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Pakistan intelligence rift shows deepening US frustration: analysts

Batmannow,

I edited your post to not be a bit more friendly on the eyes.

Could you try and only bold and underline the segments you consider important, rather than using multiple colors and increasing font size.
 
QUESTIONING ISIs CAPABALITIES & its war against the insurgnts inside pakistani boders is joke itself because, it was ISI .... which made the capture of the most of the ALQEADA LEADERS!!! if CIAs theory is right thn, there shouldnt be a single capture of those ALQEADA LEADERs wouldbe possible???:lol::crazy::hitwall:
 
I sincerely doubt you are going to get clearer information than this, unless you are willing to wait 30+ years for the Americans to declassify their records.

It isn't clear - it is alleged by some anonymous sources that certain ISI agents have contacts with Haqqani - the potential association with AQ is an extrapolation and speculation based on Haqqani's alleged contacts with Q members.

The article does mention that there is no evidence about whether this is institutional or rogue support.

Rogue support is plausible, Musharraf himself admitted that it was, but beyond that there is nothing.
 
QUESTIONING ISIs CAPABALITIES & its war against the insurgnts inside pakistani boders is joke itself because, it was ISI .... which made the capture of the most of the ALQEADA LEADERS!!! if CIAs theory is right thn, there shouldnt be a single capture of those ALQEADA LEADERs wouldbe possible???:lol::crazy::hitwall:

Why not !!

ISI has always run with the hare & hunted with the hound.

Whats new ?
 
Thread that had the IHT article talking about CIA analysts impressions of the ISI merged with this one.

Reposting the IHT article to contrast with this one.
 
Highlights and comments courtesy Muse:

From Todays, IHT -- Read it carefully, it's carefully crafted and remember the author



A CIA lesson from the field: Never trust another spy
By Mark Mazzetti

Sunday, July 20, 2008
WASHINGTON: As they complete their training at "The Farm," the CIA's base in the Virginia Tidewater, young agency recruits are taught a lesson they are expected never to forget during assignments overseas: There is no such thing as a friendly intelligence service.

Foreign spy services, even those of America's closest allies, will try to manipulate you. So you had better learn how to manipulate them back.

But most CIA veterans agree that no relationship between the spy agency and a foreign intelligence service is quite as byzantine, or as maddening, as that between the CIA and the Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI
.

It is like a bad marriage in which both spouses have long stopped trusting each other but would never think of breaking up because they have become so mutually dependent.

Without the ISI's help, U.S. spies in Pakistan would be incapable of carrying out their primary mission in the country: hunting Islamic militants, including top members of Al Qaeda. Without the millions of covert U.S. dollars sent annually to Pakistan, the ISI would have trouble competing with the spy service of its archrival, India
.

But the relationship is complicated by a web of competing interests. First off, the top U.S. goal in the region is to shore up the Afghan government and security services to better fight the ISI's traditional proxies, the Taliban, there.

Inside Pakistan, the primary U.S. interest is to dismantle a Taliban and Qaeda haven in the mountainous tribal lands.

Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan, and especially the ISI, used the Taliban and militants from those areas to exert power in Afghanistan and block India from gaining influence there. The ISI has also supported other militant groups that carried out operations against Indian troops in Kashmir, something that complicates Washington's efforts to stabilize the region.

Of course, there are few examples in history of spy services really trusting one another. After all, people who earn their salaries by lying and assuming false identities probably don't make the most reliable business partners. Moreover, spies know that the best way to steal secrets is to penetrate the ranks of another spy service.

But circumstances have for years forced successful, if ephemeral, partnerships among spies. The Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA, worked with the predecessors of the KGB to hunt Nazis during World War II, even as the United States and the Soviet Union were quickly becoming adversaries
.

These days, the relationship between Moscow and Washington is turning frosty again, over a number of issues. But, quietly, U.S. and Russian spies continue to collaborate to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, and to secure nuclear arsenals.

The relationship between the CIA and the ISI was far less complicated when the United States and Pakistan were intently focused on one common goal: kicking the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. For years in the 1980s, the CIA used the ISI as the conduit to funnel arms and money to Afghan rebels fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

But even in those good old days, the two spy services were far from trusting of each other - in particular over the Pakistani quest for nuclear weapons. In his book "Ghost Wars," the journalist Steve Coll recounts how the ISI chief in the early 1980s, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, banned all social contact between his ISI officers and CIA operatives in Pakistan. He was also convinced that the CIA had set up an elaborate bugging network, so he had his officers speak in code on the telephone
.

