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Pakistan Army Aviation Corps - Updated

The registration is still civilian and of US, indicating that it is not in our custody?

PAC stands for ?



You quoted the wrong post. Solomon said PAC, not me.

Arslanaslam123 has given the answer
 
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Not many know that Pakistan ordered specially modified 2 Beechcraft King air 350 aircrafts for SIGINT & ISR purpose , to be operated by Pakistan army aviation wing
These aircrafts have serial numbers

Beech 350 c/n FL-303 N551TP
Beech 350 c/n FL-365 N3

And here are the pics of them

N350RD-N551TP.jpg


AirForceMaterialCommandN551TP.jpg


N350RD.jpg


AirForceMaterialCommandN550RD.jpg


2BEECH.jpg


I do rem this however , can someone shine some light on the issue perhaps fatman? do we have these with PA ?
 
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I don't think that currently the PAAC (Pak Army Aviation Corps) have them.
 
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I do rem this however , can someone shine some light on the issue perhaps fatman? do we have these with PA ?

yep both delivered - ISR aircraft. a 3rd example has also been requested.

one can cleary see the temp serial no's on the a/c.
 
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6 pilots were also sent to the US for 'special training' to operate these a/c.
 
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WZ-10 Attack Helicopter

The primary mission for the treetop hugging WZ-10 is battlefield interdiction, eliminating the enemy ground fixed and mobile forces, and concurrently certain air combat ability. The WZ-10 (Wuzhuang Zhisheng-10) is generally similar to the South African Rooviak and Italian Agusta A129. The PLA Army Aviation long lacked an attack helicopter such as the AH-64 Apache or Mi-28 Havoc. The limited attack helicopter force consisted of 30-40 Z-9Ws and 8 SA-342L Gazelles, along with 60 Mi-17 Hips with unguided rocket launchers. Prior to the WZ-10 China had yet to produce an indigenously designed helicopter. The WZ-10 is thus a bellwether of the improvements in China's helicopter design and production capabilities. Although the helicopter might still not be as capable as the U.S. AH-64 Apache, it will probably play a significant role in Army Aviation modernisation and force compabilities.

Development of a dedicated attack helicopter began in the mid-1990s at the 602 Institute and Changhe Aircraft Industry Company (CHAIC) in Jingdezhen, Jiangxi Province. According to another report, the PLA orignally selected the the MI-35 but chose the Rranco-German Tiger as the source of emulation. Around 1991-92 the PLA leased a single Pakistani AH-1 for technical evaluation. The WZ-10 attack helicopter suffered several delays due to engine related troubles, and finally flew for the first time on 29 April 2003.

The helicopter's net weight is approximately 5,500 kilograms. The helicopter approximate length is 14 meters, is 3.8 meters high, and is roughly 4.3 meters at its widest point. The main rotar consists of 4 blades made up of a compound material. The diameter of the blades is approximately 12 meters length.

Initially the WZ-10 prototypes were powered by Canadian PT6C-76C engines but the production version are likely to use the WZ-9 engines. At one time the WZ-10 was believed to have two European MTR 390 turboshafts, though this now appears in error. Initially there was speculation that the design used the power plant and transmission derived from the Harbin Z-9, with the fuselage modified to accommodate two pilots. However, over time it became clear that the WZ-10 was the military componment of the Chinese Medium Helicopter [CMH], and thus shared a common power train with the Z-15 [AC352].

Two wings along the fuselage that are roughly 4.32 meters long may carry 1,500 kilograms of munitions, including a 57.0 mm multibarrel rockets, the red arrow anti-tank missile. A 23 mm machine gun is fixed to the cabin at the front of the helicopter. The helicopter can carry up to 8 ATGMs, or IR-guided short-range AAMs.

