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Pakistan Can’t Afford China’s ‘Friendship’

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Learn to ignore Solomon and your day will go fantastic

This fvcker is obsessed with anything Pakistan. Never seen a crazy Zionist like him.

It gives me pleasure watching him burn out of rage. LOL at his uncontrollable rage at China Pakistan cooperation. The more they burn and the better.
 
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If that's the case then she is retarded. Americans have FAR more presding matters to deal right now -
Her specialty is South Asia, what right do you have to demand she write about other stuff instead, or else be labeled "retarded"?

....The Pakistan military is the ONLY institution in the whole history of mankind to be able to fend off an enemy that is 7x bigger than us and has abundant access to the world's most advanced weapons systems -
Just as Luxemburg's 800-man army must be fantastic because it is obviously able to beat off the far bigger and better-equipped French military!

LOL no one over here gives a fvck about you and her opinion. Do something about it if you can.
Learn to ignore Solomon and your day will go fantastic
I suggest using PDF's "ignore" function, that way you won't have to read what I write.

(Unless, of course, you really do care about what I write and merely pretend otherwise. That's O.K. It'll be a secret, just between us....)
 
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If you want to attack the academic personally, you have to destroy her arguments first. Fail, and what she writes can be accepted and your opinion relegated to the circular file.

I would say most Pakistanis who know of her, know that shes relentlessly been critical of Pakistan for years. She is not an unbiased actor, we already know that, but her biases undoubtedly clouds her objectivity.

Let's leave aside everything I have taken issue with her on when it comes to Pakistan. She's been known to make several arguments to that end, most of which one could easily debunk.

On the subject of CPEC, I think she is right to raise environmental issues, issues regarding local loss of ownership, she is also right to argue that it ought to be considered more carefully. However, that's the extent of my kind reading of this article.

Here's what I take issue with, she has said that Pakistan is taking on a lot of debt, granted, it's a massive chunk of GDP, but does she know what the interest conditions on these loans? How much these are projected to bolster FDI inflows for the first few years, and when outflows begin? I can tell you it's more complicated than other projects because CPEC is not a single project, it's a very large and diverse portfolio of projects. The main areas of investment are infrastructure, trade, energy, and to a lesser extent agriculture and science. One of the more worrying aspects of current investments is the effect of CPEC related imports on the swelling current account deficit. Hopefully, it will be worth it in the end and will also increase FDI inflows at the same time. I've seen plenty of estimates about the interest payments and cost of outflows, on interest payments, I can say that if the projects are worth investing in and if they bolster growth, they're definitely worth it. The majority of these CPEC related projects have lower rates than the Pakistani Government can borrow at, recently our 10 year bond yields have gone down, but they were very high until recently. So it's cheaper to have the Chinese do these investments than the Pakistani government, it's also more efficient as I'd pick Chinese supervision of projects over Pakistan government's own efforts any day. On outflows, IMF projected something like 0.4% of GDP in CPEC outflows in the long term, which to me doesn't sound too bad if the projects have the intended effect by that time. Also, there's a very good chance that large net outflows could be delayed pending more investments in the short term, we've seen it happen already, when the government announced a $46 billion set of projects, I told everyone here that there'd be more along the way, the Chinese need to invest and Pakistan needs investment, so outflows could at least be delayed in the short term.

So that covers at least some of the financing aspects of the projects, the second issue I take with her is her basic understanding of these projects. Either she doesn't understand what CPEC is about, or she's scraping the barrel pretty low looking for an argument. First of all, she's doing the classic mistake of confusing Gwadar and CPEC, it's a rookie mistake I see the monkeys in the Pakistani media making, but I don't expect it from someone with her credentials. Gwadar is not CPEC, Gwadar related investments are a small fraction of all infrastructure expenditures. There are many completely unrelated projects worth more, there are networks of roads between major Pakistani cities, there are projects like Orange Line in Lahore which have nothing to do with Gwadar but fall under the CPEC portfolio. And that's just infrastructure, energy projects are the biggest of all in monetary terms, and every year we bleed some percentage of GDP due to energy needs, we've also suffered decaying industrial base as a result. This would add to my financing arguments above too, energy infrastructure in Pakistan is desperately needed and will more than pay for itself in the long run. You don't need tens of billions of dollars to develop a port, and some supporting infrastructure along a single trade route. This also undermines the trade route security argument she makes. So CPEC should be seen as a portfolio of projects intended for the development of Pakistan's infrastructure and energy, they're also conveniently tied with Gwadar and Karachi ports which offer trade routes in tandem with other road networks all across Pakistan.