When the general and his aides were invited by the CIA to visit agency training sites in the United States, the Pakistanis were forced to wear blindfolds on the flights into the facilities.

Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, CIA officers have arrived in Islamabad knowing that they will probably depend on the ISI at least as much as they have depended on any liaison spy service in the past. Unlike spying in the capitals of Europe, where agency operatives can blend in to develop a network of informants, only a tiny fraction of CIA officers can walk the streets of Peshawar unnoticed.

And an even smaller fraction could move freely through the tribal areas to scoop up useful information about militant networks there.

Even the powerful ISI, which is dominated by Punjabis, the largest ethnic group in Pakistan, has difficulties collecting information in the tribal lands, the home of fiercely independent Pashtun tribes. For this reason, the ISI has long been forced to rely on Pashtun tribal leaders - and in some cases Pashtun militants - as key informants.

Given the natural disadvantages, CIA officers try to get any edge they can through technology, the one advantage they have over the local spies
.

For example, the Pakistani government has long restricted where the CIA can fly Predator surveillance drones inside Pakistan, limiting flight paths to approved "boxes" on a grid map.

The CIA's answer to that restriction? It deliberately flies Predators beyond the approved areas, just to test Pakistani radars. According to one former agency officer, the Pakistanis usually notice
.

As U.S. and allied casualty rates in Afghanistan have grown in the last two years, the ISI has become a subject of fierce debate within the CIA. Many in the spy agency - particularly those stationed in Afghanistan - accuse their agency colleagues at the Islamabad station of actually being too cozy with their ISI counterparts. There have been bitter fights between the CIA station chiefs in Kabul and Islamabad, particularly about the significance of the militant threat in the tribal areas.

Veterans of the CIA station in Islamabad point to the capture of a number of senior Qaeda leaders in Pakistan in recent years as proof that the Pakistani intelligence service has often shown a serious commitment to roll up terrorist networks.

And, they point out, the ISI has just as much reason to distrust the Americans as the CIA has to distrust the ISI. The CIA largely pulled up stakes in the region after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, rather than staying to resist the chaos and bloody civil war that led ultimately to the Taliban ascendance in the 1990s.

After the withdrawal, the U.S. tools to understand the complexity of relationships in Central and South Asia became rusty. The ISI operates in a neighborhood of constantly shifting alliances, where double-dealing is an accepted rule of the game, a phenomenon many in Washington still have problems accepting.


Until late last year, when he was elevated to the command of the entire army, the Pakistani spymaster who had been running the ISI was General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. U.S. officials describe Kayani as at once engaging and inscrutable, an avid golfer with some odd affectations. He will spend several minutes carefully hand-rolling a cigarette, then, after taking one puff, he stubs it out.

The grumbling at the CIA about the ISI comes with a certain grudging reverence for the spy service's Machiavellian qualities. Some former spies even talk about the Pakistani agency with a mix of awe and professional jealousy.

One retired senior CIA official said that of all the foreign spymasters the CIA had dealt with, Kayani was the most formidable and may have earned the most respect at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The soft-spoken general, he said, is a master manipulator
.

"We admire those traits," he said.
 
What is this article about? If the article was just about spies not trusting each other, it would be a oxymoron -- what is the purpose this article hopes to serve??

It seems like a demonizing, one sided article designed to portray the ISI as some evil entity while the CIA are the "good guys" composed of cornfed farmboys that need to watch it in the dirty world of intelligence.

Some people say that the best place to hide something is in plain sight, a small truth hidden in a sea of lies.

Right, the best place to hide the truth is in a sea of lies and the best place to spawn a lie is in a big pool of truth. It's called camouflage. So now that we have some fortune cookie wisdom to help with the interpretation lets move on.

What specifically is the goal of this article? What is the agenda of the person who wrote it? :coffee:

It is just another attempt to subdue the Pakistani military. Nothing coming in hand the next target was expected to be the ISI-though much have already been said in this context, but this was an attempt to make a formal declaration against our efforts in the tribal areas.

Chain of comments related to the IHT article.

So, what are you going with this Muse?
 
There is truth to the allegations in the NYT in other ways, and these are not really so secret.

The ISI is backing Taliban leaders like Mullah Nazir, Haji Namdar and others in a bid to negate the influence of the TTP bent on creating mayhem in Pakistan. But those connections are relatively open, with some articles even suggesting that the CIA in fact funded the payoff of Namdar.

