Titanium100
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Is it possible to reach 5000-7000 warheads by 2050
Pakistan Nuclear Forces
- Thread starter ghazi52
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ghazi52
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Pakistan is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but does have its civil power reactors and two research reactors (PARR 1&2) under item-specific IAEA safeguards.
An agreement for two further 340 MWe reactors – Chashma 3 & 4 – came into force in April 2011. In March 2017 the IAEA approved Pakistan’s request to apply international safeguards to both Karachi Coastal units, and the agreement on this came into force in May. Pakistan has refused calls for international inspections of its enrichment activities.
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said in May 2018: "Unlike India, Pakistan has barely separated its civil and military nuclear facilities and in general remains highly secretive about its nuclear program. The opaqueness of Pakistan's nuclear program, its expanding nuclear weapons arsenal, and its refusal to separate its military and civilian nuclear program are cited as reasons by many countries opposing Pakistan's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), as well as [opposing] any country supplying it with additional nuclear power reactors or other fuel cycle facilities or capabilities. Such supply is viewed by many countries as a violation of NSG guidelines."
Pakistan's Kahuta project (incorporating Project-706) to produce a uranium bomb was launched in 1972, following a disastrous war with India. It was partly financed by Libya to 1979. In May 1974 India exploded a nuclear test close to the Pakistan border, galvanising Pakistani efforts. The project was disbanded in 1983 after a successful cold test of weapons components.
In May 1998 Pakistan exploded five atomic devices in Baluchistan. At least one was evidently made from enriched uranium, but the Chagai II test in Kharan desert used plutonium produced by New Labs.
Pakistan is reported to be the sole nation blocking agreement of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in Geneva negotiations.
Through the activities of Dr Khan, a centrifuge plant and nuclear weapons designs were secretly supplied to Libya from the late 1990s to 2003 to help build a weapons program there. He also transferred centrifuge technology to North Korea in the 1990s, and to Iran. This is the main basis for the NSG refusing to ease nuclear trade sanctions for Pakistan, as it has for India. China is the only country to act in defiance of trade sanctions, and has deepened cooperation since the international US-led concessions to India in 2008. This is most obvious in 2013 agreements to build the twin-unit Karachi Coastal power plant and the CNNC contract with PAEC for lifetime fuel supply for this.
Addressing the 3rd Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague in March 2014, the prime minister said that Pakistan had been running a safe and secure nuclear program for over four decades with the expertise, manpower and infrastructure to produce civil nuclear energy. He called for Pakistan’s inclusion in all international export control regimes, especially the NSG. He pointed out that international treaties and forums would supplement Pakistan’s national actions to fortify nuclear security.
Domestically, he said that today the country’s nuclear security is supported by five pillars – a strong command and control system led by the National Command Authority (NCA); an integrated intelligence system; a rigorous regulatory regime; a comprehensive export control regime; and active international cooperation. The security regime covers physical protection, material control and accounting, border controls and radiological emergencies, he said.
Pakistan is a major recipient of technical cooperation from the IAEA, and is one of 35 members of the IAEA Board of Governors, though it remains outside the NPT.
An agreement for two further 340 MWe reactors – Chashma 3 & 4 – came into force in April 2011. In March 2017 the IAEA approved Pakistan’s request to apply international safeguards to both Karachi Coastal units, and the agreement on this came into force in May. Pakistan has refused calls for international inspections of its enrichment activities.
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said in May 2018: "Unlike India, Pakistan has barely separated its civil and military nuclear facilities and in general remains highly secretive about its nuclear program. The opaqueness of Pakistan's nuclear program, its expanding nuclear weapons arsenal, and its refusal to separate its military and civilian nuclear program are cited as reasons by many countries opposing Pakistan's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), as well as [opposing] any country supplying it with additional nuclear power reactors or other fuel cycle facilities or capabilities. Such supply is viewed by many countries as a violation of NSG guidelines."
Pakistan's Kahuta project (incorporating Project-706) to produce a uranium bomb was launched in 1972, following a disastrous war with India. It was partly financed by Libya to 1979. In May 1974 India exploded a nuclear test close to the Pakistan border, galvanising Pakistani efforts. The project was disbanded in 1983 after a successful cold test of weapons components.
In May 1998 Pakistan exploded five atomic devices in Baluchistan. At least one was evidently made from enriched uranium, but the Chagai II test in Kharan desert used plutonium produced by New Labs.
Pakistan is reported to be the sole nation blocking agreement of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in Geneva negotiations.
Through the activities of Dr Khan, a centrifuge plant and nuclear weapons designs were secretly supplied to Libya from the late 1990s to 2003 to help build a weapons program there. He also transferred centrifuge technology to North Korea in the 1990s, and to Iran. This is the main basis for the NSG refusing to ease nuclear trade sanctions for Pakistan, as it has for India. China is the only country to act in defiance of trade sanctions, and has deepened cooperation since the international US-led concessions to India in 2008. This is most obvious in 2013 agreements to build the twin-unit Karachi Coastal power plant and the CNNC contract with PAEC for lifetime fuel supply for this.
Addressing the 3rd Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague in March 2014, the prime minister said that Pakistan had been running a safe and secure nuclear program for over four decades with the expertise, manpower and infrastructure to produce civil nuclear energy. He called for Pakistan’s inclusion in all international export control regimes, especially the NSG. He pointed out that international treaties and forums would supplement Pakistan’s national actions to fortify nuclear security.
Domestically, he said that today the country’s nuclear security is supported by five pillars – a strong command and control system led by the National Command Authority (NCA); an integrated intelligence system; a rigorous regulatory regime; a comprehensive export control regime; and active international cooperation. The security regime covers physical protection, material control and accounting, border controls and radiological emergencies, he said.