The navigation and avionics are probably from domestic sources. The WZ-10 is equipped with FLIR thus allowing an operations in all weather. The navigation system consists of radioaltimeter, doppler radar and GPS. The fire control system is similar to the French Starry Night digital integration design. Reports indicate that the WZ-10 has an optics system that relays sensor information to the pilots helmets; essentially a system similar to the US Integrated Helmet and Display Sighting System (IHADSS). The helmet system also controls the direction that the machine gun is aiming. This allows the pilots to have an improved situation awareness as they can monitor flight systems and observe the terrain.

The WZ-10 has a non-traditional [for China] design that uses composite and radar absorbant materials. The WZ-10 is equipped with radar warning systems and with systems that will alert the crew that it has been targetted with laser range finders. The helicopter is also equipped with passive countermeasures and in an effort to reduce fratricide is equipped with IFF. The WZ-10 has modified engine exhausts to reduce IR signature of the helicopter. The cabin's bulletproof glass may resist 7.62 millimeter ammunition and composite armor under the cabin resists 12.7 millimeters machine gun fires. The cabin is equipped to maximize fire protection and thw WZ-10 is also outfitted with ejection seats similar to the Ka-50.

Future upgrades to the WZ-10A will likely include new a radar, fire control systems, infrared exhaust suppression and the ability to be flown from naval vessels. Future upgrades to the WZ-10 may include sensor package carried on the Z-11 light helicopter that will improve target acquisition.

By 2012 the Z-10 helicopter was in production and initial batches were delivered to the People�s Liberation Army of China in 2009 and 2010. The primary mission of the Z-10 is anti-armor and battlefield interdiction. Weapons of the Z-10 have included 30-mm cannons, anti-tank guided missiles, air-to-air missiles and unguided rockets.

On June 28, 2012 Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (PWC), a Canadian subsidiary of the Connecticut-based defense contractor United Technologies Corporation (UTC), pled guilty to violating the Arms Export Control Act and making false statements in connection with its illegal export to China of U.S.-origin military software used in the development of China�s first modern military attack helicopter, the Z-10. In addition, UTC, its U.S.-based subsidiary Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation (HSC), and PWC all agreed to pay more than $75 million as part of a global settlement with the US Justice Department and State Department in connection with the China arms export violations and for making false and belated disclosures to the U.S. government about these illegal exports.

Since 1989, the United States has imposed a prohibition upon the export to China of all U.S. defense articles and associated technical data as a result of the conduct in June 1989 at Tiananmen Square by the military of the People�s Republic of China. In February 1990, the U.S. Congress imposed a prohibition upon licenses or approvals for the export of defense articles to the People�s Republic of China. In codifying the embargo, Congress specifically named helicopters for inclusion in the ban.

Dating back to the 1980s, China sought to develop a military attack helicopter. Beginning in the 1990s, after Congress had imposed the prohibition on exports to China, China sought to develop its attack helicopter under the guise of a civilian medium helicopter program in order to secure Western assistance. The Z-10, developed with assistance from Western suppliers, is China�s first modern military attack helicopter. During the development phases of China�s Z-10 program, each Z-10 helicopter was powered by engines supplied by PWC. PWC delivered 10 of these development engines to China in 2001 and 2002. Despite the military nature of the Z-10 helicopter, PWC determined on its own that these development engines for the Z-10 did not constitute �defense articles� requiring a U.S. export license, because they were identical to those engines PWC was already supplying China for a commercial helicopter.

Because the Electronic Engine Control software, made by HSC in the United States to test and operate the PWC engines, was modified for a military helicopter application, it was a defense article and required a U.S. export license. Still, PWC knowingly and willfully caused this software to be exported to China for the Z-10 without any U.S. export license. In 2002 and 2003, PWC caused six versions of the military software to be illegally exported from HSC in the United States to PWC in Canada and then to China, where it was used in the PWC engines for the Z-10.