It is also no secret that the groups Pakistan supports, while not intent on imposing a Shariah state in Pakistan (at this time atleast), are driven to fight NATO on ethnic and religious grounds as an 'occupying force'. The issues behind that support are explored in the Taliban/AQ vs Taliban thread, and are complex.

The article here very narrowly IMO focuses on the possible relationship with Haqqani and his son, but I'll have to find some material I thought I had stored away related to that...
 
Mark Mazzetti has been "convenient" for some in the U.S Intel community and the first article is the set up piece for the exposition that followed - again conveniently after Gilani met Bush.

Basically, the CIA does not own the ISI's balls - that ISI maintains contacts with a variety of persons, is of course a net plus -- the U.S. maintains contacts with some Pakistan wishes that the U.S. intel community would keep their distance from -- but of course some in the U.S. still think exceptionalism is a one way street, they are mistaken.:cheers:

But of course Mr. Mazzetti works both sides of the street - If there are those who express their agitated state of mind over the ISI, there are others who express admiration of it's commitment to it's duty.
 
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Either this Haqqani fellow reads the threads on Defence.pk to get some idea of what's going on, or he's a johnny come lately.

really, Mr. Ambassador, ya think??

Haqqani blames foreign hand for CIA report publication

ISLAMABAD, July 30: The involvement of ‘foreign elements’ in publication of a CIA report could not be ruled out, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States Hussain Haqqani said on Wednesday.

A TV channel quoted him as saying that these elements could be involved in the publishing of such a news item at a time when Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was in the US to make it look like that relation between Pakistan and the US were not good.

He said the prime minister’s visit to US had removed US administration’s complaints and reservations
.—APP
 
What is the Problem with the ISI?

Usman Khalid, Director LISA


ISI is in the news again but for a novel reason. Asif Zaradri, the oligarch who runs the PPP as a mafia, want to bring it under the control of his chosen don – Rehman Malik – who is also the Advisor (whose?) in charge of the Ministry of Interior. By definition, the only law in a mafia is: ‘obey the boss’. Whatever the law or the constitution of the country (which says the PM is the boss), or whatever the party may want or aspire (whose members want to be consulted) the ‘word of the boss is the law’. The word is whispered directly into the ear concerned. Yousaf Raza Gilani is the Prime Minister chosen by Asif Zardari (not the PPP) and he has eager ears for him and no one else. When he got the word, just prior to leaving for the USA, that the ISI and the IB be placed under the Ministry of Interior, he had to comply promptly or face the consequences. He has learnt from previous experience when he wanted to make ‘TV speech to the nation’ that he cannot chose his own words to say things. The boss will not tell him what to say because he does not know either. High office of the state is given in this administration only to those who can interpret ‘nods and winks’ and act appropriately. President Bush was informed that Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani is used to the language of ‘nods and winks’. The President, therefore, chose to speak to the PM of Pakistan in ‘nods and winks’. TV cameras recorded only one instance of the Presidential ‘wink’ but the press was told that there was much more and in both directions; the meeting went swimmingly.

It came to light in the American press that the US authorities have told Pakistan that ISI has ‘links’ with the Taliban. That was not news; it would be news if they didn’t. The CIA, RAW and MOSSAD also have links with the Taliban. How would they find out the real time location of commanders and troops to strike at them if they did not? But the other charge is more serious! It was reported that the President was ‘angry’ that ‘rogue’ ISI elements informed the Taliban of the impending US strikes. This time, he said the words; he did not ‘wink’. Clearly, that cannot be taken seriously and not only because he did not ‘wink’. Firstly, neither the ISI nor the Army ever stay in the area when US Predator attack is imminent because they end up being the targets. The only permanent military presence on the border with Afghanistan is of the Frontier Corps who are locally recruited. They have sympathy for the local tribesmen whose womenfolk and children are the ones who get killed in the US air strikes.

The ISI have a role to obtain information and the Army is deployed only for short periods of time. The ISI operatives are not in the chain of command; they do not get information they are accused of passing to the Taliban. The military HQ in the area is given prior warning of US air attack and their problem is to deny that they knew; they tell lies to avoid being accused of being accomplices in the slaughter of the tribal people. Wink or no wink, what President Bush said is also a lie. He spoke it for his country – to justify the launching of air strikes inside Pakistan without prior warning. That should help Yousaf Raza Gilani to deny in good conscience being an accomplice, as his commanders in the field would henceforth not have prior knowledge of strikes inside Pakistan. Is that better than being an accomplice by failing to defend the territory, the people and the borders of Pakistan?

