Again a lot of brochure bull$hit..
Per your logic, every new weapon system is brochure bull$hit.
May I ask what is the credibility of JF-17 Thunder in air-to-air engagements? Do you think that it is brochure bull$shit in this spectrum so far?
The purpose of extensively testing a weapon system is to make sure that its marketed capabilities are 'authentic' before it can be considered for purchase.
In general, the issue with present ABM systems is that they cannot yet hit with a kill vehicle in the boost phase and especially in a re-entry phase of true IRBMs/ICBMs, the speed of missile or re-entry vehicle is such (in 4-7 km/s) that it is not possible to successfully calculate a collision with a kinetic kill vehicle.
Technological capability to intercept a missile during the boost phase of its flight [exists] at present (this capability was tested in 2007 and results were promising). However, intercepting a ballistic missile at this stage [from the ground or sea] is not feasible in every contingency due to shortage of time (1 - 5 minute window for intercepting a target on average) and situation on the ground (proximity of an ABM system to the launch site of a ballistic missile); unless an ABM system is located near the launch site of a ballistic missile (like 100 or 150 km away), it may not be feasible to intercept it at this stage. In a war-like situation, ABM systems on the ground or sea are not necessarily deployed on the front-lines. This is where airborne ABM platforms come into the picture; they are relatively safer to use then ABM platforms on the ground for the said purpose.
It is difficult to intercept a missile at re-entry phase too due to shortage of time once again (1 - 2 minute window for intercepting a target on average) and great speeds. However, you are quoting the re-entry speed range of ICBMs and assuming that smaller ballistic missiles have similar re-entry speeds which is not true (ICBM attain superior speeds then IRBM/MRBM/SRBM due to relatively higher number of stages/superior boosters involved in propelling them to vast distances).
Therefore, midcourse intercepts have greatest appeal at present. Midcourse phase represents longest flight-path of a ballistic missile and it provides ample window to an ABM system to intercept it at this stage.
Now, the purpose of a multi-layered ABM deterrence is to make it possible for ABM platforms to work in conjunction (share data) and intercept targets in more situations then a single platform could unilaterally manage. The American ABM projects are moving towards this direction at present. Read this:
http://www.sldinfo.com/u-s-missile-defense-takes-big-step-forward-with-successful-tests/
From the aforementioned link:
After separating from the booster rocket at a speed of over Mach 20, the unarmed kill vehicle homed in on the target, then flying at about 4 miles per second, using its heat signature and destroyed the target through the kinetic energy released by the impact of the collision in a “hit-to-kill” operation.
1. Presently they cannot hit already deployed systems, they first need to achieve this.
Are you serious?
Lockheed Martin's LV-2 ballistic missile (intercepted during a test in 2014; see the link above) is superior to many ballistic missiles that are deployed around the world with the exception of current-generation ICBMs. In-fact, LV-2 can be converted into a real weapon for use in a war on moments notice; it is a finished product.
Americans also have history of smuggling and using ballistic missiles (of Russian and Chinese origin) to use in testing procedures.
2. Now that they are getting fielded, all parties have already started or will start taking simple counter-measures, such as using flatter trajectories, or change in path during boost phase, or giving re-entry vehicle slight manoeuvring after re-entry, using MIRVs, using decoys and objects to clutter up, for longer ranges entering into orbits and leaving them. These actually are things which even future ABM project will find very hard to solve.
Countermeasures are no longer difficult to defeat contrary to the popular belief. Even decoys cannot fool state-of-the-art tracking systems. For example:
Terminal phase is the last one or two minutes of ICBM flight. The warhead, along with any decoys or chaff, reenters the atmosphere. Aerodynamic drag then produces dramatically differing behavior for light as opposed to heavy objects. Decoys decelerate significantly and may burn up, but the warhead does neither. Thus at re-entry the defense can discriminate the warhead unambiguously. (Courtesy FAS)
My point is that there are loopholes in countermeasures as well that can be exploited with careful deliberations.
3. Cost of ABM rounds is equivalent to cost of (actually ICBMs) of ballistic missiles they are going to shoot down. Ballistic missiles can be easily targeted/re-targeted for many locations but ABMs have a fixed range to operate in. This entails deploying a far larger number of ABM rounds to have sufficient coverage for all targets.
Cost is not much of a concern to countries like US, Russia and China. Even Israel is not deterred by costs of developing an ABM capability. If a country has strong economy, it can afford such projects.
Multi-layered ABM deterrence addresses the issue of fixed-range(s) or shortcomings of a single ABM system.
The effectiveness of ABM platform will depend upon its complexity and capabilities of an enemy state it is up against. With good homework, Americans can neuter the threat of Pakistani nuclear strike capabilities but India is far from this objective at the moment.
4. Even for SRBMS, no ABM system yet boast of a 100% kill ratios which means some will get missed. For IRBMS/ICBMs it is even more harder, I do not think that any specific data exists based on tests. But the problem is even one hit will be enough.
THAAD have 100% intercept success rate so far.
I am not saying that s 400 is not a cause of concern but saying that this will change the 'strategic balance' is an over-statement. Indian efforts to induct earlier S300 and now s400 have been known for some time, also I am not asking to under-estimate their significance. I do not think that those at the helm of affairs have not taken a note and have not started taking actions e.g. try looking for news in the recent past about US being concerned about the size of fissile material stockpile, of reports about it being fifth or sixth largest, about more ready devices etc.
I respectfully disagree! S-400 systems will significantly reduce the chances of Pakistani ballistic missiles to reach important targets in India in case of a full-scale nuclear conflict (god forbid). A single S-400 system can intercept up to 16 targets at a time and India is considering 5 systems for induction in total. If the deal bores fruit and those systems are inducted, then we will have to fire multiple salvos to make sure that a single target (of great importance) is hit and this will deplete our already limited inventory much faster. In this manner, India will be able to minimize damage to its assets in its territory. Indians, on the other hand, wouldn't have to worry about such constraints while targeting Pakistan.
Do you think that we have a huge inventory of Shaheen series ballistic missiles at present? You would be terribly wrong then.
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