Pakistan is a major recipient of technical cooperation from the IAEA, and is one of 35 members of the IAEA Board of Governors, though it remains outside the NPT.
ghazi52
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Pakistan’s Missile Arsenal (Land, Air & Sea) both Conventional & Nuclear
By
Admin PSF
Exclusive Report on Pakistan's Missile Arsenal (Land, Air & Sea) both Conventional & Nuclear Warheads
HATF-1
Hatf-1 is a battlefield range, solid fueled missile. It is a single stage ballistic missile. It can deliver a payload of 500 kg over a range of 80-100 kilometres. This missile was developed by SUPARCO in a collaboration with KRL. During 1980s, Pakistan started working on Hatf-1 Missile. On 5 Feb, 1989, Pakistan tested Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles, which COAS General Aslam Beig declared successful. According to sources, these missiles are derived from M-11 missiles acquired from China.
Clearing all doubts on the M-11 transfer, General Mirza Aslam Beg said,
“In regards with the M-11 missile system that Pakistan is acquiring from China, it is covered within the six nation agreement on Missile Technology Control to which China is a signatory. The missile has a range of less than 300 kilometres and is not capable of carrying a nuclear warhead”.
Variants of HATF-1
Hatf-1 has Two Varients
Hatf-1A
Hatf-1B
During further tests, its accuracy was also increased & some guidance system improvements were added.
HATF-II (Abdali)
Abdali is a modified version of Hatf-I. It is a Short-Range Ballistic Missile. It has a range of 180-200 kilometres with a capability of delivery 250-450 kg Warhead. It is a Single Stage, Solid Fueled Missile. It can carry Conventional as well as Nuclear Warhead.
As displayed in Military Parades, it is carried on a Road Mobile Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle.
The use of solid propellant & TEL vehicle makes the missile easy to store, transport & fire.
Western experts have varying opinions about the development of these Hatf Missiles. Some believe SUPARCO had obtained technology from the French company Aerospatiale (formerly Sud Aviation) in the early to mid-1980s. These French transfers most likely included propellant ingredients, rocket components, equipment for solid-fuel casting, curing & solid-rocket testing facilities while others believe that the short time frame forced SUPARCO scientists to simply copy the French Dauphin & Eridan sounding rockets for the Hatf-I & Hatf-II, respectively.
In response to India’s demonstration of the Prithvi Ballistic Missile, in February 1989, Pakistan tested the two Hatf missiles and declared the tests a success, prompting Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to congratulate the nation for “Entering the Missile Age”.
Hatf-III (Ghaznavi)
Hatf-III is a Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM). It uses a single engine & a solid propellant Engine. It can deliver both Conventional & Nuclear Warheads. Its characteristics includes:
Basing: Road-mobile
Length: 8.5 m
Diameter: 0.8 m
Launch Weight: 4,650 kg
Payload: Single Warhead 700 kg
Warhead: HE, sub munitions, 12-20 kT Nuclear
Propulsion: Single-stage solid propellant
Range: 290 km
Status: Operational
In service: Since 2004
Accoridng to SIPRI YB’18, Pakistan has 16 deployed launchers of Ghaznavi Missiles with 12kT per warhead.
Hatf-IV Shaheen-1/1A
Shaheen-I is supersonic & highly accurate short-to-medium range Surface-to-Surface Guided Ballistic Missile. It was developed by the joint venture of NESCOM & National Defense Complex. This missile uses Solid Fuel Propellants unlike Ghauri, it has high availability & it’s deployment time is too short that there is no need to refuel it before launching. This missile has two solid state engines along with post-separation attitude correction system (a system which uses small thrust nozzles to correct the trajectory of warhead). This system provides it a high accuracy around 25 to 50 m of CEP. It can carry nuclear warhead as well, weighing around 1000 KG.
Characteristics
Mass:Shaheen-I (9,500 kg), Shaheen-IA (10,000 kg)
Length:12m
Diameter: 1.0m
Warhead: 1000 kg Single Warhead
Engine:Solid-Fuel Rocket
Propellant: Solid-Fuel
Operational Range: Shaheen (750km) Shaheen-I (900km) Shaheen-IA (1000km)
Launch Platform: Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), spaceport.
Hatf-V (Ghauri)
Ghauri is a single stage, Liquid Fueled Ballistic Missile. it is designed to be Medium Range Ballistic Missile. This missile is based on North Korean Nodong Missile. Ghauri was last time tested on October 8, 2018. this missile has a range of 1300 kilometres & can carry both Conventional & Nuclear Warheads.
Missile was tested for the first time on April 6, 1998, according to sources some North Korean scientists were also present during the Missile Test. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Pyongyang on December,30, 1994 & penned a contract to purchase Nodong Missiles & the technical design data.
Hatf-VI (Shaheen II)
Shaheen-II is a land-based supersonic surface-to-surface medium-range guided ballistic missile. Shaheen-II is jointly developed by the NESCOM & National Defence Complex. It has been operational in Pakistan Army with the tag of longest range of 2750 Km(Shaheen III) with maximum load(hence range can be increased with reducing the mass of warhead).
Shaheen layed the test bed for MIRV capable Ababeel Missile which is under development. Shaheen-III has two stage rocket motor with solid propellants. It flies at extreme height of 300Km, it’s warhead changes it’s trajectory several times hence giving no room for anti ballistic missile systems to intercept it. High altitude with multiple guidance systems & post-separation attitude correction system, Shaheen is supposed to have “Surgical Precision”.