The American have depended a great deal on the ISI in their fight against the Taliban and they have said so many times publicly as well as privately. Why are they complaining now? This is something important that Pakistan needs to understand if it is to defend the national interests. Firstly, the story in the New York Times was planted by Indian interfaces with the CIA. Secondly, India wants the USA to put pressure on Pakistan to include the Kashmiri Mujahideen alongside the Taliban as the ‘common enemy’. Thirdly, India wants the USA to approve its clandestine operation and to provide air cover in the Northern Area of Pakistan that links Pakistan with China. Since it is the role of the ISI to detect and frustrate clandestine operations, they would like the ISI to be place under their agents - Asif Zaradri and Rehman Malik – who would ‘reform’ it to make it their personal bodyguards. I am sure Yousaf Raza Gilani has no idea what the mafia dons of the PPP are up to. But to be such a simpleton in such an important position so as to be betraying Pakistan is too much to forgive. Not knowing or understanding anything might save him from the gallows but not from political oblivion that he so much deserves.

It is not the political role of the ISI that worries the USA; it is its core role to carry out and frustrate clandestine operation that the Americans are after. In every country the premier intelligence agency has a counter-intelligence role as its prime function. In that role, they keep an eye on every one of the high officials of the state including the President, the Prime Minister and the members of the Cabinet. They are not intrusive until they find evidence of a foreign or criminal link. Asif Zardari and Rehman Malik have a really long list of foreign and criminal contacts. It is a severe handicap of our system that even a peon or a sweeper cannot be employed in the service of the State without security clearance but those who have never lived on ‘halal rozi’ can become cabinet ministers. This lacuna was addressed when the Supreme Court began to take ‘suo moto’ notice of crimes by high officials of the state.

One might have been surprised why Asif Zardari was so blatantly and openly hostile to Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry even though his party had been in the forefront of the movement for his restoration. It was after the ‘constitutional package of the PPP’ became public it became clear, why? Asif Zardari was ‘in’ with President Musharraf on promulgation PCO of 3 November; the new CJ – A.H.Dogar – is Zardari’s nominee. How can he allow any promise or principle to come in the way? CJ Dogar is his lifeline; he alone can protect him against all the present and past indictments and also against the excesses and crimes a habitual offender like him is bound to commit. However, even Dogar has a fixed tenure. His successor may not be so amenable to pressure. So, the destruction of all evidence against him is the role for which Rehman Malik was put in charge of the Ministry of Interior. But the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) also holds records. So, it is being closed down. But the ISI is known to keep record even after it been asked to destroy them. So, Asif Zardari needs the expertise of Rehman Malik, who was most notorious head of the FIA (Federal Investigation Agency) ever, and his direct control over the ISI to make sure that all records against the both of them – Asif Zardari and Rehman Malik – are destroyed.

Asif Zardari is a desperate man. He thinks his life is in danger and he can see that his tenuous control over the government is fast slipping. His only hope is the American minion in the press led by Najam Sethi and the idiots as anchorpersons of the talk shows. The former cloud the issue and the latter always miss the point. They are still buying his bullshit and presenting his changes in the ISI as an effort for better co-ordination or to prevent ISI interference in politics. It is neither. It is an effort to remove all evidence against him in every office of the state. He needs time and he hopes the US would help. He has offered to accept all the demands to help India sever the land link between Pakistan and China. If that is not treachery I do not what is!

The politicians perform too important a task to avoid being under the microscope of Intelligence agencies of the country. But manipulations of political results, which rightly earned the ISI bad repute in the country, is history now. General Kiani forbade it despite President Musharraf having asked him. As long as the ISI remain a military organisation, as it is in Pakistan, there is no likelihood of it ever being used to manipulate election results. But if the independence of the judiciary is not restored, the ruling party is bound to create another cell or organisation for such tasks. After Late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was unable to use the military or the intelligence agencies against his political opponents, he created the FSF (Federal Security Force). It was the alleged attempt by the FSF personnel to murder one of his opponents that sent him to the gallows.

Now well worn, but the Clinton phrase, ‘it is the economy, stupid’ wonderfully made the point. The popularity and the credibility of Asif Zardari nose-dived when he went back on his promise to restore the judges in 30 days. His ISI fiasco is similar to the fiasco that the dismissal of the Chief Justice created for General Mushrrraf. Both are deathblows from which it is impossible to recover. Reversal of the decision to put the ISI under the Ministry of Interior is not going to solve the problem. The problem is not with the ISI; it is with those who want to use the power of the state for private or political purpose.
 

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