PWC knew from the start of the Z-10 project in 2000 that the Chinese were developing an attack helicopter and that supplying it with U.S.-origin components would be illegal. When the Chinese claimed that a civil version of the helicopter would be developed in parallel, PWC marketing personnel expressed skepticism internally about the �sudden appearance� of the civil program, the timing of which they questioned as �real or imagined.� PWC nevertheless saw an opening for PWC �to insist on exclusivity in [the] civil version of this helicopter� and stated that the Chinese would �no longer make reference to the military program.� PWC failed to notify UTC or HSC about the attack helicopter until years later and purposely turned a blind eye to the helicopter�s military application.

HSC in the United States had believed it was providing its software to PWC for a civilian helicopter in China, based on claims from PWC. By early 2004, HSC learned there might be an export problem and stopped working on the Z-10 project. UTC also began to ask PWC about the exports to China for the Z-10. Regardless, PWC on its own modified the software and continued to export it to China through June 2005. PWC anticipated that its work on the Z-10 military attack helicopter in China would open the door to a far more lucrative civilian helicopter market in China, which according to PWC estimates, was potentially worth as much as $2 billion to PWC.

These companies failed to disclose to the U.S. government the illegal exports to China for several years and only did so after an investor group queried UTC in early 2006 about whether PWC�s role in China�s Z-10 attack helicopter might violate U.S. laws. The companies then made an initial disclosure to the State Department in July 2006, with follow-up submissions in August and September 2006. The 2006 disclosures contained numerous false statements. Among other things, the companies falsely asserted that they were unaware until 2003 or 2004 that the Z-10 program involved a military helicopter. In fact, by the time of the disclosures, all three companies were aware that PWC officials knew at the project�s inception in 2000 that the Z-10 program involved an attack helicopter.

PWC exported controlled U.S. technology to China, knowing it would be used in the development of a military attack helicopter in violation of the U.S. arms embargo with China. PWC took what it described internally as a �calculated risk,� because it wanted to become the exclusive supplier for a civil helicopter market in China with projected revenues of up to two billion dollars. Several years after the violations were known, UTC, HSC, and PWC disclosed the violations to the government and made false statements in doing so.
 
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The US State Division's Pakistan Support Technique Review, released in Dec 2009, declares that the "Pakistan Army envisions obtaining 20 AH-1Z Cobras" at an predicted price of "at least USD500 thousand for the choppers alone, with a complete purchase price up to USD1 billion". The division desires that the army will search for US International Army Funding (FMF) in order to assist in the cope. ........
 
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The US State Division's Pakistan Support Technique Review, released in Dec 2009, declares that the "Pakistan Army envisions obtaining 20 AH-1Z Cobras" at an predicted price of "at least USD500 thousand for the choppers alone, with a complete purchase price up to USD1 billion". The division desires that the army will search for US International Army Funding (FMF) in order to assist in the cope. ........

500m $ was set aside in the CISF for 2013-14. lets see what happens.
 
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can any one please translate the Urdu text?
Quaid-e-Azam M A Jinnah

quaid_e_azam_m_a_jinnah-852x480.jpg

Today Warfare is not bound by borders, be prepared mentally and defensively
By Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah :pakistan:

meaning (since the word to word translations might be confusing)
In today's world, the wars and conflicts can not be held back by borders and international boundaries so one must be prepared at all time but mentally, so any aggression do not you down with a surprise, and also defensively wit a credible deterrence to deal with any aggression.

500m $ was set aside in the CISF for 2013-14. lets see what happens.
this means that IF we do get the AH-1Z Cobra Gunships these will be funded via CISF.

i think this is the only positive that shall make PA go for US arms.
Sir, what do you suggest? Shall we go for more US arms paying from our pocket specially gunships, considering the other options that are available from much friendly sources like the Turkish T-129 and the Chinese WZ-10?

regards!
 