Characteristics
Mass: 25,000 kg
Warhead: 1,050 kg
Length: 17.5 m
Diameter: 1.4 m
Warhead: Conventional high-Explosive or Strategic Nuclear Warhead
Engine: Two-stage solid-fuel rocket motor
Operational Range: 2,750 km
Flight altitude: 300 km
Guidance System: Inertial navigation system GPS satellite guidance
Launch Platform: Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL)
Hatf-VII (Babur)
In response to Indian Brahmos Cruise Missile, Pakistan also started working on a cruise missile. Babur is a short-range turbojet powered subsonic cruise missile that can be launched from land or underwater seaborne platforms. Babur-I and Babur-II uses Land while Babur-III uses Submarine as launching platform. During Initial tests of Babur missile, Only one tube was used, Later on. Multiple tubes were used.
According to some analysts, Pakistan Developed Babur Cruise Missile from US Tomahawk Missile, which US fired in Afghanistan but unfortunately due to some technical error , few missiles fell on Pakistani soil. Pakistan did reverse engineering & produced Babur Cruise Missile while some say that these missiles are based on Chinese DH-10 Missile.
On August 20, 1998 several U.S. Tomahawk missiles (TLAMs) were fired from the Arabian Sea to target camps in Afghanistan in response to an attack on U.S. embassies in Africa. That night, villagers in Baluchistan reported missiles falling from the skies, as several TLAMs malfunctioned & landed unexploded in Pakistani territory.
Pakistan Army Aviation helicopters carrying a rescue team recovered an unspecified number of TLAMs, although the United States reportedly attempted to retrieve them through the local tribal leaders in Baluchistan but failed. Later on the United States pressured Pakistan to return the fallen Tomahawks but Pakistan denied the possession of these missiles & by late summer relations between the two countries sore further.
Hatf-VIII (Ra’ad)
Hatf-VIII (Ra’ad) is an Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). It has a range of 600 kilometers & can carry Conventional as well as Nuclear warheads. In 2007, Ra’ad was successfully tested using PAF’s Mirage-III EA. Ra’ad’s design is very different from land-based Babur Cruise Missile.
Ra’ad Missile Tests
Hatf-IX (Nasr)
Nasr is a surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missile. It can carry both Conventional & nuclear warheads. Reportedly, it has a range of 70 kilometres. It was emerged in Pakistan’s Missile arsenal in 2011 when it was test fired on April 19, 2011. According to SIPRI YB’18, Pakistan has 24 deployed launchers of Nasr Missiles with 12 kT yield per warhead. 4 Nasr Missiles are loaded on a 8×8 TEL (vehicle).
A Senior Pakistani official Said
“Nasr is meant to pour cold water over India’s Cold Start Doctrine”
By
Admin PSF
Exclusive Report on Pakistan's Missile Arsenal (Land, Air & Sea) both Conventional & Nuclear Warheads
HATF-1
Hatf-1 is a battlefield range, solid fueled missile. It is a single stage ballistic missile. It can deliver a payload of 500 kg over a range of 80-100 kilometres. This missile was developed by SUPARCO in a collaboration with KRL. During 1980s, Pakistan started working on Hatf-1 Missile. On 5 Feb, 1989, Pakistan tested Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles, which COAS General Aslam Beig declared successful. According to sources, these missiles are derived from M-11 missiles acquired from China.
Clearing all doubts on the M-11 transfer, General Mirza Aslam Beg said,
“In regards with the M-11 missile system that Pakistan is acquiring from China, it is covered within the six nation agreement on Missile Technology Control to which China is a signatory. The missile has a range of less than 300 kilometres and is not capable of carrying a nuclear warhead”.
Variants of HATF-1
Hatf-1 has Two Varients
Hatf-1A
Hatf-1B
During further tests, its accuracy was also increased & some guidance system improvements were added.
HATF-II (Abdali)
Abdali is a modified version of Hatf-I. It is a Short-Range Ballistic Missile. It has a range of 180-200 kilometres with a capability of delivery 250-450 kg Warhead. It is a Single Stage, Solid Fueled Missile. It can carry Conventional as well as Nuclear Warhead.
As displayed in Military Parades, it is carried on a Road Mobile Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle.
The use of solid propellant & TEL vehicle makes the missile easy to store, transport & fire.
Western experts have varying opinions about the development of these Hatf Missiles. Some believe SUPARCO had obtained technology from the French company Aerospatiale (formerly Sud Aviation) in the early to mid-1980s. These French transfers most likely included propellant ingredients, rocket components, equipment for solid-fuel casting, curing & solid-rocket testing facilities while others believe that the short time frame forced SUPARCO scientists to simply copy the French Dauphin & Eridan sounding rockets for the Hatf-I & Hatf-II, respectively.
In response to India’s demonstration of the Prithvi Ballistic Missile, in February 1989, Pakistan tested the two Hatf missiles and declared the tests a success, prompting Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to congratulate the nation for “Entering the Missile Age”.
Hatf-III (Ghaznavi)
Hatf-III is a Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM). It uses a single engine & a solid propellant Engine. It can deliver both Conventional & Nuclear Warheads. Its characteristics includes:
Basing: Road-mobile
Length: 8.5 m
Diameter: 0.8 m
Launch Weight: 4,650 kg
Payload: Single Warhead 700 kg
Warhead: HE, sub munitions, 12-20 kT Nuclear
Propulsion: Single-stage solid propellant
Range: 290 km
Status: Operational
In service: Since 2004
Accoridng to SIPRI YB’18, Pakistan has 16 deployed launchers of Ghaznavi Missiles with 12kT per warhead.
Hatf-IV Shaheen-1/1A
Shaheen-I is supersonic & highly accurate short-to-medium range Surface-to-Surface Guided Ballistic Missile. It was developed by the joint venture of NESCOM & National Defense Complex. This missile uses Solid Fuel Propellants unlike Ghauri, it has high availability & it’s deployment time is too short that there is no need to refuel it before launching. This missile has two solid state engines along with post-separation attitude correction system (a system which uses small thrust nozzles to correct the trajectory of warhead). This system provides it a high accuracy around 25 to 50 m of CEP. It can carry nuclear warhead as well, weighing around 1000 KG.