She further displays some of this ignorance when she mentions but doesn't really explain the significance of Chabahar. Which is not in competition with Gwadar, let alone CPEC, the latter especially since it is not just a port and a trade route. Chabahar and Gwadar need not be competing for business much, just because their funded by adversaries and built in the same region, doesn't mean the success of one depends on the failure of the other. Whatever the point of Chabahar is, Gwadar is intended for use by Pakistan, by China through road links to Pakistan, and in the future it could also be used with Afghanistan and Central Asia, although that's a secondary need. It also grants Middle Eastern countries access to Western China via Pakistan. So I would say a good litmus test for whether an author who speaks on the subject of CPEC knows the subject well is if they avoid mixing it up with irrelevant things such as Chabahar. Gwadar is not all of CPEC, CPEC is much bigger, Gwadar is a port but is not in competition with Chabahar, and CPEC has nothing to do at all with Chabahar. Anyone who says otherwise doesn't know of what they speak.
 
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Her specialty is South Asia, what right do you have to demand she write about other stuff instead, or else be labeled "retarded"?

Just as Luxemburg's 800-man army must be fantastic because it is obviously able to beat off the far bigger and better-equipped French military!


I suggest using PDF's "ignore" function, that way you won't have to read what I write.

(Unless, of course, you really do care about what I write and merely pretend otherwise. That's O.K. It'll be a secret, just between us....)

Heck, this is too much fun. Why would I use the ignore button? I wanna see you squeal and you ain't disappointing. This discussion is proof of how desperate you lot are. Not a day goes by without Americans being concerned and threatened by so many things. This is marvelous.
 
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I think this is Christine Fair's article: link


ARGUMENT

Pakistan Can’t Afford China’s ‘Friendship’
Pakistan's elites think Chinese cash can save the country. They're wrong.
BY C. CHRISTINE FAIR | JULY 3, 2017, 9:00 AM

Abbottabad, PAKISTAN: Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Liu Minjiang (C) and Pakistani Major General Mohsin Kamal (behind flag) stand during the opening ceremony of the ten day Pakistan-China anti-terrorist military exercise in Abbottabad, 11 December 2006. More than 200 Chinese troops headed to Pakistan's mountainous northern region at the start of the first ever joint military exercise held here by the two allies. AFP PHOTO/Aamir QURESHI (Photo credit should read AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images)


In recent months, the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has left Pakistanis emboldened, Indians angry, and U.S. analysts worried. Ostensibly, CPEC will connect Pakistan to China’s western Xinjiang province through the development of vast new transportation and energy infrastructure. The project is part of China’s much-hyped Belt and Road Initiative, a grand, increasingly vague geopolitical plan bridging Eurasia that China’s powerful President Xi Jinping has promoted heavily.

Pakistani and Chinese officials boast that CPEC will help address Pakistan’s electricity generation problem, bolster its road and rail networks, and shore up the economy through the construction of special economic zones. But these benefits are highly unlikely to materialize. The project is more inclined to leave Pakistan burdened with unserviceable debt while further exposing the fissures in its internal security.


Pakistan and China often speak of their “all-weather friendship,” but the truth is that the relationship has always been a cynical one. China cultivated Pakistan as a client through the provision of military assistance; diplomatic and political cover in the U.N. Security Council; and generous loan aid in an effort to counter both American influence and the system of anti-Communist Western treaty alliances. China also sought to embolden Pakistan to harangue India, but not to the point of war because that would expose the hard limits of Chinese support. Despite Pakistan’s boasts of iron-clad Chinese support, when Pakistan went to war with India in 1965, 1971, and 1999, China did little or nothing to bail out its client in distress.

