@ hellfire
fatman I think that with the present posturing India is catered for Pakistan more than adequately.What the present indian mindset (and what the present indian army thinking is) is, is more evolved than what was tried out in 1987 in Ex Checkerboard. In 1987 Indian army tried mobilisation validation on the premise that a war (inclusive of deployment of nukes in tactical backdrop) has to be fought with Pakistan with additional requirements of deployment of holding strength in order to negate possible Chinese moves along Norther borders. The whole scenario (without getting into details) entailed diversion of troops from Pakistan border to China centric posturing.
This posturing was catering to multiple deployments in Ladakh-Garhwal-Sikkim-Arunachal in addition to possible chinese military thrusts through Nepal-Bhutan-North Myanmar.
Now Pakistan, IMO, does not remain the centerpoint. India is preapring for a reverse phenomenon wherein China will be main and Pakistan may try to take advantage of situation.
Hence a more Northern centric approach is there. The commensurate change and enhancement in Indian posturing needs to be seen in this backdrop
And as earlier I have been saying that irrespective of Pakistan's approach to develop short range nuclear capable missiles in order to, as many forum members here claim, 'neutralise conventional superiority' of India, is irrelevant and impractical. Our approach is very clear. In any case of CBRN usage, India reserves the right (and here the line in our nuclear doctrine is clear) to respond massively to cause unacceptable damage with a weapon of own choice. Means, even a chemical attack on a platoon size unit of IA may result in a massive nuclear strike at targets which have strategic value.
So the risk of escalation is there for Pakistan too.
The Son of Cold Start. | Page 14
The deterrence and dissuasive application is well understood. The deterrence here has probably turned into a pre-emptive offensive deterrence and the dissuasion into an enhanced dissuasion with a bit of teeth available. The difference from the older times is the pre-emptive offensive application against Pakistan, so that additional forces can be spared for subsequent need against the Chinese, if the need arose. In my opinion, from Pakistani point of view, there is not much of a difference. The difference that has been created has been One) the application of nuclear environment, which has reduced the depth of the battlefield with selection of shallow objectives due to emplacement of nuclear thresholds and Two) ability of the Chinese to apply enhanced strength which reduces Indian ability to shift dual tasked forces to western theater. The accretionary forces from Eastern Command which were earlier needed as the strike corps’ on their own were not capable of attaining the assigned deeper objectives, may not be available. Though, strategic reserves would still be required to maintain the much needed strategic balance. The commensurate change in Indian posturing needs to be seen in this backdrop.
Somehow there has been a perception in India that the development of battlefield nuclear weapons by Pakistan indicates application of a graduated escalation ladder. What needs to be understood in India Pakistan nuclear environment is the fact of “use it - lose it.” Whichever country uses nuclear weapon(s), the other would carryout a massive response. Therefore Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development needs to be looked at within the ambiance of “Full Spectrum” nuclear response, where nuclear weapons of different yields would be needed for different types of targets, in a massive first nuclear strike against India. If a number of nuclear weapons are employed against Indian pivot or strike corps elements, numerous more would be simultaneously raining down on numerous other targets in India and Andaman Nicobar.
There are around 50 Indian cities having a population of more than a million people. There are around 150 Indian cities having a population of more than 200,000. There would be additional targets pertaining to political, military, financial/economic and communication infrastructure etc etc which would have to be taken out.
Pakistan therefore would require appropriate number of varied yield weapons to take out all the above mentioned targets in the massive first strike and keep enough for a massive second or a third strike, to destroy the fabric of Indian society to function as an entity. The remainder would be automatically taken care-of by “the day-after” environment. The number of Pakistani nuclear weapons available in the open source domain (which may not be accurate at all) may have to be increased and Pakistan is probably doing just that.
So when you turn around and state that India would be able to destroy Pakistan and yet be able to survive the damage from a Pakistani nuclear strike, there may not be much left to survive on. We may have eaten grass to produce nuclear weapons, there won’t even be any grass left in India to survive on in a post Pakistani nuclear strike on India. Yes, same will happen to Pakistan and we are prepared for it, by not preparing at all.