Characteristics
Mass:Shaheen-I (9,500 kg), Shaheen-IA (10,000 kg)
Length:12m
Diameter: 1.0m
Warhead: 1000 kg Single Warhead
Engine:Solid-Fuel Rocket
Propellant: Solid-Fuel
Operational Range: Shaheen (750km) Shaheen-I (900km) Shaheen-IA (1000km)
Launch Platform: Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), spaceport.
Hatf-V (Ghauri)
Ghauri is a single stage, Liquid Fueled Ballistic Missile. it is designed to be Medium Range Ballistic Missile. This missile is based on North Korean Nodong Missile. Ghauri was last time tested on October 8, 2018. this missile has a range of 1300 kilometres & can carry both Conventional & Nuclear Warheads.
Missile was tested for the first time on April 6, 1998, according to sources some North Korean scientists were also present during the Missile Test. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Pyongyang on December,30, 1994 & penned a contract to purchase Nodong Missiles & the technical design data.
Hatf-VI (Shaheen II)
Shaheen-II is a land-based supersonic surface-to-surface medium-range guided ballistic missile. Shaheen-II is jointly developed by the NESCOM & National Defence Complex. It has been operational in Pakistan Army with the tag of longest range of 2750 Km(Shaheen III) with maximum load(hence range can be increased with reducing the mass of warhead).
Shaheen layed the test bed for MIRV capable Ababeel Missile which is under development. Shaheen-III has two stage rocket motor with solid propellants. It flies at extreme height of 300Km, it’s warhead changes it’s trajectory several times hence giving no room for anti ballistic missile systems to intercept it. High altitude with multiple guidance systems & post-separation attitude correction system, Shaheen is supposed to have “Surgical Precision”.
Characteristics
Mass: 25,000 kg
Warhead: 1,050 kg
Length: 17.5 m
Diameter: 1.4 m
Warhead: Conventional high-Explosive or Strategic Nuclear Warhead
Engine: Two-stage solid-fuel rocket motor
Operational Range: 2,750 km
Flight altitude: 300 km
Guidance System: Inertial navigation system GPS satellite guidance
Launch Platform: Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL)
Hatf-VII (Babur)
In response to Indian Brahmos Cruise Missile, Pakistan also started working on a cruise missile. Babur is a short-range turbojet powered subsonic cruise missile that can be launched from land or underwater seaborne platforms. Babur-I and Babur-II uses Land while Babur-III uses Submarine as launching platform. During Initial tests of Babur missile, Only one tube was used, Later on. Multiple tubes were used.
According to some analysts, Pakistan Developed Babur Cruise Missile from US Tomahawk Missile, which US fired in Afghanistan but unfortunately due to some technical error , few missiles fell on Pakistani soil. Pakistan did reverse engineering & produced Babur Cruise Missile while some say that these missiles are based on Chinese DH-10 Missile.
On August 20, 1998 several U.S. Tomahawk missiles (TLAMs) were fired from the Arabian Sea to target camps in Afghanistan in response to an attack on U.S. embassies in Africa. That night, villagers in Baluchistan reported missiles falling from the skies, as several TLAMs malfunctioned & landed unexploded in Pakistani territory.
Pakistan Army Aviation helicopters carrying a rescue team recovered an unspecified number of TLAMs, although the United States reportedly attempted to retrieve them through the local tribal leaders in Baluchistan but failed. Later on the United States pressured Pakistan to return the fallen Tomahawks but Pakistan denied the possession of these missiles & by late summer relations between the two countries sore further.
Hatf-VIII (Ra’ad)
Hatf-VIII (Ra’ad) is an Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). It has a range of 600 kilometers & can carry Conventional as well as Nuclear warheads. In 2007, Ra’ad was successfully tested using PAF’s Mirage-III EA. Ra’ad’s design is very different from land-based Babur Cruise Missile.
Ra’ad Missile Tests
- 25th August 2007.
- 8th May 2008.
- 29th April 2011.
- 30th May 2012.
- 2nd February 2015.
- 19th January 2016.
- 18th February 2020 (Ra’ad II) (Range 600 km).
Hatf-IX (Nasr)
Nasr is a surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missile. It can carry both Conventional & nuclear warheads. Reportedly, it has a range of 70 kilometres. It was emerged in Pakistan’s Missile arsenal in 2011 when it was test fired on April 19, 2011. According to SIPRI YB’18, Pakistan has 24 deployed launchers of Nasr Missiles with 12 kT yield per warhead. 4 Nasr Missiles are loaded on a 8×8 TEL (vehicle).
A Senior Pakistani official Said
“Nasr is meant to pour cold water over India’s Cold Start Doctrine”
ghazi52
PDF THINK TANK: ANALYST
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Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command Structure and Responsibilities
BySyed Ali Abbas
Nov 30, 2021
Pakistan’s nuclear command and control system is considered to be sophisticated and balanced. It has civilian and military involvement, checks and balances between the participating institutions, and a clear division of responsibility between the institutions. The system is based on a three-tier structure: The National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the three services’ strategic forces command.
Under the military government of General Musharraf, on 02 February 2000, the National Security Council approved the establishment of the National Command Authority (NCA) the highest decision-making body controlling nuclear command and control system.
The NCA is responsible for nuclear policy formulation and exercises employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. It includes formulating policies, deploying the strategic forces, coordinating the activities of all strategic organizations, negotiating arms control/disarmament, overseeing the implementation of export controls, and safeguarding nuclear assets and sites
NCA further consists of two committees and a division; an Employment Control Committee and a Development Control Committee, as well as the Strategic Plans Division which acts as its Secretariat.
