Pakistan in no danger post-Musharraf

[Neo]

Sunday, December 17, 2006

Pakistan in no danger post-Musharraf

* US journal says Musharraf at his weakest, but if he leaves, VCOAS would step up
* US must change policy of supporting ‘strongman’

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: Contrary to some doomsday scenarios, even if President Pervez Musharraf were to leave the scene, Pakistan is not likely to descend into anarchy, nor will its nuclear weapons fall into terrorist hands, or its government come under the control of mullahs and militants, according to a detailed analysis printed here.

Sydney J Freedberg Jr, writing in the current issue of National Journal, states that the alternatives to the Pakistani military leader do exist, but they “may require consideration sooner rather than later”.

According to Alexis Debat, a former French counter-terrorism official, “Musharraf has never been weaker. His core constituency is the military, and there are indications that he has started to lose that as well.” He quotes Stephen Cohen of Brookings who says that “there’s a lot of anxiety about Musharraf’s reckless behaviour,” adding, “Musharraf has one good friend in the world: Bush.”

Freedberg calls Musharraf “a consummate institution man, the product of a lifetime in the Pakistani army.” He also quotes South Asia expert Marvin Weinbaum who says that were Gen Musharraf “to be taken out tomorrow, there would be strong continuity” because the vice chief of the army would step up.

According to Freeberg, “If the United States wants a different future for Pakistan, the experts say that Washington is going to have to adopt a different policy. Americans need to break themselves of the habit of relying on one personable strongman and reach out to people they may dislike. Real change comes slowly, by persuading one person at a time. It does not come from counting on one person at the top.”

Freedberg argues that military discipline also means that real democracy is a lot further away than next year’s promised elections. Intimidation of candidates, suppression of turnout, bribery of voters, and blatant gerrymandering are common in Pakistan. He quotes Pakistan’s ambassador to the US Mahmud Ali Durrani as acknowledging that the military is growing weary of ruling. “Every time a military ruler has come in, the people have welcomed him with open arms. But with the passage of time, that shine seems to go away, because it’s a difficult country to govern. And for every military leader, believe it or not, one of his major agenda points was to bring back democracy.”

Freedberg writes, “Musharraf is not a lonely hero holding his country together. He is just the latest leader to stand precariously atop Pakistan’s three ever-shifting tectonic plates - the generals, the politicians, and the mullahs. Sooner, not later, he will lose his footing. To understand what might happen next, it’s important to understand the three major power centres at work in Pakistan.” These he identifies as the army officer corps, which remains loyal to the institution of the army, the civilian secular politicians and the religious elements.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\12\17\story_17-12-2006_pg1_1

 

[sparten]

Daily whines at it again. If Musharraf goes the same will happen what happened in 1988, the Chairman Senate takes over. As a result we have Mian Someroo as President, its Sindhs turn to run the country. And if Someroo pops with Mush, the second guy takes over and its Pakistan ki shaan Balochistan.

 

[Awesome]

What's this system, Sparten? Can you explain it a little more?

 

[Neo]

Monday, December 18, 2006

EDITORIAL: Post-Musharraf perspective flaws

Some American commentators are receptive to the idea that President General Pervez Musharraf might be ousted from power “sooner rather than later” and are therefore trying to tell the Bush Administration that it shouldn’t worry about the post-Musharraf phase because Pakistan is not likely to descend into terminal chaos. In other words, they are telling the Bush administration that it shouldn’t look at General Musharraf as the hero with his finger in the dyke but as a transitional figure whose departure will not damage American interests in Pakistan and the region. This comes close to implying that perhaps his departure could actually benefit America by forestalling developments in Pakistan that could hurt America in the medium term. The sequel to this kind of ‘ditch-Musharraf’ suggestion is that after him the deputy or vice chief of the army would inevitably “step up” and give continuity to General Musharraf’s pro-America policies while helping to defuse the tensions and contradictions that have cropped up with his personality, style and strategy of politics.

The American scholar who presented this thesis — Sydney J Freedberg Jr in the National Journal — is worried only about the nuclear programme falling into the “wrong hands” and posing a threat to the US. So he addresses Pakistan only in this context and argues that “even if President Pervez Musharraf were to leave the scene, Pakistan is not likely to descend into anarchy, nor will its nuclear weapons fall into terrorist hands, or its government come under the control of mullahs and militants”. This piece of wisdom, coupled with another perception that “Musharraf has never been weaker, his core constituency is the military, but there too are indications that he has started losing ground”, lays the basis of the suggestion that perhaps America should help nudge General Musharraf out of the scene and back a better alternative arrangement.

Mr Freedberg Jr thinks that General Musharraf has only one friend in the world and that is Mr Bush. His tacit advice is that the time has come to dump General Musharraf without fearing any negative blowback. The analyst simply assumes without offering any evidence or analysis that after General Musharraf’s exit his vice chief will take over and give ‘strong continuity’ to the policies followed by General Musharraf.

But this raises one fundamental question: If Washington thinks it needs continuity from the next army chief, why tighten the noose around General Musharraf or try and get rid of him? Is he doing such a bad job for America that he should be nudged out and replaced by someone who will continue to do the job he is doing? Isn’t that a contradiction in terms? The analysis is further clouded by the following observation which seems to suggest that America should, in fact, not seek continuity at all from the next dispensation. “If the United States wants a different future for Pakistan, Washington is going to have to adopt a different policy. Americans need to break themselves of the habit of relying on one personable strongman and reach out to people they may dislike. Real change comes slowly, by persuading one person at a time. It does not come from counting on one person at the top’. But if Mr Freedberg Jr is proposing a democratic change in Pakistan in which America is not dependent on one person, why talk of the vice chief of the army “stepping up” to fit into General Musharraf’s boots? More significantly, what if the next army chief doesn’t follow the American script or what if he is lacking in some critical sense? Worse, what if he is actually inclined to reverse some of the good domestic and international policies of General Musharraf?

Mr Freedberg Jr needs to do some more thinking. He also has to examine himself a little as an American thinker. Is he in the cut-and-run club that wants to benefit from the fiasco of Iraq to make Washington again show a clean pair of heels from Afghanistan and Pakistan after promising a long-term partnership? By what insider knowledge has he arrived at the conclusion that the next army chief in Pakistan will be exactly like General Musharraf in some critical sense? The generals who came after General Zia-ul Haq were shaky, scared of the army they led, and two of them were actually fired by a civilian prime minister. There is no crystal ball to show that the next chief will be a Musharraf clone. No one after Zia was a Zia clone or a fundamentalist. Indeed, there is no telling if the next general will be ‘liberal’ and ‘enlightened’, willing to change the central dogma of Islam. Even if he is a secular person, he may not want to touch American policy with a barge pole in view of the costs that General Musharraf has had to bear for espousing “enlightened moderation”.

The underlying thought in Mr Freedberg’s piece is not kind. He doesn’t care that Pakistan — an important ally against Al Qaeda on past record — may want to get back to democracy in a peaceful transition. He has arrived at a very reductionist conclusion that Pakistan has three squabbling elites — army, cleric, politician — and there is nothing America can do in the face of their waywardness. But the truth is that most Americans feel like running away from the region after Iraq. And that trend is quite familiar.

Scholars who have expended so much ink on this thesis have paid scant regard to the feelings of the people of Pakistan who wish to return to full-fledged democracy with the army firmly back in the barracks. America can help by ensuring that President Musharraf fulfils his pledge to be a transitional figure who leaves behind a sustainable democratic order that fears no army or mullah takeovers. *

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\12\18\story_18-12-2006_pg3_1