@ hellfire
Your premise is wrong here. Even with an invasion, the PA can not and will not employ nukes because the oft touted range of 40-50 kms is not much from a military point of view especially in terms of your own army's calculations which will cater for any ingress (successful) by an enemy to be contained in this limit. Its the normal conventional thinking. However if you are trying to imply that Pakistan will employ its weapons in first meter itself then an all out retaliation will be ordered. The beauty of Indian nuke command and control is that once the threshold is crossed by enemy even if the PM is neurotic enough not to order a retalition, the retaliation moves ahead on the premise that the highest office has been compromised for whatever reasons. No one, I repeat, no one has the guts to stop the armed forces from a massive retaliation. The Indian command and control has specific mechanisms whereupon there are standing instructions to individuals A to Z on what to do on a certain point. They act in consort A not knowing who B is and whats B's location or role ..... and so on ... and are required to pass/enforce their given orders. This will automatically ensure a. greater security and checks on retaliatory process b. independence of retaliation orders from interference by compromised/controlled/neurotic political authority.
In addition, you are mistaken if you think we will not win. Costs will be tremendous but I assure you, a small CBRN attack at tactical theater will result in a retaliation that shall obliterate your nation (you may do us damage too in return but it shall be lesser and later and too small in comparision). And its all hot air if you think Indian nukes will come from BARC then be assembelled and so on ............ you need not believe it. No country is that foolish that it does not have its nukes in ready condition.
As for the triad - our ships have it ....
and if its in public domain ........ then it must already be in place right
The Son of Cold Start. | Page 14
The concept of integrated battle was evolved by ARTRAC in the 90s. Simultaneity across forward, intermediate and depth of the battle zone was practiced in 1998 by 21 Corps during exercise Shiv Shakti. The concept of Pivot Corps with ability to take out divisional size force from integral resources for support of strike corps operations was initiated in late 1990s. Kargil necessitated re-thinking of doctrinal precepts. In early 2000, George fernandes announced that limited conventional wars possible under nuclear environments. In Feb 2000, during exercise Vijay Chakra, GOC in C, Indian Western Command talked about testing rapid deployment and fine tuning tactics of integrated battle for capture of depth areas in order to neutralize resistance in intermediary areas so that decisive tank battles in the last 40 km could begin which he thought was the heart of the combat zone. The Chief of Western Air Command said that this exercise was an expression of Air Land Battle concept. Exercise Brahmastra, a brain storming session by senior officers, took place in May 2000. During 2001, the American concept of Shaping the Battlefield or Degradation Strategy, was discussed as an improvement in Air Land Battle concept. After termination of operation Parakaram, Cold Start was announced in 2004.
If a person like me could document it in the manner, I think the Pakistan Army would be knowing much more and would be watching and improving their response capability as the time went by and would not have remained stationary, as against the thinking of many Indian posters.
From what you have stated above, certain aspects emerge:
Concern to this affect was also highlighted by many Indian defence analysts as well, after announcement of CSD. It related to impression of Indian Army hierarchy that Indian political elite, after taking the decision to go to war, can not stand to international pressure and thus change their decisions due to the long time gap between mobilization and initiation of hostilities. Therefore, the doctrinal precepts were changed by the Indian Army, so that before the Indian political hierarchy had enough thinking time to change their decision to wage war, the Indian Army would already have initiated war against Pakistan. You are repeating the same with regard to a nuclear strike by India, which is a totally different ball-game altogether and is indeed fictional at best and very funny to say the least.
The fact of initiation of war with commencement of Indian Army’s mobilization should not be overlooked due to the actuality of this action leading into a definite war. Therefore, the 40-50 km zone that you are talking about and General Vijay Oberoi was indicating in 2000, would not be reached if I read the Pakistani strategic thinking correctly. It is more likely this time around, that the 40-50 km zone would be well inside Indian territory, instead of Pakistani territory. The Indian strike corps would not be allowed to even approach their forward assembly areas, what to talk of crossing the border. The Pakistan Army would not allow penetration of either the international border or their main defences, and the talk of fighting the decisive armour battle in last 40 km as the heart of this combat zone has now been reversed and shifted to well within the heart of India’s combat preparatory zone. Pakistan Army does have the capability to accomplish this, not due to decrease in Indian combat potential but due to the definite enhancement of its own offensive combat potential including interdiction ability, both ground based as well as air and well supported by its varied ground and air based missile arsenal.
For a successful operation of India’s proposed IBGs, air superiority along the thrust lines was indicated to be an essential factor. IAF would not be able to achieve air superiority this time around. The Indian air bases along Pakistan’s border would be neutralized during the early stages of Indian mobilization through application of long range weapon systems and platforms. IAF would not be able to generate enough sorties to support army’s operation from air bases in eastern India, if these were also not neutralized through use of ballistic missiles.
The problem with many of the Indian gentlemen here is that they feel that it is only they who are progressing and the other side has frozen in the time and space. Please understand that this will never be the case.
The Cold Start will have Cold Feet even before it warms up.
