’s national space agency.

He also played a pivotal role in establishing the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH), now a leading establishment for research, training and capacity building – Dr. Usmani spent many a late night on this, his dream.

As a determined leader, he enthused world renowned architect Edward Stone to design and construct the PINSTECH building. Edward Stone fused eastern architecture with the modern labs building; giving it a likeness to the Taj Mahal. The building was dubbed as “Best of both the worlds” by Time Magazine. It also holds a research reactor.

Dr I. H Usmani left the PEAC in 1971 and turned the commission into the world’s leading research organisation for the peaceful utilisation of nuclear power.

He also negotiated with international bodies – like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – for the first ever nuclear power plant of Pakistan. After years of hard work, he finally succeeded to develop the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) which is also the first ever commercial nuclear reactor of the Islamic world.

Dr I. H Usmani presented the idea of Scientific Services, parallel to the Civil Service of Pakistan. He was a strong supporter in wanting to attain energy for the country needs and a pioneer of the Pakistan Science Foundation, the government agency for the promotion of Science and Technology; thus unquestionably making him among the founder of Pakistan’s scientific infrastructure.

He was also elected as the chairman of the board of governors for the IAEA and headed many conferences entitled “Atom for Peace”. He was then appointed as UN’s Senior Energy Advisor from 1974-78 when he did comprehensive surveys of renewable energy particularly in developing states.

Dr. Usmani established two regional centers of alternative energy in Senegal and Sri Lanka. He was a strong advocate of the non-conventional ways of producing energy and dedicated the last days of his life for the same cause.

Dr. I. H. Usmani also served as a Secretary General of the BCCI, International Foundation for the New and Emerging Sciences and Technologies (NEST).
Dr Abdus Salam always said: “Science is the common heritage of mankind”, surely as scientist Dr. Usmani was a heritage of all humanity. He breathed his last on June 17, 1992.