During the 1971 war, when India intervened in Pakistan’s civil war in its Bengali-dominated eastern wing, President Richard Nixon requested China move troops along its eastern border with India to intimidate India and stave off Pakistan’s defeat. However, China declined to undertake even this modest effort to preclude India from vivisecting Pakistan. East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh in 1971. In a nod to Pakistan, China refused to recognize Bangladesh until August 1975, even after Pakistan did so in February 1974.

There’s little reason to think China has made a sudden conversion to altruism when it comes to CPEC. The project originated in 2013, when the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, and Pakistan’s then-president, Asif Ali Zardari, agreed to build an economic corridor between the two countries. The project inched closer to fruition in 2014, when Pakistan’s President Mamnoon Hussain and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to China on different occasions to further discussions. In November 2014, the Chinese government announced that it would finance $46 billion in energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan as part of CPEC. In September 2016, China announced a new loan deal for CPEC valued at $51.6 billion. In November 2016, part of CPEC became “operational” when products were moved by truck from China and loaded onto ships at Pakistan’s port Gwador along the Makran coast for markets in West Asia and Africa. After this major development, China declared that it would increase its investmentagain to $62 billion in April.

Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership alike have told the public that CPEC will solve Pakistan’s chronic electricity shortages, improve an aging road and rail infrastructure, provide a fillip to Pakistan’s economy, knit an increasingly pariah state to a new Chinese-led geopolitical order, and diminish the role of the much-reviled United States in the region. CPEC has the bonus of irritating the Indians because it strengthens Pakistan’s hold on territory in Jammu and Kashmir that it snatched in the 1947-48 war as well as portions of that territory that Pakistan subsequently ceded to China in 1963 as a part of the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement. India claims these lands, currently held by Pakistan and China, and deems their occupation illegal.

Despite the bold claims made by China and Pakistan, there are many reasons to be dubious about the purported promises of CPEC. There’s already violence all along the corridor. The north-most part of CPEC is the Karakoram Highway (KKH), which gashes through the Karakoram Mountain Range to connect Kashgar in Xinjiang with Pakistan’s troubled province of Gilgit-Baltistan. Xinjiang is in the throes of a slow-burning insurgency by the Muslim Uighur minority against the Communist state. Gilgit-Baltistan, a Shiite-majority polity under the thumb of a Sunni-dominated Pakistan, is part of the above-noted contested territory of Jammu-Kashmir. Here, geology and weather further limit CPEC. The Karakoram Highway, a narrow road weaving through perilous mountains, can’t bear heavy traffic. Expanding the KKH will not be easy. Residents of Gilgit-Baltistan worry about the environmental costs in relation to the few benefits they will enjoy. There have been episodic protests, which the Pakistani government has ruthlessly put down. Meanwhile, Gwador is experiencing a prolonged drought, frustrating the project while the four extant desalination plants remain idle.

In the south, CPEC is anchored to the port at Gwador in Pakistan’s insurgency-riven Balochistan province. The local Baloch people deeply resent the plan because it will fundamentally change the demography of the area. Before the expansion of Gwadar, the population of the area was 70,000. If the project comes to full fruition the population would be closer to 2 million — most of whom would be non-Baloch. Many poor Baloch have already been displaced from the area. Since construction has begun, there have been numerous attacks against Chinese personnel, among other workers.

There’s also the stubborn problem of economic competitiveness. For CPEC to be more competitive than the North-South Corridor that is rooted to the Iranian port of Chabahar, Gwador needs to offer a safer and shorter route from the Arabian Sea to Central Asia. For that to happen, Gwador needs to be connected by road to the Afghan Ring Road in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province, which is under sustained attacks by the Afghan Taliban. Alternatively, a new route could connect Gwador with the border crossing at Torkham (near Peshawar) by traveling up Balochistan, with its own active ethnic insurgency, through or adjacent to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which is the epicenter of Islamist terrorism and insurgency throughout Pakistan. It takes great faith — or idiocy, or greed, or all of the above — to believe that this is possible.