Employment Control Committee
It is chaired by the head of the Government (Prime Minister) and includes the Minister of Foreign Affairs as its deputy Chairperson. It also consists of the defense minister, Interior Minister, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), tri-Services Chiefs, Director-General of Strategic Plans Division (Secretary), and other technical advisers (NSA, etc.), as required by the Chairperson.
It is responsible for policy-making during peacetime and deployment of strategic forces during wartime, making recommendations on the evolution of nuclear doctrine, establishing the hierarchy of command and the policy for authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and establishing the guidelines for an effective command and control system to safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use.
Development Control Committee
It is also chaired by the head of Government and includes CJCSC as its deputy chairperson, tri-Services Chiefs, Director-General of Strategic Plans Division, and representatives of the strategic1organizations and, the scientific community.
This Committee controls the development of strategic assets. exercising technical, financial, and administrative control over the strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons program, and overseeing the development of strategic weapons programs.
Strategic Plans Division
It is headed by a three-star army general officer. It is established in the Joint Services Headquarters under the CJCSC to act as the Secretariat for the NCA and perform functions relating to planning, coordination, and establishment of a reliable command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence network (C4I).
It is responsible for formulating policy options (nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine) for the NCA, implementing the NCA’s decisions, drafting strategic and operational plans for the deployment of strategic forces. Moreover, the SPD carries out the day-to-day management of Pakistan’s strategic forces, coordinates the activities of the different strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons program, and oversees budgetary, administrative, and security matters.
The SPD has eight directorates—including the Operations and Planning Directorate, the Computerized, Control, Command, Communication, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate (C4ISD), Strategic Weapons Development Directorate, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorate, Security division, which has a 25,000 strong force charged with guarding and protecting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
The Services’ Strategic Forces Command
The Services Strategic Forces Command is raised from all the three services (Army, Navy, and Airforce), which all have their respective strategic force commands. It is responsible for daily and tactical operational control of nuclear weapon delivery systems (the NCA is still responsible for overall strategic operational control). This operational control includes technical, training, and administrative control over missiles and delivery systems that would be used to deliver nuclear weapons.
Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC)
It operates the aircraft capable of delivering nuclear warheads. It mainly consists of F-16A/B, Mirage 5. Pakistan intends to incorporate the dual-capable Ra’ad Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) onto the JF-17 in order to allow the newer aircraft to eventually take over the nuclear strike role.
Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC)
NSFC was formally established on May 19, 2012, and has worked to develop a sea-based nuclear deterrent, which guarantees Pakistan’s second-strike capability. On January 9, 2017, ISPR announced that Pakistan had successfully launched its first successful test-fire of submarine-launched cruise missile SLCM (Babur-3), providing Pakistan with the second-strike capability. Presently, Pakistan Navy does not own a nuclear-powered submarine.
Pakistan Navy, however, has five French-built Agosta 90B-class submarines that are powered by diesel-electric engines. The Pakistan Navy is likely to place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on these submarines. Moreover, Pakistan signed a deal with China to buy eight Chinese Type 039A diesel-electric attack submarines that can be equipped with nuclear weapons.
Presently, Pakistan is capable to strike its adversary by land, air, and sea. The nuclear triad enhances Pakistan’s retaliatory capability or assured second-strike proficiency. Undeniably, the assured second-strike capability stabilizes and endures nuclear deterrence stability in a complex cum volatile strategic environment.
BySyed Ali Abbas
Nov 30, 2021
Pakistan’s nuclear command and control system is considered to be sophisticated and balanced. It has civilian and military involvement, checks and balances between the participating institutions, and a clear division of responsibility between the institutions. The system is based on a three-tier structure: The National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the three services’ strategic forces command.
Under the military government of General Musharraf, on 02 February 2000, the National Security Council approved the establishment of the National Command Authority (NCA) the highest decision-making body controlling nuclear command and control system.
The NCA is responsible for nuclear policy formulation and exercises employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. It includes formulating policies, deploying the strategic forces, coordinating the activities of all strategic organizations, negotiating arms control/disarmament, overseeing the implementation of export controls, and safeguarding nuclear assets and sites
NCA further consists of two committees and a division; an Employment Control Committee and a Development Control Committee, as well as the Strategic Plans Division which acts as its Secretariat.
Employment Control Committee
It is chaired by the head of the Government (Prime Minister) and includes the Minister of Foreign Affairs as its deputy Chairperson. It also consists of the defense minister, Interior Minister, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), tri-Services Chiefs, Director-General of Strategic Plans Division (Secretary), and other technical advisers (NSA, etc.), as required by the Chairperson.
It is responsible for policy-making during peacetime and deployment of strategic forces during wartime, making recommendations on the evolution of nuclear doctrine, establishing the hierarchy of command and the policy for authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and establishing the guidelines for an effective command and control system to safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use.
Development Control Committee
It is also chaired by the head of Government and includes CJCSC as its deputy chairperson, tri-Services Chiefs, Director-General of Strategic Plans Division, and representatives of the strategic1organizations and, the scientific community.
This Committee controls the development of strategic assets. exercising technical, financial, and administrative control over the strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons program, and overseeing the development of strategic weapons programs.
Strategic Plans Division
It is headed by a three-star army general officer. It is established in the Joint Services Headquarters under the CJCSC to act as the Secretariat for the NCA and perform functions relating to planning, coordination, and establishment of a reliable command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence network (C4I).