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quaid_e_azam_m_a_jinnah-852x480.jpg

Today Warfare is not bound by borders, be prepared mentally and defensively
By Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah :pakistan:

meaning (since the word to word translations might be confusing)
In today's world, the wars and conflicts can not be held back by borders and international boundaries so one must be prepared at all time but mentally, so any aggression do not you down with a surprise, and also defensively wit a credible deterrence to deal with any aggression.


this means that IF we do get the AH-1Z Cobra Gunships these will be funded via CISF.

i think this is the only positive that shall make PA go for US arms.
Sir, what do you suggest? Shall we go for more US arms paying from our pocket specially gunships, considering the other options that are available from much friendly sources like the Turkish T-129 and the Chinese WZ-10?

regards!

of the 3 the AH-1Z is the most dependable and available. T-129 is in trials and tests, and WZ-10 has engine issues. we need to replace our AH-1S/F in the next 2-3 years. the've had it.
 
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Norinco's new Arrow hits market and hints at export drive

Robert Hewson, Air-Launched Weapons Editor - London



Key Points
•Norinco is marketing a new air-to-surface missile intended to arm helicopters and UAVs

•The Blue Arrow 7 could represent China's first attempt to offer Chinese weapons for non-Chinese platforms on the export market



China's Norinco is marketing a new air-to-surface missile for helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in what may be the nation's first attempt to offer Chinese weapons for non-Chinese platforms on the export market.

The missile, the Blue Arrow 7, was earlier identified with the designation KD-10 (or AKD-10) in China, where it was developed as the primary weapon for the Z-10 attack helicopter. It has been exhibited in China as Lan Jian 7 (Blue Arrow 7) since at least 2010, but only now is it being shown internationally with an English-language name.

New information from Norinco shows that this same missile has been integrated with an Mi-171 helicopter of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). This indicates that China has developed an indigenous weapon and sensor package for the Mi-171: a conclusion that is supported by Norinco's addition of the Blue Arrow 7 to its export catalogue.

The Blue Arrow 7 is a Hellfire-class battlefield missile with a semi-active laser seeker and a tandem HEAT (high-explosive anti-tank) warhead. It has an effective range of 2,000-7,000 m and can penetrate up to 14 cm of armour. Each missile weighs 47 kg, is 1.775 m long and has a diameter of 17 cm. Norinco notes that the Blue Arrow 7 is effective against tanks, other armoured vehicles and bunkers.


Norinco has developed a four-round launcher for the Blue Arrow 7, giving a helicopter like the Mi-17 to ability to carry at least eight and perhaps 16 missiles in one load.


Norinco has released some performance details of the associated electro-optical targeting system for the missile without identifying the precise system. The daytime (TV) detection range is 10 km and the identification range is 8 km; the night (infrared) detection range is 6 km with an identification range of 5 km. Additionally, a ground-based laser for third-party target designation is available with a maximum range of 6 km.

Marketing material from Norinco shows the Blue Arrow 7 missile being fired from a PLA Mi-171. This is the first time a precision air-to-surface weapon has been seen on a Chinese Mi-17 variant; the type is the backbone of the PLA Army Aviation assault helicopter fleet. This also marks an important milestone for the integration of Chinese weapons on non-Chinese aircraft - something that China has previously attempted only with its own versions of Russian fighter designs, such as the J-11.


Firing trials for the Blue Arrow 7 have included this test launch from a PLA Army Aviation Mi-171.


Missile integration with the Mi-171 would add a new capability to the PLA but also herald a new export arena for Chinese industry. It is possible that the Blue Arrow 7/Mi-17 package is an export-driven project and China's first step into the international upgrades sector.

The same missile has also been integrated and extensively tested on the AVIC Wing Loong (Pterodactyl) UAV. Developed by Chengdu, the Wing Loong has undertaken substantial airborne weapon trials with the KD-10/Blue Arrow 7 since it first flew in 2007. A Predator-class medium-altitude long-endurance UAV, the Wing Loong has been identified by AVIC as an export programme. Now that the development of this platform is relatively mature, an armed UAV application could equally be the first export opportunity for the Blue Arrow 7.


here comes the chinese 'hellfire' AGM!
 
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