All of these issues raise salient questions about the real utility of this unfolding fiasco. If CPEC is not an economically viable route for actual commerce, what purpose does it serve? Analyst Andrew Small, among others, has argued that CPEC is, in reality, a redundant supply route for China should it face an embargo during a military conflict. It’s also possible that if the port at Gwador is not economically sustainable the real goal is the creation of a Chinese naval outpost. Many in India, Pakistan’s historic rival, have also come to this conclusion. They may well be correct, according to recent Chinese reports indicating that China may “expand its marine corps and may station new marine brigades in Gwadar.”

While the benefits to transit may be illusory, it is possible that Pakistan could benefit from purportedly low-hanging fruit, including the much-lauded economic zones and power plants. Pakistan does struggle with power shortages. But its problem is not a lack of supply, rather the complex issue of “circular debt” referring to the accumulating unpaid bills of the power sector; the theft of power through illegal connections, meter tampering, and other means; and an inadequate transmission system. Meanwhile, Pakistanis have learned that the current Chinese development model will do little for their economy. China prefers to use its own companies and employees rather than hire locally.

Pakistani citizens also have no way to know what CPEC will cost them. Neither government has been clear about what projects are part of the plan. Costing has been completely opaque. China sets the price, contracts the work out to Chinese companies, and saddles Pakistan with the loans. Given the ongoing security threats on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, Islamabad is raising a CPEC Protection Force, the costs of which will be passed on to Pakistani citizens. The State Bank of Pakistan has repeatedly called for more transparency, to no avail. Astonishingly, according to the Pakistani daily The Dawn, “Despite the frantic activity, Islamabad had yet to determine the expected cost and benefit, expressed in monetary terms, of the mega project.” And that’s before factoring in other costs such as the cultural and religious tensions between Chinese and Pakistanis, although there’s been a public relations push by both governments to downplay them.

Recently, The Dawn claimed to have accessed the alleged CPEC “master plan,” drawn up by the China Development Bank and the National Development Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China. It suggests that CPEC is really about agriculture, an issue that had not previously been discussed in the extensive media coverage of the plan. As part of the overall project, thousands of acres of productive agricultural land will be leased to the Chinese for “demonstration projects” for newly developed seed varieties and irrigation technology. Chinese companies will be the primary beneficiaries of these initiatives.

Pakistanis should be worried about the way CPEC is shaping up. If it is even partially executed, Pakistan would be indebted to China as never before. And unlike Pakistan’s other traditional allies, such as the United States, China will probably use its leverage to obtain greater compliance from its problematic client. China is particularly concerned about the Islamist militant groups active among China’s Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang. Uigher militant groups have long shared ties with groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, some of which have been patronized by the Pakistani state, such as the Afghan Taliban. China has used religious and political oppression, along with crude violence, to eviscerate the Islamist revival among Xinjiang’s Uighers and has counted on Pakistan to give China political cover while doing so. In taking on Chinese debt, Pakistan may also risk severely worsening its already critical relations with India, which has been watching the CPEC drama unfold with growing alarm. In the north, CPEC continues to make permanent the Pakistani and Chinese grip on territory India claims. In the south, Chinese naval vessels may dock in the deep port of Gwador, threatening New Delhi in the Arabian Sea. In normal times, this would be a serious concern for the United States — but Washington is so distracted by the chaos of the Trump administration that the issue has gone largely under the radar.

But the news may not be all bad. For China to get maximal returns on its extensive investments in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan it needs stability in both countries. In recent years, China has stepped up its role in trying to negotiate peace in Afghanistan by helping to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As Pakistan’s economy becomes evermore interwoven with China’s, China may be in a position to dampen Pakistan’s worrying affinity for terrorist groups and nuclear proliferation — particularly the latter, because China enabled Pakistan’s nuclear program to begin with. If China took on the responsibility of managing Pakistan, Washington might be happy to wash its hands of the problem and let the civilians in Islamabad and the uniformed men in Rawalpindi stab someone else in the back for a change.


Photo Credit: AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images
Christine and her gang of Pakistan bashers should be happy if Pakistan won’t be able to afford this friendship.In worst case scenario Pakistan will break up and that should make her ilk happy.