It is responsible for formulating policy options (nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine) for the NCA, implementing the NCA’s decisions, drafting strategic and operational plans for the deployment of strategic forces. Moreover, the SPD carries out the day-to-day management of Pakistan’s strategic forces, coordinates the activities of the different strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons program, and oversees budgetary, administrative, and security matters.
The SPD has eight directorates—including the Operations and Planning Directorate, the Computerized, Control, Command, Communication, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate (C4ISD), Strategic Weapons Development Directorate, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorate, Security division, which has a 25,000 strong force charged with guarding and protecting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
The Services’ Strategic Forces Command
The Services Strategic Forces Command is raised from all the three services (Army, Navy, and Airforce), which all have their respective strategic force commands. It is responsible for daily and tactical operational control of nuclear weapon delivery systems (the NCA is still responsible for overall strategic operational control). This operational control includes technical, training, and administrative control over missiles and delivery systems that would be used to deliver nuclear weapons.
Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC)
- It Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces with an estimated number of 12,000–15,000 persons.
- It has 60+ Surface-To-Surface Missile Launchers, 30 Ghauri Nuclear Medium Range Ballistic Missiles, 30+ Nuclear Short Range Ballistic Missiles: Ghaznavi, Abdali, Nasr series.
- Nuclear Ground Launch Cruise Missile: Babur and Ra’ad series.
It operates the aircraft capable of delivering nuclear warheads. It mainly consists of F-16A/B, Mirage 5. Pakistan intends to incorporate the dual-capable Ra’ad Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) onto the JF-17 in order to allow the newer aircraft to eventually take over the nuclear strike role.
Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC)
NSFC was formally established on May 19, 2012, and has worked to develop a sea-based nuclear deterrent, which guarantees Pakistan’s second-strike capability. On January 9, 2017, ISPR announced that Pakistan had successfully launched its first successful test-fire of submarine-launched cruise missile SLCM (Babur-3), providing Pakistan with the second-strike capability. Presently, Pakistan Navy does not own a nuclear-powered submarine.
Pakistan Navy, however, has five French-built Agosta 90B-class submarines that are powered by diesel-electric engines. The Pakistan Navy is likely to place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on these submarines. Moreover, Pakistan signed a deal with China to buy eight Chinese Type 039A diesel-electric attack submarines that can be equipped with nuclear weapons.
Presently, Pakistan is capable to strike its adversary by land, air, and sea. The nuclear triad enhances Pakistan’s retaliatory capability or assured second-strike proficiency. Undeniably, the assured second-strike capability stabilizes and endures nuclear deterrence stability in a complex cum volatile strategic environment.
ghazi52
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INDIA’S MISSILE ‘MISTAKE’ AND GLOBAL BIAS
The muted reaction at New Delhi’s admitted ‘accidental’ missile launch should give the global community pauseBY DR AHMED SAEED MINHAS
MARCH 27, 2022
KARACHI: An accidental missile firing represents the height of unimaginable strategic irresponsibility on the part of Indian nuclear command and control infrastructure and procedures. By any standards, it cannot be graded as a routine technical malfunctioning during claimed maintenance activity. It is beyond imagination that a missile that could carry all kinds of warheads, including nuclear, could go stray having no control or self-destruction mode.
Reportedly, the unknown flying object was the Indian strategic cruise missile BrahMos, having a range of 290 km and graded as the fastest cruise missile in the world with the capability of cruising at speeds of Mach 2.8. If the Indians could not manage such a sophisticated and technologically advanced missile then one could wonder what could be the state of affair with other Indian indigenously made ballistic and cruise missiles.
The Indian Ministry of Defence after a lapse of considerable time regretted the accident; however, did not officially disclose the identity of the missile for obvious strategic, economic and diplomatic backlash at international and domestic level. The Indian deliberate effort to keep the incident low profile probably meant four main purposes. One, India wanted to avoid demoralisation of its strategic weapons’ development organisations, mainly the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Indian Ordnance Factories Board, BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), which are actively involved in production of missiles in India.
Secondly, India may have feared that the planned bulk production of BrahMos missiles could be severely affected for the purpose of exporting it to other countries. It may be noted that in January 2022, Philippines' Defence Ministry signed an export contract of undisclosed numbers of BrahMos missiles worth $374 Million with BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited. If it was stated that BrahMos was missile involved in the incident, the deal could have been shelved besides discouraging other ASEAN countries, like Vietnam and Indonesia who are also eyeing similar defence deals with India.
Third, the Indian strategic community does not want to burden itself with increased criticism of its strategic command and control both at domestic and international levels.
Last but not the least; the accident of BrahMos missile can question the credibility of Indian research efforts to develop BrahMos-II, having speeds of Mach 7-8 and an enhanced range up to 1,000 km with an aim to boost striking capability in shorter time frame without being detected using cruise technology. It is likely that the accident involved the advanced version of BrahMos, which is currently in research and development phase.
Whatever the reason, the Indian effort of tagging it as an inadvertent accident does not appear commensurate to the international requirement to exercise extra responsibility, which is expected of a state having nuclear weapons in its war-fighting inventory. The most alarming element of the so-called accident is that the BrahMos missile is a strategic weapon capable of being fitted with nuclear warhead besides conventional ones. The accident clearly demonstrates sheer irresponsible attitude of Indian strategic corps elements, non-serious approach to handle sensitive inventory, poor technological credibility of Indian scientists and infrastructure, lack of the capability to produce missile systems which are main carriers of its nuclear warheads, safety and security parameters of the strategic assets, poor training standards of the maintenance and operational crew, and above all flawed command and control of strategic weapons.
The global strategic community, especially members of export control cartels like Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group (AG) and Wassenaar Arrangement (WG) will have to reconsider their politically motivated decisions for according membership to India, because of which it has an assured access to the advanced sensitive technologies. India having access to advanced weapon technologies is detrimental to the balance of power and strategic stability in South Asia. The proclaimed missile accident speaks volumes of its incapability to handle advanced technologies. Granting membership of export control cartels to India vis-à-vis Pakistan is totally an unjust and biased. India, which is being strengthened as a counterweight to rising China by the US-led Western community, has vested interests especially when it is being governed by globally known Hindu extremists. Expansionist designs of India are well known and status quo is not in their diplomatic and military doctrines.
For instance, India, when given membership of the advanced missile technology in 2016, took only a couple of years to develop and test a ground launched anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Space weapons are the least desired weapons, which do not only threaten peaceful uses of outer space but also disturb deterrence values in tangible terms. The global peace loving community paid the price for giving politically motivated access of advanced missile technology to India which resulted in India becoming the fourth nation in world possessing space weapons besides the US, Russia and China. Reportedly, Indian scientists diverted or in other words proliferated space technology acquired for stated peaceful purposes towards military purpose ASAT weapons development. The same is now being repeated by the Indians to produce state-of-the-art advanced missiles out of the technological access provided under MTCR membership cover.
Albeit the accident did not result in any life or property loss due to the fact that the missile fell in open fields, it could have resulted in unimaginable consequences such as an aviation disaster if the uncontrolled missile had hit some airliner, or loss of lives and property if it had hit some city. Lastly what if it had been fitted with conventional warhead, if not nuclear. The consequences could have been spine chilling.
The world has acknowledged Pakistan’s strategic community and armed forces for keeping their cool in responding to the incident. Indians, however, seemed to be totally ignorant of the flight path and kept quite till DG ISPR came on screen to appraise the nation about the incident before undesirable speculations were made on social media. Like always ISPR played a constructive role and did not issue any provocative statements.
Similarly, Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and media demonstrated responsibility and did not tag it as an aggression by our eastern neighbor for which the media on other side of the border is known. Pakistan overall demonstrated restraint and lodged diplomatic protest with India’s charge d’affaires in Islamabad over an unprovoked violation of its airspace.
Despite, Pakistan’s restraint and offer to hold a joint inquiry, India’s response was lukewarm and rather dismissive. Surprisingly, there has been no condemnation of the incident or concerns raised at international level. The question arises, what if Pakistan had made such blunder? I have no doubt that immediately Pakistan’s nuclear credibility would have been questioned and the incident would have made headlines. It’s a world of realpolitik and such biases are to be expected. Adding to injury, the US spokesperson simply said that there is no reason for not believing the Indian stance.
In the end, it is suggested that the world community give a serious eye to probabilities of whether it was an advertent or inadvertent act, especially when a rogue and extremist establishment is governing India. We wish that it was an inadvertent accident and not with a purpose to assess Pakistan’s capability to locate and track the supersonic missiles, judge Pakistan’s strategic response thresholds and last but not the least, to dilute the security agencies’ concentrated efforts who are committed to eliminating awakened frustrated sleeping cells of their sponsored terrorist elements. Whatever the aims, in case if it was an advertent act, Indian military and political leadership must not forget the surprise by resilient Pakistani armed forces which they had to face in ‘Operation Swift Retort’ back in February 2019. Notwithstanding Pakistan’s responsible and restrained approach, India must note that Pakistan has a threshold to absorb such misadventures and that they must not be tested for the sake of peace in the region.
(The author is a Karachi based expert on security and strategic issues and the Pro Vice Chancellor at DHA Suffa University)
ghazi52
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The Frontier Post
According to media reports, Unit 3 of the Karachi nuclear power plant has successfully reached 100% capacity for the first time on 31 March. The hot functional testing of Karachi 3 which simulates the temperatures and pressures that the reactor systems will be subjected to during normal operation and is carried out before loading nuclear fuel was completed ahead of schedule on 4 November last year. As said, the reactor achieved its first criticality on 21 February and was connected to the national grid on 4 March.
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) has told the media that various functional and commissioning tests have since been carried out at power levels of 25%, 30%, 50%, 75%, and 87% capacity, and completion of testing at full capacity, while the plant will perform a 100-hour demonstration run, after which it will enter commercial operation. The huge financial investment and hard work of Pakistani Engineers and Chinese nuclear experts have made this dream a reality over the last six years.
Being a Security state and an inherited existential threat from an eternal enemy, Pakistan initiated its nuclear program in the 1960s, however, at that time, its prime objective was to strengthen its military capabilities instead of the generation of nuclear energy. Pakistan did not sign Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because Pakistan did not intend to surrender its ambition of being a nuclear-armed state, thus western nations, and the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) refused to cooperate with Pakistan in the nuclear domain, therefore Pakistan’s civil nuclear program could not achieve its full potential in the past. However, Pakistan and China kicked off bilateral cooperation in nuclear energy through an agreement in 1986.
Due to Chinese cooperation, Pakistan was able to construct five nuclear power plants with a production capacity of 2242 MWe, which constitutes about 8% of the country’s total energy needs. After completion of the K-3 Nuclear Power Plant, an additional 1104 MWe will be added to the mainstream Thus, the share of nuclear energy in the national electricity grid would reach 10 percent of total consumption.
The Pakistan-China nuclear cooperation is successfully touching new heights as both nations had jointly constructed six nuclear power plants in the past three decades including the newly completed K-3 which successfully attained all operational standards. PAEC had struck a deal with Chinese Nuclear energy firm China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) for the construction of four additional Hualong one Pressurized Nuclear Reactors commonly known as HPR-10000 in August 2021.