So it is none of their business what we do with our country.
 
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I would say most Pakistanis who know of her, know that shes relentlessly been critical of Pakistan for years. She is not an unbiased actor, we already know that, but her biases undoubtedly clouds her objectivity.

Let's leave aside everything I have taken issue with her on when it comes to Pakistan. She's been known to make several arguments to that end, most of which one could easily debunk.

On the subject of CPEC, I think she is right to raise environmental issues, issues regarding local loss of ownership, she is also right to argue that it ought to be considered more carefully. However, that's the extent of my kind reading of this article.

Here's what I take issue with, she has said that Pakistan is taking on a lot of debt, granted, it's a massive chunk of GDP, but does she know what the interest conditions on these loans? How much these are projected to bolster FDI inflows for the first few years, and when outflows begin? I can tell you it's more complicated than other projects because CPEC is not a single project, it's a very large and diverse portfolio of projects. The main areas of investment are infrastructure, trade, energy, and to a lesser extent agriculture and science. One of the more worrying aspects of current investments is the effect of CPEC related imports on the swelling current account deficit. Hopefully, it will be worth it in the end and will also increase FDI inflows at the same time. I've seen plenty of estimates about the interest payments and cost of outflows, on interest payments, I can say that if the projects are worth investing in and if they bolster growth, they're definitely worth it. The majority of these CPEC related projects have lower rates than the Pakistani Government can borrow at, recently our 10 year bond yields have gone down, but they were very high until recently. So it's cheaper to have the Chinese do these investments than the Pakistani government, it's also more efficient as I'd pick Chinese supervision of projects over Pakistan government's own efforts any day. On outflows, IMF projected something like 0.4% of GDP in CPEC outflows in the long term, which to me doesn't sound too bad if the projects have the intended effect by that time. Also, there's a very good chance that large net outflows could be delayed pending more investments in the short term, we've seen it happen already, when the government announced a $46 billion set of projects, I told everyone here that there'd be more along the way, the Chinese need to invest and Pakistan needs investment, so outflows could at least be delayed in the short term.

So that covers at least some of the financing aspects of the projects, the second issue I take with her is her basic understanding of these projects. Either she doesn't understand what CPEC is about, or she's scraping the barrel pretty low looking for an argument. First of all, she's doing the classic mistake of confusing Gwadar and CPEC, it's a rookie mistake I see the monkeys in the Pakistani media making, but I don't expect it from someone with her credentials. Gwadar is not CPEC, Gwadar related investments are a small fraction of all infrastructure expenditures. There are many completely unrelated projects worth more, there are networks of roads between major Pakistani cities, there are projects like Orange Line in Lahore which have nothing to do with Gwadar but fall under the CPEC portfolio. And that's just infrastructure, energy projects are the biggest of all in monetary terms, and every year we bleed some percentage of GDP due to energy needs, we've also suffered decaying industrial base as a result. This would add to my financing arguments above too, energy infrastructure in Pakistan is desperately needed and will more than pay for itself in the long run. You don't need tens of billions of dollars to develop a port, and some supporting infrastructure along a single trade route. This also undermines the trade route security argument she makes. So CPEC should be seen as a portfolio of projects intended for the development of Pakistan's infrastructure and energy, they're also conveniently tied with Gwadar and Karachi ports which offer trade routes in tandem with other road networks all across Pakistan.

She further displays some of this ignorance when she mentions but doesn't really explain the significance of Chabahar. Which is not in competition with Gwadar, let alone CPEC, the latter especially since it is not just a port and a trade route. Chabahar and Gwadar need not be competing for business much, just because their funded by adversaries and built in the same region, doesn't mean the success of one depends on the failure of the other. Whatever the point of Chabahar is, Gwadar is intended for use by Pakistan, by China through road links to Pakistan, and in the future it could also be used with Afghanistan and Central Asia, although that's a secondary need. It also grants Middle Eastern countries access to Western China via Pakistan. So I would say a good litmus test for whether an author who speaks on the subject of CPEC knows the subject well is if they avoid mixing it up with irrelevant things such as Chabahar. Gwadar is not all of CPEC, CPEC is much bigger, Gwadar is a port but is not in competition with Chabahar, and CPEC has nothing to do at all with Chabahar. Anyone who says otherwise doesn't know of what they speak.