According to reports, the Chinese firm will construct two Hualong one nuclear reactors in Karachi (K-4, K-5), and two similar reactors will be constructed at Muzaffargarh (M-1, M-2) in the coming years. Both China and Pakistan had laid the foundations of a substantial and long-term cooperation that would strengthen the Pakistan Nuclear Energy industry through the construction of additional nuclear plants, aiding uranium exploration, nuclear waste management, nuclear fuel, and nuclear technology application.
Presently, Pakistan is in negotiation with the IAEA for the provision of IAEA’s nuclear safeguards for its nuclear power plants which would further pave the path for Pakistan- IAEA cooperation in the future. Pakistan has attained significant expertise in nuclear technology hence it should initiate dialogue with NSG for nuclear cooperation that could lead to its unhindered access to the latest nuclear technologies in the future.
,.,.,.,,
Pakistan’s endeavors for peaceful nuclear energy
The Frontier Post
According to media reports, Unit 3 of the Karachi nuclear power plant has successfully reached 100% capacity for the first time on 31 March. The hot functional testing of Karachi 3 which simulates the temperatures and pressures that the reactor systems will be subjected to during normal operation and is carried out before loading nuclear fuel was completed ahead of schedule on 4 November last year. As said, the reactor achieved its first criticality on 21 February and was connected to the national grid on 4 March.
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) has told the media that various functional and commissioning tests have since been carried out at power levels of 25%, 30%, 50%, 75%, and 87% capacity, and completion of testing at full capacity, while the plant will perform a 100-hour demonstration run, after which it will enter commercial operation. The huge financial investment and hard work of Pakistani Engineers and Chinese nuclear experts have made this dream a reality over the last six years.
Being a Security state and an inherited existential threat from an eternal enemy, Pakistan initiated its nuclear program in the 1960s, however, at that time, its prime objective was to strengthen its military capabilities instead of the generation of nuclear energy. Pakistan did not sign Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because Pakistan did not intend to surrender its ambition of being a nuclear-armed state, thus western nations, and the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) refused to cooperate with Pakistan in the nuclear domain, therefore Pakistan’s civil nuclear program could not achieve its full potential in the past. However, Pakistan and China kicked off bilateral cooperation in nuclear energy through an agreement in 1986.
Due to Chinese cooperation, Pakistan was able to construct five nuclear power plants with a production capacity of 2242 MWe, which constitutes about 8% of the country’s total energy needs. After completion of the K-3 Nuclear Power Plant, an additional 1104 MWe will be added to the mainstream Thus, the share of nuclear energy in the national electricity grid would reach 10 percent of total consumption.
The Pakistan-China nuclear cooperation is successfully touching new heights as both nations had jointly constructed six nuclear power plants in the past three decades including the newly completed K-3 which successfully attained all operational standards. PAEC had struck a deal with Chinese Nuclear energy firm China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) for the construction of four additional Hualong one Pressurized Nuclear Reactors commonly known as HPR-10000 in August 2021.
According to reports, the Chinese firm will construct two Hualong one nuclear reactors in Karachi (K-4, K-5), and two similar reactors will be constructed at Muzaffargarh (M-1, M-2) in the coming years. Both China and Pakistan had laid the foundations of a substantial and long-term cooperation that would strengthen the Pakistan Nuclear Energy industry through the construction of additional nuclear plants, aiding uranium exploration, nuclear waste management, nuclear fuel, and nuclear technology application.
Presently, Pakistan is in negotiation with the IAEA for the provision of IAEA’s nuclear safeguards for its nuclear power plants which would further pave the path for Pakistan- IAEA cooperation in the future. Pakistan has attained significant expertise in nuclear technology hence it should initiate dialogue with NSG for nuclear cooperation that could lead to its unhindered access to the latest nuclear technologies in the future.
,.,.,.,,
Vortex
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ghazi52
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January 1, 2023
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan said it had handed a list of nuclear installations and facilities in the country to the Indian mission in Islamabad on Sunday under a decades-old agreement between the two nuclear-armed rivals.
The neighbours have fought three wars and have had a number of military skirmishes in recent years. Last year an Indian missile launched accidentally landed in Pakistan, setting off alarms across the world.
"The list of nuclear installations and facilities in Pakistan was officially handed over to a representative of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today," Pakistan's foreign office said in a statement.
It added that, under an agreement signed between the two in 1988, lists are exchanged annually on the first of January, and that India had simultaneously handed over a list to the Pakistani mission in New Delhi. India's External Affair's Ministry did not immediately respond to a Reuters' request for comment.
The practice of exchanging the lists has been continuing since Jan. 1, 1992. With the help of China, Pakistan has recently increased its use of nuclear energy to meet rising demand for electricity.
Pakistan first officially tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and has since developed a significant stockpile of nuclear capable missiles, as has India.
Pakistan says it has provided list of nuclear facilities to India under annual practice
- Practice of exchanging lists has been continuing since January 1, 1992
January 1, 2023
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan said it had handed a list of nuclear installations and facilities in the country to the Indian mission in Islamabad on Sunday under a decades-old agreement between the two nuclear-armed rivals.
The neighbours have fought three wars and have had a number of military skirmishes in recent years. Last year an Indian missile launched accidentally landed in Pakistan, setting off alarms across the world.
"The list of nuclear installations and facilities in Pakistan was officially handed over to a representative of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today," Pakistan's foreign office said in a statement.
It added that, under an agreement signed between the two in 1988, lists are exchanged annually on the first of January, and that India had simultaneously handed over a list to the Pakistani mission in New Delhi. India's External Affair's Ministry did not immediately respond to a Reuters' request for comment.
The practice of exchanging the lists has been continuing since Jan. 1, 1992. With the help of China, Pakistan has recently increased its use of nuclear energy to meet rising demand for electricity.
Pakistan first officially tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and has since developed a significant stockpile of nuclear capable missiles, as has India.
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