It funny when a declared enemy starts preaching you about your losses LOL
 
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What is funny is that while she is talking about how Pakistan won’t be able to afford it,she talks about how CPEC passes through difficult terrain.Seems she is confused.Either she is debating the engineering challenges of CPEC or she is debating the financial implications.
CPEC has definitely ruffled few feathers .
 
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@Jungibaaz a thoughtful response, yet not really very critical, since so much CPEC-related stuff is secret. Criticizing Fair for her ignorance? Why stop there? Why can't the Pakistani public see the official documents? For example, we don't know where Gwadar ends and CPEC begins. Compare with the 1903 U.S.-Panama Canal Zone treaty, where the Canal Administration was allowed eminent domain of property in Panamanian cities if these were necessary for the Canal's functions or administration and you'll see this can be both complicated and a matter of public interest.
 
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What is funny is that while she is talking about how Pakistan won’t be able to afford it,she talks about how CPEC passes through difficult terrain.Seems she is confused.Either she is debating the engineering challenges of CPEC or she is debating the financial implications.
CPEC has definitely ruffled few feathers .

Everyone knows what this Pakistan hater is trying to do here like the rest of her countrymen. The truth is that the Americans cannot stand the sight of Pakistan prospering and cooperating with a nation they deem a threat to their hegemony. How can Pakistan provide a safe and secure trade passage to China and reap the economic benefits in return? This is blasphemy.

They would rather have Pakistan scrape and beg for American aid in return for dirty favors. Just like the old days. The landscape has changed and the Americans are having an extremely difficult time accepting the new reality. That is all. Sour grapes.

Well, I got news for these silly Trumpland folks. 200 million Pakistanis don’t give a hoot about American concerns. They can burn in their Muslim resentment for all we care. Their president is doing a tremendous job in retweeting fake footage LOL

The more Americans cry about China Pakistan relations the more intensive it will get. CPEC is just a tiny glimpse of things to come.
 
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@Jungibaaz a thoughtful response, yet not really very critical, since so much CPEC-related stuff is secret. Criticizing Fair for her ignorance? Why stop there? Why can't the Pakistani public see the official documents? For example, we don't know where Gwadar ends and CPEC begins. Compare with the 1903 U.S.-Panama Canal Zone treaty, where the Canal Administration was allowed eminent domain of property in Panamanian cities if these were necessary for the Canal's functions or administration and you'll see this can be both complicated and a matter of public interest.
You don’t need to know where CPEC begins and ends.It is none of your business.Pakistani’s and Chinese know where it begins and ends.
 
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Hahahahaha They will go mad or committee suicide if CPEC is completed. I mean wtf is wrong with the world. I never though making a road and a port is such an elemental issue. World has really gone nuts. Man it is a road made with rocks. How can a road is not good the road will not eat any one. Seriously these people have lost their brains in the media. Pakistan get an energy sector and China get access to Gulf what is wrong. The only thing wrong is East is going to progress and west can not digest that.
 
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Hahahahaha They will go mad or committee suicide if CPEC is completed. I mean wtf is wrong with the world. I never though making a road and a port is such an elemental issue. World has really gone nuts. Man it is a road made with rocks. How can a road is not good the road will not eat any one. Seriously these people have lost their brains in the media. Pakistan get an energy sector and China get access to Gulf what is wrong. The only thing wrong is East is going to progress and west can not digest that.

Why do you think these people have been occupying Afghanistan? To spread democracy and freedom? LOL Their plans have all gone to waste. They couldn’t break Pakistan through terror tactics. Today, China is investing billions of dollars and the savages are looking with disgrace. Such utter humiliation and defeat. It is unbearable. Hence the relentless obsession and sobbing.

I’m enjoying every moment. Let them cry rivers. Let them do it every minute of the day. It will only strengthen our resolve to a whole new level. What doesn't kill you makes you only stronger.
 
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